State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0642

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Bounlieng Moon Chaokhio,
Appellant.

Filed May 13, 2019
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-09-11344

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Peter R. Marker, Assistant County Attorney, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sean Michael McGuire, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JOHNSON, Judge
Bounlieng Moon Chaokhio pleaded guilty to first -degree criminal sexual conduct,
admitting that he sexually abused his step-granddaughter during a period of more than three

2
years. Before sentencing, he moved to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming that his attorney
had pressured him to plead guilty and had misinformed him of the consequences of
pleading guilty. The district court denied the motion and sentenced him to 144 months of
imprisonment, to be followed by a ten-year term of conditional release. We conclude that
the district court did not err by denying Chaokhio’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea .
We also conclude that the district court did not err by ordering a ten -year period of
conditional release. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
In October 2008, a Hennepin County Child Protection worker was informed by
Chaokhio’s then -seven-year-old step -granddaughter that Chaokhio had sexually abus ed
her and was continuing to do so. The girl was interviewed at the Midwest Children’s
Resource Center four days later and stated that several incidents of abuse had occurred at
Chaokhio’s home when she was five, six, and seven years old. Because Chaokhio was
living in Ramsey County, the Hennepin County employee referred the matter to the
Ramsey County Sheriff’s Department.
In June 2009, the state charged Chaokhio with first-degree criminal sexual conduct,
in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a ) (2004). The complaint alleged that the
offense occurred “ [b]etween the 1st day of January, 2006 and the 6th day of October ,
2008.”
Law-enforcement officers subsequently learned that Chaokhio had traveled to Laos,
where he was using a false identity. He was arrested there and extradited to Minnesota in
October 2016.

3
In November 2016, the state amended the complaint by adding a second count of
first-degree criminal sexual conduct, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a). The
state also gave notice of its intent to seek an upward departure at sentencing. The state
later amended count 2 to allege second-degree (rather than first -degree) criminal sexual
conduct, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(h)(iii) (2004). The second amended
complaint alleged that both offenses occurred “on or between March 19, 2005 and October
6, 2008.”
Trial began in late April 2017. On the second day , Chaokhio accepted the state’s
offer of a plea agreement. Chaokhio agreed to plead guilty to count 1, and the state agreed
to dismiss count 2 and to not seek an upward departure from the sentencing guidelines. At
the plea hearing, the district court stated that Chaokhio was “competent . . . to plead guilty,”
that he “provided a knowing, intelligent, voluntary waiver of [his] trial rights,” and that
there was “a sufficient factual basis for [the] plea.” The district court deferred acceptance
of the plea and adjudication of guilt until the sentencing hearing.
At the sentencing hearing i n August 2017, Chaokhio appeared with a different
attorney, who informed the district court that Chaokhio intended to file a written motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. Chaokhio filed such a motion in Sep tember 2017. He argued
that plea withdrawal was necessary to avoid a manifest injustice and would be fair and just.
The state opposed the motion. The district court held an evidentiary hearing on Chaokhio’s
motion in October 2017. Chaokhio testified on his own behalf , and his former attorney
testified for the state . In November 20 17, the district court issued a 12 -page order and
memorandum denying the motion.

4
In January 2018, the district court imposed a sentence of 144 months of
imprisonment, to be followed by a ten-year term of conditional release. Chaokhio appeals.
D E C I S I O N
I. Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea
Chaokhio argues that , for three reasons, the district court erred by denying his
motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
A.
Chaokhio first contends that he had an absolute right to withdraw his guilty plea
before the district court accepted it. The caselaw is clear in stating that a defendant who
has pleaded guilty does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea. See, e.g., State
v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Minn. 2010); State v. Tuttle, 504 N.W.2d 252, 257 (Minn.
App. 1993). The rules of criminal procedure allow for the withdrawal of a guilty plea in
only two circumstances: to correct a “manifest injustice,” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd.
1, or if it would be “fair and just,” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2. In State v. Nicholas,
924 N.W.2d 286 (Minn. App. 2019), review denied (Minn. Apr. 24, 2019), we recently
reiterated that the rules of criminal procedure do not give a defendant an absolute right to
withdraw a guilty plea before its acceptance by the district court and also determined that
no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea exists outside of the rules of criminal procedure.
Id. at 291-92. Thus, Chaokhio did not have an absolute right to withdraw his guilty plea.
B.
Chaokhio next contends that the district court erred by reasoning that plea
withdrawal is not required to correct a manifest injustice.

