State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0676

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Sam Joseph Goggleye,
Appellant.

Filed January 7, 2019
Affirmed
Stauber, Judge*

Beltrami County District Court
File No. 04-CR-15-2574

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota and;

David L. Hanson, Beltrami County Attorney, David P. Frank, Assi stant County Attorney,
Bemidji, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Abigail H. Rankin, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and
Stauber, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
STAUBER, Judge
On appeal from the district court’s revocation of his probation, appellant argues that
the district court erred in (1) determining that appellant’ s violations were intentional or
inexcusable; ( 2) determining that the need for confinement outweighed the policies
favoring continued probation ; and (3) failing to make sufficient findings on the Austin
factors. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Sam Joseph Goggleye pleaded guilty to one count each of kidnappin g
(released in a safe place – no great bodily harm), fleeing a peace officer in a motor vehicle,
and fleeing a peace officer by means other than a motor vehicle. He was sentenced to a
stayed term of 27 months in prison and placed on supervised probation. Appellant violated
probation five times between December 30, 2015, and December 12, 2017.
The first probation violation report was filed in December 2015 . After being
apprehended on an arrest warrant in May 2016 , appellant admitted violating probation by
failing to remain law abiding because he had been charged with littering, failing to inform
his probation agent of contact with law enforcement within 72 hours, failing to inform his
probation agent of the new charge within 72 hours, and failing to maint ain contact with
probation because he missed a scheduled meeting with his agent and did not contact his
agent afterward.
The second probation violation report was filed in July 2016 after appellant failed
to appear for a scheduled review hearing. After being apprehended on an arrest warrant

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almost one year later, appellant admitted violating probation by failing to maintain contact
with probation after being released from custody in May 2016, missing scheduled
appointments in June 2016 , failing to remain law abiding due to a new fleeing -on-foot
charge, and failing to attend Domestic Abuse Batterers Intervention Program (BIP).
The third probation violation report was filed in August 2017 . Appellant admitted
violating probation by failing to report to probation immediately after being released from
custody, failing to attend BIP, violating a domestic-abuse no-contact order (DANCO), and
failing to remain law abiding because he was identified as having been involved in an
assault and the victim’s property was found in his possession.
The fourth probation violation report was filed in November 2017, alleging that
appellant violated probation by using alcohol. Appellant was brought to a hospital due to
his high leve l of intoxication. The report noted that appellant had not contacted his
probation agent or participated in any programming since being released from custody two
weeks earlier. Appellant admitted violating probation.
The fifth probation violation report was filed in December 2017, alleging tha t
appellant failed to appear for a domestic violence court hearing, failed to complete a
chemical dependency assessment, failed to re -enroll in and complete BIP , and failed to
report to his agent. An addendum to the violation report was filed, alleging th at appellant
failed to remain law abiding due to an arrest for a misdemeanor DANCO violation and
fifth-degree possession o f methamphetamine. Appellant pleaded guilty to the DANCO
violation. Appellant admitted that he failed to remain law abiding due to t he DANCO
violation and denied the remaining probation violations.

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The district court revoked probation and executed appellant’s sentence. This appeal
followed.
D E C I S I O N
A district court has broad discretion in determining whether there is sufficie nt
evidence to revoke probation. State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246, 249 (Minn. 1980). This
court will only reverse a district court’s probation revocation determination “if there is a
clear abuse of that discretion.” Id. at 250.
Before a district court may revoke probation, it must make specific findings on the
Austin factors to create a “thorough, fact -specific record[ ] setting forth th[e] reasons for
revoking probation.” State v. Modtland , 695 N.W.2d 602, 608 (Minn. 2005). Fi rst, the
district court must “designate the specific probation condition or conditions ” that the
defendant violated. Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 250. Second, the district court must “find that
the violation was intentional or inexcusable.” Id. Third, the district court must determine
that the “need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation. ” Id. Whether
the district court made the required findings under Austin is a question of law that we
review de novo. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d at 605. The d istrict court’s decision to revoke
probation “cannot be a reflexive reaction to an accumulation of technical violations but
requires a showing that the offender’s behavior demonstrates that he . . . cannot be counted
on to avoid antisocial activity.” Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 251 (quotations omitted).
Intentional and inexcusable
A probation violation is mitigated when it is unintentional or excusable. State v.
Cottew, 746 N.W.2d 632, 63 6 (Minn. 2008). During the two -year time period between

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December 2015 and December 2017, five probation violation reports were filed. For over
one year during that time, appellant had no contact with probation. Following an arrest
warrant that was issued in July 2016 after the second probation violation report was filed,
appellant had no contact with probation until he was apprehended the following July of
2017. During the fall of 2017, appellant continued to miss meetings with his probation
agent and failed to maintain contact. Appellant also missed a domestic-violence-court
hearing and failed to consistently attend BIP. This evidence supports the district court’s
findings that appellant’s violations were intentional and inexcusable.
Need for confinement
The supreme court has stated:
In making the third Austin finding, we emphasize that
district courts must bear in mind that policy considerations may
require that probation not be revoked even though the facts
may allow it and that the purpose of probation is rehabilitation
and revocation should be used only as a last resort when
treatment has failed. . . .

Modtland, 695 N.W.2d at 606 (quotations omitted).
In determining whether the need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring
probation, the district court should consider the following factors:
(i) confinement is necessary to protect the public from
further criminal activity by the offender; or
(ii) the offender is in need of correctional treatment
which can most effectively be provided if he is confined; or
(iii) it would unduly depreciate the serio usness of the
violation if probation were not revoked.

Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 251.

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The district court found that confinement is necessary to protect the public from
further criminal activity. The court stated, “The victim of the kidnapping was once again
required to call law enforcement to protect herself from [appellant], and as a result,
[appellant] was convicted of [v]iolation of a [DANCO].”
The district court found that appellant is in need of correctional treatment that is not
able to be provided in the community. This finding is supported by appellant’s failure to
consistently participate in BIP. Appellant argues that his chemical dependency assessment,
which he obtained after the fifth probation violation report was filed, recommended
intensive inpatient treatment in the community. But the district court found that the state
failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that appellant violated probation by failing
to complete a chemical dependency assessment because appellant did not have enough time
to complete the assessment between his release from jail in November 2017 and his arrest
on the probation violation in December 2017. Thus, his chemical dependency violation
did not affect his probation revocation and the remaining factors establis h support for
revocation.
Although the district court did not address the depreciation factor, five probation
violation reports were filed in less than two ye ars, appellant was absent on outstanding
arrest warrants during over one year of that time, and he was charged with additional
criminal offenses, including a violation of a DANCO prohibiting contact with the
kidnapping victim.
The evidence supports the district court ’s fi nding that the need for confinement
outweighs the policies favoring probation.

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Appellant next argues that the district court’s findings on the Austin factors were
insufficient.
The requirement that courts make findings under the
Austin factors assures that district court judges will create
thorough, fact -specific records setting forth their reasons for
revoking probation. We emphasize that, in making the three
Austin findings, courts are not charged with merely conforming
to procedural requirements; rather, courts must seek to convey
their substantive reasons for revocation and the evidence relied
upon.

Modtland, 695 N.W.2d at 608.
The district court made detailed findings on appellant’s numerous probation
violations, including his failure to maintain contact with probation, his failure to complete
BIP, his absences following the issua nce of arrest warrants, and the additional criminal
charges filed against him. The findings are sufficient to support the revocation of
probation.
Affirmed.