State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0608

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jason Ronald Stauffer,
Appellant.

Filed April 1, 2019
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Bjorkman, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69HI-CR-17-835

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Michael Everson, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Mark S. Rubin, St. Louis County Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Davi E. Axelson, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and dec ided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and
Florey, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges two assault convictions, arguing that the district court abused
its discretion by admitting evidence of a prior assault conviction and methamphetamine

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use, and clearly erred by permitting police officers to testify regarding their prior contacts
with him. Appellant also contends that the district court erred in convicting him of both
offenses. Because the two offenses arose from a single behavioral incident, we reverse and
remand to the district court to vacate one of the convictions, but otherwise affirm.
FACTS
On the evening of November 5, 2017, D.G. was watching television in L.S.’s
apartment living room in Hibbing . W.G. stopped by the apartment with anoth er man,
whom D.G. did not know. The man sat in a chair near the couch where D.G. was sitting.
D.G. continued to watch television , but “felt really odd” because the man was fidgety,
rocked back and forth, and kept looking at D.G. Based on his own history of
methamphetamine use, D.G. suspected the man had been using methamphetamine. After
about 20 minutes, D.G. turned around to say something and the man suddenly stabbed him
in the left side of his abdomen.1 The man tried lunging at D.G. a second t ime, but D.G.
leaped over the couch and ran down the stairs to the garage. The man and W.G. followed
D.G. into the garage, but left after D.G. approached them with “a stick or bar or something.”
A neighbor called 911. D.G. told the responding officers from the Hibbing Police
Department that a man named “Jason” stabbed him. D.G. described “Jason” as a white
male in his early 30s, approximately 5’6” to 5’7” tall, with a shaved or bald head and facial
hair. D.G. stated that the man appeared to be on methamphetamine and was wearing jeans

1 Initially, D.G. was unsure whether he was punched or stabbed as he could not see what
the man appeared to have cupped in his hand. It was later determined that the man stabbed
D.G. in his left abdomen near his lung, causing an approximately two -inch-deep puncture
wound.

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with blood on them. Based on the name and physical description , Sergeant Arola
immediately thought of appellant Jason Ronald Stauffer , whom he had seen earlier that
day. Stauffer is a bald 31-year-old white male, who is 5’7” tall, and has a short goatee.
D.G. reported that the man left the apartment on foot, and the officers began
searching the area for him. Two hours later, a homeowner called 911 reporting that “an
unknown male by the name of Jason” had knocked on her back door. The call er lived
within ten blocks of where the stabbing took place. Officer Dycus quickly responded and
located Stauffer about one block from the caller’s residence. Stauffer was wearing jeans
and a Carhartt jacket , as the caller reported, and matched D.G.’s description of the man
who stabbed him.
Officer Dycus arrested Stauffer and transported him to the police station. After
directing Stauffer to wait on a bench, Officer Dycus observed that Stauffer “could not sit
still” and was “sweat ing a lot,” despite having just been outside. Officer Dycus also
observed that Stauffer “kept saying that somebody was standing next to him” even though
no one was there. D.G. later viewed a six -person photographic lineup and positively
identified Stauffer as the person who stabbed him.2

2 The photographic lineup consisted of six color photographs, which D.G. viewed one at a
time. When D.G. got to Stauffer’s photo, he stopped, “pointed at it[,] and said[,] ‘That’s
it, That’s him.’”

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Stauffer was charged with two counts of second -degree assault pursuant to Minn.
Stat. § 609.222, subds. 1, 2 (2016).3 Prior to trial, the state moved the district court to admit
evidence of Stauffer’s 2010 assault conviction as relevant to establish “motive, intent, plan,
and identity.” At trial, the primary issue was the identity of D.G.’s assailant. The state
offered testimony of D.G., L.S., and the investigating officers. D.G. was the only witness
who saw the man who stabbed him. When asked if his assailant was in the courtroom,
D.G. initially responded that he was not. But he later identified Stauffer and explained his
confusion. At the close of the state’s case, over Stauffer’s objection, the distr ict court
granted the state’s motion to admit evidence of the 2010 assault conviction. The jury found
Stauffer guilty of both charged offenses. The district court entered two convictions and
imposed a 68-month prison sentence. Stauffer appeals.
D E C I S I O N
I. The distri ct court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of
Stauffer’s 2010 assault conviction.

