In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: R. J. L., Parent.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0600

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
R. J. L., Parent.

Filed October 22, 2018
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Pipestone County District Court
File No. 59-JV-17-57

Travis J. Smith, Kayla M. Johnson, Smith & Johnson, Slayton, Minnesota (for appellant
R.J.L.)

Thomas J. Nolan, Jr., Nolan Law Offices, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Alex
Miller)

Damain D. Sandy, Pipestone County Attorney, Pipestone, Minnesota (for respondent
Southwest Health and Human Services)

Shanna Latterell, Redwood Falls, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and
Jesson, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BRATVOLD, Judge
Appellant-mother challenges the district court’s order adjudicating her child to be
in need of protection or services (CHIPS), arguing that: (1) the district court failed to
comply with Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 40.02 (rule 40.02) when it did not adjudicate CHIPS
2
“at a hearing”; (2) the district court failed to comply with rule 40.02 because it did not
adjudicate CHIPS within 90 days of the admit/deny hearing; and (3) the district court
abused its discretion in determining that mother failed to comply with the conditions of the
stay. We conclude that mother is not entitled to relief because the district court’s failure to
adjudicate CHIPS “at a hearing” did not prejudice mother, the CHIPS order was issued
before the stay of adjudication expired, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in
finding that mother failed to comply with the stay conditions. Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant-mother, R. J.L., was convicted of “counterfeiting/fraud and probation
violation[s],” and sentenced to the Minnesota Women’s Prison in Shakopee. In September
2017, while incarcerated, mother gave birth to R.X.L.F. The prison lacked facilities for
infants and R.X.L.F.’s father was unknown. Mother and respondent Southwest Health and
Human Services (the county ) reached a voluntary out- of-home placement agreement to
place R.X.L.F. in foster care with his sibling, Child 2. 1 R.X.L.F. has remained there since
September 2017.
Respondent Alex Miller, manager of the Fifth Judicial District Guardian ad Litem
program, filed a CHIPS petition alleging that R.X.L.F. was in need of protection or services
because (1) the child is without necessary food, clothing, shelter, education, or other
required care for the child’s physical or mental health, see Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd.

1 Child 2, born in 2015, is also mother’s biological child. Mother voluntarily terminated
her rights to Child 2, who is not a subject of the CHIPS petition on appeal.

3
6(3) (2016); and (2) the child is without the special care made necessary by a physical,
mental, or emotional condition because the child’s parent is unable or unwilling to provide
that care, see Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6(4) (2016).
On December 21, 2017, at the admit/deny hearing, the parties informed the court
that they had reached an agreement. Mother agreed to admit that R.X.L.F. was in need of
protection or services, and the parties requested that the court withhold adjudication of the
CHIPS petition for 90 days, as authorized by Minn. R. Juv. P. 40.02, provided that mother
follow several conditions. After a brief discussion, the district court stated that mother’s
consent to the CHIPS finding it “ha[d] been voluntarily and intelligently given” and that
the district court would “issue an order” after the hearing.
On January 2, 2018, the district court issued an order with these conclusions of law:
(1) R.X.L.F. met the statutory definition of a child in need of protection; (2) R.X.L.F. was
without necessary food, clothing, shelter, education, or other required care; and
(3) “[r]eunification . . . [was] not in [R.X.L.F.’s] best interests.” The district court ordered
that the CHIPS adjudication was stayed for a period of ninety (90) days and was contingent
on the following conditions:
1. The Child shall remain in the custody of the Agency for
placement in licensed foster care.
2. The Mother shall complete parenting education classes
and/or provide verification of completion of the same.
3. The Agency shall schedule a Diagnostic Assessment for the
Mother and the Mother shall make satisfactory progress toward
compliance with the recommendations.
4. The Agency shall schedule a Chemical Use Assessment for
the Mother and the Mother shall make satisfactory progress
toward compliance with the recommendations.
4
5. The Mother shall abstain from use and/or possession of non-
prescription drugs and shall submit to random testing to verify
such abstinence.
6. The Mother shall obtain proper housing for herself and the
Child and ensure that all basic needs of the Child are met. The
Agency shall follow- up with the Mother to ensure proper
housing and supplies are in place for the Child upon the
Mother’s release from custody.
7. That the Mother shall cooperate with the Agency, the
guardian, and the case plan.

