State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0463

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Tyrone Michael Strother,
Appellant.

Filed January 14, 2019
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-17-17769

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda M. Freyer, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Roy G. Spurbeck, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Larkin,
Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of burglary, arguing that the district court
abused its discretion by admitting relationship evidence at his jury trial on the underlying
charges. Appellant also makes several pro se arguments. We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Tyrone Michael Strother with
felony domestic assault and three counts of first-degree burglary. The amended complaint
alleged that on July 15, 2017, Strother forcibly entered the home of S.S.W., his ex -
girlfriend, while S.S.W. and her children were in the home. The amended complaint further
alleged that Strother committed an assault by intentionally causing S.S.W. to fear
immediate bodily harm and that he damaged property within her home.
At trial, S.S.W. testified that Strother is the father of her two youngest children. As
to the charged offense, S.S.W. testified that she was sleeping in her living room with her
children. S.S.W. heard Strother outside “ranting and raving.” He shouted, “Open the door,
and if you don’t open it I’m going to kick it in.” S.S.W. testified that the front door “flew
open” and tha t she saw “wood fly all over.” Strother was not living with S.S.W. at that
time, and she had told him that he could not come over anymore. When St rother kicked
down the front door, S.S.W. immediately left through a different door , because she was
afraid and “didn’t want to get beat up again.”
S.S.W. called 911 and reported that Strother had broken into her home and damaged
furniture and a mirror. When S.S.W. returned to her home after making the 911 call, it was

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“destroyed.” The state introduced photographs that showed extensive damage to the front
door of S.S.W.’s home, a broken mirror and end table, and other damage in the home.
Police officers testified that they responded to S.S.W.’s home following the 911 call
and received information that Strother was nearby. They spotted Strother and apprehended
him after a short foot chase. Strother’s demeanor and speech indicated that he was
intoxicated. The officers arrested Strother and transported him to jail. When the police
took Strother into custody, they served him with an ex parte order for protection (OFP) on
behalf of S.S.W. and her children that had been granted on June 21, 2017.
The state moved to admit relationship evidence at Strother’s trial, including
evidence regarding an incident that occurred on June 17, 2017, and led S.S.W. t o petition
for the June 21 OFP. The state also requested a jury instruction regarding the proper use
of relationship evidence. The district court granted both requests.
As to the June 17 incident, S.S.W. testified that she and Strother “got into a physical
altercation” and that she “ended up with two swell[ed] eyes closed,” “a big cheek,” and
“hair loss.” The June 17 incident occurred in S.S.W.’s home, while her children were
sleeping upstairs. The next day, S.S.W. went to the Hennepin County Government Center
and attempted to obtain an OFP against Strother. She obtained the OFP on June 21.
Before S.S.W. testified regarding the June 17 incident, the district court instructed
the jury regarding the proper use of that evidence:
Members of the Jury, it’s my understanding that you may hear
evidence right now that—evidence of conduct that’s alleged to
have occurred by [Strother] on or about June 17th of 2017. The
evidence is being offered for the limited purpose of
demonstrating the nature and extent of the relationship

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between [Strother] and [S.S.W.] in order to assist you in
determining whether [Strother] committed the acts with which
he’s charged in the complaint which, again, it’s burglary and
domestic assault.

The defendant is not being tried for a ny of the alleged
conduct from on or about June 17th. You are not to, obviously,
convict him in this case based upon any allegation from
June 17th, it’s really just presenting relationship evidence to
you.

In its final instructions to the jury, the distr ict court gave a similar instruction
regarding the limited purpose for which the relationship evidence had been admitted.
The jury found Strother guilty of domestic assault and two counts of burglary.1 The
district court entered judgment of conviction on one of the burglary offenses and sentenced
Strother to serve a 108-month prison term. Strother appeals.
D E C I S I O N
I.
The primary issue in this appeal is the district court’s admission of evidence
regarding the June 17, 2017 incident. Minn. Stat. § 634.20 (2018) provides for admission
of what is known as “relationship evidence.” State v. Matthews , 779 N.W.2d 543, 549
(Minn. 2010). “Evidence of domestic conduct by the accused against the victim of
domestic conduct, or against other family or house hold members, is admissible unless the
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . .” Minn.
Stat. § 634.20.2 “‘Domestic conduct’ includes, but is not limited to, evidence of domestic