Evidence of a defendant’ s prior crimes or bad acts is not admissible to prove the
defendant’s character to show he acted in conformi ty with it on a particular occasion .
Minn. R. Evid. 404(b)4; State v. Spreigl, 139 N.W.2d 167, 169 (Minn. 1965). But Spreigl
evidence may be admissible for other limited purposes . Minn. R. Evid. 404(b); State v.

3 Count I alleged assault with a dan gerous weapon under Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1.
Count II alleged assault with a dangerous weapon and infliction of substantial bodily harm
under Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 2.

4 Minn. R. Evid. 404(b) was amended after Stauffer’s trial, but the amendment does not
affect our decision here.

5
Clark, 738 N.W.2d 316, 345 (Minn. 2007). We review the admission of Spreigl evidence
for an abuse of discretion. State v. Welle, 870 N.W.2d 360, 365 (Minn. 2015). To garner
reversal, the appellant must show both abuse of discretion and resulting prejudice. State v.
Rossberg, 851 N.W.2d 609, 615 (Minn. 2014).
A five-part test governs the admissibility of other-acts evidence:
(1) the state must give notice of its intent to admit the evidence;
(2) the state must clearly indicate what the evidence will be
offered to prove; (3) there must be clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant participated in the prior act; (4) the
evidence must be relevant and material to the state’s case; and
(5) the probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed
by its potential prejudice to the defendant.

State v. Ness, 707 N.W.2d 676, 685-86 (Minn. 2006). Stauffer contends that evidence of
the prior assault is not relevant to the issue of identity and that its potential for unfair
prejudice outweighs its probative value.5 We address each argument in turn.
A. Relevance and Materiality
“Spreigl evidence may be relevant and material to show the identity of the
perpetrator if identity is at issue and if there is a sufficient time, place, or modus operandi
nexus between the charged offense and the Spreigl offense.” State v. Wright, 719 N.W.2d
910, 917 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted). The past crime does not need to be a signature
crime, but should be sufficiently similar to the incident at issue before the jury. Id. “If the
prior crime is simply of the same generic type as the charged offense, it ordinarily should

5 The Spreigl evidence was admitted through a redacted plea -hearing transcript, to which
the parties stipulated. Although the manner in which the evidence was presented is not at
issue, we note the transcript does not include many of the details showing similarities
between the two incidents.

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be excluded.” Id. at 917-18 (quotation omitted). “[T]he more distant the Spreigl act is in
terms of time, the greater the similarities as to place and modus operandi must be to retain
relevance.” Ness, 707 N.W.2d at 689 (quotation omitted).
Identity was the primary issue before the jury. The 2010 stabbing was relevant in
several important respects. First, it occurred at or near the same intersection i n Hibbing.
Second, both offenses occurred during evening hours. Third, Stauffer also committed the
2010 offense against a stranger, stabbing him in the torso, then fleeing the scene as in the
present case. And the assa ilant in both instances appeared to be under the influence of
methamphetamine. In short, the 2010 offense is not a generic assault; it is markedly similar
to the charged offense both in place and modus operandi. As such, it is highly probative
on the disputed issue of identity.
B. Probative Value Versus Potential Unfair Prejudice
The probative value of Spreigl evidence must outweigh “its potential to unfairly
prejudice.” Clark, 738 N.W.2d at 347. Evidence may give rise to “unfair prejudice” if it
“lure[s] the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the
offense charged.” State v. L.S., 749 N.W.2d 88, 95 (Minn. App. 2008) (quotation omitted).
In determining whether the probative value of Spreigl evidence outweighs its prejudicial
impact, courts balance the rele vance of the evidence and the s tate’s “need to strengthen
weak or inadequate proof” against the risk that the evidence will be used as propensity
evidence. State v. Fardan, 773 N.W.2d 303, 319 (Minn. 2009).
Stauffer asserts that the probative value of the Spreigl evidence is outweighed by its
potential for unfair prejudice. We are not persuaded. As noted above, evidence of the

