In re the Marriage of: Mark Allen Kedrowski, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0657

In re the Marriage of: Mark Allen Kedrowski, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Masako Kedrowski,
Respondent.

Filed March 25, 2019
Affirmed in part and reversed in part
Schellhas, Judge

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-FA-11-283

Kevin S. Sandstrom, Jordan N. Feis, Eckberg Lammers, P.C., Stillwater, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Linda S.S. de Beer, Jenna K. Monson, de Beer & Associates, P.A., Lake Elmo, Minnesota
(for respondent)

Considered and decided by Worke , Presiding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and Slieter,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SCHELLHAS, Judge
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion
to terminate his spousal-maintenance obligation and erred by retaining jurisdiction over the
disposition of any proceeds from his personal -injury action. We affirm the den ial of

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husband’s motion to terminate his maintenance but reverse the district court’s retention of
jurisdiction over the disposition of any proceeds from husband’s personal-injury action.
FACTS
Appellant Mark Kedrowski (husband) and respondent Masako Kedr owski (wife)
married in October 2001, and had two children during the marriage. Throughout the parties’
marriage, husband was the majority owner and chief executive officer (CEO) of Blue Earth
Internet, LLC (BEI), an interactive development company. As own er of BEI, husband
received an annual salary in excess of $100,000.
The parties separated in August 2009. A pproximately one year later, husband
sustained serious injuries when a plane that he was piloting crashed. He underwent numerous
surgeries, his left leg was amputated, his right ankle was completely reconstructed, his face
was disfigured, and he suffered a traumatic brain injury. Husband sued Lycoming Engines
(Lycoming), claiming that the airplane’s engine, which was a model designed, manufactured,
and sold by Lycoming, lost power and caused the crash.
In May 2012, with the advice of independent legal counsel, husband and wife
stipulated to the dissolution of their marriage and that BEI, valued at $324,000, would be
awarded to husband; that the homestead, valued at $250,000, would be awarded to wife; that
husband’s gross annual income was $170,724, which included his “current salary” from BEI,
$2,227 per month in social security disability insurance, and $2,000 per month in private
disability insurance; that wife’s monthly income was $924; that husband would pay wife
spousal maintenance of $2,700 per month for three years, after which spousal maintenance
would be reviewed; and that husband would pay wife child support of $1,681 per month. The

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parties did not stipulate to a reservation of the district court’s jurisdiction over husband’s
personal-injury action. The district court incorporated the parties’ stipulated terms in its
findings of fact, conclusions of law, order for judgment, and judgment and decree.
In August 2012, husband married Jeri Kedrowski (second wife). In March 2015,
husband moved for a review of his spousal -maintenance obligation to wife. Following a
hearing, the district court found that, since the time of the dissolution judgment, husband’s
income had not substantially “changed/decrease[d]” to warrant a termination of his spousal-
maintenance obligation. But the court reduced husband’s spousal-maintenance obligation to
$1,800 per month, “continuing until [wife] remarries, dies, or until further Order of this
Court.”
In January 2016, a jury awarded husband $27.7 million in damages in his lawsuit
against Lycoming. But the district court in that action granted Lycoming’s posttrial motion
for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL). On appeal, this court affirmed the district court’s
JMOL ruling, and the supreme court granted review. Kedrowski v. Lycoming Engines, a
division of AVCO Corp., No. A17-0538 (Minn. App. May 15, 2018), review granted (Minn.
Aug. 7, 2018).
In December 2016, husband and second wife dissolved their marriage through
stipulated findings of fact, conclusions of law, order for judgment, and judgment and decree.
The stipulated dissolution judgment awarded second wife 100% ownership in BEI and
awarded husband a cash property settlement of $243,000 for his combined interest in BEI,
the marital homestead, and his interest in second wife’s 401(k). The stipulated dissolution
judgment requires second wife to pay husband the $243,000 cash property settlement in

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monthly payments of $5,9 46.81, including principal and 4% interest, for a period of 44
months until the cash settlement is paid in full.
In September 2017, husband again moved to terminate his spousal -maintenance
obligation to wife, claiming that his income “has dramatically decreased as a result of [second
wife’s] acquisition of [BEI],” and that his decreased income constitutes a substantial change
in circumstances rendering his existing maintenance obligation unreasonable and unfair.
In April 2018, the district court denied hu sband’s motion to terminate his spousal -
maintenance obligation. In its order, the court stated that it “struggle[d] with what it finds to
be the inequities based upon circumstances out of [wife’s] control. Those inequities could be
due to poor decisions on [husband’s] part, bad faith by [husband], or just a result of very
unfortunate circumstances.” The court found that wife “is in need of spousal maintenance to
pay her monthly living expenses,” that she “is using, and will probably continue to use, her
property settlement to pay some of her monthly living expenses,” and that husband “has the
ability to contribute towards [wife’s] expenses.” Although the court found that the marriage
dissolution between husband and second wife “has created a change of circum stances,” it
concluded that “when viewing the parties’ respective circumstances as a whole in connection
with the background that brought them to this point, . . . the existing maintenance obligation
of $1,800 per month is both reasonable and fair.” And th e court specifically “retain[ed]
jurisdiction of [husband’s] personal injury/products liability claim to adjudicate, mediate or
otherwise dispose of any marital interest the parties may have in any potential award.”
This appeal follows.

