Twin Town Properties, LLC, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0637

Twin Town Properties, LLC,
Respondent,

vs.

Mark Janavaras a/k/a Markos Janavaras d/b/a General J’s Military Surplus,
Appellant.

Filed May 6, 2019
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-16-13391

John F. Mulligan, Mulligan & Bjornnes PLLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Michael T. Cain, Daniel L. M. Kennedy, Kennedy & Cain, PLLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota
(for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judg e; and Cochran,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
COCHRAN, Judge
Appellant-tenant Mark Janavaras challenges the district court’ s factual findings,
legal conclusions, and damages award following a court trial on respondent-landlord Twin
T o w n P r o p e r t i e s , L L C ’ s c l a i m s o f b r e a c h o f c o n t r a c t a n d J a n a v a ras’s counterclaims of
conversion, civil theft, and statutory damages under Minn. Stat . § 504B.271 (2018).

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Janavaras also challenges the district court’s decision to excl ude expert testimony and to
deny his motion for partial summary judgment. We affirm.
FACTS
Mark Janavaras operated a militar y and general surplus store ca lled General J’s
Military Surplus in Minneapolis. Janavaras had an enormous inv entory of items for sale
at General J’s. The store was located on a property (the premi ses) in Minneapolis that
Janavaras rented from Twin Town Properties, LLC (Twin Town). Barry Anderson and his
father operated Twin Town, which Anderson’s father owned.
In February 2015, Janavaras bega n amassing fire code violations at the premises.
The violations related to the la rge inventory of goods maintain ed at General J’s and the
disorganized manner in which they were stored. Twin Town brought an eviction action in
May 2015. Twin Town and Janav aras settled the eviction action with an agreement that
Janavaras would pay monthly rent, comply with fire code inspect ions, and vacate the
premises by January 31, 2016. Janavaras planned to use this time to liquidate General J’s
large inventory and cease operations.
I n e a r l y 2 0 1 6 , J a n a v a r a s a s k e d T w i n T o w n t o e x t e n d t h e l e a s e . The parties
negotiated a new lease that ran from February 1, 2016 to August 1, 2016. The parties
intended that Janavaras would li quidate his inventory and vacat e the premises by
August 1, 2016, the end of the new lease.
By July 2016, however, General J’s had not resolved the fire co de violations. The
violations were numerous. At the trial, the district court found that the store was “crammed
full” with “massive amounts of inventory, much of which was old , filthy, broken and

3
completely undesirable.” The City of Minneapolis assessed fines on the premises for the
fire code violations. Whenever Anderson spoke with Janavaras t o ask him about the fire
code violations, Janavaras told him not to worry. The cumulati ve total of the fire code
fines assessed against the property by July 2016 was $1,540. Anderson was concerned that
Twin Town could lose its rental license if the fire code fines were not paid. Based on
Janavaras’s failure to correct the fire code violations and pay the fines, Twin Town brought
another eviction action against Janavaras on July 14, 2016.
Also in July 2016, Anderson noticed that General J’s was not open, which Anderson
thought was unusual. On or about July 16, 2016, Janavaras was hospitalized with a medical
condition. At that time, he was represented by attorney Edward Rooney.
On or about July 21, 2016, Anderson entered the premises to start cleaning the store
to bring it into compliance with the fire code. Because Janava ras had failed to give Twin
Town a key to the premises, as required by the active lease, and because Anderson did not
have Janavaras’s direct contact information, Anderson replaced the locks at a cost of about
$100. Twin Town also paid approximately $300 to repair a broken window. For about the
next week, Anderson was at the premises cleaning nearly every day. No one from General
J’s attempted to access the premises during that time period.
On July 22, 2016, Twin Town conta cted Rooney about the eviction action and the
parties began to discuss resolving the matter. Rooney was negotiating for Janavaras to stay
in the store after the lease expired. The parties’ negotiations were not successful.
On July 27, 2016, the district c ourt held a hearing in the evic tion matter and made
findings determining that Janavaras had failed to pay the fire code fines as required by the

