Patrick Hugh Stack, et al., petitioners, Respondents,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0543

Patrick Hugh Stack, et al., petitioners,
Respondents,

vs.

Lamont Green,
Appellant,
Elvis Austin Butler, et al.,
Respondents Below.

Filed March 25, 2019
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-FA-14-8633

Brandon M. Zumwalt, Johnson, Moody, Schmidt & Kleinhuizen, P.A., Willmar,
Minnesota (for respondents Patrick Hugh Stack, et al.)

Rhia Bornmann Spears, Bornmann Family Law, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Maureen Stack, Dayton, Minnesota (mother)

Jacquelyn Cardinal, Minneapolis, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Cochran,
Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REYES, Judge
Appellant father challenges the district court’s grant of third -party custody of
father’s child to the child’s maternal grandparents , arguing that (1) the district court
misapplied Minn. Stat. § 257C.03, subd. 7 (2018) and (2) the district court did not consider
all of the evidence. We affirm.
FACTS
This appeal arises from a district court’s grant of third-party custody of six-year-old
G.L.S. to his maternal grandparents, respondents Patrick Hugh Stack and Colleen Agnes
Stack (grandparents). Appellant Lamont Green (father) and respondent Maureen Stack
(mother) are the biological parents of G.L.S.
Grandparents have been the primary caretaker s of G.L.S. throughout his life, with
mother providing care at times. Mother has another daughter, K.K.S., for whom
grandparents have also provided care. Mother has a history of drug use, mental illness, a
brain tumor, and criminal issue s that led to her incarceration. Mother supported
grandparents’ petition for third-party custody of both children.
Father spent some time with G.L.S. during the first year of his life but then had very
little contact with him until Hennepin County brought a paternity action and the district
court ad judicated him as G.L.S.’s biological father. The district court granted father
parenting time in 2015. However, the district court revoked his parenting time in Apr il
2016 after grandparents obtained an order for protection (OFP) against him due to
allegations that G.L.S. had suffered abuse in father’s home by father, father’s girlfriend,

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and father’s other children. The parties later agreed to dismiss the OFP. However, since
that time, father has not exercised parenting time bec ause he has not completed court -
ordered reunification therapy.
Hennepin County child protection services (CPS), while not a party, became
involved in this case and conducted an investigation and forensic interview of G.L.S. CPS
made no finding of maltreatment but opened a case to offer services to the parties.
The district court held a court trial in April 2017 to determine custody of G.L.S.
The primary dispute at trial surrounded the allegations of abuse and harm that occurred in
father’s home, which father denied completely. The district court granted sole physical
custody and sole legal custody of both children to grandparents.1 In September 2017, father
moved for amended findings and a new trial, which the district court denied. This appeal
follows.2
D E C I S I O N

I. The district court properly applied Minn. Stat. § 257C.03, subd. 7.

Father argues that the district court failed to make a finding as to whether clear and
convincing evidence showed that one of the statutory factors under Minn. Stat. § 257C.03,
subd. 7 existed. We disagree.

1 K.K.S.’s father supported grandparents’ petition.
2 Grandparents request that we dismiss the appeal, or, in the alternative, strike father’s brief,
due to a number of defects with his brief, including timeliness. However, grandparents did
not bring a formal motion to dismiss or motion to strike, and after careful review of the
record, we conclude that father’s untimeliness and other errors did not prejudice
grandparents. We therefore decline to grant grandparents’ request. See Boom v. Boom ,
361 N.W.2d 34, 36 (Minn. 1985).

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Appellate review of third -party custody determinations is limited to whether the
district court abused its discretion by improperly applying the law or by making findings
unsupported by the evidence. In re Custody of N.A.K., 649 N.W.2d 166, 174 (Minn. 2002).
We view the record in the light most favorable to the district court’s findings. Vangsness
v. Vangness, 607 N.W.2d 468, 472 (Minn. App. 2000). We will not set aside a district
court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. In re Custody of A.L.R. , 830
N.W.2d 163, 166 (Minn. App. 2013). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if we “are left
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. ” Goldman v.
Greenwood, 748 N.W.2d 279, 284 (Minn. 2008) (citation omitted).
Minn. Stat. §§ 257C.01-.08 (2018) governs third-party custody. Under the statute,
an interested third party may file a petition for third-party custody. Minn. Stat. § 257C.03,
subd. 1(a). To establish that he or s he is an interested third party, a petitioner must show
by clear and convincing evidence that:
(i) the parent has abandoned, neglected, or otherwise
exhibited disregard for the child’s well -being to the
extent that the child will be harmed by living with the
parent;
(ii) placement of the child with the individual takes priority
over preserving the day-to-day parent-child relationship
because of the presence of physical or emotional danger
to the child, or both; or
(iii) other extraordinary circumstances [exist] [.]