1 The state dismissed one of the first-degree burglary counts at trial.
2 The Minnesota Supreme Court adopted section 634.20 as a rule of evidence in McCoy,
but only “for the admission of evidence of similar conduct by the accused against the

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abuse . . . .” Id. Relationship evidence “assist[s] the jury by providing a context with which
it [can] better judge the credibility of the principals in the relationship.” State v. McCoy,
682 N.W.2d 153, 161 (Minn. 2004). An appellate court reviews the district court’s
evidentiary rulings regarding admission of relationship evidence for abuse of discretion.
Matthews, 779 N.W.2d at 553.
Strother contends that the district court “committed reversible error by admitting the
relationship evidence involving SSW because the probative value, if any, was substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” “When balancing the probative value
against the potential prejudice, unfair prejudice is not merely damaging evidence, even
severely damaging evidence; rather, unfair prejudice i s evidence that persuades by
illegitimate means, giving one party an unfair advantage.” State v. Bell, 719 N.W.2d 635,
641 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted). A limiting instruction from the district court
“lessen[s] the probability of undue weight being g iven by the jury to the evidence.” State
v. Lindsey, 755 N.W.2d 752, 757 (Minn. App. 2008) (quotation omitted), review denied
(Minn. Oct. 29, 2008).

alleged victim of domestic abuse.” 682 N.W.2d at 160, 161 (emphasis added). Then, in
State v. Moore , the supreme court impliedly extended McCoy to allow the admission of
similar conduct by the accused against other family or house hold members. See 846
N.W.2d 83, 91-92 (Minn. 2014) (allowing the admission of evidence regarding defendant’s
history of abusing former spouse). “To remove any doubt,” in State v. Fraga, the supreme
court made it clear that “evidence of domestic conduct by the accused against family or
household members other than the victim may be admitted pursuant to Minn. Stat.
§ 634.20, which, as a matter of comity, we adopt as a rule of evidence.” 864 N.W.2d 615,
627 (Minn. 2015).

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“Evidence is relevant and has probative value when it, in some degree, advances the
inquiry.” State v. Schulz, 691 N.W.2d 474, 478 (Minn. 2005). The circumstances of the
June 17 incident were relevant because they explained why S.S.W. called the police and
why she might not want Strother in her home, even though he is the fathe r of her two
youngest children. In addition, Strother challenged S.S.W.’s credibility at trial, arguing
that she fabricated the alleged offense and lied to the police. S.S.W.’s testimony about the
prior domestic incident on June 17 provided information regarding the nature of her
relationship with Strother and a context within which the jury could assess her demeanor
in court, her actions on the night of the charged offenses, and her credibility as a witness.
Moreover, any potential prejudice from admission of the relationship evide nce was
mitigated by the district court’s use of two cautionary instructions. See State v. Andersen,
900 N.W.2d 438, 441 -42 (Minn. App. 2017) (noting that “the district court’s cautionary
instructions lessened any probability that the jury would rely impr operly on relationship
evidence”).
In support of his argument that the admission of domestic -abuse relationship
evidence was unfairly prejudicial , Strother asserts that S.S.W.’s testimony had “little, if
any, probative value.” He points to the 911 call, the testimony of S.S.W. and two police
officers, as well as the photographic evidence , and argues that “[g]iven the evidence the
State presented to the jury, there was no need for the jury to hear about the prior June bad-
act evidence.”
Essentially, Strother argues for application of a need-based test for the admission of
relationship evidence under Minn. Stat. § 634.20. In Bell, the defendant argued that district

