In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: H. R. W. and M. D. L., Parents.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0508

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:
H. R. W. and M. D. L., Parents.

Filed October 29, 2018
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-JV-17-3092, 27-JV-17-4232

Mary Moriarty, Hennepin County Public Defender, David W. Merchant, Assistant Public
Defender, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant-mother H.R.W.)

Mary Moriarty, Hennepin County Public Defender, Shuly Yang Her, Assistant Public
Defender, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent-father M.D.L.)

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Britta K. Nicholson, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Hennepin County Human Services and
Public Health Department

Colin T. Nelson, Bloomington, Minnesota (for guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Johnson, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JOHNSON, Judge
The district court terminated a woman’s parental rights to her three children. She
challenges the termination on both procedural and substantive grounds. We conclude that
the appellant’s constitutional right to due process was not violated. We also conclude that

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the district court did not err by finding that the county made reasonable efforts to reunify
the appellant with her children. We further conclude that the district court did not err by
determining that termination of appellant’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests.
Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
H.R.W. and M.D.L. are the biological parents of three children . Their first child
was born in June 2011, their second child was born in May 2013, and their third child was
born in August 2017. The district court terminated both parents’ rights to all three children.
In July 2016, Hennepin County petitioned the district court to designate the first and
second children as being children in need of protection or services (CHIPS). The county
became involved with the family after receiving several reports of domestic violence
between H.R.W. and M.D.L. The district court granted the CHIPS petition, and the
children were placed in foster care . The district court ordered H.R.W. and M.D.L. to
comply with a case plan, which required H.R.W., the mother, to compl ete a Rule 25
chemical-use assessment, complete domestic-violence programming, complete a parenting
assessment, obtain and maintain suitably safe and stable housing, and cooperate with the
county and the guardian ad litem. H.R.W. had difficulty making progress with the case
plan and displayed an unwillingness to comply with its terms.
In June 2017, the c ounty petitioned the district court t o terminate H.R.W.’s and
M.D.L.’s parental rights to the two children. The petition alleged four statutory bases for
termination: (1 ) failure to comply with duties of parent -child relationship, (2) palpable
unfitness to parent, (3) reasonable efforts by the county have failed to correct the conditions

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that led to out-of-home placement, and (4) the child was neglected and in foster care. See
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), (4), (5), (8) (2016).
On August 29, 2017, H.R.W. gave birth to the couple’s third child . Immediately
after giving birth, H.R.W. tested positiv e for tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) , and the third
child’s meconium tested positive for the same. On September 5, 2017, the county
petitioned the district court to terminate H.R.W.’s and M.D.L.’s parental rights to the third
child. The petition alleged the same four statutory bases for termination as the previous
petition, with an additional allegation that H.R.W. was unwed to M.D.L. at the time of
conception and birth, neither parent was entitled to an adoption hearing, and neither parent
had registered with an adoption registry. Id., subd. 1(b)(7). On the same day, the district
court ordered the third child into out -of-home placement . In response to the county’s
request, the district court consolidated the two termination-of-parental-rights (TPR) cases
for trial.
Trial in the first case had previously been scheduled for November 20. At the outset
of trial, H.R.W. moved for a continuance of the trial with respect to all three children or,
in the alternative, with respect to only the third child. The district court took the motion
under advisement and gave the county additional time to submit briefing. Meanwhile, the
district court proceeded w ith the first witness, M.D.L. On the second day of trial, the
district court denied H.R.W.’s motion for a continuance with respect to all three children.
The case was tried on four days between November 20, 2017, and January 9, 2018.
On February 22, 2018, the district court filed an order granting the TPR petitions and
terminating the parental rights of H.R.W. and M.D.L. with respect to all three children .