7
2010 offense was highly relevant. And the state’s need for the evidence was high. D.G.
was the only witness who saw his assailant. Although D.G. identified Stauffer in the photo
lineup without hesitation, he initially did not see his assailant in the courtroom . Only
during cross- and redirect-examination did D.G. identify Stauffer. Accordingly, the Spreigl
evidence was critical to the state’s ability to demonstrate D.G.’s credibility. And t he
district court gave a limiting instruction to the jury to reduce the risk that the 2010
conviction would be used as propensity evidence . See Zornes v. State, 880 N.W.2d 363 ,
373 (Minn. 2016) (noting that appellate courts “presume that jurors follow the court’s
instructions”). The state also cautioned against improper use of the evidence in its closing
statement.
On this record, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion by granting
the state’s motion to admit the Spreigl evidence.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting police officer
testimony regarding characteristics associated with methamphetamine use and
their observations of Stauffer.

Evidence is relevant and admissible if it has “any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence.” Minn. R. Evid. 401, 402.
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness’
testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to
those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on
the p erception of the witness; (b) helpful to a cle ar
understanding of the witness’ testimony or the determination
of a fact in issue; and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.

8
Minn. R. Evid. 701. “Evidentiary rulings rest within the sound discretion of the [district]
court and will not be reversed abse nt a clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Amos , 658
N.W.2d 201, 203 (Minn. 2003).
The challenged testimony came from two officers with specialized training in the
indicia of controlled -substance use . Sergeant Arola testified that signs of
methamphetamine use include shakiness, eye and body tremors, and exaggerated, shaky
speech. He identified auditory and visual hallucinations as “a pretty common thing to see
in a habitual methamphetamine user.” He also testified that people under the influence of
methamphetamine are “very unpredictable,” “sometimes violent,” and “they can take on a
very aggressive demeanor.” Stauffer displayed body tremors, exaggerated speech, and
auditory hallucinations.
Officer Dycus testified that signs of methamphetamine use include dilated pupils,
restlessness, lack of sleep, increased blood pressure, paranoia, hallucinations, abnormal
sweating, and inability to sit still. He observed that Stauffer sweated abnormally, reported
“seeing somebody” who was not there, and was unable to sit still at the police station.
Stauffer first argues that evidence of methamphetamine use is irrelevant. We
disagree. Such e vidence is relevant to explain Stauffer’s motivation to stab a stranger
without provocation. See Ness, 707 N.W.2d at 687 (recognizing that evidence of a
defendant’s motivation “explains the reason for an ac t”). More importantly, the Spreigl
evidence makes it more probable that Stauffer was the man who stabbed D.G. because D.G.
reported that his assailant appeared to have been using methamphetamine.

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Stauffer next asserts that Sergeant Arola ’s testimony that people who use
methamphetamine are unpredictable and “sometimes violent” is inadmissible character
evidence. Citing State v. Williams , 525 N.W.2d 538, 547 -48 (Minn. 1994), and State v.
Litzau, 650 N.W.2d 177, 185 (Minn. 2002), Stauffer contends that a police officer “cannot
testify about typical behaviors of criminals and claim that a defendant’s behavior meets
that criteria to imply his guilt of the offense.” This argument is unavailing for two reasons.
First, both cases involve the admissibility of drug-courier profile evidence. “A drug
courier profile is an informally compiled abstract of characteristics thought typical of
persons carrying illicit drugs.” Williams, 525 N.W.2d at 545 (quotation omitted). Law
enforcement officers rely on these profiles at airports, train depots , and bus terminals to
identify and detain passengers who may be transporting drugs. Id. The problem with using
drug-courier profiles as evidence of guilt is that they are so general, nonscientific, and
inconsistent that any traveler could fit into some profile. See id. at 545-47 (noting that
drug-courier profile factors include walking slowly or quickly, traveling alone or in a
group, and appearing nervous or calm). This concern is not implicated here. The officers
did not offer anecdotal generalizations to suggest Stauffer was selling or transporting drugs.
They testified he appeared to be under the influence of methamphetamine.
Second, the state presented this testimony to prove identity. D.G. testified that the
person who stabbed him appeared to have used methamphetamine. And methamphetamine
use was relevant to the Spreigl offense. We note Sergeant Arola’s testimony regarding the
conduct of methamphetamine users—as opposed to signs of methamphetamine use —was
limited. And the state did not directly present evidence that Stauffer acted violently or

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unpredictably on the evening in question . To the extent that the limited testimony went
beyond what was relevant to identify Stauffer or prove motive, we conclude that any error
was harmless.
III. The district court did not plainly err by admitting unobjected-to police
testimony regarding prior contacts with Stauffer.

