At Home Apartments, LLC, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0512

At Home Apartments, LLC,
Respondent,

vs.

D. B., et al,
Appellants.

Filed January 14, 2019
Reversed and remanded
Smith, Tracy M., Judge
Concurring specially, Connolly, Judge

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-CV-14-4702

Amanda Schmitz, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Edwin H. Caldie, Calvin P. Hoffm an, Kevin P. Kitchen, Stinson L eonard Street, LLP,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellants)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tr acy M., Judge; and
Stauber, Judge.


 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by app ointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Appellants D.B. and S.B. challenge the district court’s denial of their motion to
expunge the court records of an eviction action brought against them, arguing that the
district court erred by failing to exercise its inherent authority to expunge judicial records
of evictions. We reverse and remand.
FACTS
Appellants began renting a residence from respondent At Home Ap artments LLC
(At Home) in 2010. When appellant s failed to make rent payments f o r A u g u s t a n d
September of 2014, At Home filed an eviction action. Appellants settled with At Home,
agreeing to vacate the home. Since then, appellants have strugg led to find stable housing;
they contend that the reason for their difficulties is the continuing public availability of the
court records of the 2014 eviction action.
In 2017, appellants moved the district court for expungement o f judicially held
records relating to the eviction action. They asserted two theories justifying expungement.
First, they argued that the records should be expunged under Minn. Stat. § 484.014, subd. 2
(2018). Second, they argued that the court should exercise its inherent authority to expunge
the records.
After a hearing, the court denied the motion. In its order, the court correctly
observed that Minn. Stat. § 484.014, subd. 2, allows expungement of the court records of
an eviction action only if the plaintiff’s case was “sufficiently without basis in fact or law.”
But the eviction action did have a b a s i s i n f a c t a n d l a w : a p p e llants had not paid rent.

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Because the settlement did not negate that basis, the district court held that “failure to meet
the first requirement of the statute must result in the denial of the motion to expunge.” The
district court did not address the argument about inherent authority.
Appellants requested permission to file a motion for reconside ration, asking to be
allowed to present additional argument on the district court’s inherent authority to expunge
the records. See Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 115.11 (pr ohibiting motions for reconsidera tion
“except by express permission of the court”). The district cour t summarily denied the
request.
This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
Appellants do not challenge the dis trict court’s conclusion tha t statutory
expungement is unavailable. Instead, they argue that the distri ct court erred by failing to
address whether their eviction file should be expunged as a mat ter of the court’s inherent
authority. Appellants ask that this court hold that they are en titled to expungement as a
matter of law.
The parties agree that district courts have inherent authority to expunge eviction
files. But this court is not controlled by the agreement of par ties regarding questions of
law. Rayford v. Metro. Transit Comm’n , 379 N.W.2d 161, 164-65 (Minn. App. 1985),
review denied (Minn. Feb. 14, 1986). And no Minnesota published decision has held that
courts have inherent authority to expunge judicially held eviction records.
1

1 In one recent case, this court reversed an eviction expungemen t granted under inherent
authority. Sela Invs. Ltd. v. H.E. , 909 N.W.2d 344 (Minn. App. 2018). However, the

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Minnesota courts have inherent a uthority to expunge criminal re cords. State v.
Ambaye, 616 N.W.2d 256, 258 (Minn. 2000). This authority derives from the Minnesota
Constitution. State v. C.A. , 304 N.W.2d 353, 358 (Minn. 1981). It permits the courts to,
among other things, “control court records . . . in order to reduce or eliminate unfairness to
individuals,” even if that unfairness does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.
Id. To serve that end, expungement is permitted in appropriate cas es if it “will yield a
benefit to the petitioner commensurate with the disadvantages t o the public from the
elimination of the record and the burden on the court in issuing, enforcing and monitoring
an expungement order.” Id.
The supreme court has suggested that expungement of judicially held criminal
records to eliminate unfairness is within a court’s inherent au thority when the petitioner
was not convicted or the conviction no longer stands. Id. at 361; see also State v. S.L.H.,
755 N.W.2d 271, 277 (Minn . 2008) (distinguishing C.A., in the context of records
maintained within the executive branch, because C.A.’s conviction had been overturned).
Specifically, the court in C.A. stated that a district court file could be expunged “upon the
right kind of showing.” C.A., 304 N.W.2d at 361. The supreme court did not spell out what
that showing would be, nor did it explain why C.A. had failed t o make the necessary
showing, but cited to a pair of federal cases indicating that c ourt records could be sealed
where a person was not prosecuted or where a person was arrested without probable cause.

