In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: A. D. S., D. L. B. and J. J. J., Parents.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0575

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:
A. D. S., D. L. B. and J. J. J., Parents.

Filed September 4, 2018
Affirmed
Kirk, Judge

McLeod County District Court
File No. 43-JV-17-95

Amber Donley, Gavin, Donley & Ostlund, Ltd., Glencoe, Minnesota (for appellant A.D.S.)

Michael Junge, McLeod County Attorney, Amy E. Olson, Assistant County Attorney,
Glencoe, Minnesota (for respondent McLeod County)

Scott L. Nokes, Glencoe, Minnesota (for respondent D.L.B.)

Troy Scotting, Hutchinson, Minnesota (for respondent J.J.J.)

Lisa Hill, Hutchinson, Minnesota (for respondent-child J.J.)

Erica Mendez, Gaylord, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Cleary, Chief Judge; Kirk, Judge; and Smith, Tracy M.,
Judge.

2
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
KIRK, Judge
On appeal from the involuntary termination of her parental rights, appellant mother
argues that the record does not support the district court’s conclusion s that: (1) mother is
palpably unfit to be a party to the parent -child relationship, (2) reasonable efforts by the
county failed to correct the conditions leading to the children’s placement, (3) the children
are neglected and in foster care, and (4) it is in the best interests of the children to terminate
mother’s parental rights. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant A.D.S. is the mother of J.J., born in 2006, and I.B., born in 2010.
Appellant also is the biological parent of six older children. Permanent custody of one of
appellant’s older children was voluntarily transferred to the child’s father in 2001 following
juvenile court proceedings in Anoka County. Appellant voluntarily terminated her rights
to her other five older children between 2002 and 2004 following further juvenile court
proceedings in Anoka County.
Appellant has been in a series of relationships with men who were uninvolved in
her children’s lives and were emotionally, verbally, or physically abusive, or involved with
drugs or both. Appellant has had a long -term “on and off ” relationship since 2005 with
J.J.J., J.J.’s father . At one point when appellant and J.J.J. were apart, appellant married
D.L.B., who is I.B.’s father. D.L.B. physically abus ed mother and was chemically
dependent.

3
J.J. and I.B. previously have been the subject of child -protection proceedings in
Wisconsin. In 2012, while living in Wisconsin, the children were removed from
appellant’s care for approximately e ight months. In March 2016, Wisconsin child
protection received a report from a hospital that appellant had overdosed on a tranquilizer,
tested positive for methamphetamines, and reported concern for her children because they
were living in a “meth house.”
In the summer of 2016, appellant left the children in J.J.J.’s care and came to
Minnesota by herself to look for housing to move away from J.J.J. While visiting the father
of one of her older children in jail, appellant met B.W. in the jail parking lot, and he offered
her rooms to rent in a residence with no running water or functioning toilets. Appellant
agreed to rent rooms from B.W. and moved into the residence in July. J.J. and I.B. moved
into the residence in early September 2016.
In November 2016, a report was made to McLeod County Social Services raising
concerns for the children’s welfare. When the children were interviewed, they stated that
they had no running water and primarily used a nearby gas station for toileting needs. On
December 1, 2016 , the children were removed from appellant’s home and placed in
relative-foster care with appellant’s 18 -year-old daughter. The following day McLeod
County filed a petition alleging that the children were in need of protection or services
(CHIPS).
Social services then discovered that I.B. suffered from significant dental neglect,
requiring extensive dental repairs while in foster care, specifically, six crowns, four fillings,
two root canals, and two pulled teeth. Both children have b een diagnosed with

4
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and J.J. has struggled with toileting accidents. In
March 2017, the district court held a court trial to determine whether the children should
be adjudicated CHIPS. Appellant did not appear for the hearing, and the children were
adjudicated CHIPS.
The children were placed in a nonrelative-foster home to which they adjusted easily
and where they did well and were happy. J.J., who was in fourth grade at the time, saw his
reading level go up from grade 2.5 to 4.0 from January to May. As part of permanency
planning, in September 2017, the children were placed with Foster Parent 1, an adult non-
joint daughter of J.J.J. J.J. attended court hearings with Foster Parent 1, and the district
court observed that J.J. has bonded to Foster Parent 1 and “looks to her for physical
affection, comfort, and emotional support.” Foster Parent 1 wants to adopt both children
to provide them with stability and security. Since the children have been placed with Foster
Parent 1, the previous nonrelative-foster parents have maintained contact with the children,
providing respite foster care o nce per month, and they also are interested in adopting the
children. Both Foster Parent 1 and the children’s nonrelative -foster mother testified that
they believe that it is in the children’s best interest s to maintain their relationships with
their biological parents.
When this case was first referred to McLeod County Social Services in November
2016, it requested that appellant submit to a drug test, which she refused. Appellant
eventually submitted to a test on December 13, 2016, and it came back po sitive for
methamphetamine. In March 2017, appellant completed a rule 25 evaluation, which