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lease. Janavaras did not appear at the hearing. The district court issued a writ of recovery
of premises in the eviction matter.
On July 29, Rooney proposed that Twin Town rent the premises to Janavaras for
two additional months to facilita te an auction of the inventory . Twin Town rejected the
proposal.
On July 30, an employee of General J’s attempted to access the premises with
Janavaras’s daughter using Janavaras’s key. Because the locks were changed, they could
not enter.
On August 1, the lease expired. Janavaras had made no arrangem ents to move the
massive inventory out of the premises before the lease expired. He also never asked for a
key to reenter the premises. Jan avaras’s large inventory remai n e d a t t h e p r e m i s e s . A
provision of the lease indicated that “any property not removed [upon the expiration of the
lease or earlier termination of Janavaras’s right to possession] shall be deemed abandoned,
and [Janavaras] shall be liable for all costs of removal.”
Also on August 1, Twin Town made a new proposal to Janavaras—th at Janavaras
make an immediate payment of $24 ,047.49, and in exchange, Javan aras could stay at the
premises through September. Twi n Town believed $24,047.49 was approximately the
amount that Janavaras would owe under the lease that expired if he held over through
September plus a $7,000 deposit for damages. It included holdover rent, which, under the
lease, was double the ordinary m onthly rent. It also included payment of the fire code
fines. Rooney responded to the proposal on August 3, stating t hat Janavaras could not
afford to pay the proposed amount.

5
Janavaras retained a new attorney , Daniel Kennedy, sometime bef ore August 22,
2016. The writ of recovery was executed on August 23, 2016. O n August 26, Kennedy
emailed Twin Town’s attorney and asked that Twin Town allow Jan avaras to access the
premises on August 31 to remove the inventory. Kennedy asked that Twin Town respond
by August 29 so that Janavaras could arrange for trucks and per sonnel to remove the
inventory. Twin Town’s attorn ey responded on August 29 and ask ed for assurances that
Janavaras would remove all of the inventory. Kennedy told Twin Town that it would take
more than one day to remove the inventory, and made a counter-p roposal that Janavaras
remain at the premises until December 31, 2016. Kennedy represented that Janavaras could
sell off as much of the inventory as possible in that time and then give the rest of the
inventory to Twin Town. There w as no proposal that Janavaras w ould pay rent. Twin
Town rejected the counter proposal. Twin Town wanted all of the inventory removed. On
August 30, Kennedy sent an email to Twin Town’s attorney that s pecifically noted that
Twin Town never gave Janavaras e xpress permission to remove the inventory and
reiterated Janavaras’s request that Twin Town allow Janavaras on the premises to remove
the inventory.
On September 7, 2016, Twin Town filed a summons and complaint. Twin Town
alleged that Janavaras breached the lease contract in several w ays, including by
non-payment of rent and failure to remove the property left on the premises.
On September 8, Kennedy sent a letter to Twin Town’s attorney d emanding that
Twin Town allow Janavaras to ent er the premises and remove the inventory on
September 9. Twin Town did not respond to the letter. On Sept ember 13, Kennedy sent

6
another letter to Twin Town dema nding Twin Town to allow Janava r a s t o e n t e r t h e
premises and remove the inventory the next day. Twin Town’s at torney sent an email to
Kennedy on September 14 asking whether Janavaras would post a $90,000 bond to remove
all the inventory. Janavaras rejected the proposal.
On September 20, 2016, Janavaras filed an answer to the complai nt and asserted
counterclaims related to Twin To wn’s control over the inventory t h a t r e m a i n e d i n t h e
premises. Janavaras claimed that Twin Town was liable for statutory damages under Minn.
Stat. § 504B.271, conversion, civil theft, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment.
On September 28, Twin Town’s attorney sent a letter to Kennedy that stated:
The inventory of your client Mr. Janavaras is available to be
picked up by him at any time in the next three weeks. When
your client is prepared to pick it up, he should contact Barry
Anderson to obtain access. After October 21st, we will assume
that the tenant does not want to recover the property, and Twin
Town will dispose of it. There are no conditions attached to
this offer. My client will be reserving all claims against you r
client, and will pursue them in our District Court action.

In response to the letter, Kennedy asked whether the offer was being made as a settlement
offer. Twin Town’s counsel indicated that the offer was not a settlement proposal.
Janavaras accessed the premises multiple times in October to r emove some of his
property. He made no effort to remove all of the inventory and only removed a few items.
While he was at the premises on one of these occasions, he told Anderson that he had no
place to store the inventory and never intended to vacate the p remises at the end of the
lease.

