In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: S. R. O. and J. D. B., Parents.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0615

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
S. R. O. and J. D. B., Parents.

Filed October 8, 2018
Affirmed
Halbrooks, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-JV-17-1117

Lisa Ann Rutland, Rutland Law PLLC, Princeton, Minnesota (for appellant S.R.O.)

Gretchen Severin, Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent J.D.B.)

Anthony C. Palumbo, Anoka County Attorney, Robert I. Yount, Assistant County
Attorney, Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent Anoka County)

Jena Schuler, Ramsey, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and
Bjorkman, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HALBROOKS, Judge
Appellant-mother challenges the district court’s decision to terminate her parental
rights on the grounds th at the district court’s finding s are not supported by the record,
termination is not in the best interests of the child, and the county failed to prove a statutory
basis for termination. We affirm.

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FACTS
Appellant S.R.O. (mother) and respondent J.D.B. (father) are the parents of T.J.B.,
who was born on May 19, 2015. Father and mother have an abusive relationship, which
resulted in the police being called on several occasions. On November 18, 2016, father
stabbed mother. Mother initially did not seek medical treatment, but later asked a friend
to take her to the emergency room. Hospital s taff reported the injuries to police. On
November 21, police conducted a welfare check. They were concerned about the alleged
domestic assault and reports of drug use in the home. When police arrived, mother was
not home and the child was being cared for by his 15-year-old brother. The home was dirty
and did not have electricity or hot water. Police referred the matter to Anoka County Social
Services. The county removed the child from the home and placed him in foster care. He
has remained in foster care since.
On December 15, 2016, the district court adjudicated T.J.B. as a child in need of
protection or services (CHIPS). The district court ordered mother to comply with the case
plan submitted by the county. The case plan required mother to complete domestic-abuse
programming, complete a chemical -dependency evaluation, and follow all
recommendations.
By way of history, i n 2008, mother suffered a herniated disc and was prescribed
oxycodone to treat the injury. When mother ran out of medication, she started using heroin
to stave off withdrawal symptoms. Mother admitted that at the time of the CHIPS petition
that she had been using heroin daily for a year and a half.

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The chemical-dependency evaluator recommende d that mother complete mental -
illness and chemical-dependency treatment and abstain from all chemicals. Mother started
treatment at Living Free Recovery Services, an outpatient facility. Sean Miller, her
chemical-dependency counselor, believed that mother needed a more intensive treatment
program. He recommended that she attend inpatient chemical -dependency treatment.
Mother disagreed and indicated she would not attend inpatient treatment because she did
not have a chemical-use problem. Mother was discharged from Living Free. On February
24, 2017, the district court ordered mother to enter inpatient treatment. She completed a
21-day program and was discharged to Valhalla, a methadone program. Two days prior to
her discharge from Valhalla, mother submi tted a urinalysis (UA) that tested positive for
the presence of methamphetamine. As a result, s he was ordered to complete an updated
chemical-dependency evaluation.
Mother obtained an updated evaluation from Nystrom and Associates. Marzak
McAllister, a licensed alcohol and drug counselor, reviewed the assessment and referred
mother for intensive outpatient treatment. In October 2017, mother started treatment at
Nystrom. As part of the treatment program, she was required to submit UAs . The test
results were initially negative, but staff had concerns that mother was still using chemicals.
They elected to switch to testing with oral cheek swabs so that staff could ob serve the
sample being taken. At least four of the ch eek swabs tested positive for chemicals ,
including methamphetamine, fentanyl, and heroin. Mother ultimately admitted that she
had cheated on the UAs by using urine she had stored from a prior period of sobriety. In

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January 2018, mother was discharged from Nystrom because she was noncompliant .
McAllister rated her prognosis as “poor” at the time of discharge.
On February 6, 2018, mother entered inpatient treatment at Recovering Hope.
Marie Bergloff, a licensed alcohol and drug counselor, performed an assessment. Mother
denied using chemicals, but her UA tested positive for methamphetamine and opiates.
When confronted with the positive UA, mother said that she had taken Adderall that must
have been laced with the substances. She denied otherwise using chemicals. Mother did
not have a prescription for Adderall. On February 27, mother was discharged from
Recovering Hope due to behavio ral reasons. Bergloff stated that mother was “not
successful at all” in completing treatment. Mother did not seek further chemical -
dependency treatment.
The county petitioned to terminate mother ’s parental rights. The petition alleged
that termination was warranted because mother neglected to comply with the dut ies
imposed by the parent-child relationship, mother was palpably unfit to parent, reasonable
efforts failed to correct the conditions that led to out -of-home placement, and T.J.B. was
neglected and in foster care. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), (4), (5), (8) (2016).
At trial, Miller, McAllister, and Bergloff all testified that mother failed to make
progress in addressing her chemical health and was in denial about her addiction. Heather
Wilmes, a mental-health provider at Valhalla, testified regarding mother’s experience with
domestic abuse. She testified that mothe r had limited insight into her susceptibi lity to
abusive relationships and how those relationships affected her mental health and the lives
of her children. Wilmes testified tha t her last session with mother occurred on July 28,