Minn. Stat. § 257C.03, subd. 7(a)(1)( i)-(iii) (2018). The district court found that the first
two factors were present, although it only needed to find the presence of one.
Under the second factor, the district court found that “placemen t of [G.L.S.] with
his grandparents takes priority over preserving the day -to-day parent -child relationship

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between father and G.L.S. because of the presence of physical and emotional danger to
[G.L.S.].” The district court found that G.L.S. has suffered harm in father’s care, despite
father’s absolute denial that anyone in his home has harmed G.L.S. Father repeatedly
challenges the district court’s findings of abuse and harm to G.L.S.
The record supports the district court’s findings. 3 Grandparents took G.L.S. to the
doctor on multiple occasions for injuries beginning in April 2016. Among those injuries
were a bruised k nee, a bruised eye, bite marks , and fork marks on his abdomen. G.L.S.
reported that father had hit him with a frying pan. Further, G.L.S.’s daycare provider
noticed consistent bruising on his body, bite marks, and scratches. As a result, she filed
three reports with CPS on behalf of G.L.S. Two of these reports were made in April 2016
after observing a fork -like wound in G.L.S.’s abdomen and multiple large bruises on his
temples. G.L.S.’s CornerHouse interview also supports the district court’s findings.
G.L.S.’s play the rapist testified that she had “significant concern” for G.L.S.’s
safety after he reported that father had hit him, he had marks consistent with this, and he
said that he feared father. She testified that , between April and June 2016, she noticed
significant behavioral regressions, which is consistent with the time period during which
the abuse occurred.

3 The district court also found that grandparents had shown by a preponderance of the
evidence that it is in G.L.S.’s best interests to be in the custody of grandparents and that
grandparents had not been convicted of the crimes set forth in Minn. Stat. § 518. 179, as
required by the statute. The district court further considered and made findings under the
eight factors laid out in Minn. Stat. § 257C.03, subd. 7(b)(1)-(8) (2018). We have carefully
reviewed the record and conclude that it supports the district court’s findings.

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G.L.S. also worked with a family therapist. During those sessions, G.L.S. has
reacted negatively to father and expressed worry that father would be there because father
hurts him. The family therapist asked G.L.S. to place pictures of family members on cards
representing the feelings he had when he thought of them. G.L.S. placed father on the card
representing mad feelings and his father’s girlfriend on the card representing scared
feelings. After discussing his father, G.L.S. became upset and curled up in the fetal position
on the floor. The family therapist further testified that she did not believe G.L.S. had been
coached.
The guardian ad litem (GAL) recommended that the district court award sole
physical custody and sole legal custody of G.L.S. to grandparents, that father have
supervised parenting time after completing reunification therapy, and that mother have
supervised parenting time. The GAL had been appointed to this case in April 2015 and
had represented G.L.S.’s interests for two years at the time of trial.
Appellant repeatedly attacks the district court’s findings by arguing his theory that
the instances of G.L.S.’s harm were fabricated and that grandparents coached him to make
false accusations against father. But the district court rejected this theory, noting that it
“has thoroughly considered [fa]ther’s claim that the child’s fear is not from within, but
planted in his thoughts by [grandparents] and [his play therapist].” As an appellate court,
our purpose is to correct err ors, and not to retry the case. Turner v. Alpha Phi Sorority
House, 276 N.W.2d 63, 68 n.2 (Minn. 1979).
Father points to favorable facts and attacks the credibility of testimony. The district
court accepted the testimony of grandfather, the play therapist, the reunification therapist,

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the daycare provider’s actions following G.L.S.’s reports of injuries, and the CornerHouse
interview as credible evidence of G.L.S.’s fear of his father. A district court is in a far
superior position to determine the credibility of witnesses, and we give such determinations
considerable deference. In re Welfare of L.A.F. , 554 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. 1996) .
Moreover, that an appellant’s version of the facts might lead another trier of fact to make
different findings does not render the district court’s findings clearly erroneous when there
is sufficient contradictory evidence to reasonably support the district court’s findings.
Crosby v. Crosby, 587 N.W.2d 292, 296 (Minn. App. 1998), review denied (Minn. Feb. 18,
1999).
Father further assigns error to the district court because it did not separately consider
the common-law presumption that a natural parent is presumed fit to raise their child. But
this court has clarified that the common-law parental presumption is now incorporated into
chapter 257C. A.L.R., 830 N.W.2d at 168-69 (noting district court did not err by failing to
separately address parental presumption in its custody order). The district court did not
abuse its discretion in granting third-party custody to grandparents.
II. The district court properly weighed the evidence and made credibility
determinations regarding grandfather’s interference with father’s parenting
time.
Father argues that the district court disregarded evidenc e relating to grandfather’s
interference with father’s parenting time with G.L.S. and his “fundamental right to parent.”
Father’s argument lacks merit.

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First, f ather provides no legal authority or analysis to support this argument .
Inadequately briefed issues are not properly before this court. Melina v. Chaplin, 327
N.W.2d 19, 20 (Minn. 1982).
Second, this argument is largely repetitive of father’s first argument. Father places
great emphasis on the custody evaluator’s report, completed in April 20 16, which
recommended granting custody to father. The district court gave weight to this
recommendation but also considered the fact that, at the time of that recommendation, the
allegations of abuse against father had not yet surfaced. Father also attacks the credibility
of G.L.S.’s play therapist and alleges bias against G.L.S.’s daycare provider, again urging
this court to make credibility determinations and findings of fact. But that is not the role
of this court. L.A.F., 554 N.W.2d at 396; Turner, 276 N.W.2d at 68 n.2.
For the reasons already stated above, the district court’s findings of fact are not
clearly erroneous because the record supports them.
Affirmed.