7
On November 9, 2016, Twin Town filed a motion requesting an or der to allow Twin
Town to take possession of the inventory and sell or dispose of it pursuant to Minn.
Stat. § 504B.271. Janavaras did not contest the motion but asked that he be given time to
conduct an inventory count. On December 12, 2016, the district court granted the motion
allowing Twin Town to sell the inventory.
In its effort to sell the inventory, Twin Town spoke with seve ral potential buyers.
Most were not interested in the inventory. The district court found that the store, and its
inventory, were in an “abysmal condition.” There were “enormou s amounts of valueless
items,” and “[m]any of the clothes in the store smelled like th ey were covered in urine.”
There were areas on the store floor that were covered in what appeared to be rat feces, and
at some places on the floor the feces were an inch thick. Twin Town sold some select items
to one buyer (who was uninterested in the rest of the inventory) for approximately $1,200.
Twin Town sold the rest of the inventory to the owner of a different military surplus store
(the inventory purchaser) for $7,500 in March 2017. After buying the inventory from Twin
Town, the inventory purchaser spent 16 days and approximately $ 30,000 removing the
inventory from the premises. H e only ended up keeping approxim ately 20% of the
property. He testified that he would not have purchased the in ventory given the
information he now has.
Long before the inventory purchaser bought the inventory from T win Town,
Janavaras had contacted him about selling his inventory. The inventory purchaser was not
interested in purchasing the inventory at the $250,000 price that Janavaras suggested at the
time.

8
The trial began on August 18, 2 017. The district court found that Janavaras had
breached the lease contract by fa iling to pay the fire code fin es and failing to remove the
inventory from the premises.1 The district court awarded Twin Town $21,000 in damages
relating to the cost to store the inventory on the premises after the lease expired, $1,540 for
the fire code violation fines that Janavaras had amassed on the premises, $300 for repairing
the broken window on the premis es, $100 for changing the locks, and $6,801 in attorney
fees. The district court offset the damages awarded to Twin To wn by the $8,700 that it
recovered by selling the inventory, making the total damages aw arded to Twin Town
$21,041. The court found that Jan avaras’s counterclaims failed because Twin Town did
not convert or steal the inventory and complied with Minn. Stat. § 504B.271 in storing and
disposing of the property. 2 Janavaras did not make a motion for a new trial or amended
findings after the district court entered judgment in favor of Twin Town.
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Janavaras argues that the district court made several errors ov er the course of this
litigation. He argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for partial summary
judgment regarding Twin Town’s liability under Janavaras’s counterclaims. He maintains
that the district court abused its discretion by excluding expert testimony due to Janavaras’s
failure to comply with the district court’s scheduling order. He contends that the district

1 Some of Twin Town’s breach-of-contract claims—related to unpai d rent—were
dismissed by summary judgment.
2 The district court also found that Janavaras’s counterclaims f or breach of contract and
unjust enrichment failed, but those counterclaims are not at issue in this appeal.

9
court made erroneous findings of fact and legal conclusions when it found that Twin Town
was not liable for damages to Janavaras under any of the theories that he asserted under his
counterclaims. Finally, he argue s that the district court erre d in calculating the damages
awarded to Twin Town. We address each issue in turn.
I. The district court’s denial of Janavaras’s motion for partia l summary
judgment is not within this court’s scope of review.

Janavaras argues that the district court erred in failing to gr ant partial summary
judgment on the issue of liability for his counterclaims against Twin Town. He asserts that
there were no genuine issues of material fact concerning the cl aims, that the undisputed
facts proved that Twin Town was liable under each claim, and that the trial court misapplied
Twin Town’s defenses to the claims.
T h i s c o u r t “ h a s t h e a u t h o r i t y t o r e v i e w o r d e r s t h a t ‘ a f f e c t ’ t he judgment being
appealed.” Bahr v. Boise Cascade Corp., 766 N.W.2d 910, 918 (Minn. 2009) (citing Minn.
R. Civ. App. P. 103.04). The denial of a motion for summary ju dgment is not within this
court’s appellate review when the district court denied summary judgment because there
were material disputed facts. Schmitz v. Rinke, Noonan, Smoley, Deter, Colombo, Wiant,
Von Korff & Hobbs, Ltd., 783 N.W.2d 733, 744 (Minn. App. 2010), review denied (Minn.
Sep. 21, 2010). A “district court’s conclusion . . . that there was a genuine dispute of fact
becomes moot once” a trial is held and the parties have been gi ven a full and fair
opportunity to litigate their claims. Bahr, 766 N.W.2d at 918. Here, the district court
denied summary judgment because it found that there were genuine issues of material fact
related to the defenses that Twin Town asserted to Janavaras’s claims. The district court’s