5
Under the manifest -injustice standard, withdrawal of a guilty plea is required if a
guilty plea is invalid. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. To be constitutionally valid, a guilty
plea “must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.” State v. Farnsworth, 738 N.W.2d 364,
372 (Minn. 2007). As the supreme court has explained,
The accuracy requirement protects the defendant from
pleading guilty to a more serious offense than he or she could
be properly convicted of at trial. The voluntariness
requirement insures that the guilty plea is not in response to
improper pressures or inducements; and the intelligent
requirement insures that the defendant understands the
charges, his or her rights under the law, and the consequences
of pleading guilty.

Alanis v. State, 583 N.W.2d 573, 577 (Minn. 1998) (footnot es omitted), overruled in part
on other grounds by Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010),
as recognized by Taylor v. State, 887 N.W.2d 821, 823 (Minn. 2016). If a guilty plea does
not satisfy any of these three requirements, it is invalid. See State v. Ecker , 524 N.W.2d
712, 716 (Minn. 1994). Thus, if a defendant’s guilty plea was not accurate, not voluntary,
or not intelligent, a district court must permit the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea to
correct a manifest injustice. State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 650 (Minn. 2007).
1.
Chaokhio contends that his plea was not voluntarily entered because his attorney,
coerced him into pleading guilty by telling him that he would be subject to a 30-year
sentence without telling him about the procedures for an upward departure.
During the plea hearing, the district court informed Chaokhio that his sentence
presumably would be between 144 and 172 months but that his attorney could ask for a

6
shorter sentence. When asked if anyone w as forcing him to plead guilty, Chaokhio
answered, “Well, I was afraid if I go to trial and I lose I might end up with 30 years, whether
that’s true or not, I don’t know.” The district court inquired further , and Chaokhio stated,
“No one forced me. I was just afraid that I might lose at trial.” Chaokhio’s attorney
inquired as to whether Chaokhio understood the meaning of the sentencing-guidelines grid,
which they had reviewed together, and Chaokhio said that he understood it.
Five months later, at the evidentiary hearing on his motion to withdraw , Chaokhio
testified that his former attorney had told him that he would lose at trial. Chaokhio also
testified that his former attorney had told him that if he were to lose at trial, he would have
to go to pri son for 30 years , but that if he pleaded guilty , he would get “90, 60, or 30 ”
months. Chaokhio testified that his former attorney did tell him about the presumptive
sentence. Chaokhio testified that he felt that his former attorney wanted him to go to jail
and that he pleaded guilty because he “didn’t really understand the system here in America”
and did not want to die in prison.
Chaokhio’s former attorney testified at the evidentiary heari ng that he informed
Chaokhio that the tria l would be “a challenge” given the state’s evidence and the district
court’s rulings on pre-trial motions. He testified that he informed Chaokhio of the state’s
intention to seek an aggravated sentence and the possible consequences of that motion. He
testified that he did not force Chaokhio to plead guilty, did not threaten him, and did n ot
tell him to lie under oath.
In its order denying the motion to withdraw, the district court stated, “The only
statements in the record that support [Chaokhio’s] conten tion that he was coerced into a

7
plea by trial counsel are his own testimony at the withdrawal hearing and the arguments of
his new counsel.” The district court further stated , “The record does not support a
conclusion that [Chaokhio’s] will was overborne by pressure from his trial counsel.”
We review the district court’s findings for clear error. State v. Danh, 516 N.W.2d
539, 544 (Minn. 1994). Chaokhio’s plea colloquy and his former attorney’s testimony at
the evidentiary hearing support the district court’s finding that Chaokhio was not coerced
into pleading guilty. The absence of any advice about the procedures required for an
upward departure does not make the attorney’s advice coercive. The district court did not
clearly err by determining that Chaokhio’s plea was entered voluntarily.
2.
Chaokhio also contends that his plea was not intelligently entered because his
former attorney advised him that he could move for a downward durational departure based
on remorse.
At the plea hearing, Chaokhio stated that he had reviewed the plea petition with his
attorney and an interpreter and that his attorney had answered his questions. His attorney
reviewed the plea petition with Chaokhio on the recor d. The district court informed
Chaokhio that he could request a shorter sentence than the presumptive guidelines sentence
but that the district court would not decide that issue until the sentencing hearing. Chaokhio
stated that he understood and wished to go forward with the plea. Chaokhio stated that his
attorney had told him that “he was going to help me see my sentence reduced because of
my age.” Chaokhio’s attorney stated that they would be gathering evidence to “ask the

