State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0451

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Christopher Richardson,
Appellant.

Filed March 18, 2019
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CR-17-7500

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Cynthia R. Kirchoff, St. Cloud City Attorney, Kirsten A. Lucken, Assistant City Attorney,
St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Anders J. Erickson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.

2
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of second -degree driving while impaired
(DWI), arguing that the district court violated his right to present a complete defense by
limiting his cross-examination of the arresting officer. We affirm.
FACTS
At approximately 11:18 p.m. on August 22, 2017, St. Cloud Police Officer Kaleb
Waaraniemi received a driving complaint. Officer Waaraniemi saw a vehicle that appeared
to match the description of the com plained-of vehicle traveling near Tenth Street in
St. Cloud, but he was unable to verify that it was the s uspect vehicle. Approximately 30
seconds later, Officer Waaraniemi observed what he thought was the same vehicle. The
vehicle was stationary, its headlights and taillights were illuminated, and the driver’s door
was open . As Officer Waaraniemi pulled his squad car behind the veh icle, appellant
Christopher Richardson exited the vehicle through the driver’s door, from the driver’s seat,
carrying a set of car keys. Officer Waaraniemi never determined if those keys were the
keys to the vehicle.
Officer Waaraniemi told Richardson to return to the vehicle and sit down.
Richardson complied and shut the driver’s door after doing so. Officer Waaraniemi
approached the vehicle on the driver’s side and asked Richardson to roll down the driver’s
window. Richardson told Officer Waaraniemi that the window was not operational , and
Officer Waaraniemi opened the driver’s door at Richardson’s request.

3
Officer Waaraniemi smelled an odor of alcohol emitting from Richardson’s breath,
observed that his eyes were bloodshot and watery, and noticed that his speech was slurred.
Richardson admitted that he had consumed three beers, but he repeatedly denied having
driven the vehicle and initially refused to participate in any field sobriety tests on the
ground tha t he had not been driving. Richardson eventually agreed to perform the
horizontal gaze nystagmus test, performed poorly on the test, and refused to take other field
sobriety tests.
Officer Waaraniemi arrested Richardson for DWI and offered him a prelimi nary
breath test, which he refused. Officer Waaraniemi transported Richardson to the Stearns
County Jail, where he read Richardson a breath-test advisory and asked him to submit to a
breath test. Richardson refused the breath test.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Richardson with third-degree DWI, second-
degree DWI—test refusal, and driving after revocation. The case was tried to a jury. At
the beginning of the trial, the state dismissed the third -degree DWI and driving -after-
revocation charges.
Officer Waaraniemi testified at trial, and the state questioned him regarding why he
approached and questioned Richardson. Officer Waaraniemi testified that he was
dispatched based on a driving complaint. He saw a moving vehicle that appeared to match
the description of the complained-of vehicle, and he believed that the stationary vehicle
that Richardson exited was the moving vehicle that he had just seen. He testified that he
believed Richardson had been driving the vehicle.

4
Richardson also questioned Officer Waaraniemi regarding the basis for his
investigation. The state objected to several of his questions. The district court allowed
some of Richardson’s questions but disallowed others, reasoning that they were not
relevant.
The jury found Richardson guilty of second-degree DWI—test refusal. The district
court entered judgment of conviction and placed Richardson on probation. Richardson
appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Richardson contends that the district court erred by “p rohibit[ing him] from cross-
examining the arresting officer regarding whether [he] drove the vehicle prior to the officer
making contact with [him] inside the parked vehicle” and that this “violated [his]
constitutional right to present a meaningful defense.”
The due -process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and a rticle I, section 7 of the Minnesota Constitution require that every
criminal defendant be “afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.”
California v. Trombetta , 467 U.S. 479, 485, 104 S. Ct. 2528, 2532 (1984); State v.
Richards, 495 N.W.2d 187, 191 (Minn. 1992). “A criminal defendant’s right to present a
complete defense includes the right to call and examine witnesses.” State v. Munt , 831
N.W.2d 569, 585 (Minn. 2013). “But the evidence proffered in support of the defense must
still comply with the rules of evidence.” State v. Nissalke , 801 N.W.2d 82, 102 (Minn.
2011).