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denial of partial summary judgment is not within this court’s s cope of appellate review
because the denial of summary judgment was based on the existen ce of genuine issues of
material fact and a trial has been held on the merits of Janava ras’s counterclaims. We do
not reach the merits of Janavaras’s partial summary judgment arguments.
II. The district court did not ab use its discretion when it exc luded expert
testimony that Janavaras intended to introduce.

Janavaras argues that the district court abused its discretion by excluding his expert
witness from trial because he fa iled to comply with the distric t court’s expert disclosure
requirements. He argues that the district court should have co nsidered a less severe
sanction for his failure to comply with the scheduling order. Janavaras asserts in his
appellate brief that the value of the property that the expert would have testified to at trial
is the purported retail value of the inventory.3
The parties disagree over whether the district court’s decision to exclude Janavaras’s
expert witness is subject to appellate review, given that Janavaras failed to move for a new
trial. See Sauter v. Wasemiller, 389 N.W.2d 200, 201 (Minn. App. 1986) (indicating that,
generally, to preserve an evidentiary ruling for appeal, the party seeking review must make
a motion for a new trial to the district court). The supreme c ourt recently held that the
general rule established in Sauter does not apply to pretrial orders on motions in limine.
County of Hennepin v. Bhakta, 922 N.W.2d 194, 199 (Minn. 2019). Because Twin Town’s

3 The amount that Janavaras argues is the retail value in his ap pellate brief is the same
amount that Janavaras claimed th e expert witness would testify to on an expert witness
disclosure document before trial.

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motion to exclude expert testimony was made as a motion in limine, we review the merits
of Janavaras’s arguments.
On November 2, 2016, the district court issued a scheduling order. The scheduling
order provided that Janavaras was required to disclose expert w itnesses and their reports
by June 16, 2017. Janavaras disclosed that he would call an ex pert witness by the
June 16, 2017 deadline, but failed to disclose the expert’s report until July 28, 2017, more
than a month after the deadline and less than a month before trial. The district court found
that Janavaras “flagrantly” ignored the scheduling order consid ering the amount of time
between the filing of the scheduling order and the deadline to disclose expert witnesses and
reports.
“The admission of evidence rests within the broad discretion of the [district] court
and its ruling will not be disturbed unless it is based on an e rroneous view of the law or
constitutes an abuse of discretion.” Kroning v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 567 N.W.2d 42,
45-46 (Minn. 1997) (quotation omitted). “We view the record in the light most favorable
to the district court’s ruling.” In re Conservatorship of Smith, 655 N.W.2d 814, 820 (Minn.
App. 2013). “[T]he availability of other sanctions does not re nder the exclusion of
testimony an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 821. A party is not entitled to a new trial based
on an erroneous evidentiary ruling unless the ruling resulted in prejudicial error. Id. at 820.
“The trial court has a duty to suppress such evidence or testimony where counsel’s
dereliction is inexcusable and res ults in unjust surprise and p rejudice to his opponent.”
Phelps v. Blomberg Roseville Clinic , 253 N.W.2d 390, 394 (Minn. 1977) (quotation
omitted). The decision to exclude is discretionary and may be ordered “if the opponent has

