State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0678

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Isidro Carranza,
Appellant.

Filed October 22, 2018
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Winona County District Court
File No. 85-CR-17-1805

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Karin L. Sonneman, Winona County Attorney, Christina M. Galewsk i, Assistant County
Attorney, Winona, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sharon E. Jacks, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In this direct appeal of his conviction for second-degree controlled-substance crime,
appellant Isidro Carranza argues that he should be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea

2
because neither his counsel nor t he district court adequately i nformed him of the
deportation consequences of his plea. Because we conclude that (1) the record is
insufficient to determine whether Carranza was prejudiced by an y ineffectiveness of
counsel and (2) the law does not support Carranza’s argument th at the district court was
obligated to inform him of the immigration consequences of his plea, we affirm Carranza’s
conviction without prejudice to his ability to seek postconviction relief.
FACTS
Carranza was stopped for a traffic violation, and a search of t he car he was driving
revealed over 25 kilograms of marijuana in the trunk. He was c harged with and pleaded
guilty to controlled-substance crime in the second degree, admi tting to possession of at
least ten kilograms of marijuana. Carranza signed a plea petit ion containing the standard
acknowledgement that his attorney had advised him that, if he w as not a U.S. citizen, his
guilty plea “may result in deportation.” During the plea hearing, the court asked Carranza
directly whether a conviction would make him deportable. Carranza answered, “No.” The
district court asked his public defender to confirm Carranza’s statement. The public
defender stated that, because Ca rranza has “resident status,” n e i t h e r h e n o r t h e p u b l i c
defender’s immigration attorneys inquired into the immigration effects of a conviction. He
indicated that this noninquiry was consistent with the public d efender’s “checklist.” The
day after sentencing, Carranza was taken into custody by Immigr ation and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) for deportation proceedings.
Carranza did not file a petition for postconviction relief. In stead, he brings this
direct appeal.

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D E C I S I O N
I. The record is insufficient to d etermine whether Carranza’s plea is invalid due
to ineffective assistance of counsel.

Carranza argues that his guilty plea was invalid because his counsel failed to inform
him that he was almost certain to be deported if convicted of a second-degree controlled-
substance crime.
To be valid, a guilty plea must b e “accurate, voluntary, and in telligent.” State v.
Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). “Ineffective assistance of c ounsel renders a
guilty plea involuntary and unintelligent.” Sanchez v. State, 868 N.W.2d 282, 286 (Minn.
App. 2015), aff’d, 890 N.W.2d 716 (Minn. 2017). To establish inadequate assista nce of
counsel, a defendant must show t wo elements: first, that couns el’s representation “fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness”; and, second, that there was “a reasonable
probability” that, “but for . . . counsel’s unprofessional error, the outcome would have been
different.” Leake v. State , 767 N.W.2d 5, 10 (Minn. 2009) (citing Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984)) (other citations omitted).
The validity of a guilty plea is a question of law, and a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel is a mixed question of law and fact; both are reviewed de novo. Raleigh, 778
N.W.2d at 94; State v. Rhodes, 657 N.W.2d 823, 842 (Minn. 2003).
A. Counsel’s performance
Carranza argues that his counsel ’s representation was objective ly unreasonable
because the law was clear that the controlled-substance conviction would subject him, as a
non-citizen, to automatic deportation. When the immigration consequences of a guilty plea

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are “truly clear,” counsel has a duty to provide correct advice about those consequences.
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 369, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010). Failure to provide
such advice is an error that is sufficiently serious to satisfy the first prong of Strickland.
Id.
The state does not attempt to rebut Carranza’s argument that th e law was clear.
Instead, in its letter submission to this court, the state asks that the case be remanded to the
district court for an evidentiary hearing regarding what Carranza represented to his counsel
that led counsel to describe him as having “resident status.” Specifically, the state suggests
that Carranza told his lawyer that he was a naturalized citizen. The state’s request implies
an argument that, if Carranza represented himself as being a naturalized citizen, counsel’s
performance might not have been objectively unreasonable.
We need not resolve the parties’ arguments concerning the first Strickland prong if
Carranza has not established the second prong. See Sanchez v. State, 890 N.W.2d 716, 720
(Minn. 2017) (“[Appellate courts] need not analyze both elements of the Strickland test if
one or the other is determinative.”). We therefore turn to the prejudice prong.
B. Prejudice
A defendant who is c hallenging a guilty plea may satisfy the p rejudice prong of
Strickland by showing a “reasonable probab ility” that he would not have p leaded guilty
but for counsel’s errors. State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 718 (Minn. 1994). Success on
this prong requires that the record contain “facts fully explai ning the reasons for [the
defendant’s] decision to plead guilty.” State v. Ellis-Strong, 899 N.W.2d 531, 540 (Minn.
App. 2017).

