State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0552

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Curtis McCain, Jr.,
Appellant.

Filed April 1, 2019
Reversed and remanded
Halbrooks, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-17-12137

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Kelly O’Neill Moller, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Julie Loftus Nelson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HALBROOKS, Judge
Appellant challenges the validity of his guilty plea to the crime of failing to register
as a predatory offender, arguing that his plea is inaccurate because he made statements

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during the plea hearing that negated the mens rea element of the offense. We reverse and
remand.
FACTS
Appellant Curtis McCain Jr., is subject to lifetime predatory -offender registration
following his conviction of f ourth-degree criminal sexual conduct in 2006. McCain’s
supervised release ended in 2012. McCain traveled to Illinois to visit family but was
arrested for an outstanding warrant and remained in custody in Illinois until 2015. Upon
his release, McCain reg istered as a predatory offender in Illinois but did not register in
Minnesota.
In 2017, a review of McCain’s registration information revealed that he was
noncompliant as of 2015 becaus e he did not return his address -verification paperwork.
McCain was charged with violating the predatory-offender registration requirements under
Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5(a) (2014).
At a January 2018 hearing, McCain pleaded guilty to knowingly violating Minn.
Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5(a) , and requested a downward d urational departure. The district
court accepted McCain’s guilty plea. The district court noted that this was McCain’s first
failure-to-register violation “despite having registered for years.” The district court also
found that McCain’s failure to regi ster “was less onerous than typical because, although
[McCain was] not supposed to leave the state without telling Minnesota that [he] was
leaving, [he] thought [he] had registered when [he] came out of prison in Illinois and that
two different states was confusing at best.” The district court granted th e downward

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durational departure and imposed the mandatory minimum prison term of one year and one
day. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
A defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilt y plea. State v.
Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Minn. 2010). But withdrawal must be allowed if “necessary
to correct a manifest injustice.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. A manifest injustice
arises when a guilty plea is not valid. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. A guilty plea is valid if
it is intelligent, voluntary, and accurate. Id. The defendant bears the burden of proving
that a plea was invalid. Id. A defendant may challenge the validity of a guilty plea for the
first time on direct appeal. State v. Newcombe, 412 N.W.2d 427, 430 (Minn. App. 1987),
review denied (Minn. Nov. 13, 1987). We review the validity of a guilty plea de novo.
Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94.
Here, McCain challenges only the accuracy of his plea. For a guilty plea to be
accurate, it must be supported by a proper factual basis, with “sufficient facts on the record
to support a conclusion that defendant’s conduct falls within the charge to which he desires
to plead guilty.” State v. Iverson , 664 N.W.2d 346, 349 -50 (Minn. 2003) (quotation
omitted). The factual basis of a plea is inadequate if a defendant makes statements that
negate an essential element of the charged offense. Id. at 350. We review the sufficiency
of the factual basis for a plea from the record made when the defendant entered it. State v.
Lillemo, 410 N.W.2d 66, 69 (Minn. App. 1987).
McCain pleaded guilty to violati ng Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5(a) , which states
that it is a felony to knowingly violate its provisions or to intentionally provide false

4
information to a corrections official. To be convicted of knowingly violating a prov ision
of the predatory-offender registration statute, a defendant must know that he is violating
the law at the time of the violation. State v. Mikulak, 903 N.W.2d 600, 603 (Minn. 2017)
(“Accordingly, the knowledge and the violation must occur at the same time.”).
At the plea hearing, McCain’s attorney asked McCain a series of quest ions about
his failure to register:
Q. And, Mr. McCain, it is correct that back in December of
2015 you were under an obligation to register as . . .
what we call a predatory offender in the state of
Minnesota; is that right?
A. Correct.
Q. And you were aware of that requirement, and for many
years you had been doing what you were supposed to
do; is that correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And then you went to the state of Illinois for a visit, but
unfortunately you were arrested and incarcerated in the
state of Illinois; is that right?
A. Correct.
Q. But you understand one of the obligations under
Minnesota law was that you were supposed to contact
the state of Minnesota and let them know where you
were; is that right?
A. Correct.
Q. And you did not do that; is that right?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay. And you understood you had an obligation and
you attempted to make some steps but you didn’t do it;
is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Okay. And that’ s what makes you guilty of failing to
comply with the registration requirements; is that
correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you understand you are required to register for your
lifetime; is that right?
A. Yes, sir.