Stauffer asserts that the district court erred by allowing three police officers to testify
that they were familiar with Stauffer from prior contacts. Because Stauffer did not object
to this testimony at trial, we review its admission for plain error , considering whether
Stauffer has demonstrated “ (1) an error; (2) that is plain; and (3) the error affected
substantial rights .” State v. Huber , 877 N.W.2d 519, 522 (Minn. 2016). If all three
conditions are satisfied, we determine whether it is necessary to address the error to ensure
the fairness and integrity of the judicial proceedings. Id. “An error is plain if it is clear or
obvious, which is typically established if the error contravenes case law, a rule, or a
standard of conduct.” State v. Webster , 894 N.W.2d 782, 787 (Minn. 2017) (quotation
omitted). “Eliciting an officer’s testimony that he knows the defendant from prior contacts
is error if the defendant’s identity is not an issue in the case.” State v. Valentine , 787
N.W.2d 630, 641 (Minn. App. 2010) (emphasis added), review denied (Minn. Nov. 16,
2010).
Three officers testified that they were familiar with Stauffer. Sergeant Arola
identified Stauffer in the courtroom , stating that he was familiar with Stauffer and his
physical description. Sergeant Arola also testified that an off-duty officer reported having
contact with Stauffer the night before his arrest. Officer Loewen testified that Stauffer

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“matched the description from prior contacts with him having a shaved head with some
facial hair.” Officer Dycus recognized Stauffer “from prior incidents,” and testified that
earlier in the day “there was a subject stop at which it involved a Jason Stauffer that
matched the description .” None of the officers stated that Stauffer had been arrested or
charged with a crime in the past.
Stauffer argues that because none of the officers saw Stauffer at the scene of the
crime, their testimony was not relevant to his identity. We disagree. Their testimony
generally established that Stauffer matched the description of the suspect given to the
police by D.G. and the homeowner who later called 911 to report a man named Jason at
her house. Because the testimony of these officers was limited and offered on the disputed
issue of identity, the admission of the testimony was not error, let alone plain error.6
V. The district court erred by convicting Stauffer on count I.

The jury returned guilty verdicts on both assault charges . The warrant of
commitment reveals that a judgment of conviction was entered on both counts. A
defendant “may be convicted of either the crime charged or an included offense, but not
both.” Minn. Stat. § 609.04, subd. 1 (2018). The supreme court has “consistently held that
section 609.04 bars multiple convictions under different sections of a criminal s tatute for
acts committed during a single behavioral incident.” State v. Chavarria-Cruz, 839 N.W.2d

6 Stauffer argues that the cumulative effect of the alleged evidentiary errors deprived him
of a fair trial. In rare cases, “the cumulative effect of trial errors can depr ive a defendant
of his constitutional right to a fair trial when the errors and indiscretions, none of which
alone might have been enough to tip the scales, operate to the defendant’s prejudice by
producing a biased jury.” State v. Davis, 820 N.W.2d 525, 538-39 (Minn. 2012) (quotation
omitted). As we have found no prejudicial error, there is no cumulative effect to review.

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515, 522-23 (Minn. 2013); see State v. LaTourelle , 343 N.W.2d 277, 284 (Minn. 1984)
(stating that when a defendant is found guilty on multiple charges for the same act, the
district court should formally adjudicate and impose sentence on only one count).
The parties agree that the district court erred by entering a conviction on count I .
We also agree. Second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon (count I) is a lesser -
included offense of second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon resulting in substantial
bodily harm (count II) . See Minn. Stat. §§ 609.04, subd. 1 (4) (including within the
definition of lesser-included offense “a crime necessarily proved if the crime charged were
proved”), .222, subds. 1, 2. Because both assault offenses arose from the same behavioral
incident, the district court erred by convicting Stauffer on count I. We reverse and remand
to the district court to vacate Stauffer’s conviction for count I, while leaving the finding of
guilt intact. See State v. Walker , 913 N.W.2d 463, 469 (Minn. 2018) (reversing and
remanding appellant’s conviction for a lesser-included charge, but “leaving the finding of
guilt intact”).
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.