In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Blake S. Uddin.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0686

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of:
Blake S. Uddin.

Filed September 24, 2018
Affirmed
Halbrooks, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-PR-16-84

Daniel P. Repka, Repka Law, LLC, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant Blake Uddin)

Anthony C. Palumbo, Anoka County Attorney, Lisa Broos Jones, Assistant County
Attorney, Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent Anoka County)

Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and
Hooten, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HALBROOKS, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to terminate his
commitment as a person who is mentally ill, arguing that his commitment has exceeded
the six-month maximum prescribed by the district court under Minn. Stat. § 253B.13,
subd. 1 (2016). We affirm.

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FACTS
In February 2016, the state petitioned to commit appellant Blake Uddin as a person
who is mentally ill . In March 2016, the district court determined that Uddin met the
statutory criteria for commitment and was mentally ill as defined by Minn. Stat. § 253B.02,
subd. 13 (2016). But upon stipulation between Uddin and the state , the district court did
not commit him to the Commissioner of Human Services. Instead, it determined that the
least-restrictive alternative that met his treatment needs was a release before commitment
under Minn. Stat. § 253B.095 (2016). For that reason, the district court stayed commitment
for six months, provided that Uddin abided by certain terms.
In June 2016, Uddin’s case manager filed a report alleging that Uddin violated
certain terms of the March 2016 stayed commitment order. After a hearing, t he district
court again concluded that Uddin met the statutory criteria for commitment and was
mentally ill as defined by Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 13. But upon the oral stipulation
of the parties, the district court did not r evoke the March 2016 stay of commitment.
Instead, the district court again d etermined that the least -restrictive alternative that met
Uddin’s treatment needs was a release before commitment under Minn. Stat. § 253B.095.
For the second time, the district court stayed commitment for six months.
In October 2016, Uddin’s case manager asked the district court to revoke Uddin’s
stayed commitment, alleging that Uddin again violated the March 2016 stayed commitment
order. On November 1, the district court determined that Uddin met the statutory criteria
for commitment, concluded that clear and convincing evidence established that he was
mentally ill under Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 13, and committed him for six months.

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In April 2017, the state filed a petition for continued commitment. On April 25,
2017, the district court determined, after a hearing, that Uddin met the statutory criteria for
continued commitment, concluded that clear and convincing evidence established that
Uddin was m entally ill under Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 13, and continued his
commitment for six months.
In June 2017, Uddin petitioned the district court under Minn. Stat. § 253B.17
(2016), to terminate his commitment, reasoning that he was not in need of continued care
and treatment and that he no longer met the definition of a person who is mentally ill under
Minn. Stat. § 253B.02 , subd. 13. After a hearing o n July 1 1, 2017, the parties reached
another stipulation. Per that stipulation, the district court released Uddin from the
commissioner’s custody and stayed his commitment for “six months from [July 13, 2017].”
In August 2017, Uddin’s case manager sought revocation of the July 2017 stayed
commitment order, alleging that Uddin violated certain terms of it . On September 21,
2017, and upon oral stipulation, the district court revoked the July 2017 stayed commitment
order and committed Uddin for six months.
In February 2018, Uddin moved to terminate his commitment, arguing that the
duration of his commitm ent had exceeded the six-month maximum prescribed by the
district court in the April 2017 continued commitment order. The district court denied the
motion, reasoning that commitment started on September 21, 2017, when it revoked the
July 2017 stayed commi tment order and stating that because the September 2017
commitment order contemplated a six -month initial period, Uddin’s commitment had not
exceeded the maximum under Minn. Stat. § 253B.13, subd. 1 (2016). This appeal follows.

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D E C I S I O N
Uddin argues that his commitment must be terminated because he has been under a
continued commitment in excess of the maximum period under the Minnesota
Commitment and Treatment Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 253B.001 -.24 (2016), specifically Minn.
Stat. § 253B.13, subd. 1 , which governs continued commitments . We interpret the
Minnesota Commitment and Treatment Act de novo. In re Brown, 640 N.W.2d 919, 922
(Minn. 2002). Our role in interpreting statutes “ is to ascertain and effectuate legislative
intent.” In re Robledo, 611 N.W.2d 67, 69 (Minn. App. 2000). We give the statute’s terms
their plain and ordinary meaning, taking into account the overall structure of the statutory
scheme and the context of the disputed language. Id. If a statute’s language is ambiguous,
the legislature’s intent controls. In re Kleven, 736 N.W.2d 707, 709 (Minn. App. 2007).
Ambiguity arises only when a statute’s language is susceptible of more than one reasonable
interpretation. Am. Family Ins. Grp . v. Schroedl , 616 N.W.2d 273, 277 (Minn. 2000).
Within the civil-commitment context, we construe any ambiguity “against the state and in
favor of the person who is being deprived of his or her liberty.” In re Colbert, 464 N.W.2d
505, 507 (Minn. 1991).
Under Minn. Stat. § 253B.13, subd. 1 —the st atute governing continued
commitments—if a district court determines that a person continues to need commitment,
it must determine the length of the continued commitment. The length of the continued
commitment cannot exceed the probable length of commitme nt necessary —a length of
time determined by the district court —or 12 months, whichever is less. Minn. Stat.