5
Evidence is inadmissible unless it is relevant, that is, it has “an y tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Minn. R. Evid. 401, 402.
A district court m ay exclude relevant evidence if “its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.” Minn. R. Evid. 403.
We review the district court’s evidentiary rulings for a “clear abuse of discretion.”
State v. Bustos , 861 N.W.2d 655, 666 (Minn. 2015). “Under an abuse -of-discretion
standard, [an appellate court] may reverse the district court when the district court’s ruling
is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” Id.
(quotation omitted). We apply the abuse-of-discretion standard even if a defendant claims
that exclusion of evidence deprived him of his constitutional rig ht to present a complete
defense. State v. Penkaty, 708 N.W.2d 185, 201 (Minn. 2006). If a defendant shows that
the district court erroneously excluded defense evidence in violation of the defendant’s
right to present evidence, this court must determine “whether, assuming that the damaging
potential of the excluded evidence were fully realized . . . the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.” State v. Post, 512 N.W.2d 99, 102 (Minn. 1994) (quotation omitted).
Richardson assigns error to the distri ct court’s disallowance of some of his cross-
examination of Officer Waaraniemi regarding whether he had been driving the vehicle. As
to that issue, the state introduced the following testimony:

6
PROSECUTOR: Officer, just in general terms, why were you
dispatched?
OFFICER WAARANIEMI: There was a driving complaint
. . . .
PROSECUTOR: Now, was the vehicle stationary or actually
moving?
OFFICER WAARANIEMI: I believe I witnessed the vehicle
moving as it traveled south bound on 32nd Avenue. When I
activated my emergency lights, the vehicle was stationary.
. . . .
PROSECUTOR: Now, when —at this point in your
investigation, did you have reason to believe that [Richardson]
may have been driving this vehicle?
OFFICER WAARANIEMI: I believe that he had.
PROSECUTOR: And did you, yourself, see [Richardson] in
the driver’s seat driving the vehicle at any time?
OFFICER WAARANIEMI: I did not.
PROSECUTOR: Okay. And had you seen the vehicle being
driven earlier?
OFFICER WAARANIEMI: I believe that I had.
. . . .
PROSECUTOR: While the vehicle was in motion, were you
able to get close enough to the vehicle that you’re just talking
about that you saw several blocks away?
OFFICER WAARANIEMI: I was not able to verify that was
the same vehicle. I lost sight of it and then located the vehicle
in question, stationary, shortly after.
. . . .
PROSECUTOR: Okay. Now, when you confronted
[Richardson] about driving the vehicle, what, if anything, did
he say to you?
OFFICER WAARANIEMI: He said that he had just gotten to
the vehicle to retrieve some cigarettes, but that he had not been
driving it.
. . . .
PROSECUTOR: Now what factors did you take into
consideration to support your suspicion that [Richardson] was
in physical control while under the influence of alcohol?
OFFICER WAARANIEMI: The factors that weighed into my
decision to arrest him was that a named com plainant had first
initiated a driving complaint. I later located the same vehicle.
And when I made contact with the driver, he had the odor of
an alcoholic beverage on his breath; slurred speech; bloodshot,

7
watery eyes. And then w hen I conducted the horizontal g aze
nystagmus test, all of these six indicators were present for
impairment.

(Emphasis added.)
Richardson complains that during his cross-examination of Officer Waaraniemi, he
attempted to challenge the officer’s testimony that the officer believed that Richardson had
been driving the vehicle, but the district court sustained the state’s relevance objections.
In district court, the prosecutor explained that she objected to that line of questioning
because the state was “not proceeding on the theory that [Richardson] was driving [his]
motor vehicle” and instead was arguing that Richardson “was in physical control of the
vehicle” when the officer made contact with him. Defense counsel argued that , because
“[y]ou must look at the totality of the circumstances leading to the stop” to det ermine
whether Officer Waaraniemi had probable cause to believe that Richardson was in physical
control of the vehicle in violation of the DWI statute, questions regarding the circumstances
leading to the stop were relevant. The district court sustained the prosecutor’s objections,
reasoning: “There is no evidence of a driving conduct here that would lead to a Driving
While Impaired charge. This is simply a being in physical control case. And so the
evidence will need to conform with those allegations.”
On appeal, the state again argues that Richardson’s proposed cross-examination was
irrelevant because “this was a ‘physical control’ [case]” and not a “‘driving’ while impaired
case.” The state’s argument is disingenuous because the state made Richardson’s alleged
driving relevant by presenting Officer Waaraniemi’s testimony that he believed Richardson
had been driving the vehicle.

8
The state charged Richardson with second-degree DWI—test refusal under Minn.
Stat. § 169A.25, subd. 1(b) (2016). The underlying test-refusal statute provides that it is a
crime for any person to refu se to submit to a chemical test of the person’s breath under
Minnesota’s implied-consent statute. Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2(1) (Supp. 2017). The
implied-consent statute provides:
[A breath] test may be required of a person when an
officer has probable cause to believe the person was driving,
operating, or in physical control of a motor vehicle in violation
of section 169A.20 (driving while impaired), and one of the
following conditions exist:
(1) the person has been lawfully placed under
arrest for violation of section 169A.20 or an ordinance in
conformity with it[.]

