State of Minnesota, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0484

State of Minnesota,
Appellant,

vs.

Jessy Alejandro Aguilar Garcia,
Respondent.

Filed October 1, 2018
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-CR-17-5296

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark A. Ostrem, Olmsted County Attorney, Byron H. Black, Assistant County Attorney,
Rochester, Minnesota (for appellant)

Drake D. Metzger, Metzger & Nyberg, LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge ; and Jesson,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
Appellant State of Minnesota challenges the district court’s pr etrial order denying
both its motion to amend the complaint and its request for a continuance of trial. Because
the district court appropriately weighed the state’s desire to prosecute respondent for

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additional drug-related charges, including importing a controll ed substance across state
lines, against Garcia’s right to a speedy-trial, and did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.
FACTS
On August 10, 2017, the state c harged respondent Jessy Alejandro Aguilar Garcia
with two counts stemming from alleged criminal activity that occurred from September 21,
2016 to August 8, 2017: (1) conspiracy to commit first-degree controlled-substance crime
(sale of 17 grams or more cocaine or methamphetamine); 1 and (2) first-degree aiding and
abetting controlled-substance crime (sale of 17 grams or more c ocaine or
methamphetamine).2 The complaint alleged that in September 2016, officers from a drug
task force conducted a controlled buy of approximately one poun d of methamphetamine,
“as part of an investigation into drug trafficking in Rochester, Minnesota.” In August 2017,
the task force arranged another controlled buy with the same co nfidential informant. The
complaint alleged that during th e August 2017 buy, Garcia and a n accomplice flew from
Arizona to Minnesota to deliver two pounds of methamphetamine. According to the
complaint, Garcia and his accomplice received the methamphetamine in Rochester, drove
t o S t . P a u l , a n d s o l d t h e m e t h a mphetamine at a St. Paul busines s. Garcia and his
accomplice were arrested.
At a pretrial hearing on February 13, 2018, Garcia pleaded not guilty and entered a
speedy-trial demand. Pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 11.09, which requires that a trial begin

1 In violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 1(1) (2016).
2 In violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 1(1).

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within 60 days of the defendant’s demand for a speedy trial, Garcia’s speedy-trial demand
expired on April 13, 2018. The district court scheduled a jury trial for March 19, 2018.
On March 14, 2018, the state filed an amended complaint adding three charges:
(1) aiding and abetting racketeering; 3 (2) conspiracy to commit aggravated first-degree
controlled-substance crime;4 and (3) importing a controlled substance across state borders.5
In the evening of March 14, Gar cia filed a motion requesting that the district court
deny the state’s request to amend the complaint. On March 15, a district court judge signed
and filed the amended complaint. Later that day, the parties a p p e a r e d f o r a p r e t r i a l
conference with a different district court judge. The second district court judge determined
that it was unlikely that the first district court judge was aware of Garcia’s motion objecting
to the amended complaint when s he signed it. The district cour t decided that it would
consider the amended complaint as a “motion to amend” by the st ate and informed the
parties that it would hear arguments on whether it should allow the amended complaint the
next day.
On March 16, the state dismissed the racketeering charge, reco gnizing that it
“introduce[d] a new and complex dimension to the case.” But th e state argued that the
district court should grant its request to amend the complaint because the additional counts
were based on the same discovery previously disclosed to Garcia and dealt with “issues
that have been known.” The prosecutor also stated that the additional counts relied on facts

3 In violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.903, subd. 1(1) (2016).
4 In violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 2b(2) (2016).
5 In violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.0261, subd. 1 (2016).

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that were known “at a minimum, since November [2017],” and thus, were not “of surprise
to anyone.” The state also explained its delay in amending the complaint, stating that the
original prosecutor had retired, and the new prosecutor did not realize until “fully
review[ing] the files” that the complaint needed to be amended. 6 Finally, the state asked
the district court to grant a continuance of trial “so that per haps amendment can be
allowed.”
Garcia strongly objected to the motion to amend the complaint. Garcia argued that
if the district court granted the state’s motion to amend the c omplaint, his trial would be
delayed for several reasons. Fir st, Garcia would be provided t he opportunity to assert
probable cause challenges on th e additional counts, many of whi ch, he argued, occurred
before his alleged involvement in the criminal activity. Secon d, Garcia’s trial counsel
asserted that he would need to complete further investigation t o defend against the
additional counts. Third, Garc ia’s counsel stated that he had several upcoming schedule
conflicts. Due to these potentia l delays, Garcia contended tha t his right to a speedy-trial
would be violated if the court a llowed the state to amend the c omplaint and granted the
continuance.
On March 16, the district court denied the state’s request to amend the complaint.
The district court reasoned that the amended complaint would br ing the case “back to the
pre-omnibus hearing stage,” double the number of charges, incre ase the severity level of
the offenses from “D8 to D9,” an d would not allow the parties s ufficient time to prepare

6 The state also contended that, because there was the possibili ty of settlement, the new
prosecutor did not “pay particular attention to amending the complaint.”