8
judge for a lower amount of time” but confirmed that Chaokhio was aware of the
presumptive sentencing range.
At the evidentiary hearing on his motion to withdraw , Chaokhio testified that his
former attorney had told him that he would write a letter to Chaokhio’s wife and Chaokhio
would write a letter to the judge and apologize “and then I would get a good deal.”
Chaokhio’s former attorney testified that he “provided counsel that generally if you can
accept responsibility there are matters that can be presented in both extenuation and
mitigation that . . . may result in less of a sentence.” He also testified that he and Chaokhio
discussed the possibility of a motion for a downward durational departure but that he told
Chaokhio that he should assume that the sentence would be within the presumptive range.
In its order denying the motion to withdraw, the district court found that Chaokhio
was aware that, although he was free to seek a departure from the presumptive sentence ,
there was no specific sentencing agreement in place and that his sentence would ultimately
be determined by the district court and, “knowing all of those facts, he wished to plead
guilty.” The district cour t also found that Chaokhio’s contention that he was promised a
downward durational departure was “negated by the plea petition that [Chaokhio] signed,
by trial counsel’s testimony at the motion hearing, and by [Chaokhio’s] own statements at
the plea colloquy.”
The record indicates that Chaokhio’s plea was entered intelligently. Chaokhio
stated that he understood the charges against him, his rights under the law, the terms of the
plea agreement, and the consequences of pleading guilty. He told the district court that he
had had a full opportunity to consult with his attorney through an interpreter , and his

9
attorney reviewed the petition with him again on the record. Chaokhio also indicated that
he understood that he likely w ould receive the presumptive sentence. Chaokhio later
testified that he believed that he could receive a lower sentence based on his age or an
apology to the judge. Although remorse usually is offered in support of a request for a
downward dispositional departure, see State v. Back, 341 N.W.2d 273, 275 (Minn. 1983),
it also may be offered to support a request for a downward durational departure, see State
v. Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618, 625-26 (Minn. 2016). The district court did not clearly err by
determining that Chaokhio entered his plea intelligently.
Thus, the district court did not err by denying Chaokhio’s motion to withdraw his
guilty plea under the manifest-injustice standard.
C.
Chaokhio further contends that the district court erred by reasoning that plea
withdrawal is not required under the fair-and-just standard.
“The fair-and-just standard is less demanding than the manifest-injustice standard.”
State v. Lopez , 794 N.W.2d 379, 382 (Minn. App. 2011). But the fair-and-just standard
does not allow a defendant to withdraw a plea “for simply any reason.” Theis, 742 N.W.2d
at 646 (quotation omitted). The fair-and-just standard requires district courts to give “due
consideration” to two factors: (1) “the reasons advanced by the defendant in support of the
motion” and (2) “any prejudice the granting of the motion would cause the prosecution by
reason of actions taken in reliance upon the defendant’s plea.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05,
subd. 2; Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 97. “A defendant bears the burden of advancing reasons
to support withdrawal.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 97. The state “bears the burden of