12
been prejudiced to any appreciable degree.” Id. In deciding whether to suppress expert
testimony for failure to disclose the expert, the district cour t should consider whether the
nondisclosure was inexcusable, inadvertent, and whether the expert is necessary. Norwest
Bank Midland v. Shinnick, 402 N.W.2d 818, 823 (Minn. App. 1987).
The district court found that Janavaras’s nondisclosure of the expert’s report was
“blatant non-compliance.” It is clear that the district court considered Janavaras’s
nondisclosure to be inexcusable. The district court reviewed the report and indicated that
it was not clear what benefit the expert would provide to Janavaras’s case. Moreover, the
district court recognized that Twin Town was unable to rebut the expert’s report due to the
late disclosure less than a month before trial. Considering th ese factors, the district court
precluded Janavaras from introducing expert testimony. Based on our review of the record,
we conclude that the district court’s evidentiary ruling was not an abuse of its discretion.
We also conclude that, even if t he district court abused its discretion in precluding
the expert testimony, the evident iary ruling was not prejudicia l . A s d i s c u s s e d i n m o r e
detail below, Janavaras failed to establish at trial that he was entitled to damages under any
of his counterclaims. Ultimately, the measure of the value of the property that was
applicable was not the retail value of the property, but rather the amount that Twin Town
sold the property for, which was offset against the breach of c ontract damages that Twin
Town was awarded. Janavaras’s e xpert’s testimony regarding the retail value of the
inventory would not have affected the outcome of trial, and thus the evidentiary ruling did
not result in prejudicial error.

13
III. The district court’s factual findings and legal conclusion s regarding
Janavaras’s counterclaims were not erroneous.

Janavaras argues that the distric t court erred in not awarding damages for his
counterclaims under Minn. Stat. § 504B.271, conversion, and theft.
“On appeal from a bench trial, this court’s scope of review is limited to determining
whether the trial court’s findings are clearly erroneous and wh ether the court erred as a
matter of law.” Birch Publ’ns, Inc. v. RMZ of St. Cloud, Inc., 683 N.W.2d 869, 872 (Minn.
App. 2004) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Oct. 19, 2004). We will reverse a
district court’s findings of fact only if we are “left with a definite and firm conviction that
the trial court has made a mistake.” Id. (quotation omitted). We review issues of law
de novo. See id. (“This court exercises independent judgment on purely legal questions.”).
A. Minn. Stat. § 504B.271
Janavaras contends that the dist rict court erred in concluding that Twin Town
complied with Minn. Stat. § 504B.271. He maintains that the di strict court should have
determined that Twin Town was liable for damages under Minn. Stat. § 504B.271 because
it did not allow Janavaras access to the premises after Janavaras’s written demand.
If a tenant abandons (or is evic ted from) a rented premises and leaves personal
property on the premises, the landlord may take possession of t he property and store and
care for the property on the premises. Minn. Stat. § 504B.271, subd. 1(a); see also Minn.
Stat. § 504B.365, subd. 3(d) (2018) (applying the provisions of Minn. Stat. § 504B.271 to
property stored on the premises following eviction). The landl ord may sell the property
“28 days after the landlord recei ves actual notice of the aband onment, or 28 days after it

14
reasonably appears to the landlord that the tenant has abandone d the premises, whichever
occurs last.” Minn. Stat. § 504 B.271, subd. 1(b). The landlor d must make reasonable
efforts to notify the tenant at least 14 days before a sale. Id., subd. 1(d). Proceeds of the
sale may offset the landlord’s cost of removal, care, and stora ge of the property, and any
remaining proceeds must be paid to the tenant upon a written demand. Id., subd. 1(c).
Upon a written demand by the tenant, the landlord in possession of property must
allow the tenant to retake possession of the personal property within 24 hours if it is stored
on the premises. Id., subd. 2. If the landlord fails to allow the tenant to retake possession
of the property after written demand, the tenant shall recover actual and punitive damages.
Id. A n y p r ovi s i o n i n a l e a s e whe r e b y t he t e na nt a gr e e s t o wa i v e a provision of Minn.
Stat. § 504B.271 is contrary to public policy and void. Id., subd. 4.
The district court determined that Twin Town complied with the requirements of
Minn. Stat. § 504B.271 and was not liable for damages under subdivision 2. It found that
the premises became abandoned wh en the lease expired on August 1, 2016, and that the
property left there became subject to the provisions of Minn. S tat. § 504B.271.4 Though
Janavaras made requests to access the property on August 26, August 30, September 8, and