The parties appeared for a review hearing on March 20, 2018; the court received
reports from the guardian ad litem (GAL) and a social worker on behalf of the county and
heard mother’s testimony. The GAL report stated that mother had completed her prison
sentence and had entered inpatient chemical-dependency treatment at Project Turnabout in
Granite Falls. The GAL report also stated that mother and R.X.L.F. had visits once a week,
and that these visits were positive and mother was very attentive with R.X.L.F. The GAL
report noted that mother had located housing in Iowa and was working with her parole
officer to complete an Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) in order to
move to Iowa. The GAL report recommended that R.X.L.F. be adjudicated CHIPS and that
legal custody remain with the county until mother completed inpatient treatment
programming and a diagnostic assessment, located safe and stable housing, “determine[ d]
how she will financially maintain housing and meet her and [R.X.L.F.’s] physical needs,”
and continued to abstain from “mood altering chemicals.”
The county report stated that mother had com pleted parent-education classes and
cooperated with a chemical-dependency assessment. The county report also stated that
mother had signed all requested releases and was doing “well working the program at
5
Project Turnabout.” The county report noted that completing an ICPC to allow mother to
move to Iowa might “take up to 45 days.” And the county report stated that mother had not
yet completed a diagnostic assessment, but that the county was “going to reach out to get
a date set up.” The county report recommended that R.X.L.F. be adjudicated CHIPS and
that legal custody remain with the county.
Mother testified that she had completed parenting-education classes and the
chemical-dependency assessment , and she was complying with its recommendations.
Mother also testified that she had not completed the diagnostic assessment, but planned to
complete it as soon as the county provided an appointment. And mother testified that she
was currently in chemical-dependency treatment and was complying with all requirements
of the treatment program, and had an anticipated release date of March 28, 2018. Mother
also testified about the housing she had found in Iowa. Upon her release, mother planned
to stay with h er uncle until she received the ICPC approval. When asked how she would
financially provide for R.X.L.F., mother testified that she planned to start applying for jobs
and had obtained general assistance.
Miller stated that he recognized the “spectacular” progress mother had made and
her efforts were “very much appreciated.” The district court said it would “take this matter
under advisement,” but wanted to recognize “the progress [mother] made in treatment and
. . . the dedication” mother had shown on the “road to recovery.” The district court stated
that even if it adjudicated R.X.L.F. as CHIPS, this adjudication would not impact mother’s
“progress in recovery and [her] ability to achieve a reunification.”
6
On March 26, 2018, the district court issued a written order stating that mother had
complied with the following conditions: completed parenting-education classes; completed
a chemical-use assessment and complying with its recommendations; abstained from use
and/or possession of non-prescription drugs and submitted to random testing; and
cooperated with the agency , guardian, and case plan. But the district court found that
mother had not fulfilled two conditions: (a) she had not scheduled a diagnostic assessment,
although the district court noted that mother’s failure to complete a diagnostic assessment
was “due to scheduling rather than any purposeful delay on her part,” and (b) she had not
obtained proper housing for herself and R.X.L.F. to ensure that all his basic needs would
be met. The district court emphasized that it was particularly “concerned with the lack of
proper housing,” which was necessary to ensure the “needs of the child are met,” pursuant
to the stay of adjudication. The district court order provided that “the stay of adjudication
[was] vacated” and R.X.L.F. “shall be adjudged in need of protection effective April 2,
2018,” when the stay expired.
On April 2, 2018, mother moved to dism iss the CHIPS petition, arguing that she
completed the diagnostic assessment after the March 20 review hearing, and she had
obtained proper housing, was able to en sure that all of R.X.L.F.’s basic needs were met,
and had received permission from her parole officer to move to Iowa. The GAL report
opposed mother’s motion, stating that, given mother’s history, it was important that she
“become established” in her “new community” before regaining custody of R.X.L.F. The
GAL report also noted that mother’s recent “staffing report” from Project Turnabout stated
that mother had a “high risk of relapse,” had “no coping skills” to address “mental health
7
or addiction illness or prevent relapse.” The GAL report stated that she had not yet seen
the results from the diagnostic assessment. The county also submitted a report
recommending that the district court deny mother’s motion.
The district court conducted a hearing on April 10, 2018. Miller testified that the
county would like to see the services “in place,” rather than “simply . . . arranged for,” and
would also like the ICPC “completed prior to reunifying” R.X.L.F. with mother. The
district court stated that mother had made “very good progress,” but had not fully complied
with the stay conditions before April 2. On April 10, 2018, the district court issued a written
order denying mother’s motion and ordered that R.X.L.F. “shall remain in the custody of
the [county] for placement in licensed foster care” and mother shall “comply in full with
the existing case plan.” Mother appeals.
D E C I S I O N
I. The district court did not violate rule 40.02 when it adjudicated R.X.L.F. in
need of protection or services.