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H.R.W. and M.D.L. filed separate motions for a new trial or amended findings, which the
district court denied. H.R.W. appeals.
D E C I S I O N
I. Due Process
H.R.W. first argues that the district court erred by depriving her of her constitutional
right to due process , in two ways: first, by denying her motion to continue the trial with
respect to the third child and, second, by allowing the county’s attorney to represent the
guardian ad litem and conduct direct examination of the guardian ad litem.
A. Denial of Motion to Continue Trial
As stated above, H.R.W. argues that the district court erred by denying her motion
to continue the trial with respect to the third child . She contends that, because she was
forced to go to trial so soon after the third child’s birth, she did not have a fair opportunity
to comply with the case plan and, thus, was not allowed adequate time to defend against
the allegations in the petition. She does not cite any caselaw that is specifically on point;
rather, she argues generally that additional time was necessary to ensure “fundamental
fairness” and “a meaningful adversarial hearing.” See In re Child of P.T., 657 N.W.2d 577,
587-88 (Minn. App. 2003). In response, the county argues that H.R.W. “had a full and fair
trial before an impartial decision -maker” and that the trial occurred within the statutory
timeframe.
In her pre-trial motion, H.R.W. argued that a continuance was appropriate because
she should have more of an opportunity to complete her case plan and to reunify with her
third child. The district court denied the motion. After trial, in a portion of its 42 -page

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order on the merits, the district court stated that it would have reached the same result even
if it had given H.R.W. additional time to work on her case plan because there are grounds
for granting the county’s termination petition with respect to the th ird child “that are not
dependent on timeline related arguments.” In her subsequent motion for a new trial or
amended findings, H.R.W. argued that the district court erred by denying her motion for a
continuance as to the third child. The district court denied that part of the motion by
referring back to its termination order.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution prohibits states from depriving a person of life, liberty, or property “without
due process of l aw.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV , § 1 . A court must conduct a two -step
analysis to determine whether a person’s right to due process has been violated. Rew v.
Bergstrom, 845 N.W.2d 764, 785 (Minn. 2014). First, the court must determine whether
the state has deprived the person of a protected interest in life, liberty, or property. Id. If
so, the court then must determine whether the state’s procedures were constitutionally
sufficient. Id. If the relevant facts are not in dispute, this court applies a de novo standard
of review to a district court’s decision that its procedures do not violate a person’s
constitutional right to due process. See id.
In this case, the first requirement is satisfied because there is no dispute that H.R.W.
has a recognized protected interest. Natural parents have a “ fundamental liberty
interest . . . in the care, custody, and management of their child.” Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745, 753, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1394-95 (1982); see also In re Welfare of Child of R.D.L.,
853 N.W.2d 127, 133 (Minn. 2014). This “freedom of personal choice in matters of family

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life is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment .” Santosky,
455 U.S. at 753, 102 S. Ct. at 1394. “When the State moves to destroy weakened familial
bonds, it must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures.” Id. at 753-54, 102
S. Ct. at 1395. This is so because, “‘[w]hen the State initiates a parental rights termination
proceeding, it seeks not merely to infringe that fundamental liberty interest, but to end it.’”
In re Welfare of Child of B.J.-M., 744 N.W.2d 669, 672 (Minn. 2008) ( quoting Santosky,
455 U.S. at 759, 102 S. Ct. at 1397).
The second requirement of the caselaw is that the procedures utilized at trial were
constitutionally sufficient. Rew, 845 N.W.2d at 785. In a TPR proceeding, the process due
to a parent is determined by the three-factor due-process test. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 754,
102 S. Ct. at 1395 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976)); see
also In re Welfare of J.W., 391 N.W.2d 791, 794 (Minn. 1986). The three factors are (1) the
private interest affected by the proceeding, (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that
interest compared with the value of additional or substitute procedural safeguards , and
(3) the nature of the state’s interest. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S. Ct. at 903.
In this case, the first factor is significant. A parent’s loss of parental rights is “a
unique kind of deprivation” with lasting im plications. Lassiter v. Dep artment of Soc.
Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27, 101 S. Ct. 2153, 2160 (1981). It is “plain beyond the need for
multiple citation that a natural parent’s desire for and right to the companionship, care,
custody, and management of his or her children” is substantial. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758,
102 S. Ct. at 1397 (quotation omitted). The fundamental liberty interest in raising one’s
children “undeniably warrants deference” and respect. Stanley v. Illinois , 405 U.S. 645,