4 Janavaras asserts that the distr ict court erroneously applied the affirmative defense of
abandonment to relieve Twin Town of liability under Minn. Stat. § 504B.271 and his other
counterclaims. Abandonment is an affirmative defense that appl i e s w h e n o n e p a r t y
voluntarily relinquishes his ownership of property. See In re Application of Berman, 247
N.W.2d 405, 408 (Minn. 1976) (“A bandonment is defined as a volu ntary relinquishment
of an interest by the owner with the intent of terminating his ownership.”). Abandonment
under Minn. Stat. § 504B.271, in contrast, is the event of the tenant leaving the leased
premises by eviction, expiration of the lease, or other means. We conclude that the district
court’s discussion of “abandonmen t” in this case related to the event of abandonment as
contemplated by Minn. Stat. § 504B.271—not the affirmative defense of abandonment.

15
September 13, the district court concluded that Janavaras never made the slightest attempt
to remove all the inventory from the premises. We conclude that the evidence supports the
district court’s factual finding regarding Janavaras’s lack of intent to remove the inventory
and that damages under Minn. Stat. § 504B.271 are inappropriate.
Janavaras does not specifically contest any of the district cou rt’s factual findings,
but to the extent that Janavaras contends that the district court clearly erred in finding that
Janavaras never intended to remove the inventory from the premi ses, we disagree.
Evidence was presented to support that: Janavaras made no arran gements to remove the
inventory following the 2015 eviction settlement or during the most recent lease term that
ended on August 2016; Janavaras did not ask for access to the premises until late August;
and given the opportunity to rem ove the inventory in late Septe mber, Janavaras removed
only a few items from the premises. In October 2016, when Janavaras was at the premises
removing a few select items, he told Barry Anderson, a representative of Twin Town, that
he never intended to vacate the premises and that he had no pla ce to store the inventory.
Considering Janavaras’s conduct and statements, the district co urt did not err in finding
that Janavaras did not intend to remove the inventory and that his requests to access the
premises to remove the goods were not genuine.
Given the unique facts of this case, we also conclude that the district court correctly
determined that Twin Town was not liable for damages under Minn . Stat. § 504B.271,
subd. 2. Janavaras argues that T win Town’s failure to allow Ja navaras access to the
premises within 24 hours of his September 8 and September 13 requests was a violation of
the statute, but the requests must be considered in the context of the parties’ past

16
interactions. Janavaras failed to remove his massive inventory following the first eviction
action in 2015 after agreeing to vacate the premises by January 31, 2016. He failed to do
so again during the term of the February 1 to August 1, 2016 lease, which was entered into
for the express purpose of giving Janavaras time to liquidate h is inventory and vacate the
premises. While Janavaras had expressed an interest in staying at the premises to continue
to sell or auction off his inventory after August 1, it was rea sonable to believe, and the
district court ultimately found, t hat Janavaras did not intend to actually remove his
inventory from the premises at a ny point in time. The evidence and the district court’s
findings of fact support the conclusion that Janavaras’s reques ts to remove the inventory
were not genuine. And, though Twin Town was not initially cooperative with Janavaras’s
requests to access the premises t o remove inventor y, Twin Town eventually allowed
Janavaras unconditional access to the premises from September 2 8, 2016 to
October 21, 2016. Janavaras made no effort to remove the inven tory during that time.
Later, he waived his right to recover the inventory and did not object to Twin Town selling
the inventory. Because the distr ict court found that Janavaras never actually intended to
remove his inventory from the premises, and because Twin Town e ventually gave
Janavaras unconditional access to t he premises to retake posses sion of the inventory that
was left there, we agree with the district court’s determinatio n that Twin Town did not
violate Minn. Stat. § 504B.271, subd. 2. Janavaras is not enti tled to damages under that
provision.

