Phyllis Louise Luskey, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0623

Phyllis Louise Luskey,
Appellant,

vs.

Nikki Dee Eggum, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed January 14, 2019
Affirmed
Halbrooks, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-CV-17-2182

Paul P. Sarratori, Mesenbourg & Sarratori Law Offices, P.A., Coon Rapids, Minnesota;
and

MacKenzie Guptil, Bina and Guptil LLC, Pine City, Minnesota (for appellant)

Mark K. Hellie, Georgeanna M.H. Ihrke, Eden Prairie, Minnesota (for respondents)

Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HALBROOKS, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s denial of her motion for relief under Minn.
R. Civ. P. 60.02. We affirm.
FACTS
In 2011, appellant Phyllis Luskey and respondent Nikki Eggum were involved in a
motor-vehicle accident. On February 1, 2016, appellant served respondents Nikki and
Brian Eggum with a summons and complaint for a personal-injury claim arising out of the
accident. The parties exchanged discovery requests and responses throughout 2016. On
May 1, 2017, appellant filed the complaint in district court.
On August 21, 2017, based on Minn. R. Civ. P. 5 .04(a) and appellant’s failure to
file the complaint within one year of commencing the action, respondents moved for
summary judgment. Appellant filed a responsive motion to enlarge the deadline based on
Minn. R. Civ. P. 6.02, arguing that she met the standard for excusable neglect under both
rule 6.02 and Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02. The district court determined that appellant’s lawsuit
was automatically dismissed with prejudice on February 1, 2017, ba sed on the plain
language of Minn. R. Civ. P. 5.04(a). This determination is not challenged on appeal. The
district court analyzed appellant’s enlargement motion under rule 60.02 and applied the
Finden factors. Finden v. Klaas , 128 N.W.2d 748 , 750 (Minn. 1964). Finding that
appellant failed to satisfy two of the four Finden factors, t he district court denied
appellant’s motion and granted summary judgment to respondents. This appeal follows.

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D E C I S I O N
Appellant contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying her rule
6.02 motion to enlarge the time for filing the complaint based on excusable neglect. In
addressing appellant’s motion, the district court properly conducted a rule 60.02 analysis.
See Parker v. O’Phelan, 414 N.W.2d 534, 537 (Minn. App. 1987) (“An analogous standard
[to the excusable neglect analysis under rule 6.02] is used for finding excusable neglect in
granting relief from a default judgment or denial of a motion for default judgment.”), aff’d
mem., 428 N.W.2d 361 (Minn. 1988).
We review a district court’s decision to grant or deny rule 60.02 relief for an abuse
of discretion. Gams v. Houghton, 884 N.W.2d 611, 620 (Minn. 2016). The supreme court
has held that rule 60.02(a) allows relief from a proceeding when the moving party makes
an affirmative showing on the following factors: “(1) . . . a debatably meritorious claim ;
(2) a reasonable excuse for his or her failure or neglect to act; (3) that he or she acted with
due diligence after learning of the error or omission; and (4) that no substantial prejudice
will result to the other party. ” Cole v. Wutzke , 884 N.W.2 d 634, 637 (Minn. 2016)
(quotations omitted). While some showings “may be stronger than others . . . the moving
party must establish all four requirements for relief to be warranted.” Id.
In its analysis, the district court determined that appellant established that her claim
is debatably meritorious and that respondents would not be substantially prejudiced if the
dismissal was vacated. But the district court found that appellant failed to satisfy the
reasonable-excuse and due-diligence factors.

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Appellant argues that she had a reasonable excuse for her failure to file before the
one-year deadline: her attorney was unaware of rule 5.04 and , in addition, the case was
ready for trial in September 2017 , despite her failure to provide respondent s with signed
unrestricted medical authorizations .1 As a consequence, an independent medical
examination had not been done.
Mistakes of law and mistakes of fact can be grounds for relief. Id. at 63 8.
Appellant’s attorney admitted “that he missed the deadline, but also admit[ted] that he was
unaware that the deadline existed.” There is a “strong policy favoring the granting of relief
when judgment is entered through no fault of the client.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Generally, courts are “loath to ‘punish’ the innocent client for the counsel’s neglect” even
when the neglect is “inexcusable.” Charson v. Temple Israel, 419 N.W.2d 488, 491 (Minn.
1988). But the district court noted appellant’s failure to provide unrestricted releases for
her medical rec ords even though she had not object ed to the discovery request. The
supreme court has long held that determining whether there was reasonable excuse is “a
matter largely within the discretion of the trial court.” Cole, 884 N.W.2d at 638 (quotation
omitted). Based on this record, we conclude that the district court acted within its
discretion in determining that appellant has not met the reasonable-excuse factor.
Appellant contends that the due -diligence factor is met because “the parties [had]
worked with due diligence on this case” since 2016. But d ue diligence “is assessed from
the time that the movant learns of his or her error or omission.” Id. at 639. Appellant’s

1 It was undisputed that an evaluation of appellant’s soft-tissue injuries related to the motor-
vehicle accident was more complex due to her pre-existing condition of multiple sclerosis.

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attorney conceded that he became aware of the rule 5.04(a) deadline when counsel f or
respondents filed their civil cover sheet on July 5, 2017 —five months after the one-year
deadline to file the complaint . In its analysis of this factor, the district court noted that,
upon realizing his failure to meet the deadline, appellant’s attorney did not contact
opposing counsel to request an extension or file any documents in district court.
Appellant’s attorney took no action until responding to respondents’ motion for summary
judgment. In his response to the summary-judgment motion, appellant’s attorney failed to
adequately address the legal issue before the district court or provide any analysis of any
Finden factors, with the exception of the reasonable -excuse factor. On this record, we
conclude that the district court acted within its dis cretion in determining that the due -
diligence factor was not satisfied. Because appellant did not satisfy the reasonable-excuse
or due -diligence factors of the Finden analysis, the district court properly denied
appellant’s rule 60.02 motion.
Affirmed.