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Carranza challenges his counsel’s effectiveness on direct appea l, rather than by a
postconviction petition to withdraw his guilty plea. “Generall y, an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim should be raised in a postconviction petition for relief, rather than on direct
appeal.” State v. Gustafson , 610 N.W.2d 314, 321 (Minn. 2000). But a postconviction
petition is not mandatory. Brown v. State, 449 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Minn. 1989). Defendants
may appeal directly, basing their claims on the facts in “the r ecord made at the time the
plea was entered.” Id.
Carranza argues that the record contains four pieces of evidenc e that prove that he
would not have pleaded guilty but for counsel’s error. First, exchanges at the plea hearing
demonstrate that defense counsel, the prosecutor, the judge, an d Carranza himself all
believed that he would not be deported. Second, his appellate counsel’s request for hearing
transcripts reflects that Carranza contacted the appellate publ ic defender’s office to
challenge his plea after ICE took him into custody. Third, the presentence investigation
(PSI) reflects that Carranza has been in the country for over twenty years. Finally, the PSI
also reflects that Carranza has family in the country.1
While this evidence may show why Carranza could have wanted to stay in the
country, it is insufficient to establish a reasonable probabili ty that Carranza would have
rejected the plea had he known of its deportation consequences at the time. Notably, the
record contains no affidavit or testimony from Carranza that he would not have pleaded

1 In its letter submission, the state does not challenge the existence of prejudice but instead
states that it is willing to stipulate to Carranza having his c onviction reversed and
withdrawing his plea if an evidentiary hearing establishes that he did not tell his lawyer he
was a naturalized citizen.

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guilty but for his lawyer’s misadvice. See Ellis-Strong, 899 N.W.2d at 540 (declining to
find prejudice where the defendant “never submitted an affidavit or testified that he would
not have pleaded guilty but for the misadvice”).
Because the record is inadequate t o evaluate Carranza’s ineffec tive-assistance-of-
counsel claim on direct appeal, we reject it, but without preju dice to Carranza’s right to
pursue postconviction relief in accordance with the law and rules governing postconviction
proceedings. See Gustafson, 610 N.W.2d at 321 (affirming appellant’s conviction without
prejudice to appellant’s right to raise claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and invalid
guilty plea in a postconviction proceeding).
II. The district court was not obligated to inform Carranza of the immigration
consequences of his plea.

Carranza also argues that the district court had a duty to ensu re that his plea was
voluntary and intelligent, and that the district court breached this duty by failing to advise
him of the specific immigration consequences of his plea when his lawyer failed to do so.
A guilty plea unsupported by a record showing that it was voluntary and intelligent
is a manifest injustice warranting withdrawal of the plea. See Perkins v. State, 559 N.W.2d
678, 688 (Minn. 1997). Before accepting a guilty plea, the Min nesota Rules of Criminal
Procedure obligate the district court to question the defendant under oath to ensure, among
other things, that defense counsel has told the defendant and the defendant understands that
“[i]f the defendant is not a citizen of the United States, a gu ilty plea may result in
deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization as a
United States citizen.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.01, subd. 1(6)(l).