Minn. Stat. § 169A.51, subd. 1(b)(1) (2016) (emphasis added).1
“Probable cause under section 169A.51, subdivision 1(b), exists whenever there are
facts and circumstances known to the officer which would warrant a prudent man in
believing that the individual was driving or was operating or was in physical control of a
motor vehicle while impaired.” State v. Koppi , 798 N.W.2d 358, 362 (Mi nn. 2011)
(quotation omitted). “[P]robable cause requires that, under the totality of the
circumstances, a person of ordinary care and prudenc e would entertain an honest and
strong suspicion that a crime has been committed.” Id. at 364 (emphasis added) (quotation

1 Consistent with the implied -consent statute, the district court instructed the jury to
determine whether Officer Waaraniemi had “probable cause to believe that [Richardson]
was in physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.”

9
omitted).2 Thus, Officer Waaraniemi’s beliefs that the stationary vehicle was the
complained-of vehicle and that Richardson had been driving that vehicle were relevant to
the jury’s totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry regarding whether the officer had probable
cause to believe that Richardson was in physical control of the vehicle.
This court has previously concluded that it is “sub stantial error” to completely
disallow cross-examination regarding evidence that the state has introduced at trial. State
v. Carroll, 639 N.W.2d 623, 626 (Minn. App. 2002), review denied (Minn. May 15, 2002).
We stated that “once evidence is admitted in a trial and heard by the jury, thus giving the
jury the right to consider it for whatever it is worth, we cannot fathom a case where either
the state’s attorney or the defendant’s attorney is not allowed to refer to evidence that has
been admitted!” Id. at 629.
Accordingly, if the district court had not allowed any cross-examination regarding
Officer Waaraniemi’s belief that Richardson had been driving the vehicle, a reversal might
be necessary. See id. at 626. However, the district court allowed the following cross-
examination regarding that issue:
DEFENSE COUNSEL: And in the driving complaint there
was no description of a driver, correct?
. . . .
OFFICER WAARANIEMI: I was advised that two males had
gotten into the vehicle.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: And wa s there any description of
those males?
OFFICER WAARANIEMI: That was the full description that
I received.

2 Consistent with caselaw, the district court instructed the jury that it was required to “look
at the totality of the circumstances leading to the stop” in determining whether the officer
had probable cause.

10
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay. Dispatch didn’t advise you of
the race of the males?
OFFICER WAARANIEMI: No.
. . . .
DEFENSE COUNSEL: So did you do any investigation
between—to see if anyone else was driving?
OFFICER WAARANIEMI: Again, I asked who I could speak
with; and I don’t recall a name of anyone that I was given.
. . . .
DEFENSE COUNSEL: And when you—when Dispatch gets
a call saying—and you call it a driving complaint—that doesn’t
necessarily mean that there is any driving conduct, correct? It
just means that someone called in and was concerned?
OFFICER WAARANIEMI: It could be for any number of
reasons related to driving.

The district court di sallowed the following questions , which solicited more details
regarding the description of the complained -of driver and the complainant’s veracity or
motive:
Did the caller give any description that would allow you to
determine who the driver was when they called in?
. . . .
Do you know whether the person who called in saw anybody
drive the vehicle?
. . . .
And did you ever, like, go back —during all of [Richardson’s]
objections and how upset he was —to try to get more
information from the person who called in about who they saw
driving or a description?
. . . .
Okay. When someone calls in a driving complaint, whether
they are saying that they saw someone driving or they saw
some driving conduct that made someone think they were
drunk or whatever, is ther e any investigation into the veracity
or the motive of that person calling in?

Because the district court had already allowed some cross-examination to show that
Officer Waaraniemi lacked information regarding the identity of the complained-of driver

11
and the reason for the complaint, additional questioning regarding these points was
arguably cumulative and could have confused the issues.
In sum, the district court’s approach allowed Richardson to challenge the basis for
Officer Waaraniemi’s investigatio n without risking the introduction of cumulative and
confusing evidence. Although the district court’s stated reason for disallowing the
additional questioning was based on the state’s relevance argument—which we reject—its
ruling was not against logic an d the facts i n the record and, therefore, not an abuse of
discretion. See Bustos, 861 N.W.2d at 666; see also Kahn v. State, 289 N.W.2d 737, 745
(Minn. 1980) (“[An appellate court] will not . . . reverse on appeal a correct decision simply
because it is based on incorrect reasons.”). And because the prohibited cross-examination
did not comply with the rules of evidence, the district court’s limitation did not violate
Richardson’s right to present a complete defense. We therefore affirm.
Affirmed.