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2017. Wilmes opined that when she last saw mother she had regressed in her treatment
and remained susceptible to entering into an abusive relationship.
The district court terminated mother’s parental rights on the grounds that the county
had proven each alleged statutory basis for termination and termination is in the best
interests of the child. The district court further determined that the county had made
reasonable efforts to reunite the family. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
I.
Parental rights may be terminated “only for grave and weighty reasons.” In re
Welfare of Child of W.L.P., 678 N.W.2d 703, 709 (Minn. App. 2004). Termination requires
clear and convincing evidence that (1) the county has made reasonable efforts to reunite
the family, (2) there is a statutory ground for termination, and (3) termination is in the
child’s best interests. In re Welfare of Children of S.E.P. , 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn.
2008). The district court must find that at the time of termination, the parent is not
“presently able and willing to assume [her] responsibilities” and that the parent’s neglect
of these duties “will continue for a prolonged, indeterminate period.” In re Welfare of J.K.,
374 N.W.2d 463, 466 -67 (Minn. App. 1985) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn.
Nov. 25, 1985). The determination should not rely primar ily on past history, but rather
“upon the projected permanency of the parent’s inability to care for his or her child.” In re
Welfare of S.Z., 547 N.W.2d 886, 893 (Minn. 1996) (quotation omitted).
Mother argues that the district court erred in determining that she was unable to care
for the child. She asserts that at the time of trial she had eliminated the possibility of

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domestic abuse because father had been incarcerated, she had addressed her chemical use,
and she had obtained suitable housing. She argu es that in determining she was unable to
care for the child, the district court impermissibly focused on her past history, rather than
the conditions that existed at the time of trial.
The district court made detailed findings addressing mother’s ability to care for
T.J.B. The district court found that father had “been eliminated in the short term as a safety
risk” due to his incarceration. But the district court noted that mother had “a history and
pattern of domestic abuse and violent relationships” a nd “intentionally avoided any
recommended domestic abuse counseling.” Mother does not dispute that she failed to
complete the domestic-abuse programming required by the case plan. And at trial, Wilmes
testified that mother had little insight into her sus ceptibility to domestic violence and
remained at risk to regress into an abusive relationship.
The district court’s findings similarly address mother’s chemical use. Three
licensed alcohol and drug counselors testified that mother had little insight i nto her
chemical dependency and failed to make any meaningful progress while in treatment. The
district court credited this testimony and found that mother continued to use chemicals.
This finding is supported by mother’s unsuccessful attempts at complet ing treatment and
history of failed UAs. In the two months leading up to trial, mother was discharged from
two treatment programs and submitted multiple UAs that tested positive for the presence
of chemicals, including a UA that tested posi tive for alcohol and amphetamines the day
before trial started.

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Finally, mother argues that she obtained suitable housing. At trial, mother testified
that she was living in a sober -living community and asserted that it was a safe and
supportive environment to care for the child. But as the district court noted, mother had
only been living at the residence for two weeks. In the 15 months between the filing of the
CHIPs petition and the termination trial, mother did not remain at any residence for longer
than three months. She was asked to leave a shelter, a treatment program, and her mother’s
home for behavioral reasons. In determining that mother had displayed an inability to
obtain suitable housing, the district court did not inappropriately focus on her past, but
rather on how it demonstrated a continued pattern of behavior . See In re Welfare of
Clausen, 289 N.W.2d 153, 156 (Minn. 1980) (stating that in determining whether to
terminate parental rights, “the relevant time period includes all times up to the time of the
termination hearing”). The record supports the district court’s factual findings.
II.
We will affirm a district court’s decision to terminate parental rights if at least one
statutory ground for termination is proved by clear and convincing evidence and if
termination is in the child’s best interests. In re Welfare of Children of T.R. , 750 N.W.2d
656, 661 (Minn. 2008). “We give considerable deference to the district court’s decision to
terminate parental rights. But we closely inquire into the sufficiency of the evidence to
determine whether it was clear and convincing.” S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385 (citation
omitted). The district court may terminate parental rights upon a showing “that following
the child’s placement out of the home, reasonable efforts, under the direction of the court,