The procedures for juvenile protection matters are governed by the Minnesota Rules
of Juvenile Protection Procedure. See In re Welfare of L.L.P., 836 N.W.2d 563, 569 (Minn.
App. 2013). Under rule 40.02, when it is in the best interest of the child, a district court
may withhold a CHIPS adjudication for up to 90 days “from the finding that the statutory
grounds set forth in the petition have been proved.” Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 40.02, subd. 1.
Rule 40.02 further provides:
At a hearing, which shall be held within ninety (90) days
following the court’s withholding of adjudication, the court
shall either:
8
(a) dismiss the matter without an adjudication if both the child
and the child’s legal custodian have complied with the terms
of the continuance; or
(b) adjudicate the child in need of protection or services if
either the child or the child’s legal custodian has not complied
with the terms of the continuance.

Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 40.02, subd. 2.
On appeal, mother challenges the district court’s CHIPS adju dication because the
court did not comply with rule 40.02. First, mother argues that the district court erred
because it did not dismiss the matter or adjudicate the child as CHIPS “at a hearing.”
Second, mother argues that the district court erred in determining that the stay expired on
April 2, 2018. Third, mother argues that, even if the stay expired on April 2, the CHIPS
adjudication was still untimely. We discuss each of mother’s objections in turn.
A. Failing to adjudicate CHIPS at the hearing
Mother argues that rule 40.02, subdivision 2, provides that the district court “shall”
adjudicate or dismiss the matter at a hearing, and “shall” is mandatory. See Minn. Stat.
§ 645.44, subds. 1, 16 (2016) (stating that, for the purposes of statutes and legislative acts,
“‘Shall’ is mandatory”). Accordingly, mother argues that the plain language of rule 40.02
requires that the district court hold a hearing within 90 days, and, at that hearing, either
dismiss the matter or adjudicate CHIPS. Because the district court failed to adjudicate or
dismiss at the March 20 review hearing, mother argues that this court must reverse the
CHIPS adjudication. Respondent argues that, even if the district court failed to adjudicate
at the hearing, reversal of the adjudication is not warranted because rule 40.02 does not
provide a consequence for a court’s failure to properly adjudicate. This issue requires the
9
court to interpret the Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Protection Procedure. This court
interprets procedural rules de novo. See Matter of Welfare of Child of R.K., 901 N.W.2d
156, 159 (Minn. 2017).
We agree with mother that the district court failed to comply with rule 40.02,
subdivision 2’s requirement to adjudicate or dismiss the CHIPS petition “at a hearing.” The
district court did not adjudicate or dismiss at the March 20 review hearing, but instead took
the “matter under advisement.” On March 26, 2018, the district court issued a written order
concluding that “the stay of adjudication is vacated” and R.X.L.F. “shall be adjudged in
need of protection effective April 2, 2018.”
We conclude, however, that the district court’s failure to comply with rule 40.02
does not warrant reversal. 2 Mother does not assert any prejudice arising from the district
court’s decision to adjudicate R.X.L.F. as CHIPS in a written order, rather than at the
hearing. To prevail on appeal, an appellant must show both error and prejudice resulting
from the error. See Midway Ctr. Assocs. v. Midway Ctr., Inc., 237 N.W.2d 76, 78 (1975)

2 In support of her argument, mother points to an unpublished decision from this court, In
re Welfare of C.L.C., which stated that, “when the district court withholds adjudication
after making a CHIPS finding it must either dismiss the matter or adjudicate the children
as CHIPS at a hearing while the stay is in force.” No. A16- 1103, 2016 WL 7042112, *3-
4 (Minn. App. Dec. 5, 2016) (e mphasis added). Unpublished opinions are not precedent,
but may be persuasive. See Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3(c) (2016); Dynamic Air, Inc. v.
Bloch, 502 N.W.2d 796, 800-01 (Minn. App. 1993) (stating that, while “of persuasive
value,” unpublished opinions “are not precedential”). We conclude that C.L.C. is
distinguishable. In C.L.C., the district court failed to adjudicate or dismiss the case at a
hearing during the 90-day stay. 2016 WL 7042112, *3-4. But, in C.L.C., the district court
“overlooked” the adjudication issue entirely and did not issue an adjudication on the CHIPS
issue until almost two months after the stay expired. Id. at. *4. Here, however, the district
court adjudicated R.X.L.F. as CHIPS in a written order before the stay expired.