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D E C I S I O N
I. Denial of motion to terminate husband’s spousal-maintenance obligation
Husband challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to terminate his spousal-
maintenance obligation. Appellate courts review a district court’s decision regarding
whether to modify an existing maintenance award for an abuse of discretion. Hecker v.
Hecker, 568 N.W.2d 705, 709–10 (Minn. 1997). A district court abuses that discretion by
making findings of fact that are unsupported by the record or by improperly applying the
law. Dobrin v. Dobrin, 569 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Minn. 1997) (citing Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427
N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988)). A reviewing court defers to a district court’s findings of
fact and will uphold them unless they are clearly erroneous. Antone v. Antone, 645 N.W.2d
96, 100 (Minn. 2002).
Spousal maintenance is an award of “payments from the future income or earnings
of one spouse for the support and maintenance of the other.” Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd.
3a (2018). Our supreme court has ruled that the “income” from which maintenance
payments are made is the “gross income” defined in Minn. Stat. § 518A.29 (2018). Lee v.
Lee, 775 N.W.2d 631, 635 n.5 (Minn. 2009). Under Minn. Stat. § 518A.29(a), “gross
income includes any form of periodic payment to an individual.”
If spousal maintenance has been ordered, the district court may modify the
maintenance award after determining that (1) a substantial change in circumstances has
occurred, (2) which has made the existing support award unreasonable and unfair. Minn.
Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(a) (2018). Changed circumstances can be established by showing
a substantial increase or decrease in the gross income or need of either the obligee or the

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obligor. Id. The movant bears the burden of demonstrating a substantial change in
circumstances that renders the current maintenance amount unreasonable and unfair. Beck
v. Kaplan, 566 N.W.2d 723, 726 (Minn. 1997).
Husband argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion
to terminate his spousal -maintenance obligation because his “primary source of income
ended as a result of [second wife’s] acquisition” of BEI pursuant to the terms of the
stipulated dissolution decree between husband and second wife. Husband contends that
without his previous salary from BEI, his gross monthly income consists of social security
benefits of $2,300, and long -term disability benefits of $2,000, the combination of which
is less than his claimed reasonable monthly living expenses of $5,250. Although husband
acknowledges that he rec eives monthly property -settlement payments of $5,946.81 from
second wife, he maintains that the entirety of the payments cannot be considered as income
for purposes of determining his ability to pay maintenance to wife because the payments
represent his property settlement from second wife. Husband does not address the fact that
a portion of each monthly payment consists of income in the form of interest.
We acknowledge that Minnesota caselaw provides that absent fraud, mistake, newly
discovered evidence, or other extraordinary circumstances, the district court does not have
authority to modify a marital property division once the time for appeal from the judgment
and decree has expired. Lee, 775 N.W.2d at 639–40; Kiesow v. Kiesow, 133 N.W.2d 652,
661–62 (Minn. 1965); Kruschel v. Kruschel , 419 N.W.2d 119, 121 (Minn. App. 1988);
Boom v. Boom, 367 N.W.2d 536, 538 (Minn. App. 1985), review denied (Minn. June 27,
1985). And because of the finality of a property distribution under a judgment and decree,

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neither the obligee nor the obligor is generally required to invade the principal of his or her
property settlement to meet his or her monthly needs for purposes of determining spousal
maintenance. See Lee, 775 N.W.2d at 640 (concluding that district court could not properly
include previously divided martial assets in its determination of husband’s income for
maintenance purposes); see also Dougherty v. Dougherty , 443 N.W.2d 193, 195 (Minn.
App. 1989) (“It is established law that spouses are not required to invade the principal of
their property settlement to meet their monthly needs.”); Kruschel, 419 N.W.2d at 122
(concluding that basing a maintenance obligation on a property award inappropriately
redistributed the property as income).
Nonetheless, the district court never specifically found that the periodic payments
husband receives from his second wife constitute income for purposes of spousal
maintenance. Rather, the court found that despite the changed circumstances, the “existing
maintenance obligation of $1,800 per month is both reasonable and fair.” In determining
that the existing maintenance award was reasonable and fair, the district court considered
all of the circumstances presented in the case . The court found that wife “is in need of
spousal maintenance to pay her monthly living expenses,” and that she is, in fact, “using
. . . her property settlement to pay some of her monthly living expenses.” The court also
considered husband’s living expenses and found that “with his reduced income, [husband]
continues to contribute to charity, and enjoy a highly discretionary level of spending related
to eating out, shopping and entertainment.” In addition, the court found that aside from the
monthly payments he receives from second wife, husband has income of $4,300 per month
from social security disability and long -term disability. These findings are supported by

