In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: M. D. J., L. W., and R. L., II, Parents.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0500

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: M. D. J., L. W., and R. L., II, Parents.

Filed October 29, 2018
Affirmed
Florey, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-JV-16-5024

Rhia Bornmann Spears, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant M.D.J.)

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin Coun ty Attorney, Mary M. Lynch, As sistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Hennepin County)

Mary F. Moriarty, Chief Hennepi n County Public Defender, Peter W. Gorman, Assistant
Public Defender, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent R.L., II)

Polly Ann Krause, Assistant Hennepin County Public Defender, Mi nneapolis, Minnesota
(for respondent child)

Jonathan G. Steinberg, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent guardian ad litem)

Andrew R. Small, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for L.W.)

Considered and decided by Florey, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge ; and Reyes, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
FLOREY, Judge
Appellant-mother, M.D.J., challenges the district court’s order transferring legal and
physical custody of the minor ch ildren to respondent-father, R.L., II. She argues that the
district court abused its discretion when it determined that (1 ) respondent-county made

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reasonable efforts to reunite the family; (2) M.D.J.’s compliance with her case plan did not
correct conditions which led to the out-of-home placement; (3) the transfer of legal and
physical custody was supported by clear and convincing evidence; and (4) the transfer of
legal and physical custody was in the children’s best interests. We affirm.
FACTS
M.D.J. is the mother of Child One, born in 2006, and Child Two, born in 2009, who
are the subjects of this appeal. The children were removed fro m M.D.J.’s care following
reports by the children of physical and sexual abuse.
In December 2014, it was reporte d to the Hennepin County Human Services and
Public Health Department (the dep artment) that M.D.J. whipped C hild Two with a belt,
leaving marks that were observed and photographed by police. C hild Two stated in an
interview with the department that M.D.J. had hit him on multiple occasions and had also
attempted to choke him during this latest incident of abuse. C hild One independently
corroborated Child Two’s statement in an interview to the department. In November 2015,
Child Two told the department that M.D.J. had again choked him.
The children also reported bein g physically abused by M.D.J.’s relatives. In January
2013, M.D.J. left Child Two with h er sister who whipped Child T wo with a belt, leaving
marks on his neck. In February 2013, Child One reported to a child-protection investigator
that a maternal uncle had punched him in the stomach and thrown him against a wall. Child
One stated that he told M.D.J. of this incident, but she did not believe him.
In October 2015, Child Two reported to his paternal grandmother , his teacher, and
in subsequent interviews with the department, that he had been sexually abused by another

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maternal uncle. He stated that, in separate incidents, the unc le had exposed his penis to
Child Two, pushed his clothed pelvis in Child Two’s face and told him to “suck his stuff,”
and that his uncle “dug into his butt and tried to make [Child Two] smell his finger.” In
November 2015, Child Two reported that his maternal aunts and u ncles discussed this
conduct with him and instructed him to tell everyone that the a llegations of sexual abuse
were false. M.D.J. denies that any abuse occurred at the hands of her brother.
Both Child One and Child Two have special needs as a result of the abuse they have
witnessed and experienced. Child Two acts out sexually in scho ol, while Child One has
been suspended for fighting and struggles with conflicting claims of abuse from Child Two
and from M.D.J. and her family who told him Child Two was lying. Further, both children
have been diagnosed with post-traumatic-stress disorder as a result of the abuse they have
witnessed and experienced.
A child-in-need-of-protection- or-services (CHIPS) petition was filed in November
2015 by the department, and the children were removed from M.D. J.’s care. In February
2016, the children were adjudicated CHIPS, and legal custody wa s transferred to the
department. A court-ordered case plan was developed, which called for M.D.J. to address
her mental health, the mental health of the children, and her parenting skills.
In September 2016, t he department filed a petition to Transfer Permanent Legal and
Physical Custody. In August 2017, the department filed a Termination of Parental Rights
(TPR) petition. The transfer of permanent legal and physical c ustody (TLC) petition
alleged that it was in the best interests of the children to be permanently transferred to the
custody of R.L., II, father of Child Two and foster father of C hild One, in order to aid