10
(stating that, absent prejudice, error is not ground for reversal); In re Welfare of Children
of D.F., 752 N.W.2d 88, 98 (Minn. App. 2008) (applying harmless-error analysis in a
juvenile protection appeal). Here, the district court adjudicated CHIPS before the 90-day
stay expired. Additionally, the record shows that m other was aware of the written
adjudication because she filed a motion to dismiss.
Because mother asserts no prejudice from the district court’s decision to adjudicate
in a written order, and the district court adjudicated R.X.L.F. as CHIPS before the stay
expired, we conclude that the district court’s failure to adjudicate or dismiss at the March
20 hearing does not warrant reversal of this CHIPS adjudication.
B. Finding that the stay expired on April 2, 2018
Mother argues that the district court erred by determining that the stay of
adjudication expired on April 2, 2018. Under rule 40.02, subdivision 1, when it is in the
best interest of the child, the district court may withhold a CHIPS adjudication for up to 90
days “from the finding that the statutory grounds set forth in the petition have been proved.”
Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 40.02, subd. 1. Mother asserts that the district court withheld
adjudication at the admit/deny hearing on December 21, 2017. She argues, therefore, that
the stay of adjudication expired on March 21, 2018, and the district court erred by finding
that the stay expired on April 2, 2018. Respondents argue that the stay expired on April 2,
because the stay was imposed on January 2, 2018, when the district court issued its order
based on the December 21 admit/deny hearing.
We conclude that the stay commenced when the district court issued its order on
January 2, 2018, for three reasons. First, at the December 21 hearing, the district court
11
found that mother’s consent to the CHIPS finding was “voluntarily and intelligently given,”
and specifically stated that it intended to issue an order after the hearing. Also, the district
court’s statements during the hearing did not include the order to stay proceedings. Second,
the district court’s January 2 order included two notable differences from the stay
conditions that the parties described at the December 21 hearing: (1) the district court added
the requirement that mother cooperate with the agency, guardian, and the case plan; and
(2) the district court revised the housing condition. 3 Third, the district court did not
determine that “the statutory grounds set forth in the petition have been proved” at the
December 21 hearing; the court made this finding in its January 2 order. See Minn. R. Juv.
Prot. P. 40.02, subd. 1. Accordingly, we conclude that the stay commenced on January 2
and expired on April 2, 2018.
C. Timing of the CHIPS adjudication
Mother argues that, even if the stay expired on April 2, this court should reverse
because the CHIPS adjudication was untimely. The district court’s March 26 order stated
that, unless otherwise ordered, R.X.L.F. would be adjudicated CHIPS effective April 2,

3 At the December 21 hearing, mother’s attorney outlined the housing condition as
requiring mother to:
[O]btain proper housing for herself and the child and ensure
that all of the child’s basic needs can and will be met. [Mother]
has provided the agency with a proposed home and so the
agency will be responsible for checking the home and notifying
[mother] promptly of any concerns with that home so that she
may correct them or find alternate housing, and the agency will
also follow up with [mother] to make sure that she has all of
the supplies in place for [R.X.L.F.] after she is released from
custody.
12
2018, when the stay expired. On April 2, mother moved to dismiss the petition based on
her alleged compliance with the stay terms. The district court scheduled a hearing for
April 10. Thus, mother argues, the district court did not adjudicate CHIPS until April 10,
“outside of the 90-day timeframe.”
But, as conceded by mother, during the April 10 hearing, the district court stated
that it had adjudicated R.X.L.F. as CHIPS on April 2. The district court also explained that
mother had not complied with the terms “on or before April 2 when that agreement
expired.” Because the district court did not issue a subsequent inconsistent order after
March 26 and the order did not end pursuant to its terms, the March 26 order remained in
full force and effect. See Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 10.01 (providing that a written order “shall
remain in full force and effect pursuant to law or until the first occurrence of one of the
following: (a) issuance of an inconsistent order; or (b) the order ends pursuant to the terms
of the order”). In short, the district court’s decision to schedule a hearing on April 10 did
not alter the effective date of the March 26 order. Thus, we conclude that the district court’s
CHIPS adjudication was effective on April 2 and was timely.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that mother failed
to comply with the conditions of the stay.

