In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: A. R., Mother.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0518

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:
A. R., Mother.

Filed October 8, 2018
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File Nos. 62-F6-01-050928, 62-FA-15-931, 62-JV-15-2704

John W. Sadowski, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant A.R.)

John Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Robert Hamilton, Assistant County Attorney, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent Ramsey County Social Services Department)

Michael Fahey, St. Paul, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Anne Tyler Gueinzius, St. Paul, Minnesota (for Child One)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
WORKE, Judge
Appellant-mother challenges the termination of her parental rights, arguing that the
record does not support the district court’s determinations that (1) respondent-county made
reasonable reunification efforts, (2) she failed to comply with the duties of the parent-child

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relationship, (3) reasonable efforts failed to correct the conditions that formed the basis of
the petition or would be fu tile and unreasonable, and (4) termination of parental rights
(TPR) is in the children’s best interests. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant-mother A.R. has three children. At the time of the TPR trial, Child One
was sixteen years old, Child Two was six years old, and Child Three was three years old.
The two younger children have special and educational needs and are the subject of this
appeal.1 On September 5, 2015, police officers saw A.R. slumped over a stroller holding
the children at a bus stop. The police suspected that A.R. was under the influence of alcohol
or drugs. On September 24, 2015, A.R. was again found slumped over a stroller holding
the children at a bus s top. T his time the stroller was edging toward the street. A.R.
admitted to police that she was under the influence of alcohol. On October 6, 2015, police
were called to A.R.’s home where A.R. was in a heated argument with her oldest child,
who is not involved in this appeal. Police observed A.R. to be intoxicated. A.R. refused
to allow the child to stay at the home. All three children were placed on a 72-hour hold as
a result of this incident.

1 The district court found that, due to the oldest child’s age, credible preference, and
reliance on A.R. for both behavioral and emotional support, it was in the best interests of
this child to maintain a parent-child relationship with A.R. This court commends the district
court for its thorough and thoughtful analysis of this issue.

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A child -in-need-of-protection-or-services (CHIPS) petition was filed , and on
October 22, 2015, all three children were adjudicated CHIPS. Case plans were developed
for all three children that addressed A.R.’s mental -health, including a diagnostic
assessment, following the assessment’s recommendations, an d attending therapy. A.R.
attended therapy on and off for approximately two months before she stopped attending.
Over the next two years, A.R. did not complete a mental-health assessment or attend
therapy. In March 2017, A.R. discussed the importance of therapy with her case worker.
In September 2017, A.R. began seeing Dr. Philip Klees, a psychologist. A.R. completed a
diagnostic assessment, but attended only three of eight scheduled sessions with Dr. Klees.
At trial, Dr. Klees testified that A.R.’s ch emical-dependency and mental -health issues
remained unresolved.
The case plans addressed A.R.’s chemical-dependency, including a chemical-health
assessment and follow ing its recommendations. The record shows that A.R. completed
four chemical-health assessments. All four found that A.R. met the criteria for Alcohol
Use Disorder – Moderate. A.R. never completed a chemical -dependency-treatment
program.
The case plans also instructed A.R. to address her children’s basic needs. A.R.’s
case manager referred her for in -home parenting classes through Neighborhood House,
however A.R. was either not home or not available during scheduled appointments. A.R.’s
case manager made another reference for parenting cla sses, but A.R. did not follow
through. One child was referred for an assessment through Help Me Grow . A.R. did not