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651, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 1212 (1972). Thus, the termination of H.R.W.’s parental rights affects
a significant liberty interest.
The third factor also is significant. The state has important interests in a TPR
proceeding. Specifically, the state has “a parens patriae interest in preserving and
promoting the welfare of the child and a fiscal and administrative interest in reducing the
cost and burden of such proceedings.” Santosky, 455 U.S. at 766, 102 S. Ct. at 1401. The
district court’s decision to not continue the trial with respect to the third child served the
state’s interests by achieving permanency for the third child at an earlier date and by
reducing the expense of the judicial proceedings necessary to resolve both TPR petitions.
The second factor is the key to resolving H.R.W.’s due-process argument. H.R.W.’s
primary contention is that it was fundamentally unfair for the county to file the TPR petition
with respect to the third child only one week after she was born and fundamentally unfair
that she was required to go to trial on that petition when the third child was only 12 weeks
old. H.R.W.’s secondary contention is that she did not have a fair opportunity to defend
against the petition because, in the short time between the birth of the third child and trial,
the county did not provide her with a court-approved case plan that was specifically tailored
to the third child.
We note that H.R.W.’s contention is contradicted by the district court’s statement
in its termination order that H.R.W. was not pr ejudiced by the lack of additional time
between the birth of the third child and the trial. The district court stated that the grounds
for terminating H.R.W.’s parental rights to the third child were “not dependent on timeline
related arguments.” The dis trict court added that H.R.W. “received 15 -plus months of

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services in support of the [ county’s] reasonable efforts at reunification” and that such
efforts “were not enough to overcome the serious and persistent concerns about her safe ty
and the best intere sts of her children.” As the district court also noted, a finding of
prejudice is essential to a determination that the right to due process has been violated. See
B.J.-M., 744 N.W.2d at 673. Accordingly, to prevail, H.R.W. must overcome the district
court’s statement that she was not prejudiced by the lack of additional time before trial .
H.R.W. does not directly challenge the district court’s statement. She identifies ways in
which her chances of success at trial might have been enhanced, but she doe s not
demonstrate that her eviden ce would have been so different that the district court would
have found in her favor and against the county on all five of the alleged grounds for
termination. Thus, H.R.W. has not shown that additional time before trial would have been
consequential or that the absence of additional time created an undue risk of an erroneous
deprivation of her fundamental interest in parenting her third child. See Mathews, 424 U.S.
at 335, 96 S. Ct. at 903.
Thus, the district court did not err by concluding that its denial of H.R.W.’s motion
to continue trial with respect to the third child did not violate H.R.W.’s right to due process.
B. Testimony of Guardian ad Litem
As stated above, H.R.W. also argues that the district court violated her right to due
process by allowing the county’s attorney to also represent the guardian ad litem and to
conduct direct examination of the guardian ad litem during what H.R.W. claims was the
guardian ad litem ’s case. In r esponse, the county argues initially that H.R.W. did not
properly preserve this argument by presenting it to the district court at the appropriate time.