Mother argues that the district court erred by determining that she failed to comply
with the conditions of the stay of adjudication. The district cour t’s March 26 order
determined that mother failed to comply with two conditions of the stay: (a) schedule a
diagnostic assessment and make “satisfactory progress toward compliance with the
13
recommendations,” and (b) “obtain” proper housing f or herself and R.X.L.F., and ensure
all his basic needs are met.
On appeal, mother argues that the district court’s conclusion that she failed to
comply with the conditions of the stay should be considered under the principles of contract
law, and reviewed de novo, because this court is required to interpret the terms of the
parties’ agreement. It is true that a settlement agreement is a contract. See TNT Props., Ltd.
v. Tri-Star Developers LLC, 677 N.W.2d 94, 100-01 (Minn. App. 2004). But the parties
did not enter into a settlement agreement in this case. Instead, the parties agreed on
conditions, which were subject to the court’s approval, that the mother must comply with
in order to satisfy the stay of adjudication. In fact, as stated above, the district court did not
rubberstamp the parties’ proposed conditions, and included two changes from the proposed
conditions in its order. Thus, as in other CHIPS proceedings, we conclude that the district
court’s findings “will not be reversed unless clearly erroneous or unsupported by
substantial evidence.” In re Welfare of B.A.B., 572 N.W.2d 776, 778 (Minn. App. 1998).
Mother initially argues that the district court erred in determining that she failed to
complete the diagnostic assessment because “the agency had failed to schedule it for her,”
and thus, that she was “relieved of her obligation to perform.” The district court noted in
its decision that mother’s failure to complete a diagnostic assessment was “due to
scheduling rather than any purposeful delay on her part.” Respondents concede on appeal
that mother’s failure to complete the diagnostic assessment did “not reflect non-
compliance” with the stay conditions. Accordingly, we do not consider mother’s failure to
14
complete the diagnostic assessment in determining whether mother complied with the stay
conditions, and analyze only mother’s failure to satisfy the housing condition.
Mother also argues that the district court erred in finding that she failed to “obtain”
proper housing for herself and R.X.L.F . because, at the March 20 review hearing, she
testified that she had signed a lease for a home in Iowa . Mother asserts that the district
court misinterpreted the housing condition as requiring “[o]ccupancy of actual housing,
rather than a plan for such housing, [to] ‘ensure that all basic needs of the child are met.’”
We conclude that the district court did not err in determining that “[ o]ccupancy of
actual housing” was necessary to satisfy the condition that mother “obtain proper housing”
and provide for R.X.L.F.’s basic needs. Mother acknowledges in her brief to this court that
the “semantic range” of the verb “obtain” includes “the concept of occupy.” Mother
suggests, however, that the parties “could not possibly have intended” that mother occupy
housing because she was in prison at the inception of the stay and that it would have been
“impossible” for her to occupy housing within 90 days. But the CHIPS statute supports the
district court’s view because a CHIPS determination is appropriate when the child is
without “shelter . . . because the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian is unable or unwilling
to provide that care.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6(3). We conclude that the district
court did not err in concluding that “[ o]ccupancy of actual housing, rather than a plan for
such housing, is necessary to ‘ensure that all basic needs of the child are met.’”
Finally, the stay condition specifically required that mother “ensure that all basic
needs of [R.X.L.F.] are met” and that the county would follow-up with mother to “ensure
proper housing and supplies are in place for [R.X.L.F.] upon [] [m] other’s release from
15
custody.” The district court determined that, even if mother had obtained housing, she had
not met the basic needs of R.X.L.F. nor had she allowed the county the opportunity to
ensure that housing and supplies were in place, and complete a home study, before the stay
expired. In fact, the record reflects that the agency in Iowa undertook a home study, but
was not able to ensure “proper housing and supplies [were] in place,” until May 15, 2018,
well beyond the expiration of the 90-day stay. In light of R.X.L.F.’s very young age, the
record fully supports the district court’s finding that mother failed to comply with the
housing condition.
Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in adjudicating R.X.L.F. as
CHIPS and finding that it is in the child’s best interest to continue court supervision, we
affirm. We echo the district court’s comments that mother has made remarkable progress
and shown superior dedication. We also underscore the district court’s comments that this
CHIPS adjudication should not negatively impact mother’s recovery or her ability to
achieve reunification with R.X.L.F.
Affirmed.