5
recommended inpatient chemical-dependency treatment, but appellant did not comply with
the recommendation.1
On April 11, 2017, appellant was hospitalized after ov erdosing on Lithium and
Lyrica. Initially, a ppellant was hospitalized in an intensive care unit , but she was
transferred to mental -health hospitalization and referred for potential civil commitment.
Following a contested hearing held on April 28, 2017, a ppellant was civilly committed as
mentally ill. On May 25, 2017, the district court filed an order authorizing the involuntary
administration of neuroleptic medication , but stayed that order on the condition that
appellant take neuroleptic medication as p rescribed. Later that day, the district court
revoked the stay when appellant refused to take her prescribed medication.
Near the completion of her inpatient menta l-health treatment, appellant was
recommended to attend inpatient chemical-dependency treatment. Appellant opposed the
suggestion and attended only under a court order requiring her to do so to be discharged
from the mental -health hospital. Ultimately, appellant was transferred directly from the
mental-health facility to inpati ent chemical -dependency treatment. When a ppellant
completed inpatient chemical -dependency treatment on September 15, 2017 , outpatient
treatment was recommended. Appellant opposed the recommendation.

1 J.J.J. attended hearings and participated in parenting time with appellant, but refused to
participate in a case plan and generally refused to cooperate with drug testing. J.J.J. agreed
to one hair-follicle test, which came back positive for methamphetamine. While the child-
protection matter was ongoing, J.J.J. was criminally charged in Wisconsin for possession
of methamphetamine. Appellant testified to being aware that J.J.J. drinks alcohol and has
used methamphetamine. However, appellant testified that she was not able to say whether
or not he is dependent on those substances. Appellant testified that “just drinking alcohol
don’t make you chemically dependent.”

6
On October 10, 2017, the district court held a review hearing, during which all
parties agreed to postpone trial on whether to terminate appellant’s parental rights because
she was in compliance with her case plan and it was in the children’s best interests to
continue reunification efforts. Appellant entered outpatient treatment on October 26, 2017,
and completed it on January 17, 2018. Despite her long history with drug abuse, appellant
testified that “the staying clean part is easy.”
In December of 2017, a ppellant had three police contacts , each involving the loan
of her car to acquaintances she met in chemical -dependency treatment. First, appellant
reported that an acquaintance did not return her car after she had allowed him to use it.
Second, two acquaintances from treatment who had borrowed appel lant’s car came to the
attention of the police because one had an outstanding warrant for his arrest . Appellant
allowed law enforcement to enter her home and arrest both acquaintances on outstanding
warrants. Finally, appellant reported that she had allo wed two other acquaintances from
treatment to borrow he r car and that they did not return with it when they told her they
would. Appellant missed her parenting time on the days of the second and third contact .
On the day of the second contact, a ppellant told a social worker that she could not go to
parenting time because she had to work, and on the day of the third contact, she told the
social worker that she was sick.
The case was tried to the district court over one week in February 2018. At that
time, appellant was on the verge of being evicted. Her landlord had loaned her $2,789.50
to purchase furniture, and her church had contributed $1,700 to pay rent. Appellant had
paid back nothing towards the loan, had not made any rent payments herself o ver five

7
months, and was at least $2,100 behind in rent. Appellant testified that she has been
employed at times and had employment lined up but was not employed at that time.
Appellant testified that her relationship with J.J.J. included emotional or m ental
violence and that they “disagree a lot .” Appellant nevertheless expressed “wishes and
hopes” to reunify herself and the children with J.J.J. as a family. Appellant testified that
she remained friends with W.B ., who was, at the time of trial, incarc erated for felony
assault.
Both the social worker and the guardian ad litem assigned to this case testified that
termination of appellant’s parental rights is in the best interest s of the children. On
March 22, 2018, the district court ordered appellant ’s parental rights be terminated. This
appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
I. The record supports the district court’s finding that appellant is palpably unfit
to parent.