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In reply, H.R.W. concedes that she did not object during trial but contends that this court
nonetheless should consider the issue for the first time on appeal.
We do not accept H.R.W.’s premise that the assistant county attorney who
represented the county also represented the guardian ad litem. Rather, it appears that the
county called the guardian ad litem as a witness in the county’s case-in-chief out of order.
The district court and counsel discussed the matter off the record before the district court
recited the agreed-upon procedure on the record. The county was prepared to rest its case
except for the testimony of the guardian ad litem, whom the county preferred to call after
both parents had presented their respective cases. The county’s request presumably was
intended to make it unnecessary to call the guardian ad litem twice, both in t he county’s
case-in-chief and in its rebuttal case. The district court made clear that either parent or
both parents could be recalled as sur-rebuttal witnesses if requested. No party objected to
the procedure described by the district court . In fact , H.R.W.’s attorney affirmatively
agreed to the procedure . In light of H.R.W.’s expressed agreement, she has waived the
right to challenge the procedure on appeal. See T hiele v. Stich , 425 N.W.2d 580, 582
(Minn. 1988); Doe v. Columbia Heights Sch. Dist. , 842 N.W.2d 38, 45 -46 (Minn. App.
2014). In any event, we note that n either the county nor the district court stated that the
county’s attorney would represent the guardian ad litem.
Thus, H.R.W. was not deprived of her right to due process.
II. Reasonable Efforts
H.R.W. also argues that the district court erred by finding that the county made
reasonable efforts to reunify H.R.W. with her third child.

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After a CHIPS adjudication, a county social services agency must make “reasonable
efforts . . . to prevent placement or to eliminate the need for removal and to r eunite the
child with the child’s family at the earliest possible time.” Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a) (2016).
Reasonable efforts “are always required ,” subject to a few exceptions. Id. Unless an
exception exists, a district court may not terminate parental rights without finding that the
county made reasonable efforts to reunify parent and child. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd.
8 (2016). In determining whether the county made reasonable efforts, a court shall consider
whether the services offered were “(1) relevant to the safety and protection of the child;
(2) adequate to meet the needs of the child and family; (3) culturally appropriate;
(4) available and accessible; (5) consistent and timely; and (6) realistic under the
circumstances.” Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h ) (2016). Reasonable efforts “must go beyond
mere matters of form so as to include real, genuine assistance.” In re Welfare of H.K., 455
N.W.2d 529, 532 (Minn. App. 1990), review denied (Minn. July 6, 1990). A court should
consider “the length of the time the county was involved and the quality of effort given.”
Id. This court applies an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to a district court’s finding
that the county made reasonable efforts. In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D. , 865 N.W.2d
315, 323 (Minn. App. 2015), review denied (Minn. July 20, 2015); In re Welfare of Child
of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 87 (Minn. App. 2012).
In th is case, the district court found that the county made reasonable efforts to
prevent foster -care placement and return the children to H.R.W. The record contains
evidence that supports the district court’s finding. The record indicates that the county
offered to refer H.R.W. to professionals who could provide a parenting assessment and a

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psychological assessment but that she declined. The record also indicates that the county
provided transportation for her children to and from appointments and helped H.R.W.
secure affordable housing by assisting with Section 8 paperwork. The county also provided
H.R.W. with financial assistance in the form of bus passes and pre-paid telephone services.
These services were provided to H.R.W. by the county for more than 15 months. In fact,
H.R.W. essentially admitted on cross-examination that the county made reasonable efforts;
she testified that there was no service that was requested that the county could not offer
and that her social workers were helpful to her when she attempted to complete the case
plan.
H.R.W. contends that the county failed to make reasonable efforts because it did not
comply with the statutory requirements concerning a case plan. Specifically, she contends
that the county did not seek her participation in the preparation of a case plan and that the
county never sought or received the district court’s approval of the case plan. The county
was required to “prepare an out -of-home placement plan addressing the conditions that
[the] parent must meet before the child can be in that parent’s day -to-day care.” Minn.
Stat. § 260C.219(a)(2)(i) (2016). The purpose of this requirement is to ensure that a parent
is aware of what is required for reunification. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd.
1(c) (2016); In re Welfare of Copus, 356 N.W.2d 363, 366 (Minn. App. 1984).
In this case, the district court approved a written case plan for the third child on
September 5, 2017. This case plan was modeled afte r the written case plan for the older
two children, which had been discussed and reviewed with H.R.W. and approved by the
district court. In its order approving the case plan for the third child, the district court