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B. Conversion
Janavaras argues that the district court erred in concluding that Twin Town did not
convert his inventory by changing the locks to the premises on July 21, 2016—before the
writ of recovery of premises issued and before the lease expired.
“Conversion occurs where one willf ully interferes with the pers onal property of
another without lawful justification, depriving the lawful possessor of use and possession.”
Williamson v. Prasciunas, 661 N.W.2d 645, 649 (Minn. App. 2003) (quotations omitted).
The elements of conversion are “(1) plaintiff holds a property interest; and (2) defendant
deprives plaintiff of that interest.” Id. “To constitute conversion, one must exercise
dominion over property that is inconsistent with the owner’s right to the property, or some
act must be done that destroys or changes the character of the property or deprives the
owner of possession permanently or for an indefinite length of time.” McKinley v.
Flaherty, 390 N.W.2d 30, 32 (Minn. App. 1986). Conversion requires that the actor have
the intent to commit an act that results in dispossession of the property, and that “his act be
one which he knows to be destructive of any outstanding possess ory right, if such there
be.” Christensen v. Milbank Ins. Co. , 658 N.W.2d 580, 586 (Minn. 2003) (quoting
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 222 cmt. c (1965)).
The district court concluded that Twin Town did not convert Jan avaras’s property
because Twin Town had not willfu lly interfered with or deprived Janavaras of his
inventory.
We review findings of fact following a bench trial to determine whether the district
court’s findings are “clearly erroneous.” Birch Publ’ns, Inc., 683 N.W.2d at 872 (quotation

18
omitted). The district court’s finding that Twin Town had not willfully interfered with or
deprived Janavaras of his inventory was not clearly erroneous. The district court found,
and the evidence supports, that Anderson accessed the premises on July 21, 2016, to begin
cleaning the premises to bring it into compliance with the fire code. Because Janavaras
never provided Twin Town with a master key, as required by the lease, Twin Town needed
to change the locks when Anders on entered the premises. Though Janavaras’s employee
and daughter were unable to access the premises on July 30, Jan avaras never contacted
Twin Town for a copy of the new key.
Given the district court’s factual finding that Twin Town did not willfully interfere
with or deprive Janavaras of his inventory, we determine that t he district court correctly
concluded Twin Town did not conve rt Janavaras’s inventory by ch anging the locks. An
actor does not convert property unless he willfully interferes with the personal property of
another and deprives the owner o f use or possession of the prop erty. Williamson, 661
N.W.2d at 649.
Janavaras also argues that the district court erred in finding that Twin Town did not
convert his inventory by failing to return it to him after the lease expired. Because we have
determined that Twin Town comp lied with Minn. Stat. § 504B.271 in keeping and
disposing of the inventory, we conclude that Twin Town did not convert the inventory by
keeping it after the lease expired.
C. Civil Theft
Janavaras also contends that the district court erred in not fi nding that Twin Town
stole his property under Minn. Stat. §§ 604.14, 609.52 (2018). A person commits theft

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when he “intentionally and without claim of right takes, uses, transfers, conceals or retains
possession of movable property of another without the other’s c onsent and with intent to
deprive the owner permanently of possession of the property.” Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd.
2(a)(1). A person also commits t heft if he exercises temporary control of property in a
manner that “manifests an indifference to the rights of the own er or the restoration of the
property to the owner,” or if “the actor intends to restore the property only on condition
that the owner pay a reward or buy back or make other compensation.” Id., subd. 2(5)(i),
(iii). A person guilty of theft may be liable for civil damage s to the rightful owner under
Minn. Stat. § 604.14, subd. 1.
Janavaras argues that Twin Town committed civil theft by changing the locks to the
premises and proposing that Janavaras pay to access it. Janavaras characterizes proposals
made by Twin Town to allow Janavaras to stay at the premises for a longer period of time
and a proposal that Janavaras post a bond before accessing premises after litigation began
as demands that Janavaras pay money for access to the premises. The district court found
that because Twin Town did not act to deprive Janavaras of his inventory permanently or
temporarily, it was not liable for civil theft. We agree. The district court’s factual finding
that Twin Town did not act to deprive Janavaras of his property by changing the locks was
not clearly erroneous—as discussed above, the evidence supporte d a finding that Twin
Town changed the locks with the intent to bring the premises into compliance with the fire
code. We also conclude that the district court did not err in not considering the parties’
negotiations for a new lease and post-complaint proposal regard ing the bond as theft
because Twin Town ultimately complied with the applicable statute regarding property left

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at a rented premises. Considering the district court’s finding that Twin Town did not have
the intent to deprive Janavaras of his inventory before the lea se expired, the district court
correctly concluded that Twin Town did not commit civil theft.
IV. The district court did not err in calculating damages award ed to Twin Town
for breach of contract.

