State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0684

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Chris Marquis McMorris,
Appellant.

Filed May 6, 2019
Affirmed; motion granted
Connolly, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-16-21960

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Jean Burdorf, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Ira W. Whitlock, Whitlock Law Office, LLC, Champlin, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Florey, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and
Bjorkman, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of second-degree murder, arguing that he is
entitled to a new trial because the district court judge was partial and biased and the

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prosecutors intimidated defense witnesses. Appellant also argues that the district court
erred when it admitted his statements to police officers in violation of Miranda and that his
counsel was ineffective . Because appellant has failed to demonstrate that (1) the district
court judge was partial, (2) the prosecutors employed impermissible intimidation tactics,
and (3) his trial counsel was ineffective, and because the district court did not err in
admitting his statements to the police officers, we affirm.
FACTS
In 2016, appellant Chris Marquis McMorris called 911 to report that his girlfriend’s
daughter was not breathing. An ambulance arrived and transported the seven -month old
infant to the hospital where she was pronounced dead. Paramedics and hospital staff
noticed bruising on the child, and an autopsy revealed multiple rib fractures and a lacerated
liver. The cause of death was determined to be blunt force trauma to the abdomen and the
manner of death was homicide. Appellant was subsequently charged in the infant’s death
with three counts of felony second-degree murder—without intent. Appellant was tried
and the jury found him guilty on all three counts.
On appeal, appellant requests that this court grant him a new trial on the grounds
that (1) the district court judge was not impartial and demonstrated clear bias in her rulings,
which deprived him of his due process righ t to present a complete defense, (2) the
prosecutors engaged in impermissible intimidation tactics with defense witnesses that
prevented him from putting forth a complete defense, (3) his trial counsel was ineffective,
and (4) the district court erred when it allowed into evidence statements that violated his

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Miranda rights. The state also filed a motion to strike portions of appellant’s brief and
addendum that are not part of the record on appeal. The motion was deferred to the panel.
D E C I S I O N
I. Motion to strike
“The documents filed in the trial court, the exhibits, and the transcript of the
proceedings, if any, shall constitute the record on appeal in all cases.” Minn. R. Civ. App.
P. 110.01. “[This] court will strike documents included in a party’s brief that are not part
of the appellate record.” Fabio v. Bellomo, 489 N.W.2d 241, 246 (Minn. App. 1992), aff'd,
504 N.W.2d 758 (Minn. 1993). The disputed sections in appellant’s brief concern matters
outside the record. Neither the affidavits of Patrice Whitlock, dated December 14, 2018,
nor the email sent to Ira Whitlock, dated November 18, were filed with the district court.
Consequently, these documents are not part of the record on appeal. This court will not
consider these sections of appellant’s brief and appendix in reaching its decision. See
Griese v. Kamp, 666 N.W.2d 404, 408-09 (Minn. App. 2003) (“Because the district court
did not consider [defendant’s] . . . affidavit, we grant respondent’s motion to strike it from
the appellate record.”).
II. There is absolutely no evidence in the record demonstrating judicial bias.
Appellant argues that he is ent itled to a new trial because the district court judge
showed clear bias in her rulings, which interfered with his right to present a complete
defense and receive a fair trial. Due process entitles a defendant to an impartial and
disinterested tribunal. McKenzie v. State , 583 N.W.2d 744, 747 (Minn. 1998).

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Consequently, “a judge must have no actual bias against the defendant.” Id. (quotation
omitted).
Appellant has failed to put forth any evidence of actual bias on the part of the district
court judge in this case. Instead, his contention focuses on a few adverse evidentiary
rulings. However, appellant does not argue how the district court judge ’s evidentiary
rulings were erroneous. Moreover, we apply a “presumption that a judge has discharged
his or her judicial duties properly. ” State v. Mems , 708 N.W.2d 526, 533 (Minn. 2006).
And “prior adverse rulings by a judge, without more, do not constitute judicial bias,” even
if they are “erroneous.” Id.
No more serious allegation can be raised against a trial judge than bias against a
party. After careful consideration, it is absolutely clear from the record that the district
court judge carefully considered all of appellant’s motions and made rulings, many of
which were favorable to him. Accordingly, appellant was not denied the right to a fair
trial, and he has shown no judicial bias.
III. There is no evidence in the record demonstrating that prosecutors intimidated
defense witnesses.
Appellant argues that the state intimidated lay and expert defense witne sses during
its prosecution of the case. Both claims are unsupported by the record.
First, to support his claim that he is entitled to a new trial on the grounds that the
prosecutors intimidated his expert witness, appellant relies extensively on State v. Beecroft,
813 N.W.2d 814, 849-50 (Minn. 2012). In Beecroft, the Minnesota Supreme Court granted
a defendant a new trial when it concluded that the prosecution worked to prevent expert

