State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0568

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Troy Brown,
Appellant.

Filed January 28, 2019
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-17-23598

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin Coun ty Attorney, Michael Richardson, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jodi Lynn Proulx, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Hoote n, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and
Cochran, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
In this direct appeal from his convictions for two counts of s econd-degree assault,
appellant Troy Brown argues that his convictions must be reversed because the state failed

2
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant used a box cutter as a dangerous weapon.
We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant1 was convicted of two counts of second-degree assault with a dangerous
weapon in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1 (2016). The charges arose from an
incident at the U.S. Bank Stadium light-rail station in which appellant, using a box cutter,
threatened his ex-girlfriend (F.M.) and a male whom F.M. refers to as her cousin (S.L.).
F.M. testified that she and appellant broke off their relation ship about a month
before the incident. F.M. said that she and S.L. were waiting for a train when appellant
approached them on the platform. F.M. testified that she was s cared and did not want to
talk with appellant. She therefore became loud and tried to ca use a scene. Appellant
punched F.M. in the face. A bystander, N.F., testified at trial that he saw appellant hit F.M.
in the face with a closed fist. S.L. then began defending F.M. until the two were separated
by N.F.
F.M. and S.L. then walked away, but appellant followed them to the other side of
the platform. F.M. testified that appellant was threatening her and S.L. with a yellow box
cutter and that “[appellant] said that he would kill me.” N.F. , the bystander, testified that
he did not see a box cutter in appellant’s hands, but his line of sight was obstructed “because
they had walked past the pillars.” F.M. and S.L. were able to distance themselves from
appellant, but appellant ran after them again. Video footage f rom the light-rail station

1 Appellant uses several aliases, and the record suggests that “Troy Brown” may have been
an alias. No issue is raised on appeal concerning appellant’s identity or name.

3
shows appellant first chasing aft er S.L., and then F.M. Appell ant can be seen holding a
yellow object. F.M. testified at trial that she ran away from appellant because she was
scared that he would kill her. Police arrived moments later to find a group of people trying
to keep appellant away from F.M. and S.L. Police arrested appe llant. Officers found a
yellow box cutter in appellant’s pocket. A jury found appellan t guilty of two counts of
second-degree assault.
This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
Appellant argues that the state failed to prove beyond a reason able doubt that
appellant committed second-degree assault. In a criminal proceeding, the prosecution must
prove every element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jones, 347
N.W.2d 796, 800 (Minn. 1984). When considering a claim of insu fficient evidence, an
appellate court conducts a thorough review of the record to det ermine whether the
evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the convic tion, was sufficient to
permit the jurors to reach the verdict which they did. State v. Ortega, 813 N.W.2d 86, 100
(Minn. 2012). This court must assume that “the jury believed t he state’s witnesses and
disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” State v. Moore, 438 N.W.2d 101, 108 (Minn.
1989). “We will not disturb the verdict if the jury, acting wi th due regard for the
presumption of innocence and for the necessity of overcoming it by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, could reasonabl y conclude that [a] defendant was proven guilty of the
offense charged.” Bernhardt v. State, 684 N.W.2d 465, 476-77 (Minn. 2004) (quotation
omitted).

4
Second-degree assault is defined , in relevant part, as “an act done with intent to
cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm or death” and du ring which a dangerous
weapon was used. Minn. Stat. §§ 609.02, subd. 10(1), .222, subd. 1 (2016). A dangerous
weapon is “any device designed as a weapon and capable of producing death or great bodily
harm.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 6 (2016). In addition to t his definition, a dangerous
weapon can be any “other device or instrumentality that, in the manner it is used or intended
to be used, is calculated or lik ely to produce death or great b odily harm.” Minn. Stat.
§ 609.02, subd. 6; see State v. Moss, 269 N.W.2d 732, 735-36 (Minn. 1978). Accordingly,
even ordinary objects can become dangerous weapons based on the manner in which they
are used. See State v. Basting, 572 N.W.2d 281, 285 (Minn. 1997); State v. Cepeda, 588
N.W.2d 747, 748-49 (Minn. App. 1999).
A p p e l l a n t a s s e r t s t h a t t h e s t a t e f a i l e d t o p r o v e b e y o n d a r e a sonable doubt that
appellant used, or intended to use, the box cutter in a manner capable of producing great
bodily harm or death to F.M. or S.L. Supporting this assertion, appellant claims that F.M.’s
testimony was not credible or cor roborated, because F.M.’s test imony that appellant was
“flailing” the box cutter at her and at S.L. does not correspon d with the video footage or
N.F.’s testimony.
Credibility
Appellant challenges F.M.’s credi bility because F.M. was unable to articulate a
specific threat made by appellant, and it was only after the st ate questioned her about
appellant’s specific threat to k ill her that she answered in th e affirmative. Appellant’s
challenge is directly contrary to the record evidence.

5
F.M. testified that she was scared, and when the state asked her what she was scared
of, F.M. testified that “[appellant] said he would kill me.” F .M. articulated a fear that
appellant would kill her, and the jury’s verdict evidences that it believed F.M.’s testimony.
The credibility of the witness is for the jury to determine, no t a reviewing court. See
Staunton v. State, 784 N.W.2d 289, 298 (Minn. 2010); State v. Cao, 788 N.W.2d 710, 716-
17 (Minn. 2010).
Corroboration
Appellant correctly argues that the video evidence in the record does not reveal, and
N.F. was not able to verify at trial, that appellant was “swing ing” the box cutter, as F.M.
testified. First, F.M.’s testi mony requires no corroboration. See State v. Foreman , 680
N.W.2d 536, 539 (Minn. 2004) (“[A] conviction can rest on the uncorroborated testimony
of a single credible witness.” (quotation omitted)). Second, l arge pillars obstructed both
the camera and N.F.’s view of appellant’s actions to which F.M. testified. Finally,
immediately after the moment at which F.M. testified that appel lant was swinging a box
cutter, the video footage shows appellant, with a yellow object in his hand, running after
both F.M. and S.L. Police found a yellow box cutter in appella nt’s pocket when they
arrested him. F.M.’s testimony is consistent with the other evidence in the case.
While the evidence of appellant “swinging” the box cutter at F. M . a n d S . L . i s
limited, there is no reason to interfere on appeal with the jur y’s record-supported verdict.
To the contrary, the act of appellant chasing after F.M. and S.L., with a box cutter in hand,
coupled with F.M.’s testimony that appellant said he was going to kill her, amply supports

6
the jury’s conclusion that appe llant committed assault with a d angerous weapon. The
record evidence is sufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict.
Affirmed.