reversal was based on the district court’s error in awarding de fault judgment after the
landlord failed to obtain a transcript as required by Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 611. Id. at 349-50.
Sela did not address whether the district court has inherent author ity to expunge eviction
records.

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Id. (citing Sullivan v. Murphy , 478 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1973); District of Columbia v.
Hudson, 404 A.2d 175 (D.C. 1979)). 2 The supreme court has not addressed the
expungement of judicially held criminal records when the convic tion stands. Published
opinions of this court, however, indicate that the inherent power to expunge judicially held
records does not depend on wheth er the petitioner’s conviction remains valid. See, e.g.,
State v. N.G.K. , 770 N.W.2d 177, 181 (Minn. App. 2009) (affirming expungement of
judicially held records of a conviction that had not been overturned).
In the context of executive-branch criminal records, the supreme court has rejected
the exercise of inherent authority to expunge criminal records when the person’s conviction
stands. State v. M.D.T. , 831 N.W.2d 276, 281 (Minn. 2013) (“The unfairness issue we
discussed in C.A. is simply not present in this case because M.D.T.’s conviction has not
been set aside.”); S.L.H., 755 N.W.2d at 277 (“Because S. L.H.’s conviction has not been
set aside, the expungement of he r criminal records held outside the judicial branch is not
necessary to grant her full relief.”).
This case involves judicially hel d eviction records. No publish ed decision holds
that judicially held eviction re cords—whether the eviction stan ds or not—may be
expunged under the courts’ inherent authority. Appellants argued to the district court, first,
that expungement was justified un der Minn. Stat. § 484.014, sub d. 2, and, second, that
expungement was justified under the district court’s inherent a uthority. The district court

2 The supreme court has also approved of criminal-record expungements when the person
was acquitted of the offense. See State v. R.H.B., 821 N.W.2d 817, 819, 824 (Minn. 2012).
But such expungements are authorized by statute, so they provide little guidance as to the
extent of courts’ inherent authority. See Minn. Stat. § 609A.02, subd. 3(a)(1) (2018).

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held that “failure to meet the first requirement of the statute must result in the denial of the
motion to expunge.” We cannot tel l if the district court conclu ded that it did not have
inherent authority to expunge appellants’ eviction records or i f it found that it had the
authority but the facts of this case did not satisfy the standard for expungement.
A reviewing court “must generally consider only those issues that the record shows
were presented and considered by the trial court in deciding the matter before it.” Thiele v.
Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (emphasis added) (quotation omitted).
Additionally, because the parties agree that the district court had inherent authority to
expunge appellants’ eviction records, the issue was not briefed to the district court or to
this court. In these circumstances, we will not decide in the first instance whether inherent
authority authorizes expungement in this case. In addition, if the district court denied
expungement because it decided that, while expungement was within its inherent authority,
the standard for expungement was not satisfied here, we cannot review that decision
without a record of the district court’s findings of fact. See In re Estate of Eckley , 780
N.W.2d 407, 415 (Minn. App. 2010) (observing that findings of f act are necessary to an
appellate court’s review).
On remand, the district court should determine whether it has inherent authority to
expunge the records of the eviction action and, if it does, whe ther the facts support
expungement. The district court should provide a written record of its findings and
conclusions.
Reversed and remanded.