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for trial and “honor the speedy trial demand.” The district co urt also denied the state’s
request for a continuance of trial.
The state appeals.
D E C I S I O N
I. The district court’s denial of the state’s motion to amend had a critical impact
on the state’s ability to prosecute the case.

The state’s right to appeal in a criminal matter is limited. State v. Rourke , 773
N.W.2d 913, 923 (Minn. 2009). When the state appeals a pretrial order of the district court,
the state must show that the district court’s order will have a critical impact on its ability
to prosecute the case. State v. Zais, 805 N.W.2d 32, 35-36 (Minn. 2011).
The state argues that the district court’s decision will have a critical impact on the
state’s ability to prosecute Garcia. Garcia concedes that the critical-impact threshold is
met. Although the parties agree on this legal question, we conduct an independent inquiry.
See State v. Hannuksela , 452 N.W.2d 668, 673 n.7 (Minn. 1990) (noting that it is the
responsibility of appellate courts to decide cases in accordance with the law, regardless of
whether counsel chooses to contest an issue).
We conclude that the district court’s decision will have a crit ical impact on the
state’s ability to prosecute Garcia for two reasons. First, to establish critical impact, the
state must demonstrate that the district court’s ruling will si gnificantly reduce the
likelihood of a successful prose cution; it is enough if it impa cts the state’s ability to
prosecute only a specific charge. Zais, 805 N.W.2d at 36. The district court’s denial of

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the amended complaint resulted in the dismissal of two counts a lleged in that complaint
and satisfies the critical-impact requirement.
Second, this court has determined that “[t]he state satisfies t he critical-impact test
when the district court’s order is based on an interpretation o f a rule that bars further
prosecution of a defendant.” State v. Baxter, 686 N.W.2d 846, 850 (Minn. App. 2004). In
what is called the single-behavioral-incident rule, Minnesota l a w p r o v i d e s t h a t “ i f a
person’s conduct constitutes more than one offense under the laws of this state, the person
may be punished for only one of the offenses.” Minn. Stat. § 609.035, subd. 1 (2016). In
other words, the state would not be able to prosecute Garcia in the future for the offenses
in the amended complaint if the course of conduct “consists of a single behavioral
incident.” Baxter, 686 N.W.2d at 851.
In determining whether a course of conduct consists of a single behavioral incident,
this court considers time, place, and “whether the segment of c onduct involved was
motivated by an effort to obtain a single criminal objective.” State v. Williams, 608 N.W.2d
837, 841 (Minn. 2000) (quotati on omitted). The record shows th a t t h e o f f e n s e s i n t h e
original and amended complaint all occurred in the same locations, in the “identical period
of time,” and were motivated by the same criminal objective: “i mporting and distributing
methamphetamine in Minnesota.” The series of incidents that fo rmed the basis for the
charges in the original complain t, “are the exact same incident s that are the basis for the
added counts,” and therefore, we agree with the parties that these offenses were part of the
same behavioral incident. Baxter, 686 N.W.2d at 851. As a result, the state would be
barred from prosecuting the additional counts in the future.

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In sum, because the denial of t he amended complaint resulted in dismissal of two
counts and the offenses in the original and amended complaints occurred as part of a single
behavioral incident, the state h as demonstrated a critical impa ct. We turn to consider
whether the district court abused its discretion by denying the state’s motion to amend the
complaint.
II. T h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t d i d n o t a b u s e i t s d i s c r e t i o n b y d e n y i n g b o t h t h e s t a t e ’ s
motion to amend the complaint and its request for a continuance.

Amending the complaint
The district court has broad discretion to grant or deny a moti on to amend a
complaint, and its ruling will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of that discretion. Baxter,
686 N.W.2d at 850. “The inquiry into whether a court should grant or deny such a motion
is factual and case specific.” Id. at 852.
Here, the district court denied the state’s motion to amend because it found that the
amended complaint was untimely. “Pre-trial proceedings may be continued to permit a
new complaint to be filed . . . if the prosecutor promptly moves for a continuance.” Minn.
R. Crim. P. 3.04, subd. 2 (emphasis added). Under rule 3.04, subdivision 2, “the trial court
is relatively free to permit am endments to charge additional of fenses before trial is
commenced, provided the trial court allows continuances where needed.” State v. Bluhm,
460 N.W.2d 22, 24 (Minn. 1990). The state argues that, because rule 3.04 allows it to
amend the complaint at any point p rior to trial, the district c ourt abused its discretion in
denying the motion to amend.