Janavaras argues that the distric t court erred in awarding dama ges to Twin Town
for breach of contract. We review the district court’s award o f damages for abuse of
discretion. VanLandschoot v. Walsh, 660 N.W.2d 152, 156 (Minn. App. 2003).
First, Janavaras argues that the district court should not have awarded damages to
Twin Town for storage fees and the cost to change the locks bec ause Twin Town
unlawfully changed the locks and then kept the inventory in violation of Janavaras’s rights.
As discussed above, we have concl uded that Twin Town did not co nvert or steal
Janavaras’s inventory and that Twin Town complied with Minn. Stat. § 504B.271 in storing
and disposing of the inventory. Consequently, we find that this argument has no merit.
Janavaras also maintains that the district court improperly rec haracterized Twin
Town’s unpaid rent claims—which were dismissed at summary judgm ent—when
calculating Twin Town’s cost of storing the inventory at the pr emises. The district court
awarded damages for storage fees under the provision of the lea se that provided that
Janavaras was liable for the costs of removing any property that remained on the premises
after the lease expired. The court determined that the cost of storing the inventory at the
premises was properly considered a cost of removal, and that th e measure of the cost of
storing the inventory was forgone rent. The district court awarded $21,000 in storage fees,

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which was the equivalent of si x months of forgone rent (from Oc tober 2016 to March
2017). We find no merit to Janavaras’s argument that the distr ict court revived the
dismissed claim for unpaid rent—the rent was used as a measure for the cost of storing the
inventory. The record supports the damages award, and we conclude that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in awarding $21,000 in damages for the costs of storing the
inventory at the premises.
Janavaras’s other arguments rega rding the district court’s dama ges award also are
not supported by the record. He contends that the district court erroneously ordered $1,540
in damages related to fines associated with Janavaras’s fire code violations at the premises.
The city of Minneapolis assessed fines against the property in the amounts of $220, $440,
and $880. Janavaras argues that the $880 fine included the oth er two fines and that the
$1,540 award was not supported by the evidence. Anderson, however, testified that each
fine was assessed separately. Consequently, the district court did not err in awarding the
cumulative total of all three fines as breach-of-contract damages.
Janavaras argues that Anderson br oke the window to access the p roperty before
Twin Town changed the locks. The record contains evidence that the window was broken
before Anderson accessed the property—Anderson testified that h e entered the premises,
in part, to repair the broken window. Repairing broken windows was Janavaras’s
responsibility under the parties’ lease. Consequently, the dis trict court acted within its
discretion in awarding breach-of-contract damages to Twin Town for the cost to repair the
broken window.

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Finally, Janavaras argues that once the damages are reduced to the amount that he
suggests is appropriate, the atto rney fees awarded by the distr ict court are not reasonable
in relation to the damages award and must be reduced. 5 Because we conclude that the
district court did not abuse its d iscretion in awarding damages for breach of contract, we
need not consider Janavaras’s argument regarding attorney fees.6
Affirmed.

5 Janavaras’s only challenge to the district court’s attorney fees award is that, if the damages
are reduced, they are not reasonable in relation to the amount o f t h e j u d g m e n t . See
Bloomington Elec. Co. v. Freeman’s, Inc. , 394 N.W.2d 605, 608 (Minn. App. 1986)
(indicating that an award for attorney fees must be “in reasonable relation to the amount of
the judgment secured”), review denied (Minn. Dec. 12, 1986). He does not argue that the
attorney fees award is unreasonable in relation to the amount o f damages that the district
court actually ordered.
6 Janavaras also maintains on appeal that this court should remand with instructions to the
district court to determine the retail value of the property th at Janavaras left on the
premises. Janavaras argues that the measure of damages for civ il theft under Minn.
Stat. § 604.14, subd. 1, is the retail value of merchandise stolen. Because the district court
correctly determined that Twin To wn did not commit civil theft, t h e r e i s n o r e a s o n t o
remand for further findings on the value of the property. The district court properly applied
Minn. Stat. § 504B.271, subd. 1(c), to offset the proceeds of T win Town’s sale of the
inventory to the breach-of-contract damages awarded to Twin Town.