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reunification efforts by allowing the children to rebuild relationships with M.D.J. when it
was emotionally safe for them. The TPR petition alleged five s tatutory grounds for
termination of M.D.J’s parental rights: (1) M.D.J. abandoned th e children; (2) M.D.J.
substantially, continuously, or r epeatedly refused or neglected her parental duties;
(3) M.D.J. is palpably unfit; (4) reasonable efforts failed to correct the conditions that led
to the children’s out-of-home placement; and (5) the children a re neglected and in foster
care. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(1), (2), (4), (5), (8) (2016).
A court trial was held on September 11, 12, and 13, 2017, Octo ber 26 and 30, 2017,
December 13, 2017, January 17, 2018, and February 7, 2018. On March 19, 2018, the
district court filed an order d ismissing the county’s petition for termination, but granting
the petition for transfer of legal and physical custody of the children to R.L., II.
M.D.J. appeals.
D E C I S I O N
On appeal of a juvenile-protection order transferring custody, this court applies a
two-part standard of review. See In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D., 865 N.W.2d 315, 321-
22 (Minn. App. 2015), review denied (Minn. July 21, 2015). First, we review the district
court’s factual findings for clear error. Id. “A finding is clearly erroneous only if there is
no reasonable evidence to suppor t the finding or when an appell ate court is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake occurred.” Id. at 322 (quotation omitted).
Second, we review a district court’s ultimate determination that there was a statutory basis
for a permanency disposition unde r an abuse-of-discretion stand ard. Id. at 321-22. An
abuse of discretion occurs if the district court improperly applies the law. In re Welfare of

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Child of J.K.T. , 814 N.W.2d 76, 93 (Minn. App. 2012) (citing Dobrin v. Dobrin , 569
N.W.2d 199, 202 (Minn. 1997)).
A TLC to a fit and willing relative is one of several permanenc y dispositions a
district court may order in a child-protection proceeding. Min n. Stat. §§ 260C.513, .515
(2016). An order permanently transferring legal and physical custody of a child must detail
the following findings of fact:
(1) how the child’s best inter ests are served by the order;
(2) the nature and extent of th e responsible social services
agency’s reasonable efforts . . . to reunify the child with the
parent . . . .;
(3) the parent’s . . . efforts and ability to use services to
correct the conditions which led to the out-of-home placement;
and
(4) that the conditions which led to the out-of-home
placement have not been corrected so that the child can safely
return home.

Minn. Stat. § 260C.517 (2016).
The county’s reasonable efforts to reunify
Before granting a TLC, the district court must make findings regarding the county’s
reasonable efforts to reunify the children with their parents. Minn. Stat. § 260C.517(a)(2).
M.D.J. argues that the district court clearly erred by determin ing that the county made
reasonable reunification efforts.
“[T]he nature of the services which constitute reasonable effo rts depends on the
problem presented.” In re Welfare of Children of T.R., 750 N.W.2d 656, 664 (Minn. 2008)
(quotation omitted). Here, the most significant issues that M. D.J. needed to address for

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reunification, as directed in her case plan, were her mental he alth, her children’s mental
health, and her parenting skills.
In its order granting TLC, the district court identified numero us reasonable efforts
made by the county to address the issues raised by M.D.J.’s cas e plan and to facilitate
reunification including: supervis ed visits, case-management ser vices, therapy for both
children, therapy for M.D.J., therapeutic visits, parenting cla sses, and a mental-health
evaluation for M.D.J. The district court also noted some gaps in the services offered to
M.D.J., particularly that family therapy did not occur. Howeve r, the district court
acknowledged that family therapy did not occur because the chil dren’s therapist did not
believe the children were ready for it.
The district court’s findings are supported by the record, including testimony from
the children’s therapist, which the district court found credib le, and its findings
demonstrate a clear effort by the county to address issues uniq ue to this case. These
findings satisfy the statutory requirement regarding the county ’s reasonable efforts to
reunify, and therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion.
M.D.J.’s efforts did not correct the conditions resulting in ou t-of-home
placement.