10
showing prejudice caused by withdrawal.” Id. The district court’s application of the fair-
and-just standard “is left to the sound discretion of the [district] court,” and its decision
“will be reversed only in the rare case in which the appellate court can fairly conclude that
the trial court abused its discretion.” State v. Kaiser, 469 N.W.2d 316, 320 (Minn. 1991)
(quotation omitted).
The district court determined that Chaokhio “failed to advance any reason why
withdrawal would be fair and just.” The district court found that Chaokhio was aware of
the consequences of pleading guilty, that he was given extended recesses with his attorney
and an interpreter, that he said that he had had adequate time to consult with counsel and
consider his options, and that he stated that he understood the trial rights he was waiving
and was not forced to plead guilty. The district court also found Chaokhio’s arguments
regarding a lack of prejudice to the state to be “unpersuasive.” The district court stated
that it had been almost a decade since the offense was reported to law enforcement and that
“the long delay in bringing Defendant to trial has been almost entirely caused by
Defendant’s actions in fleeing to Laos and living under a different identity.” The district
court also noted that when Chaokhio made his motion to withdraw his plea, “the State had
already informed its witnesses that a guilty plea had been entered and they would not be
required to testify at trial.”
Chaokhio contends that it would have been fair and just for the district court to allow
him to withdraw his plea because of his confusion during the proceedings, his “cognitive
issues,” his “reliance on an interpreter,” and his former attorney’s “minimal contact wi th
him and affirmative misadvice .” We believe that the district court did not abuse its

11
discretion by not granting the motion for these reasons. Chaokhio further contends that the
state did not make a sufficient showing that it would be prejudiced by withdrawal of the
plea. The district court’s reasoning that the state would suffer prejudice because the victim
and other witnesses had been dismissed is supported by the record and the caselaw. See,
e.g., Kim v. State, 434 N.W.2d 263, 267 (Minn. 1989).
Thus, the district court did not err by denying Chaokhio’s motion to withdraw his
guilty plea under the fair-and-just standard.
II. Conditional Release
Chaokhio also argues that the district court erred by imposing a ten -year term of
conditional release.
If a defendant is found guilty of first-degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of
section 609.342, the district court “shall provide that, after the offender has completed the
sentence imposed , the commissioner [of corrections] shall place the offender on
conditional release for ten years.” Minn. Stat. § 609.3455, subd. 6 (20 05). The statute
authorizing the automatic imposition of a ten-year term of conditional release was enacted
in 2005 and became effective on August 1, 2005. See 2005 Minn. Laws ch. 136, art. 2,
§ 21, at 929 -33. For violations of section 609.342 committed before August 1, 2005, a
district court is required to impose a conditional-release term of only five years. See Minn.
Stat. § 609.109, subd. 7 (2004).
Chaokhio contends that the state did not establish that he committed first -degree
criminal sexual conduct after August 1, 2005, in light of the allegation in the second
amended complaint that he committed the alleged crimes “on or between March 19, 2005

12
and October 6, 2008.” He contends that the imposition of a ten -year term of conditional
release violates his right to a jury trial on the ground that the facts necessary for a ten-year
term must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted by the defendant. See Blakely
v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301-04, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2536-37 (2004); State v. DeRosier,
719 N.W.2d 900, 903 (Minn. 2006).
In response, the state cites Rickert v. State, 795 N.W.2d 236 (Minn. 2011), the facts
of which are quite similar to the facts of this case. In Rickert, the state alleged that the
defendant engaged in first -degree criminal sexual conduct “[o]n or about 2003 through
2006.” Id. at 238. Rickert pleaded guilty. Id. The district court imposed a ten-year term
of conditional release. Id. Rickert made the same argument that Chaokhio makes now.
Id. at 238, 242. The supreme court rejected the argument, reasoning that a guilty plea “in
effect judicially admit[s] the allegations contained in the complaint” and that “by his guilty
plea, Rickert judicially admitted that” he committed the offense “in 2006.” Id. at 242-43
(quotation omitted). Accordingly, the supreme court concluded that no additional fact -
finding was required and that there was no violation of Rickert’s Blakely rights. Id. at 243.
The relevant facts of this case are only slightly different from those of Rickert in
that the words used in the two complaints are slightly different, but the difference is not
meaningful. The state alleged that Chaokhio committed his offense “on or between March
19, 2005 and October 6, 2008.” We acknowledge that the phrase “on or between March
19, 2005 and October 6, 2008” is somewhat awkward and not perfectly clear. But no more
so than the phrase “[o]n or about 2003 through 2006,” which was the language used in the
complaint in Rickert. Id. at 238. The supreme court concluded in Rickert that the defendant

13
admitted to committing the alleged crime after August 1, 2005. Id. at 242-43. For the same
reasons, we conclude that Chaokhio admitted to committing his crime after
August 1, 2005.
Thus, the district court did not err by imposing a ten-year term of conditional release.
Affirmed.