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the record. And although under Lee, husband is not required to pay maintenance from the
periodic payments he receive s from second wife that stem from his property award, the
portion of the periodic payments derived from interest is available for purposes of
satisfying husband’s maintenance obligation. 1 See 14 M ichael P. Boulette, Minnesota
Practice § 10.2 (2018-19 ed. 2018) (stating that income from which maintenance can be
paid includes any form of periodic payment, including interest) ; see also Kruschel , 419
N.W.2d at 123 (stating that once obligor has received from pension “amount equivalent to
its value as determined in the original property distribution,” court may properly consider
any subsequent pension benefits as “income” for maintenance purposes).
We acknowledge the unique facts and circumstances presented in this case. See
Curtis v. Curtis, 887 N.W.2d 249, 254 (Minn. 2016) (noting that “each marital dissolution
proceeding is unique and centers upon the individualized facts and circumstances of the
parties” (quotation omitted)). We agree with the district court that this is a case of
“unfortunate circumstances,” and that in light of these unfortunate circumstances, both
parties must invade their property settlements to meet their monthly expenses that include
a highly discretionary level of spending that was established during the parti es’ marriage.
The district court’s determination that, as a result of these “unfortunate circumstances,” the
existing maintenance award is both reasonable and fair is based on thoughtful analysis, and
precisely describes the situation.

1 Husband’s brief includes a copy of the amortization schedule for second wife’s cash
property-settlement payment of $243,000, payable with 4% interest, totaling $18,659.64
over the course of the payment schedule.

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The fact that husband stipulated to his spousal -maintenance obligation to wife
further supports the district court’s decision that the maintenance award is reasonable and
fair. See Beck, 566 N.W.2d at 726 (cautioning district courts to “exercise . . . cons iderable
discretion carefully and only reluctantly when . . . faced with a request to alter the terms of
an agreement which was negotiated by the parties”). Despite the changed circumstance of
husband’s decreased income, we therefore conclude that the cour t’s denial of h is motion
to terminate his spousal-maintenance obligation was well within its broad discretion.
II. Retention of jurisdiction over husband’s personal injury action
Husband also challenges the district court’s retention of “‘jurisdiction’ ov er [his]
personal injury action.” The court specifically “retain[ed] jurisdiction of [husband’s]
personal injury/products liability claim to adjudicate, mediate or otherwise dispose of any
marital interest the parties may have in any potential award.” The court appears to have
retained jurisdiction over the disposition, i.e., division, of “any marital interest” of the parties
in husband’s potential personal-injury award. To that extent, the order is erroneous.
Wife contends that the district court properly retained jurisdiction over husband’s
personal-injury action “as an extension of its continuing jurisdiction over spousal
maintenance.” Wife’s argument is unnecessary. A district court “may reserve jurisdiction
of the issue of maintenance for determination at a later date.” Minn. Stat. § 518A.27, subd.
1 (2018). Reservation permits a district court to “later assess and address future changes in
one party’s situation as those changes arise, without prematurely burdening the other
party.” Prahl v. Prahl, 627 N.W.2d 698, 703 (Minn. App. 2001). And district courts always
retain jurisdiction to hear later motions to modify existing maintenance awards upward or

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downward, unless the parties and the court together adopt as part of the judgment and
decree provisions providing that future jurisdiction is divested. See Minn. Stat. § 518.552,
subd. 3 (2018) (stating that where there is uncertainty as to the necessity of a permanent
spousal-maintenance award, an award of permanent maintenance should be lef t open for
later modification).
But as stated above, property settlements are final and may be modified only upon
a showing of fraud , mistake, newly discovered evidence or other extraordinary
circumstances. Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2 (2018); Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd . 2(g)
(2018); see Kerr v. Kerr, 243 N.W.2d 313, 314 (Minn. 1976) (stating that property awards
in dissolution judgments are generally final and not subject to alteration). Here, although
husband was injured in the plane crash prior to the dissolution of his marriage with wife, wife
stipulated to the division of the parties’ assets without reference to, or reservation of, any
interest that she might have had in husband’s personal -injury action. The division of the
parties’ marital property became final when the judgment and decree was entered in 2012,
and the time for appeal expired. Thereafter, the property award was subject to modification
only if wife showed fraud, mistake, or otherwise satisfied the requirements for reopening a
dissolution judgment. See Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(g) (stating that a property settlement
is final and may be modified only upon a showing of fraud or mistake); see also Minn. Stat.
§ 518.145, subd. 2 (addressing reopening of dissolution judgments). W e therefore reverse
that part of the district court’s order that retains jurisdiction over husband’s personal-injury
award. This reversal does not preclude wife from arguing the existence of a substantial change

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in circumstances in a maintenance-modification motion in the event that husband recovers a
substantial personal-injury award.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.