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have failed to correct the conditions leading to the child’s placeme nt.” Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5).
A presumption that reasonable efforts have failed is created in two situations. First,
the district court may presume reasonable efforts have failed when: (1) a child has resided
outside the home for a cumulative period of 12 months within the preceding 22 months ,
(2) the district court approved an out -of-home placement plan, (3) the conditions leading
to the out-of-home placement have not been corrected, and (4) reasonable efforts have been
made by the social services agency to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family. Id.,
subd. 1(b)(5)(i)-(iv). Second, the district court may presume reasonable efforts have failed
when: (1) the parent has been diagnosed as chemically dependent by a certified
professional, (2) the parent has been required by case plan to complete chemical -
dependency treatment, (3) the parent has failed to complete appropriate programming two
or more times, (4) and the parent continues to use chemicals. Id., subd. 1(b)(5)(A)-(E).
The district court determined that both presumptions apply. We agree. T.J.B. was
in foster care for the 15 months preceding the termination trial. The district court approved
a case plan that required mother to address her chemical use and complete domestic-abuse
programming. The county made reasonable efforts to assist mother in completing
appropriate programming and complying with the case plan, but mother failed to do so. At
the time of trial, mother had not addressed her chemical use or suscept ibility to domestic
violence. Accordingly, the first presumption applies. And the record supports the district
court’s determination that the second presumption also applies. Mother was diagnosed as
chemically dependent by three licensed alcohol and dru g counselors and required by the

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case plan to complete treatment. She was discharged as unsuccessful from appropriate
programs at Living Free, Nystrom, and Recovering Hope. And she continued to use
chemicals at the time of trial. The only evidence mothe r presented to rebut these
presumptions was her own testimony, which the district court did not find credible.
On this record, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that
reasonable efforts have failed to correct the conditions l eading to the child’s out -of-home
placement.1
III.
Mother challenges the district court’s determination that termination of her parental
rights is in the best interests of T.J.B. Even if a statutory ground for termination exists, “a
child’s best interests may preclude terminating parental rights.” In re Welfare of Child of
D.L.D., 771 N.W.2d 538, 545 (Minn. App. 2009) (quotation omitted). Analyzing the best
interests of a child requires a balancing of the child’s interest in preserving a pa rent-child
relationship, the parent’s interest in preserving that relationship, and any competing interest
of the child. In re Welfare of R.T.B. , 492 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 1992). “Competing
interests include such things as a stable environment, health considerations and the child’s
preferences.” Id. We review the district court’s determination that termination is in the
best interests of the child for an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B. ,
805 N.W.2d 895, 905 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012).

1 The district court also determined that termination is appropriate under Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), (4), and (8). Because we may affirm if at least one statutory
ground is established, T.R., 750 N.W.2d at 661, and Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5),
is most applicable to this case, we do not address the other statutory grounds.

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Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion in determining that it is in
T.J.B.’s best interests to terminate her parental rights. In making its best -interests
determination, the district court first noted that the limited emotional connection that T.J.B.
may have with mother is “waning.” The district court also found his need for a stable
environment outweigh s any emotional connection. When T.J.B. was removed from
mother’s home, he was not thriving and was emotionally dysregulated and
developmentally delayed. He suffered night terrors, would meltdown in public, and put
himself at risk of injury when having tantrums. He was also diagnosed with post-traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD). Since being placed in foster care, T.J.B. has received treatment for
his PTSD, developed a strong bond with his foster family, and displayed more stable and
appropriate behavior. But his behavior regresses following visitation with mother or when
he hears his biological parents’ names. The district court determined that these
circumstances weigh in favor of termination of mother’s parental rights.
The district court next considered mother’s interest in preserving the parent -child
relationship. The district court observed that while mother had expressed an interest in
continuing a relationship with T.J.B., she had not displayed the ability t o place his needs
above her own. Mother did not complete chemical -dependency treatment, continued to
use chemicals, and did not complete domestic -abuse programming, despite being aware
that the case plan required her to do so to regain custody of T.J.B. Finally, the district court
credited the guardian ad litem’s testimony that termination of mother’s parental rights is in
the child’s best interests because she did not believe that mother is capable of providing
for the child’s needs for the foreseeable f uture. On this record, the district court did not

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abuse its discretion in determining that termination is in the best interests of the child. The
district court appropriately balanced the child’s interests with mother’s, and determined
that the child’s need for a stable environment outweighs mother’s interest in preserving the
parent-child relationship.
Mother also asserts that she received ineffective assistance of counsel. But because
she does not cite to any legal authority to support her argument , the issue is waived. See
In re Welfare of Children of L.L.P., 836 N.W.2d 563, 570 n.2 (Minn. App. 2013) (stating
we decline to address arguments unsupported by legal analysis or citation).
Affirmed.