Minnesota law requires the district court to make findings abo ut a parent’s “efforts
and ability to use services to correct the conditions which led to the out-of-home
placement” and whether “the conditions . . . have [] been corre cted so that the child can
safely return home.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.517(a)(3), (4). M.D.J. argues that she was case-
plan compliant and that her compliance deprives the district court of clear and convincing

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evidence to support its finding that the conditions which led to the out-of-home placement
have not been corrected. We disagree.
The district court acknowledge d that M.D.J. “completed her cas e plan.” In doing
so, the district court met its statutory burden to address M.D. J.’s efforts and ability to
correct the conditions which led to the children’s out-of-home placement. However,
despite M.D.J.’s argument, no statute or precedent compels the district court to equate case-
plan completion with correction of the conditions that led to out-of-home placement. See
e.g. J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 88 (stating that the relevant statute “presumes that failure to
complete the case plan amounts to a failure to correct the conditions leading to out-of-home
placement. But there is no converse presumption that completion of the case plan amounts
to a correction of those conditions.”). Nor is there a require ment that the district court
come to negative conclusions about M.D.J. on all of its mandate d findings; the only
requirement is that the findings are made. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.517(a).
Here, the district court acknowledged M.D.J.’s efforts, but fou nd that conditions
preventing reunification remained . The district court stated t hat without M.D.J.’s
acceptance that the children had been abused in the past, “there [was] concern that [M.D.J.]
would not be able to keep her children safe if they were returned to her care.” This finding
is supported by the record in the form of testimony from the children’s therapist, M.D.J.’s
first case manager, M.D.J.’s second case manager, and the guardian ad litem—all of whom
the district court found credible. The district court also fou nd, and repeatedly noted, that
M.D.J. was never able to participate in family therapy with the children, but that additional
individual and family therapy was possible in the future and co uld correct the conditions.

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The district court went further in emphasizing this point by ordering reunification therapy
to begin within 60 days of its order. By doing this, the district court left open the possibility
for correction of the conditions which continue to prevent reunification.
We believe the attempted supervi sed visit between M.D.J. and th e children,
scheduled for one month before the TPR/TLC trial, is illustrati ve of the continued
conditions preventing reunification. The visit was cancelled a fter the children refused to
enter the building to see their mo ther, instead walking away an d throwing rocks at signs.
Clearly, the children’s behavior demonstrated they are not ready to be reunited with M.D.J.,
further supporting the district court’s findings. Because the record contains substantial
evidence that supports the district court’s findings, we conclude there is no clear error, and
the district court’s order was not an abuse of discretion.
The best interests of the children are served by the district court’s order.
Minnesota law requires that the district court describe “how the child’s best interests
are served by the order.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.517(a)(1). M.D.J . argues that the district
court abused its discretion by determining that TLC was in the children’s best interests.
Specifically, she argues that the district court’s findings are clearly erroneous because they
are contradictory, relied too heavily on the testimony of the c hildren’s therapist, and they
found TLC to be in the children’s best interests but not TPR.
A district court’s best-interes ts findings must “facilitate eff ective appellate
review . . . provide insight into which facts or opinions were most persuasive [of] the
[court’s] ultimate decision, [and] demonstrate the court’s comprehensive consideration of
the statutory criteria.” In re Tanghe, 672 N.W.2d 623, 626 (Minn. App. 2003) (quotation

