State of Minnesota, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0627

State of Minnesota,
Appellant,

vs.

Chad Harold Dyrdahl,
Respondent.

Filed September 4, 2018
Reversed and remanded
Reilly, Judge

Clearwater County District Court
File No. 15-CR-17-462

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Alan G. Rogalla, Clearwater County Attorney , Heather L. Labat, Assistant County
Attorney, Bagley, Minnesota (for appellant)

Peter J. Timmons, Samuel Edmunds, Mendota Heights, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Kirk, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Smith, John,
Judge.
*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REILLY, Judge
The state challenges the district court’ s suppression of evidence based on the
determination that law enforcement violat ed respondent Chad Ha rold Dyrdahl’s due-
process rights by giving respondent a misl eading breath-test advisory. Because the
advisory was not misleading, we reverse and remand.
FACTS
On November 19, 2017, a state patrol officer observed respondent weaving and
swerving as he drove his car. Based on respondent’s driving, the officer conducted a traffic
stop. The officer observed th at respondent’s eyes were bloodshot and watery, and he
smelled a moderate odor of alcohol coming from inside the vehicle. Respondent told the
officer that he had consumed “a little bit” of alcohol that evening. The officer conducted
field sobriety tests; respo ndent exhibited multip le signs of impairment. The officer
conducted a preliminary breath test, which re gistered a reading of 0.18. The officer
arrested respondent and transported him to the county jail.
At the jail, the officer read the breath- test advisory to respondent. Respondent
contacted an attorney and, after speaking to his attorney, agreed to take the offered breath
test. Respondent’s alcohol co ncentration was 0.14. Respo ndent was charged with third-
degree driving while impaired in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(5).
Respondent filed a motion to suppress th e evidence resulting from his agreement to
take the breath test, alleging that the breath-t est advisory violated his due-process rights.
Respondent agreed that while it is against the law to refuse to consent to a breath test, the

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advisory seemed to suggest that it was against the law to re fuse to consent to any test, a
misstatement of the law. The district court agreed and suppressed evidence resulting from
his agreement to take the breath test, finding that the advisory, as read by the officer, was
misleading and violated respondent’s due-process rights.
This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
“When reviewing pretrial orders on motions to suppress evidence, we may
independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court
erred in suppressing—or not suppressing—the evidence.” State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90,
98 (Minn. 1999) (citing State v. Othoudt, 482 N.W.2d 218, 221 (Minn. 1992)). We review
factual findings on a pretrial suppression or der under the clearly erroneous standard and
review legal determinations de novo. State v. Onyelobi , 879 N.W.2d 334, 342-43 n.4
(Minn. 2016).
Minnesota law requires law enforcemen t to provide an a dvisory prior to
administering a breath test to a driver. Minn. Stat. § 169A.51, subd. 2 (2016). The advisory
must inform drivers that “Minnesota law require s [them] to take a test,” “that refusal to
submit to a breath test is a crime,” and that they may consult with an attorney. Id. Failing
or refusing such a test can result in license revocation. Minn. Stat. § 169A.52, subds. 3, 4
(2016).
We note that due-process guarantees in a civil implied-consent proceeding differ
from due-process guarantees in a criminal proceed ing. Because a driver’s license is an
important property interest, due process in a civil implied-consent context requires a

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hearing before a person may be de prived of a driver’s license. See State v. Polsfuss, 720
N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 2006).
In the criminal context, lik e this case, due process requires that criminal defendants
be treated with fundamental fairness. Id. A due-process violation in a criminal prosecution
for driving while impaired occurs when a breath test is obtained through coercion. Id. An
implied-consent advisory is coercive if it is misleading. State v. Stumpf, 481 N.W.2d 887,
889-90 (Minn. App. 1992).
Here, the advisory given by law enforc ement did not violate respondent’s due-
process rights because it was not misleading. The officer informed respondent that
Minnesota law required him to take “a test” to determine the presence of alcohol. The
officer then informed respondent that refusa l to take “a test” is a crime. The officer
informed respondent that he had a right to c onsult with an attorney, and respondent then
spoke with an attorney. La stly, the officer offered respondent a “breath test,” and
respondent consented to take the breath test. The officer ac curately informed respondent
that his failure to take the breath test coul d result in criminal pe nalties. Therefore the
advisory did not misstate the law. See Minn. Stat. § 169A.52, subds. 3, 4.
The district court determined that the in struction was misleading because the officer
informed respondent that refusal to take a “chemical test” is a crime. The court determined
this was a misstatement of the law because a driver may refuse certain chemical tests like
those for blood or urine and such a refusal is not a crime. See State v. Thompson , 886
N.W.2d 224, 234 (Minn. 2016); State v. Trahan, 886 N.W.2d 216, 224 (Minn. 2016). But
based on the record, the officer did not inst ruct respondent that refusal to take a chemical

5
test is a crime and instead explained that refusal to take a test is a crime. And, the only test
offered to respondent was a breath test; the instruction accurately described that refusal to
take the offered breath test would be a crime. The officer never asked respondent to take
a blood or urine test. Given the circumst ances, the breath-test advisory was not
misleading.1
Because we determine the officer accurate ly informed the dr iver of the legal
consequences for refusing to su bmit to the testing, respon dent’s due-process rights were
not violated, and the suppression of the breath-test evidence was improper.
Reversed and remanded.

1 We also note that respondent consulted with an attorney before agreeing to take the test.
Respondent presumably relied on that advice of counsel and not the breath-test advisory
when making his decision about whether to take the test.