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expressly indicated that the case -planning services provided to H.R.W. for the older two
children also applied to the third child. Although the case plan for the third child was
granted on a temporary basis, it was nonetheless a “written document ,” as required by
statute. Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 1(b) (2016). At trial, H.R.W. acknowledge d that
she understood her second case plan and its requirements. Because the requirements for
the initial case plan were essentially the same as those for the case plan relating to the third
child, H.R.W. was aware of what was necessary for reunification with her third child.
Indeed, in her motion for a continuance, H.R.W. repeatedly referred to “her case plan.”
On appeal, H.R.W. contends that this court’s recent decision in In re Welfare of
A.R.B., 906 N.W.2d 894 (Minn. App. 2018), supports this argument. In A.R.B., the county
never developed a case plan for the a ppellant at any time. Id. at 896. Accordingly, t his
court noted that “it was impossible for [the appellant] to know what steps he needed to take
to correct the conditions in the absence of a case plan.” Id. at 899 (emphasis added). This
case is distinguishable. H.R.W. was given a court-approved written case plan shortly after
her third child was born. This case plan contained similar requirements to those of the case
plan for the older two children, of which H.R.W. was fully aware. Unlike the appellant in
A.R.B., H.R.W. knew th e steps she needed to take in order to be reunited with her third
child.
Thus, the district court did not err by finding that the county made reasonable efforts
to reunite H.R.W. with her third child.

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III. Best Interests
H.R.W. last argues that the district court erred by finding that the termination of her
parental rights is in the best interests of her children.
“[I]n terminating parental rights, the best interests of the child are the paramount
consideration, and conflicts between the rights o f the child and rights of the parents are
resolved in favor of the child.” In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 902
(Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012); see also Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 7 (2016). “In analyzing the best interests of the child, the court must balan ce three
factors: (1) the child’s interest in preserving the parent -child relationship; (2) the parent’ s
interest in preserving the parent -child relationship; and (3) any competing interest of the
child.” In re Welfare of R.T.B. , 492 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 1992); see also Minn. R.
Juv. Prot. P. 39.05, subd. 3(b)(3). The district court “must consider a child’s best interests
and explain its rationale in its findings and conclusions.” In re Tanghe, 672 N.W.2d 623,
626 (Minn. App. 2003). This court applies an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to a
district court’s determination that termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interests.
In re Children of D.F., 752 N.W.2d 88, 95 (Minn. App. 2008).
In this case, the district court found that it was in the best interests of the children to
terminate the parental rights of H.R.W. and M.D.L. The district court noted that H.R.W.
expressed an interest in parenting her children. But the district court found that her lack of
case-plan compliance cast doubt on her ability to parent the children safely. The district
court also found that H.R.W. was unable to meet the children’s basic needs and significant

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special needs. Ultimately, the district court found that the needs of the children “far
outweigh” the desires of their parents to retain their parental rights.
The district court’s findings are supported by the record. The evidence shows that
H.R.W. consistently failed to meet the req uirements of her case plan . The evidence also
shows that the first child , who has significant medical needs, had not been seen by his
medical specialists for two years before entering foster care . One of H.R.W.’s social
workers testified that termination was in the children’s best interests based on the parents’
failure to ensure a safe environment for the m. Another social worker testified that
termination was in the children’s best interests because H.R.W.’s parenting issues would
continue for the reasonably foreseeable future. The guardian ad litem testified in favor of
termination, citing the children’s exposure to domestic violence and numerous safety
concerns that she had observed during parenting -education sessions. The district court
expressly found the testimony of the two social workers and the guardian ad litem to be
credible, and we typically defer to a district court’s credibility determinations. In re
Welfare of Child of T.D., 731 N.W.2d 548, 555 (Minn. App. 2007).
Thus, the district c ourt did not err by finding that the termination of H.R.W.’s
parental rights is in the children’s best interests.
In sum, the district court did not err by granting the county’s petition and terminating
H.R.W.’s parental rights to her three children.
Affirmed.