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courts should be required to consider “the state’s need for the evidence before admitti ng
evidence under section 634.20.” 719 N.W.2d at 639. The supreme court declined to adopt
this approach, noting that “the need for section 634.20 evidence is naturally considered as
part of the assessment of the probative value versus prejudicial effect of the evidence.” Id.
This court rejected a similar need-based approach in State v. Meyer, 749 N.W.2d 844, 848-
49 (Minn. App. 2008 ). Following Bell and Meyer, we reject Strother’s need -based
analysis.
Strother also asserts, “The unfair prejudice in this case lies in the dangerous
influence other bad acts can have on a jury’s decision -making process.” He argues that
“[a]llowing the jury to hear the details of the alleged June 2017 assault was nothing short
of inflammatory because it reflected primarily o n [Strother’s] bad character.” He further
argues that “the jury’s decision -making process was clouded by the evidence of the June
conduct” because it “allowed the jury to infer that if [Strother] had engaged in such conduct
in the past, he also must have committed the charged crimes or, at the very least, deserved
punishment because of his prior conduct.”
The state counters that, if the court were to accept that argument, section 634.20
“would in effect be rendered void.” The state argues that “[n]o domestic-abuse relationship
evidence could meet the bar [Strother] wishes to set, since in every case admission of the
evidence would carry such a great and inherent risk of unfair prejudice that it would
outweigh any possible probative value.” The state arg ues that such an outcome “clearly
was not the legislature’s intent when it enacted Minn. Stat. § 634.20.” The state also notes
that the supreme court has “ on numerous occasions recognized the inherent value of

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evidence of past acts of violence committed b y the same defe ndant against the same
victim.” Bell, 719 N.W.2d at 641 (quotation omitted).
The state has the better argument . Although there are risks attendant to the
admission of relationship evidence , section 634.20 allows admission under certain
circumstances. The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the relationship
evidence under the circumstances here.
II.
Strother filed two supplemental pro se briefs that devote significant attention to the
trial evidence and the credibility of the state’s witnesses. We construe his arguments as a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction.
When considering a claim of insufficient evidence, an appellate court carefully
analyzes the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in a light most
favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the jury to reach the verdict that it did.
State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989). An appellate court “assume[s] that the
jury believed the state’s witne sses and disbelieved contrary evidence.” State v. Brocks ,
587 N.W.2d 37, 42 (Minn. 1998). An appellate court will not disturb a guilty verdict if the
jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that the defendant was proved guilty
of the offense charged. Bernhardt v. State, 684 N.W.2d 465, 476-77 (Minn. 2004).
Strother’s claim of insufficient evidence rests on assertions that the state’s witnesses
lied, were unable to remember events or did not clearly remember events, and provided
testimony and reports that were inconsistent with other evidence. “Assessing the

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credibility of a witness and the weight to be given a witness’s testimony is exclusively the
province of the jury.” State v. Mems , 708 N.W.2d 526, 531 (Minn. 2006). Strother’s
challenge to the credibility of the state’s witnesses is therefore unavailing.
Strother also argues that the OFP that S.S.W. obtained was “forged.” Strother’s
assertion that the June 21 OFP was “forged” similarly relates to witness credibility and is
therefore unavailing. See id.
To establish Strother’s guilt under Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1(c) (2016), the state
had to prove that Strother entered S.S.W.’s home without consent and committed an assault
while in the building. See Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 10 (2016) (“‘Assault’ is: (1) an act
done with intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm or death; or (2) the
intentional infliction of or attempt to inflict bodily harm upon another.”). Our review of
the record—including the testimony of S.S.W. and the police officers and the photographs
of damage inside S.S.W.’s home—satisfies us that the jury, acting with due regard for the
presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could
reasonably conclude that Strother was proved guilty of the burglary . We therefore do not
disturb the verdict.
Strother raises several other pro se issues including ineffective assistance of counsel,
prosecutorial misconduct, and judicial bias. Strother’s assertions of error regarding these
issues include the following: “Prosecutor . . . telling [the district court judge], she and . . .
my public defender, have been emailing and communicating back and forth about this case
regularly”; “[the district court judge] had me convicted before the trial even started”; and

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“[my] Public Defender . . . showing decisive manipulation convincing me into admitting
guilt in front of your face.”
Strother also asserts that the trial transcripts “have been altered to some degree, to
dismiss or to cover up cour t misconduct,” and that the pre trial and sentencing transcripts
were altered. But Strother does not specify what is missing from, or was added to, the
transcripts, other than alleging that the prosecutor was listed as a participant at a particular
hearing even though she was not present.
We have considered Strother’s pro se arguments and conclude that none provides a
basis for appellate relief. See Ture v. State, 681 N.W.2d 9, 20 (Minn. 2004) (rejecting pro
se arguments without detailed discussion).
Affirmed.