State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0689

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Glenn David Johnson,
Appellant.

Filed March 18, 2019
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-CR-17-1751

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Anthony C . Palumbo, Anoka County Attorney, Robert I. Yount, Assistant County
Attorney, Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent)

David Sjoberg, Sjoberg Law Office, P.A., Ham Lake, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and
Florey, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant, convicted of fourth -degree criminal sexual conduct, challenges the
district court’s denial of his presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that it

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would have been fair and just to permit his plea withdrawal. Because appellant’s reasons
for permitting withdrawal lack merit and because allowing withdrawal would have
prejudiced the state, we affirm the district court.
FACTS
In 1998, appellant Glenn Johnson, then 33, pleaded guilty to fourth-degree criminal
sexual conduct resulting from his 1997 assault of his 14-year-old niece who was sleeping
at his house. For the next 14 years, appellant worked for a food service routing delivery
trucks; his position was th en eliminated, and in 2013 he began working as a school bus
driver.
In March 2017, appellant was charged with one count of second -degree criminal
sexual conduct and one count of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct, resulting from his
assault of his daughter’s 15-year-old girlfriend, who was sleeping at their house. Appellant
pleaded not guilty at the omnibus hearing.
The state moved to introduce Spreigl evidence of appellant’s 1997 offense, and the
victim of that offense agreed to testify at appellant’s trial. Appellant moved to exclude her
evidence of the prior offense . Following a hearing, and shortly before the trial was to
begin, his motion was denied. Appellant then pleaded guilty to fourth -degree criminal
sexual conduct under a plea agreement that provided a stay of execution of his prison
sentence, probation, a 60-day jail cap, a ten -year conditional release period, pred atory-
offender registration, no contact with the victim, and dismissa l of the second -degree
criminal-sexual-conduct charge. The district court deferred its acceptance of appellant’s
guilty plea to allow time for a presentence investigation and a psychosexual evaluation.

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In March 2018, five months after pleading guilty, appellant, represented by different
counsel, moved to withdraw his guilty plea. His motion was denied . He argues that the
district court abused its discretion in denying his motion.
D E C I S I O N
When a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is made prior to sentencing, the district
court has discretion to permit withdrawal under the fair -and-just standard and we reverse
only in the rare case. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 97 (Minn. 2010). The parties agree
that there is no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea. See State v. Theis , 742 N.W.2d
643, 646 (Minn. 2007).
In reply to appellant’s counsel’s argument for withdrawal of his gui lty plea, the
district court stated:
[T]hese criminal sexual conduct cases are hard cases from start
to finish and they are very hard on people involved incl uding
[appellant], including the other folks involved.
I don’t know what more . . . could have been done [at
the plea hearing.] We followed a good Rule 15 procedure, used
a plea petition, he had the benefit of experienced Counsel, took
it right up to the very day of trial, I understood the Spreigl issue
[i.e., testimony of the victim of appellant’s 1997 offense] to be
the dispositive issue in the negotiations.

I’m not sure what . . . more could have been done there.
. . . .
I don’t see anything deficient in the process that was
followed, so I’m going to deny that motion [to withdraw the
guilty plea].

In determining whether it is fair and just to withdraw a plea, a court must consider
the reasons the defendant gives to support withdrawal and the prejudi ce granting
withdrawal would cause to the state. Raleigh, 778 N.W. 2d at 97.

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1. Appellant’s Reasons
Appellant argues that three circumstances make it fair and just for him to withdraw
his plea. The first is that “subsequent to his guilty plea, [he] asserted his innocence.” But
the transcript indicates that appellant consistently asserted his guilt at his plea hearing. He
told the district court that, at the age of 52, he had sexual contact with a girl of 15 “[b]y
touching her breasts and putting my arm around her buttocks and then around her waistline
in the front.” He answered affirmatively when asked if this had been “pretty alarming to
her” then or afterwards, if this had happened in his house, if he was in charge of the house,
and if he was in a position of authority because he was the parent of his daughter and
supposed to be looking after her and the victim, her friend. When the prosecutor asked
appellant, “[W]hen you had contact with her breasts, you agree that was with a sexual
intent, right? That wasn’t an accident or a mistake, correct?” He replied, “That’s correct.”
Appellant also admitted the offense during his presentence investigation and psychosexual
evaluation. He provides no explanation for why it would be fair and just to disregard what
he said at the plea hearing and subsequent events and consider only what he now says in
support of his motion to withdraw. Moreover, innocence proclaimed after entering a plea
is not a significant reason to withdraw a plea. State v. Williams , 373 N.W.2d 851, 853
(Minn. App. 1985). The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s
motion to withdraw based on appellant’s change of mind as to his own guilt or innocence.
Appellant next argues that his plea was not knowing and in telligent because of his
cognitive limitations. But neither appellant’s employment history, which includes running
his own part -time business since 1989, working 14 years routing delivery trucks as the