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CONNOLLY, Judge (concurring specially)
I concur with the majority’s opinion that the district court erred by failing to squarely
address whether expungement of D. B. & S.B.’s eviction records w as warranted under its
inherent authority. I write separ ately because I would reach t he inherent authority issue
and hold that courts have the inherent authority to expunge jud icial records of eviction
actions—despite the district court’s failure to properly consider it.
“A reviewing court must generally consider only those issues that the record shows
were presented and considered by the [district] court in decidi ng the matter before it.”
Thiele v. Stich , 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 198 8) (quotation omitted). But a well-
established exception to Thiele allows such decisions if they are “plainly decisive of the
entire controversy,” and there is “no possible advantage or disadvantage to either party in
not having had a prior ruling by the [district] court on the question,” particularly where the
facts are not in dispute. Holen v. Minneapolis-St. Paul Metropolitan Airports Comm’n, 84
N.W.2d 282, 286 (Minn. 1957). Here, the facts are not in dispute, the parties agree that the
district court had inherent authority to grant expungement, and such a decision is decisive
of the entire controversy because if the district court lacks such authority, there is nothing
left to be decided on remand. Accordingly, the well-established exception applies here.
Two essential judicial functions underlie a court’s inherent au thority to expunge
judicial records of civil eviction actions. First, is a court’s power to control its own records,
which extends equally to civil as well as criminal records. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune
Co. v. Schumacher , 392 N.W.2d 197, 202 (Minn. 1986) (“Every court has supervisor y
power over its own records and f iles, and access has been denie d where court files might

CS-2

have become a vehicle for improper purposes.” (quoting Nixon v. Warner Comm., Inc., 435
U.S. 589, 598, 98 S. Ct. 1306, 1312 (1978))). Though published cases on inherent
expungement authority appear only in the context of criminal re cords, the language used
in many of those cases is not specific to criminal records. See State v. C.A., 304 N.W.2d
353, 358 (Minn. 1981) (“Part of [a court’s essential] function is to control court
records . . . .”); State v. T.M.B. , 590 N.W.2d 809, 811 (Minn. App. 1999) (“[T]he courts
may exercise their inherent authority to issue expungement orde rs affecting court
records.”). Thus, judicial control over judicial records is not limited to records of criminal
cases, and inherent expungement authority may extend to records of eviction actions.
Second, is a court’s inherent authority to expunge records, whi ch derives from the
essential judicial function of “reduc[ing] or eliminat[ing] unfairness to individuals.” C.A.,
304 N.W.2d at 358. This function is equally applicable in the context of a civil action when
the continued existence of a record could create a hardship that is unfair given the facts that
led to the creation of that record. Caselaw construes this function narrowly in the context
of criminal-record expungements, in part because of concerns over intrusion into the proper
functions of other branches. See State v. M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d 276, 280-82 (Minn. 2013)
(holding that inherent judicial authority over judicial records does not include the authority
to order the expungement of records held by the executive branch). But those concerns are
not present when the records at issue are judicially held records of an expungement action.
Our caselaw has established that the district court may expunge criminal records
when “expungement will yield a benefit to the petitioner commen surate with the
disadvantages to the public from elimination of the record and the burden on the court in

CS-3

issuing, enforcing, and monitoring an expungement order.” C.A., 304 N.W.2d at 358.
C.A.’s language is equally applicable to eviction record expungements as it is to criminal
record expungements. In consider ing whether expungement of evi ction records is
warranted, the district court s hould weigh the potential “benef it to the petitioner” against
the potential “disadvantages to the public” from expungement an d any “burden on the
court” from granting the petition. Id. Finally, I believe that i n evaluating whether an
expungement is justified under its inherent authority, the district court should consider all
relevant facts including but not limited to: (1) whether any ba ck-rent is owed, how much
is owed, and if there is a payment plan in place—although I do not believe that an
expungement should be automatically denied solely because any r ent owing has not been
paid; (2) a petitioner’s eviction history; (3) the cause for the nonpayment of rent—whether
it was due to economic hardship or a mere willful refusal; (4) the length of time since the
petitioner’s last eviction; (5) whether the eviction was for a material breach of the lease
other than nonpayment of rent (e.g., conducting illegal activit y on the leased premises);
(6) the number of evictions with the same landlord as opposed t o different landlords; and
(7) the term of the lease. See State v. H.A. , 716 N.W.2d 360, 364 (Minn. App. 2006)
(describing analogous factors for criminal-record expungements).