State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0574

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Lewis Henry Kaufman,
Appellant.

Filed March 11, 2019
Affirmed
Halbrooks, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-VB-17-3026

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, Kyle R. Triggs, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

John J. Neal, Willenbring, Dahl, Wocken & Zimmermann, PLLC, Cold Spring, Minnesota
(for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and
Jesson, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HALBROOKS, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of speeding, arguing that the state is required to
prove that the entity with jurisdiction over the roadway adopted a 35 -mile-per-hour zone,

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or, alternatively, that Minn. Stat. § 169.06, subd. 4(c ) (2018), creates an unconstitutional
mandatory presumption that relieves the state of its burden of proof. We affirm.
FACTS
In March 2017, appellant Lewis Henry Kaufman was driving north on Highway 15
in St. Augusta. Kaufman drove past a sign that indicated a reduced speed limit of 35 miles
per hour. A Minnesota state trooper was stationed on the side of Highway 15 with a radar
gun. The radar indicated that Kaufman’s vehicle was traveling at 52 miles per hour. The
trooper pulled Kaufman over and issued him a speeding ticket in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 169.14, subd. 2(a) (2016).
A court trial was held in which the state trooper was the sole witness. Kaufman
argued to the district court that the state did not prove that the entity with jurisdiction over
the rural residential district had adopted a speed limit of 35 miles per hour, therefore
requiring dismissal of the citation. The district court ruled that the state did not need to
prove that the speed limit had been adopted and found Kaufman guilty of spe eding. This
appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Kaufman first asserts that the state must prove that the entity with jurisdiction over
the road adopted a 35-mile-per-hour speed limit in order to convict him of speeding under
Minn. Stat. § 169.14, subd. 2(a)( 8). He contends that the clause “if adopted by the road
authority” creates an additional element of proof.
Whether the adoption clause in subdivision 2(a)(8) creates an additional element of
the offense presents a question of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. State

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v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 307 (Minn. 2012). “The objective of statutory interpretation is
to ascertain and effectuate the Legislature’s intent.” State v. Struzyk, 869 N.W.2d 280, 284
(Minn. 2015). When we interpret a statute, we give words and phrases their plain and
ordinary meaning. Id. If the language of the statute is clear, we interpret the statute
according to its plain meaning. Cocchiarella v. Driggs , 8 84 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Minn.
2016). When the language of the statute is susceptible to more than one reasonable
interpretation, we may consider the canons of statutory construction to ascertain its
meaning. Struzyk, 869 N.W.2d at 285.
Speed limits are established in Minn. Stat. § 169.14 (2018). Subdivision 2 provides
a default speed for locations not specifically set forth in the section. See Minn. Stat.
§ 169.14, subd. 2(a)(3) ( stating “55 miles per hour in locations other than those specified
in this section”). This subdivision also provides two alternative speed limits that the road
authority with jurisdiction over the roadway may adopt. One is provided in Minn. Stat.
§ 169.14, subd. 2(a)(8): “35 miles per hour in a rural residential district if adop ted by the
road authority having jurisdiction over the rural residential district.” A speed limit adopted
under subdivision 2(a)(8) “is not effective unless the road authority has erected signs
designating the speed limit and indicating the beginning and end of the rural residential
district for the roadway on which the speed limit applies.” Minn. Stat. § 169.14, subd. 2(c).
When considering the plain meaning of subdivision 2(a)(8), we first must determine
if the adoption clause creates an additional ele ment of proof for speeding in a rural
residential district. Kaufman argues that the statute is unambiguous and that its meaning
is plain. He contends that because the adoption clause appears in two of the eight speed -

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limit sections of the subdivision, it creates an additional pr oof element for those
subdivisions. See Minn. Stat. § 169.14, subd. 2(a)(1) -(8). In its brief, the state suggested
that the statute is ambiguous . But at oral argument, the state proposed that we find the
statute unambiguous and that its plain meaning precludes the creation of an additional
element of proof based on the adoption clause.
We agree that the statute is unambiguous. When interpreting a statute, we read and
construe a statute as a whole and interpret each section in light of the surrounding sections
in order to avoid conflicting interpretations. Am. Family Ins. Grp. v. Schroedl, 616 N.W.2d
273, 277 (Minn. 2000). While statutory interpretation focuses on the language of the
provision, it is sometimes necessary to analyze the provision in its surrounding context. Id.
at 278. In light of section 169.14 as a whole, and specifically subdivision 2(c), subdivision
2(a)(8) unambiguously provides for an optional reduced speed limit for rural residential
districts.
The adoption clause in subdivisions 2(a)(7) and 2(a)(8) is the mechanism within the
provisions to differentiate these subdivisions from the default speeds listed above. The
adoption clause is the means by which the legislature authorized optional speed limits. It
does not create an additional element that the state must prove when a person is cited for
speeding in rural residential districts. Instead, subdivision 2(c) addresses what is required
to show that the speed limit on a road in a rural r esidential district is reduced to 35 miles
per hour: posted speed -limit signs that mark the beginning and end of the reduced speed
limit. Here, there is no dispute about the posted speed limit.

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A plain reading of section 169.14 as a whole reinforces the unambiguous meaning
that the adoption clause does not create an additional element of proof. While subdivision
2 sets maximum speed limits, subdivision 4 allows for the commissioner of transportation
to set speeds greater or less than the existing speed limit. This allows the commissioner to
effect a speed limit that conflicts with those set forth in subdivision 2 by erecting speed -
limit signs.
Subdivision 2 simply provides another method for setting a speed limit other than
those listed in subdivision 2(a)(1)-(6). It authorizes optional speed limits for residential
roadways and rural residential districts that conflict with the default 55-mile-per-hour
speed limit, which are made effective through the posting of speed-limit signs when
adopted by the l ocal authority and without the authority of the commissioner of
transportation. A plain reading of the section as a whole suggests that the speed-limit signs
for these areas, whether posted by the commissioner of transportation or the local road
authority, set the official speed limit. And any speed in excess of the posted limit is
unlawful.1 Because the language of the statute is clear, we conclude that a reduced speed
limit can be adopted by the local road authority. The new speed limit takes effect w hen
the speed is posted with signs marking the beginning and end of the reduced speed.