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respond to assessors , and the file was closed. The child was unable to be enrolled in a
school that could meet his needs because A.R. did not remain in contact with the school.
Arrangements for the child’s special education were also delayed due to A.R.’s lack of
contact.
On September 1, 2017, a petition was filed alleg ing four statutory grounds to
terminate A.R.’s parental rights: (1) A.R. substantially, continuously, or repeatedly refused
or neglected her parental duties; (2) A.R. is palpably unfit; (3) reasonable efforts failed to
correct the conditions that led to the children’s out-of-home placement; and (4) the children
are neglected and in foster care.
Following a court trial, the district court filed an order ter minating A.R.’s parental
rights on March 12, 2018. The district court analyzed three of the four grounds for TPR,
made relevant findings on each, and found that three grounds had been satisfied by clear
and convincing evidence. This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
A district court may terminate parental rights when at least one statutory ground for
TPR is supported by clear and convincing evidence and the court determines t hat it is in
the children’s best interests. In re Welfare of Child of R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d 127, 137 (Minn.
2014). This court reviews the district court’s findings for clear error. In re Welfare of
Children of T.R., 750 N.W.2d 656, 660 (Minn. 2008). A finding is clearly erroneous if it
is “manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the
evidence as a whole.” Id. at 660-61 (quotation omitted). This court reviews the district

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court’s TPR decision for an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of the Child of J.K.T. , 814
N.W.2d 76, 87 (Minn. App. 2012). “An abuse of discretion occurs if the district court
improperly applied the law.” Id.
Dismissal
As an initial matter, the county correctly points out that A.R. does not contest, brief,
or even mention the neglected-and-in-foster-care basis upon which the district court based
its TPR decision . Therefore, this issue is deemed forfeited on appeal . See Melina v.
Chaplin, 327 N.W.2d 19, 20 (Minn. 1982) (Stating that issues not briefed are deemed
waived).
Because A.R. made no motion for a new trial, we could affirm the district court’s
TPR order without reaching the remaining issues. However, given the subject matter and
the importance of a meaningf ul review of a TPR order, this court will, in the interests of
justice, address one of the statutory grounds properly appealed and briefed in addition to
analyzing the district court’s reasonable-efforts and best-interests findings. See Minn. R.
Civ. App. P. 103.04.
Reasonable reunification efforts

A.R. argues that the county failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify her with the
children because she was never provided with or referred for grief counseling upon the
death of her husband. This argument is not supported by the record.
When a child is removed fr om the family home, the responsible social -services
agency must make “reasonable efforts” to reunify the family. Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a)

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(2016). A district court must make findings as to whether the county provided reasonable
efforts to rehabilitate the parent and reunify the family. Id. (h) (2016). What constitutes
“reasonable efforts” depends on the problems presented. T.R., 750 N.W.2d at 664
(quotation omitted).
The district court found that the county made reasonable efforts “to rehabilitate
[A.R.] and correct the conditions that led to the children’s adjudication as [CHIPS]”;
however, these efforts “have not [been] successful.” This finding is supported by the
record.
A case manager was appointed to A.R.’ s case, and case plans were generated and
signed by A.R. The case plans outlined issues of mental-health, chemical-dependency, and
parenting skills. The case plans outlined steps to be taken to address these issues, and
proper referrals were made to faci litate those services. Financial support was provided in
the form of bus cards and gas cards in order to ensure A.R.’s access to those services.
However, A.R. was habitually unavailable or unreachable by service providers. Social
workers, teachers, and counselors all testified to difficulty in reaching A.R. and to her lack
of attendance or participation. The district court found these testimonies credible. The
district court also found that the services offered “were appropriate, timely, and realistic
under the circumstances.” There is nothing in the record to dispute this finding.
A.R. was referred for mental-health treatment, but failed to attend consistently, and
attended only three of eight sessions with her therapist. Regardless of whether these
referrals were specifically for grief, the therapy services offered were properly equipped to

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help A.R. with her grief. Given this record, the district court did not err in finding that the
county made reasonable reunification efforts.
A.R. substantially, continuously, or repeatedly refused or neglected her duties as a parent