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omitted). Determining the best interests of the children requires the district court to make
written findings that properly reflect its consideration and ev aluation of the relevant
statutory factors. See Rosenfeld v. Rosenfeld, 249 N.W.2d 168, 171 (Minn. 1976); Minn.
Stat. § 260C.511(a) (2016). In th e case of a permanency dispos ition, “the court must be
governed by the best interests of the child, including a review of the relationship between
the child and relatives and the child and other important perso ns with whom the child has
resided or had significant contact.” Id. (b) (2016). However, the district court’s findings
need not “go into great detail.” In re Welfare of Child of W.L.P. , 678 N.W.2d 703, 711
(Minn. App. 2004).
Here, the district court reviewed the relationships between the children and their
relatives. The district court found that it was in the children’s best interests to maintain the
family relationship they had developed with R.L., II. The dist rict court also found that
permanency was in their best int erests. It found that the chil dren would be better able to
heal from their trauma if they knew their placement with R.L., II would not change. The
district court further found that it had been over two years si nce the children had seen
M.D.J., and yet the children were not ready or willing to see their mother. These findings
are supported by the record. The district court made findings, supported by substantial
evidence in the record, to justify its determination regarding the best interests of the
children. Whether or not these findings appear contradictory t o M.D.J. is not dispositive
here.
The district court opined that termination of M.D.J.’s parental rights was not in the
best interests of the children in part because M.D.J. had compl ied with her case plan and

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was not given an opportunity to show that she had corrected the conditions that brought
the case to court. However, the court further found that TLC w as appropriate, because
reunification was not yet possible or currently in the children ’s best interests due to the
children’s need for permanency and time to repair their relationship with M.D.J.
M.D.J.’s argument, that the district court’s findings conflict with each other,
confuses, or fails to distinguish, the best-interests analysis in a TPR decision as opposed to
a TLC. See generally, In re Paternity of B.J.H. , 573 N.W.2d 99, 102 (Minn. App. 1998)
(noting that what a district court considers to address a child’s best interests in the context
of a parentage dispute is not the same as what a district court considers when addressing
custody); In re Welfare of M.J.L. , 582 N.W.2d 585, 589 (Minn. App. 1998) (citing this
aspect of B.J.H. in an appeal involving a challenge to the district court’s den ial of foster
parents’ motion to remove the county as guardian of their foster child). The district court’s
subtle distinction on this poin t and its painstaking effort to balance the interests of the
children against the interests of M.D.J. is further evidence of its thoughtful consideration
of the best-interests factor.
Based on substantial evidence in t he record, the district court ’s findings on the
children’s best interests are not clearly erroneous, and the re sulting conclusion does not
constitute an abuse of discretion.
The district court’s transfer o f legal custody is not clearly erroneous.
A district court’s findings of fact, supported by substantial evidence, are treated with
great deference and will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. See Fletcher v. St. Paul
Pioneer Press, 589 N.W.2d 96, 101 (Minn. 1999). A finding is clearly erroneous “only if

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the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm convicti on that a mistake has been
made.” Id. (quotation omitted).
M.D.J. argues that the district court’s findings of fact supporting its order to transfer
legal and physical custody are clearly erroneous because they positively discuss her efforts
towards reunification. We disagree.
Pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 260C.517, the district court found t hat reasonable efforts
were made by the county, that M.D .J. was case-plan compliant, t hat conditions remained
that prevented reunification, and that TLC was in the best inte rests of the children. The
record contains ample evidence to support these findings. As w e previously stated, the
children’s therapist testified th at the children were not ready to be reunited with their
mother. This testimony was corroborated by statements from M.D.J.’s case manager and
the guardian ad litem. For example, M.D.J.’s case manager test ified to the services
provided M.D.J., her case-plan compliance, and how reunification was not in the children’s
best interest at that time. The guardian ad litem testified that it would be in the children’s
best interests for the district court to grant R.L., II permanent custody. She stated that the
children were thriving in the care of R.L., II, where they had stability and felt comfortable.
She further testified that, not only was staying in the care of R.L., II in the best interests of
the children, but the children were having trouble trusting M.D .J. due to her continued
failure to acknowledge their experiences of abuse. The distric t court found all of this
testimony credible.
The district court went to painstaking lengths to dismiss the TPR petition and grant
the TLC, while still leaving many doors open for reunification in the future. While the

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district court praised M.D.J.’s e fforts on a number of occasion s, it ultimately found that
reunification was not in the children’s best interests at that time. Its order includes findings
of fact required by statute and is supported by sufficient evidence in the record. See Minn.
Stat. § 260C.517(a). As such, we find no clear error.
Affirmed.