1 This is consistent with caselaw in which this court relied solely on the posted speed limit
of the roadway. See State v. Ali , 679 N.W.2d 359, 361 (Minn. App. 2004) (affirming
speeding violation in which defendant drove in excess of the posted speed limit of 30 miles
per hour); State, City of St. Louis Park v. Bogren , 410 N.W.2d 383, 384 -85 (Minn. App.
1987) (affirming speeding violation in which defendant drove in excess of the posted speed
limit of 30 miles per hour); State v. Champion, 400 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. App. 1987)
(affirming speeding violation when defendant drove in excess of posted speed limit when
sign read “speed limit 55”).

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Relying on Brechon, Kaufman argues that the adoption clause creates an additional
element of proof because it is incorporated into the definition of the offense. But his
reliance on Brechon is unsupported. In State v. Brechon, the defendant was convicted of
trespass and the supreme court was required to determine if the clause, “without claim of
right,” constituted an element of the crime. 352 N.W.2d 745, 749 (Minn. 1984). The
supreme court stated, “The test for determining what constitutes a basic element of rather
than an exception to a statut e has been stated as whether the exception is so incorporated
with the clause defining the offense that it becomes in fact a part of the description.” Id.
(quotation omitted).
Using the Brechon analysis, the question is whether the adoption clause is so
incorporated into the definition of the offense that it becomes part of the description.
See id. As discussed above, the adoption clause was not intended to define the offense of
speeding in rural residential districts. Instead, the clause was intended to provide for a
safer, reduced speed in rural residential areas where the local authority deemed a 55-mile-
per-hour limit too high. Minn. Stat. § 169.14, subd. 2(c), makes it clear that adopting the
reduced speed limit is not enough to set a maximum speed, but that it must be effected
through posted signage of the reduced limit. The adoption clause therefore does not create
an additional element under Brechon as it does not define the nature of the offense.
Kaufman additionally argues that the district court failed to account for the
comments to the Jury Instruction Guides for speeding. The district court, in part, utilized
the jury instructions to find Kaufman guilty. According to 10A Minnesota Practice ,
CRIMJIG 29.51 (2015), a person is guilty of speeding when he “drives a vehicle at a speed

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in excess of the posted speed limit.” The jury instruction , 10A Minnesota Practice,
CRIMJIG 29.52 (2015), advises the fact-finder that the elements of speeding are: (1) the
defendant drove a vehicle in an area where there was a posted speed limit, (2) the speed of
the defendant’s vehicle exceeded the posted speed limit, and (3) the defendant’s act
occurred in the county on the specified date. The comment section provides:
This instruction is a generic compilation of M.S.A. § 169.14,
subds. 4, 5, 5a and 5b, and is designed for the typical case
where the only issue is whether or not the defendant was
exceeding the posted limit. For those cases where there is a
contested issue as to the authority or manner in which the limit
was determined or posted, reference should be made to the
particular subdivision, as well as to M.S.A. § 169.06, subd. 4.

CRIMJIG 29.52. Minn. Stat. § 169.06, subd. 4(c), provides : “Whenever official traffic -
control devices 2 are placed in position approximately conforming to the requirements of
this chapter, such devices shall be presumed to have been so pla ced by the official act or
direction of lawful authority, unless the contrary shall be established by competent
evidence.”
Kaufman contends that the district court should have considered that he was cited
for violating subdivision 2(a)(8), instead of re lying solely on the three elements p rovided
in the jury instruction. But the district court did not err based on the presumption in Minn.
Stat. § 169.06, su bd. 4(c), that official traffic -control devices are presumed to have been
placed by the lawful authority. Because the 35-mile-per-hour speed limit was posted, the

2 “Official traffic-control devices” are defined as “all signs, signals, markings, and devices
not inconsistent with this chapter placed or erected by authority of a public body or official
having jurisdiction, for the purpose of regulating, warning, or guiding traffic.” Minn. Stat.
§ 169.011, subd. 49 (2018).

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district court correctly presumed that the reduced speed had been adopted by the
appropriate authority.
Kaufman alternati vely argues that Minn. Stat. § 169.06, subd. 4(c ), creates an
unconstitutional mandatory presumption. In a criminal case, the state must establish each
element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Williams, 324 N.W.2d
154, 160 (Minn. 1982). “[P]resumptions cannot be used in criminal cases to establish an
essential element of the offense because it casts on defendant the burden of proving his
innocence.” State v. O’Neill, 216 N.W.2d 822, 831 (Minn. 1974). Here, Kaufman argues
that the adoption clause is an element of the offense and that subdivision 4(c) mandatorily
presumes the adoption-clause element.
Because we conclude that the adoption clause does not constitute an element of the
crime of speeding under Minn. Stat. § 169.14 , subd. 2(a)(8), Kaufman’s argument fails .
There is no need to address the constitutionality of Minn. Stat. § 169.06, subd. 4(c), because
the presumption does not pertain to an element of the offense. See id. (“We have held that
presumptions cannot be us ed in criminal cases to establish an essential element of the
offense.” (emphasis added)).
Because the state does not need to prove that the entity with jurisdiction over a rural
residential district roadway adopted a 35 -mile-per-hour zone under Minn. Stat. § 169.14,
subd. 2(a)(8), we affirm.
Affirmed.