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Here, Carranza signed a plea petition acknowledging that his co unsel had advised
him that he may face deportation as a result of his plea, and t he district court at the plea
hearing directly inquired of Ca rranza and of his counsel regard ing possible deportation.
Carranza, however, argues that the district court had a broader duty: he asserts that, to
ensure that his plea was voluntary and intelligent, the district court was obligated to advise
him of the immigration consequences of his plea with the same d egree of clarity as is
required of defense counsel under Padilla. As Carranza acknowledges, no binding
Minnesota case has applied the requirements of Padilla to a district court.
A district court must inform a defendant of the direct conseque nces of his guilty
plea, but need not inform a defe ndant of collateral consequence s. Kaiser v. State , 641
N . W . 2 d 9 0 0 , 9 0 3 - 0 4 , 9 0 7 ( M i n n . 2 0 0 2 ) . F a i l u r e t o i n f o r m a d e f endant of direct
consequences renders a plea i nvoluntary and unintelligent. Id. Direct consequences are
those punitive consequences that are “definite, immediate, or automatic.” Alanis v. State,
583 N.W.2d 573, 578 (Minn. 1998); see Kaiser, 641 N.W.2d at 904 (clarifying Alanis’s
definition to exclude nonpunitive consequences).
Carranza argues that, under the reasoning of Padilla, deportation is a direct
consequence, not a collateral one, and therefore the district c ourt was obligated to advise
him that he would be deported up on conviction. Carranza relies on Padilla’s description
of deportation as “nearly an automatic result” of conviction for many crimes. 559 U.S. at
366, 130 S. Ct. at 1481. However, that is only one statement out of a decision that expressly
declined to classify deportation as either a direct or a collateral consequence. Padilla, 559
U.S. at 365-66, 130 S. Ct. at 1481-82 (“Deportation as a conseq uence of a criminal

8
conviction is . . . uniquely di fficult to classify as either a direct or a collateral
consequence.”). And, since Padilla, neither the United States Supreme Court nor the
Minnesota Supreme Court has held that deportation is a direct consequence of a conviction.
See Taylor v. State , 887 N.W.2d 821, 824 (Minn. 2016) (reiterating that Padilla neither
classified immigration conseque nces as direct or collateral nor destroyed the “direct-
versus-collateral distinction”). We decline to so hold here. See State v. Anderson , 603
N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. App. 1999) (stating that extension of the law is for the legislature
or the supreme court), review denied (Minn. Mar. 14, 2000).
Carranza also argues that, regardless of whether deportation is a direct or collateral
consequence, Padilla holds that deportation advice is necessary to make a guilty ple a
voluntary and intelligent, and therefore the district court must provide it when counsel fails
to do so. This argument, too, is unsupported by caselaw. In the pre-Padilla case of Alanis,
the Minnesota Supreme Court held that neither counsel nor the district court had a duty to
inform a defendant of the deportation consequences of his plea. 583 N.W.2d at 578. The
United States Supreme Court decision in Padilla later abrogated the Alanis court’s holding
that defense counsel has no duty to inform a defendant of the deportation consequences of
a plea. See Campos v. State , 816 N.W.2d 480, 486 (Minn. 2012). But Padilla did not
require district courts to inform defendants about the consequence of deportation, and the
Minnesota Supreme Court has not overruled that part of Alanis’s holding. See id. at 499
n.11. We cannot overrule our supreme court’s precedent and are bound by that court’s
decisions. State v. M.L.A., 785 N.W.2d 763, 767 (Minn. App. 2010), review denied (Minn.
Sept. 21, 2010).

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Finally, Carranza cites to a dec ision from a foreign jurisdicti on to support his
argument that the district court was required to ascertain and inform him of the immigration
consequences of his plea. Beyond the fact that a foreign decis ion can only serve as
persuasive authority for this court, the case Carranza cites is not persuasive as to his
argument. In People v. Peque, a New York appellate court held that district courts must
notify a defendant that deportation may be a consequence of a guilty plea. 3 N.E.3d 617,
637 (N.Y. 2013) (“The trial cour t must provide a short, straigh tforward statement on the
record notifying the defendant that . . . if the defendant is not a United States citizen, he or
she may be deported upon a guilty plea.”). The substance of th e warning is nothing more
than what Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 15.01 already requires and what Carranza
received.
Carranza’s claim that the district court violated its duty to inform him of the
deportation consequence of his plea, rendering it invalid, lack s support in the law.
Accordingly, we reject that challenge to his conviction.
Affirmed.