“We review the termination of parental rights to determine whether the district
court’s findings address the statutory criteria and whether the district court’s findings are
supported by substantial evidence and are not clearly erroneous.” In re Welfare of Children
of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008). “A finding is clearly erroneous if it is either
manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the
evidence as a whole.” In re Welfare of Children of T.R., 750 N.W.2d 656, 660-61 (Minn.
2008) (quotation omitted). “Termination of parental rights will be affirmed as long as at
least one statutory ground for termination is supported by clear and convincing evidence

8
and termination is in the child’s best interests.” In re Welfare of Children of R.W. , 678
N.W.2d 49, 55 (Minn. 2004). We apply an abuse -of-discretion standard of review to the
district court’s decision to terminate parental rights. See In re Welfare of Child of R.D.L.,
853 N.W.2d 127, 136 -37 (Minn. 2014) (“[T]ermination of parental rights is always
discretionary.”).
Appellant challenges the district court’s determination that she is palpably unfit to
parent. A district court may terminate parental rights to a child it if finds that the parent
is palpably unfit to be a party to the parent and child
relationship because of a consistent pattern of specific conduct
before the child or of specific conditions directly relating to the
parent and child relationship either of which are determined by
the court to be of a duration or nature that renders the parent
unable, for the reasonably foreseeable future, to care
appropriately for the ongoing physical, mental, or emotional
needs of the child.
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4) (2016). The petitioner must prov e “a consistent
pattern of specific conduct or specific conditions existing at the time of the hearing that
appear will continue for a prolonged, indefinite period and that are permanently detrimental
to the welfare of the child.” T.R., 750 N.W.2d at 661 (quotation omitted). In deciding
whether to terminate parental rights, the district court should rely “ not primarily on past
history, but to a great extent upon the projected permanency of the parent’s inability to care
for his or her child.” In re Welfare of A.D., 535 N.W.2d 643, 649 (Minn. 1995) (quotation
omitted).
In this case, the district court found that appellant ha s a pattern of being involved
with unhealthy living arrangements, including many partners and other individuals who

9
abused her, used drugs, or engaged in criminal activity. The district court specifically noted
appellant’s continued involvement with J.J.J. and B.W., despite serious questions about
their lifestyles.
The district court also noted appellant’s continued inabili ty to set proper priorities,
like paying rent. The record reflects that appellant repeatedly provided the children with
gifts, but did not pay anything toward rent for five months and was on the verge of eviction.
The district court concluded that, despite some positive progress, appellant “continue[d] to
demonstrate the same pattern of behavior and choices that indicate she cannot provide an
adequately safe, stable home for the children.”
Appellant argues that the district court erred in not giving her sufficient credit for
the progress she had made both in and out of treatment and that she is capable of parenting
her children. The record demonstrates that the district court fully considered and credited
the progress appellant had made, and weighed it against her continued pattern of
associating with individuals involved in drugs or crime and her continued inability to
ensure stable housing for the children. Although appellant did have housing at the time of
trial, the record supports the district court’s finding that appellant demonstrated a continued
pattern of failing to prioritize housing for her children.
On this record, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that appellant
was palpably unfit to parent. Because a single statutory basis for termination is sufficient
to affirm a district court, we need not address the other statutory bases for termination. See
R.W., 678 N.W.2d at 55.

10
II. Termination of appellant’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests.

The children’s best interests is “ the paramount consideration” when deciding
whether to terminate parental rights. In re Welfare of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 902 (Minn.
App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012); Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2016).
“In analyzing the best interests of the child, the court must balance three factors: (1) the
child’s interest in preserving the parent -child relationship; (2) the parent’s interest in
preserving the parent -child relationship; and (3) any competing interest o f the child.” In
re Welfare of R.T.B. , 492 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 1992); see also Minn. R. Ju v. Prot.
P. 39.05, subd. 3 (b)(3). Competing interests may include “a stable environment [and]
health considerations.” R.T.B., 492 N.W.2d at 4. “We review a di strict court’s ultimate
determination that termination is in a child ’s best interest for an abuse of discretion .”
J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 905.
Here, the district court considered J.J.’s testimony that he loves appellant and wishes
to return to her, and that the same is likely true of I.B. The district court also considered
that appellant loves her children. The district court noted that the termination of appellant’s
parental rights will not necessarily end the parent-child relationship because the children’s
current foster -care provider demonstrated an interest in preserving the children’s
relationship with appellant , and then weighed the children’s and appellant’s interest in
preserving the parent-child relationship against the children’s need for stability.
Both children have gone through multiple placements, have been diagnosed with
PTSD, and have been out of home for over a year. The children are current ly happy and
stable in their foster home. Both the social worker and the guardian ad litem assigned to

11
this case testified that termination of appellant’s parental rights is in the best interest s of
the children. The record supports the district court’s assessment that the competing
interests of the children in being in a safe, stable, and secure environment weigh strongly
in favor of termination. On this record, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
finding that termination of appellant’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests.
Because the record supports the distr ict court’s findings, and because the district
court properly applied the law to those findings, the district court did not abuse its
discretion when it terminated appellant’s parental rights to both children.
Affirmed.