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§ 253B.13, subd. 1. Here, the district court determined that the probable length of
commitment necessary was six months.
In June 2017, Uddin mov ed to terminate his commitment . At the hearing in July,
the parties reached a stipulation. Under that stipulation, the district court determined that
clear and convincing evidence established that Uddin met the definition of a person who is
mentally ill. But at the same time, the district court released him from the commissioner’s
custody and stayed his commitment proceedings for six months. Uddin argues that this
stay “tolled” the six-month limitation imposed by the district court’s April 2017 continued
commitment order because that order remained the “legal vehicle under which [he] was
committed.” We disagree.
The legal vehicle under whic h Uddin was committed was, as the district court
determined, the July 2017 stayed commitment order. That order provides that the parties
stipulated that Uddin met the statutory criteria for commitment, that he would be released,
and that the commitment would be stayed. That order also provides, as one of the stipulated
findings of fact, that Uddin “filed his petition for relief with the intent of being placed back
under a stay of commitment so he can have another opportunity to participate in the VA’s
dual-diagnosis . . . program.” In other words, Uddin sought a stay of commitment in July
2017 so that he could participate in a specialized program that would have been unavailable
to him if he were committed.
The problem with the July 2017 stayed commitment orde r is that the state did not
file a petition for initial commitment or a peti tion for continued commitment before the
district court issued it. An interested person must file a petition for a person’s initial

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commitment or continued commitment before a district court conducts a hearing and makes
a determination. Minn. Stat. §§ 253B.07, .13, subd. 1.
Here, it was Uddin’s petition to terminate his commitment under Minn. Stat.
§ 253B.17—not the state’s petition for initial commitment under Minn. Stat. § 253B.07—
that prompted the district court to schedule a hearing and make a determination as to
whether Uddin met the statutory definition for a person who is mentally ill. The parties
effectively stipulated around Minn. Stat. § 253B.07’s requirement that an interested person
must file a petition for initial commitment before a hearing and determination is made.
At oral argument, Uddin suggested that the stipulation should not be enforced
because he had unequal bargaining power when he entered into it. We disagree. Generally,
parties are bound by a stipulation of the issues before a district court unless they are
released from that stipulation. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Judd Co., 380 N.W.2d 122, 124 (Minn.
1986) (citing Pampusch v. Nat’l Council of Knights & Ladies of Sec., 176 N.W. 158, 158
(Minn. 1920)). If no motion is made to the district court by a party requesting relief from
a stipulation, absent a showing of fraud, mistake, or some other reason for disregarding the
stipulation, its terms are binding on the parties. See Amundson v. Cloverleaf Mem ’l Park
Assoc., 22 N.W.2d 170, 172 (Minn. 1946).
Uddin has been represented by legal counsel throughout these proceedings. He did
not seek relief from the July 2017 stipulation and has not shown cause for us to set it aside.
Rather, Uddin stipulated to a stay so he could have “another opportunity to participate in
the VA’s dual -diagnosis . . . program.” Therefore, Uddin’s unequal-bargaining argument
contradicts his stated purpose for entering into a stipulation for a stayed commitment in the

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first place. Because Uddin did not move the district court for relief from the July 2017
stipulation and because he has not shown cause for us to set it aside, the terms of the July
2017 stipulation are binding.
As the district court acknowledged, t he underlying purpose of the Minnesota
Commitment and Treatment Act is to guarantee patients due process before involuntarily
committing them. See Robledo, 611 N.W.2d at 70 (“Judicial safeguards are necessary both
because the mentally ill are least able to assure their own protection and because it is
attention to our duty to the mentally ill that maintains us as a human community. ”). The
act ensures that a patient’s due-process rights are preserved by requiring a petition, hearing,
and determination before a district court orders an initial or continued commitment. Minn.
Stat. §§ 253B.07, .13, subd. 1. The act also provides specific rights for patients, including
the right to have counsel, attend hearings, and request a second examiner . Minn. Stat.
§§ 253B.07, subds. 2c, 3.
We agree with t he district court that Uddin’s due-process rights were preserved.
Upon his June 2017 petition to terminat e his commitment, the district court provided
notice, held a hearing, and determined , based on the parties’ stipulation, that Uddin was a
person who is mentally ill under the heightened standard for initial commitments. See
Minn. Stat. §§ 253.02, subd. 13 , .09, subd. 1(a) (stating that for initial commitments, the
district court must determine if clear and convincing evidence establishes that the person
has made recent attempts or threats to physically harm themselves or others or recent
failures to provid e necessities ). Per the terms of the stipulated -to July 2017 stayed
commitment order, the district court had authority to revoke the stay if Uddin violated it .

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On September 21, 2017, based on the oral stipulation of the parties, the district court
determined that Uddin violated certai n terms of the July 2017 stayed commitment order,
revoked it, and committed him for an initial commitment period “not to exceed six
months.”
In Brown, the supreme court concluded that when a district court revokes a stayed
commitment order, the six -month limitation on the initial commitment under Minn. Stat.
§ 253B.09, subd. 1, begins on the date that the commitment is executed and the order or
warrant under Minn. Stat. § 253B.10, subd. 1, issues. 640 N.W.2d at 925. Therefore, per
the parties’ stipulation, Uddin’s initial commitment began when the district court revoked
the July 2017 stayed commitment order on September 21 , 2017. That initial commitment
could not exceed six months , which was March 21, 2018. Uddin moved to terminate his
commitment in February 2018, before the six -month time-period li mitation had lapsed.
Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not err by declining to terminate Uddin’s
commitment.
Affirmed.