A.R. argues that she was “working diligently to complete her case plan, worked for
the vast majority of the child protection matter toward reunification, diligently att ended
court hearings and was patient with the child protection process,” therefore “it simply
cannot be said that [s]he ‘substantially, continuously or repeatedly refused or neglected to
comply with the duties imposed upon [her] by the parent and child rel ationship.’” This
argument presents an extremely stilted view of the facts and is not supported by the record.
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2) (2016) permits a district court to terminate
parental rights if it finds
that the parent has substantially , continuously, or repeatedly
refused or neglected to comply with the duties imposed upon
that parent by the parent and child relationship, including but
not limited to providing the child with necessary food,
clothing, shelter, education, and other care a nd control
necessary for the child’s physical, mental, or emotional health
and development, if the parent is physically and financially
able, and either reasonable efforts by the social services agency
have failed to correct the conditions that formed the basis of
the petition or reasonable efforts would be futile and therefore
unreasonable[.]

To terminate parental rights under this statutory basis , the district court must find that “at
the time of termination, the parent is not presently able and willing to assume [her]
responsibilities and that the parent’s neglect of these duties will continue for a pro longed,
indeterminate period.” J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 90 (quotations omitted).

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A.R. points out that she was finding “a suitable home for her family” and attempting
to move a child to a different school for his benefit. While A.R. did find housing at some
points during the case, there were also periods of homelessness and periods of instability
at the home, including the February 23, 2017 incident in which A.R. was transported to the
hospital with a 0.22 alcohol con centration while the children were in her care.
Additionally, testimony the district court found credible was provided which indicated that
A.R. was the only factor slowing down her child’s access to educational services.
The district court found that for mos t of the children’s lives A.R. “has failed to
provide the parental care the children need.” Specifically, the district court concluded that
A.R. has not provided them with a safe home or provided for their basic and special needs.
The district court found, based on credible testimony regarding A.R.’s failure to follow her
case plan s and address her mental, chemical, and parenting issues, that the c ounty had
proved by clear and convincing evidence that A.R. substantially, continuously, and
repeatedly negle cted to comply with the duti es imposed on her by the parent -child
relationship within the statutory meaning. This conclusion is well supported by the record,
and does not constitute an abuse of discretion.
Children’s best interests

A.R. challenges the district court’s finding that TPR is in the best interests of the
children. In a TPR case, the best interests of the children is “the paramount consideration.”
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2016). A district court must make “findings regarding
how the order is in the best interests of the child.” Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 42.08, subd. 1(b).

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In analyzing the best interests of the children, the district court must balance three
factors: “(1) the child[ren]’s interest in preservin g the parent -child relationship; (2) the
parent’s interest in preserving the parent -child relationship; and (3) any competing
interest[s] of the child[ren].” In re Welfare of R.T.B., 492 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 1992).
We apply an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to a district court ’s conclusion that
TPR is in a child ’s best interests. In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B. , 805 N.W.2d 895,
905 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 17, 2012).
The district court made findings on each of the relev ant factors. Regarding the
children’s interests in preserving the parent-child relationship, the district court found that
the children have been in out -of-home care for over 798 days in the past five years, and
have only ever had minimal parenting from A.R. The district court also found that A.R.
will not be able to parent the children for the foreseeable future due to her unaddressed
chemical, mental, and parenting issues. The district court specifically remarked on the
credibility of the guardian ad litem who testified that he firmly believes that it is in the best
interests of the children for A.R.’s rights to be terminated. The district court therefor e
concluded that the first best -interest factor clearly and convincingly weighed in favor of
TPR. Regarding A.R.’s interests, the district court found that this factor weighed in favor
of maintaining A.R.’s parental relationship with the children because she loves them very
much.
The district court then addressed the third factor and found numerous c ompeting
interests. Specifically, the children “deserve permanency and a stable, supportive home,”

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the children have special needs, which A.R. “has not shown an ability to comprehend or
fulfill,” and finally A.R. has not been able to provide basic necessities for the children. The
district court therefore concluded that these interests clearly and convincingly weigh ed in
favor of TPR. Given the district court’s detailed findings, which are supported by the
record, this conclusion does not constitute an abuse of discretion. The district court did not
abuse its discretion by terminating A.R.’s parental rights.
Affirmed.