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witnesses from testifying on behalf of the defendant. Id. However, in Beecroft there was
overwhelming evidence that the prosecution interfered with the defendant’s case. Id. But
here, there is no evidence in the record that state actors intimidated witnesses or interfered
with appellant’s defense. Second, appellant claims that the state intimidated his girlfriend
from testi fying favorably for the defense, but there is no evidence of appellan t’s
accusations in the record. Consequently, there is no support for appellant’s challenge.
IV. Appellant was not deprived of his right to effective assistance of counsel.
Appellant argues that he was deprived of his right to effective assistance of counsel.
“An ineffective assistance of counsel claim is an alleged violation of the right to reasonably
effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.” State v. Rhodes , 657 N.W.2d 823, 842 (Minn. 2003) (citing Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-85 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063 (1984)).
Appellant argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial
counsel—who is also representing appellant on appeal —failed to demand the name and
findings of a forensic pathologist who confirmed and agreed with his expert’s findings and
conclusions in his case. Appellant argues that his trial counsel chose not to press his expert
to reveal the name and findings of the forensic pathologist because his counsel was fearful
that too much pressure could result in his expert withdrawing from the case.
Counsel’s decision not to pressure his expert falls within the realm of defense
strategy. The Minnesota Supreme Court has consistently held that courts will not review
an attorney’s trial strategy. Opsahl v. State , 677 N.W.2d 414, 421 (Minn. 2004). Thus,
this court is “ in no position to second -guess counsel’s decision to focus his strategy on

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other defenses” instead of press uring his expert to reveal colleagues who may share her
opinion of the case. Id. Because appellant only challenges his counsel’s pretrial decision
not to put too much pressure on his expert witness, this court has no basis to find his counsel
ineffective.
V. The district court did not err by failing to suppress appellant’s statements to
the police.

The district court admitted , over appellant’s objection, statements made to police
officer’s immediately following the 911 call. Appellant argues that the district court erred
by concluding that these statements did not violate the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, which protects a suspect ’s right to be free from compelled self -
incrimination. State v. Sterling, 834 N.W.2d 162, 168 (Minn. 2013). To protect this right,
statements made by a suspect during a “custodial interrogation” are inadmissible unless the
police provide a Miranda warning prior to the statements being made. Id. at 167 -68;
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1612 (1966).
The question of whether a “suspect is ‘ in custody ’ and therefore entitled to a
Miranda warning presents a mixed question of law and fact qualifying for independent
review.” Sterling, 834 N.W.2d at 167 (quotation omitted). An interrogation is custodial
if, based on all the facts, “a reasonable person under the circumstances would believe that
he or she was in police custody of the degree associated with formal arrest.” State v.
Thompson, 788 N.W.2d 485, 491 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted).
The Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that, while no factor alone is
determinative, factors that may indicate a suspect is in custody are: (1) the interview taking

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place at a p olice station, (2) the officer telling an individual t hat he is the main suspect,
(3) the suspect’s freedom of movemen t is restrained by officers, (4) a suspect making a
significantly incriminating statement, (5) the presence of multiple officers, and (6) a gun
pointed at a suspect. Id. Factors that may indicate a suspect is not in custody are
questioning taking place in the suspect’s home; police
expressly informing the suspect that he or she is not under
arrest; the suspect leaving the police station at the close of the
interview without hindrance; the brevity of questioning (fifteen
minutes); the suspect’s freedom t o leave at any time; a
nonthreatening environment; and the suspect’s ability to make
phone calls.

Id.

After reviewing these factors, it is clear to us that appellant was not subject to a
custodial interrogation. Appellant was interviewed at his home, not the police station,
immediately after reporting the medical emergency. The officer s never told appellant he
was a suspect or that he was under arrest. Appellant’s movement within his home was also
not restricted; he was not in handcuffs. While it is true that an officer told appellant to wait
at the house for a detective to arrive, and the officer testified that he was not going to let
appellant leave until the detective talked with him, it is also true that the detective was there
to gather “information about what [was] going on with [the child] medically or what had
been the circumstances that she was found nonbreathing.” And when appellant pressed the
detective to let him leave to go to the hospital, the detective “very quickly let him get on
his w ay.” See i d. (noting that a suspect leaving the police station at the close of the
interview without hindrance supports the conclusion that there was not a custodial arrest).

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Consequently, the fact that the officer initially told appellant he needed to s tay in
the house until the detective arrived does not transform the interview into a custodial
interrogation. A reasonable person under the circumstances would not have believed that
he or she was in police custody of the degree associated with formal arre st. Id. Because
appellant can only establish that his freedom of movement was briefly limited, and because
no other factor suggests that appellant was in custody, the district court did not err in
admitting appellant’s statements to the officer as evidence at trial.
Affirmed; motion granted.