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But, as this court decided in Baxter, rule 3.04, subdivision 2 “does not state that any
motion to amend a complaint made prior to trial must be granted. Instead, the rule gives
the district court discretion to allow amendments to the complaint and the continuance of
pretrial proceedings.” Baxter, 686 N.W.2d at 852 (emphasis added). Rule 3.04 recognizes
the “importance of timeliness,” and provides that the state mus t “promptly” move for a
continuance pursuant to the amended complaint. Id. at 853 (citing Minn. R. Crim. P. 3.04,
subd. 2). The district court has a “responsibility” to consider the timeliness of the amended
complaint in criminal actions to avoid prejudice against the defendant. Id.
Here, the state completed its inve stigation in November 2017 an d failed to amend
the complaint in a prompt manne r. In fact, the state waited ov er four months, until three
days before the jury trial was scheduled to begin, to amend the complaint. In a careful,
thorough analysis, the district court concluded that the amended complaint was untimely,
would have brought the case “back to the pre-omnibus hearing st age,” and ultimately,
denied the state’s motion to amend.
On appeal, the state argues that it is not clear “why a hypothetical omnibus challenge
could not be resolved before [Garcia’s] speedy-trial demand expired.” But the district court
considered this argument, and determined that, based on both at torneys’ availability, the
potential delay for further necessary investigation, and Garcia ’s right to make probable
cause challenges, it would not be able to honor Garcia’s speedy -trial demand if it granted
the motion to amend.7 The district court retains broad discretion over a case once it is filed,

7 The state further argues that the parties could have met the s peedy-trial deadline, even
with the delays for investigation, probable cause challenges, a nd attorney schedule

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and the district court did not abuse its discretion denying the motion to amend the complaint
in this case. Baxter, 686 N.W.2d at 852.
Nor are the state’s attempts to distinguish Baxter from this case persuasive. In
Baxter, the state amended its complaint three months after a speedy-t rial demand, on the
morning of the trial. Id. at 853. As the state points out, in contrast to this case, Ba xter’s
speedy-trial demand had already expired when the state sought t o amend the complaint.
Id. B u t t h e s e f a c t u a l d i s t i n c t i o n s do not require a different resu lt. The district court
concluded that, like in Baxter, the amended complaint was not a “housekeeping
amendment” because the additional charges would result in delay s for necessary
investigation by Garcia’s attorn ey and probable cause challenge s, would permit the
presentation of additional defens es, and would allow greater pe nalties.8 Id. In addition,
like the appellant in Baxter, Garcia had been in custody for “six or seven months” at the
time of the motion to amend. Finally, similarly to Baxter, the state had completed its
investigation based on intervie ws with Garcia’s accomplice in N ovember 2017, and yet

conflicts. But since we have already determined that the distr ict court did not abuse its
discretion in deciding that the omnibus challenges may not have been resolved before the
speedy-trial deadline expired, we also conclude that it was not an abuse of the district
court’s discretion to decide tha t the delays would have violate d Garcia’s right to a
speedy-trial.
8 On appeal, the state asserts that it was not “clear what—if an y—additional investigation
[was] necessary for [Garcia] to meet the new charges in the amended complaint.” But, as
pointed out by Garcia, the additi onal counts in the amended com plaint “changed the
landscape of the case.” Garcia’s counsel indicated that, due t o the additional charge of
importing a controlled substance across state lines, he would need to interview out-of-state
witnesses, research the routes allegedly taken, and “develop potential defenses to the new
charges.” We conclude that the district court’s determination that additional time would
be needed to investigate the new charges was not an abuse of its wide discretion.

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failed to amend the complaint until March 2018. The district c ourt properly exercised its
discretion to deny the state’s motion to amend.
Continuance of trial
Next, the state argues that the district court abused its discr etion by denying the
state’s request to continue the trial to allow it to amend the complaint. The decision to
grant or deny a continuance is reviewed under a clear abuse-of- discretion standard. State
v. Mix, 646 N.W.2d 247, 250 (Minn. App. 2002), review denied (Minn. Aug. 20, 2002).
“Furthermore, the appellate court will not reverse the denial o f a motion for continuance
unless the moving party shows that the ruling prejudiced him.” Id.
The district court determined that if it continued the trial, Garcia would be deprived
of his right to a speedy trial for the reasons described above. Because only 30 days
remained before Garcia’s speedy- trial demand expired, the distr ict court appropriately
exercised its wide discretion when it denied the state’s request for a continuance.
The state argues, however, that it is prejudiced by the distric t court’s refusal to
continue the trial because it is now precluded “from ever prese nting the new offenses in
the amended complaint to a jury.” But the state, which waited four months after completing
its investigation to move to amend the complaint, is entirely responsible for any prejudice
it now faces. See State v. Sistrunk, 429 N.W.2d 280, 282 (Minn. App. 1988), review denied
(Minn. Nov. 23, 1988) (providing, in the speedy-trial context, that a reviewing court must
consider whether the delay is attributable to the defendant or to the state). We further note
that Garcia will still be tried for two first-degree drug charg es, based on the original
complaint. Therefore, although t he state is prejudiced in that it cannot prosecute Garcia

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for each additional count, it is not prejudiced in that it lose s the ability to pursue the case
entirely.
Because a continuance could result in a violation of Garcia’s right to a speedy trial,
we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the state’s motion
for a continuance to amend the complaint.
Affirmed.