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distribution manager for a food service, and working a s a school bus driver for three -and-
a-half years , nor the hearing transcript supports his claim of cognitive inability to
understand what was happening at a plea hearing. The transcript indicates that appellant
told the d istrict court that he understood the charge and pleaded guilty to it. Appellant
answered in the affirmative when the district court asked “[Y]ou’re making an informed
decision today, right?” and “[W]e’re not going to have a trial; understand that part?”. When
the district court asked appellant if his medication interfered with his ability to think or
helped him think clearly, he answered, “It helps me calm down and think clearly . . . .”
Appellant answered “Yeah” when the district court asked if it made sen se that the court
“wouldn’t let someone plead guilty who then says, ‘I’m innocent. I didn’t do it.’” and if it
was right that the judge needed “to be convinced people are actually guilty of these serious
offenses before he let them go through probation.” None of these answers demonstrates
an inability to understand the questions put to him.
Appellant finally argues his plea was involuntary because his attorney “forcefully
explained” that appellant should plead guilty when his motion to exclude the Spreigl
evidence was denied. But the record reflects tha t the victim of appellant’s 1997 assault
was ready to testify in his 2017 trial as to the harm she suffered because appellant did
essentially the same thing to her as he did to the 2017 victim. Appellant’s attorney had a
basis for forcefully explaining that the admission of her evidence was likely to be very
damaging to appellant. Moreover, appellant told his attorney at the plea hearing that he
agreed they had gone through the plea petition and that he understood he was giving up his
right to have a trial, to contest the evidence, to question witnesses, and to testify or remain

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silent. He replied affirmatively when his attorney asked if he agreed that he entered the
plea freely and voluntarily, that no one had threatened him, that no one had promised him
anything other than what had been discussed in court, and that he was pleading guilty
because he was, in fact, guilty.
The only evidence appellant offers in opposition to the transcript is his own
affidavit, prepared five months after the plea hearing to support his motion to withdraw.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to rely on this affidavit as a basis
for permitting withdrawal of the guilty plea. Appellant’s reasons for seeking withdrawal
are not sufficient, separately or collectively, to establish a fair and just reason.
2. Prejudice to the State
During the hearing on appellant’s motion to withdraw his plea, t he district court
addressed the victims and others involve d, saying, “You people have been through a lot
and it concerns me . . . reopening the case an[d] putting these folks [i.e., the victims] right
back where they were.” The incident occurred in March 2017; the witnesses were prepared
for a trial to begin on October 16, 2017. But on that date, appellant pleaded guilty, and the
victim and witnesses were told the re would be no trial. Not until March 12, 2018, five
months after being told there would be no trial and almost a full year after the incident, did
appellant petition for withdrawal of his guilty plea. “[T]he timeliness of a petition to
withdraw a guilty plea is a relevant consideration in determining whether that relief should
be granted.” James v. State , 699 N. W.2d 723, 728 (Minn. 2005) . Requiring a teenage
victim and witnesses who had been prepared for trial, then told there would be no trial

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because the case was over, to once again prepare for trial would have prejudiced the ability
of victim and witnesses to testify effectively and would have prejudiced the state’s case.
Appellant concedes that the victim and the witnesses might be prejudiced by the
withdrawal of his guilty plea, but argues that there is no evidence that the state would
therefore be prejudiced. But see Kim v. State, 434 N.W.2d 263, 267 (Minn. 1989) (noting
that district court “was not unjustified in considering the interests of the victim”). In
deciding a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, the district court must balance the defendant’s
reasons for seeking withdrawal against any resultin g prejudice to the state. Raleigh, 778
N.W.2d at 97. That prejudice may be inferred from the disruption the withdrawal of
appellant’s guilty plea would cause in the lives of the victim s and witnesses on whom the
state’s case depends.
Because appellant’s reasons for granting his motion to withdraw lacked merit and
because a plea withdrawal would have prejudiced the state, the district court did not abuse
its discretion in denying appellant’s motion.
Affirmed.