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Then, the prosecutor asked McCain, “[Y]ou knew of your requirement to register or
to contact Minnesota if you were in a different state, correct? You knew that you were
supposed to do that?” McCain responded, “I do now, yes, sir.” The prosecutor then
inquired, “Well, did you know at the time that you were supposed to contact Minnesota if
you left?” McCain stated, “I don’t think I did, but I do now.”
After an off -the-record conversation, McCain and his attorney had the following
exchange:
Q: Let me ask you this, Mr. McCain. You had gone
through the list of requirements multiple times—
A: Right.
Q: —with your [probation] officer?
A: Correct.
Q: And you do recall that at some point you had been told
that it’s your obligation to follow the requirements and
to provide them with your address?
A: Correct.
Q: Is that right?
A: Correct.
Q: And when they went through the requirements with you,
one of the things they told you is that if you left the state
you have to notify them; is that right?
A: Yes, sir.

McCain asserts that his plea is inaccurate because his statements to the prosecutor
negate the mens rea element of the failure -to-register offense. McCain analogizes to
Mikulak, where the defendant was charged with knowingly violating a prov ision of the
predatory-offender registration statute when he left his primary address in one county and
went to visit a friend in another county without informing law enforcement. 903 N.W.2d
at 602. The state alleged that Mikulak violated Minn. Stat. § 243.155, subd. 3a(a), (c)

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(2016), which requires a predatory offender who leaves a primary residence without
obtaining a new one to register within 24 hours of leaving the primary residence and 24
hours of entering a new jurisdiction. Id. Mikulak pleaded guilty but stated during the plea
hearing that he did not register in the new county because he thought he had a w eek to do
so. Id. at 602, 605. Mikulak agreed that he had been informed of the 24-hour registration
requirement but stated that he did not remember at the time that he changed counties. Id.
at 602. When asked whether he was satisfied that the seven-day registration period did not
apply, Mikulak stated, “Yeah, now I am.” Id. The supreme court held that the “factual
basis fails to satisfy the accuracy requirement for a valid plea because Mikulak made
statements that were not withdrawn or corrected a nd that negated the mens rea element of
the charged offense.” Id. at 605.
McCain’s statements during his plea hearing are nearly identical to those made by
Mikulak. McCain agreed that he was under an obligation to register and did not do so. But
when asked if he knew of the requirement to register in Minnesota if he was in a different
state, McCain stated, “I do now, yes, sir.” When asked if he knew at the time that he was
supposed to contact Minnesota when leaving the state, McCain responded, “I don’t think I
did, but I do now.” Like the statements made by Mikulak, these statements neg ate the
mens rea element of the failure-to-register offense because they show that McCain was not
aware at the time of the violation that he was in violation of the statute.
The state contends that McCain’s plea was accurate because his statements were
withdrawn or corrected during the second round of questions asked by his attorney.
Specifically, McCain was asked if he reviewed the registration requi rements with his

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probation officer and whether he had been told “at some point” that it was his obliga tion
to follow the requirements. McCain responded in the affirmative to the question.
In Mikulak, the defendant had similarly been informed of the regis tration
requirement in the past and agreed that he had signed a reporting form acknowledging the
24-hour registration requirement. Id. at 602, 60 5. Nevertheless, the supreme court held
that Mikulak’s statements on the record rendered his plea inaccurate because they di d not
support a conclusion that he knew, at the time of the violation, that he was violating the
registration requirements. Id. at 605. The same is true here. McCain’s acknowledgment
that he had previously been informed o f the registration requirements and his agreement
that he had signed a form of acknowledgment do not correct his previous statements that
he did not know that he was violating the registration requirement at the time of the offense.
These statements negate the mens rea requirement of “knowingly” imposed by Minn. Stat.
§ 243.166, subd. 5(a). Because the record does not show that these statements were
withdrawn or corrected, we conclude that McCain’s guilty plea is inaccurate and, therefore,
invalid. Because it is invalid, there is a manifest injustice and McCain should be permitted
to withdraw his plea. We reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.