Kenny Lee Reed, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0691

Kenny Lee Reed, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed December 31, 2018
Affirmed
Schellhas, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-99-102206

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sean Michael McGuire, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Jonathan P. Schmidt, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Florey,
Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SCHELLHAS, Judge
Appellant challenges the postconviction court’s denial of his petition to withdraw
his guilty plea, arguing that plea withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice. We
affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Kenny Lee Reed with felon in
possession of a firearm and two counts of second-degree assault in connection with a July
1999 shooting. While those charges were pending, Reed shot R.J.T. in the leg at a party in
September 1999. The state charged Reed with second-degree assault in violation of Minn.
Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1 (1998) and felon in possession of a firearm in violation of Minn.
Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(b) (1998).
In connection with the July 1999 shooting, a jury found Reed guilty of two counts
of second-degree assault and one count of felon in possession of a firearm. In December
1999, b efore sentenc ing o n those offenses, the state offered to dismiss the felon -in-
possession-of-a-firearm charge from September 1999 in exchange for Reed’s plea of guilty
to second -degree assault. The plea negotiation also contemplated that Reed would be
sentenced consecutively to 36 months’ imprisonment on each second -degree assault
conviction, two from the shootings in July 1999 and one from the shooting in September
1999, “for a grand total of 108 all consecutive.” Reed pleaded guilty to second-degree
assault, and the district court sentenced Reed to three consecutive 36 -month prison
sentences for his three second -degree-assault convictions and one 60 -month prison

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sentence for his July 1999 conviction of felon in possession of a firearm, to be served
concurrently with his sentences for assault.
In March 2017, Reed filed a pro se writ of error coram nobis, seeking to withdraw
his guilty plea to second-degree assault in connection with the September 1999 shooting
and his December 1999 guilty plea. The district court construed the writ as a postconviction
petition, concluded that Reed’s claim was not time barred because of “unusual and
exceptional circumstances,” considered Reed’s petition on the merits, and denied relief.
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
The state argues that we should affirm the district court’s deni al of Reed’s
postconviction petition on the basis that it was untimely. Because we affirm the denial on
the merits, we need not address the timeliness of Reed’s petition.
An appellate court reviews the denial of a postconviction petition for an abuse of
discretion. Johnson v. State, 916 N.W.2d 674, 678 (Minn. 2018). An appellate court “will
reverse a postconviction court if the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or
capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly
erroneous factual findings.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Validity of Reed’s guilty plea
“At any time the court must allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea upon a
timely motion and proof to the satisfaction of the court that withdrawal is necessary to
correct a manifest injustice.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. A manifest injustice ex ists
if the plea is not valid. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). To be valid, a

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guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent. Id. Whether a plea is valid is a legal
question that we review de novo. Id.
Reed does not argue that his guilty plea was inaccurate or involuntary. He argues
that he did not validly waive his fundamental rights when he entered his plea of guilty to
second-degree assault in December 1999 , and that the postconviction court abused its
discretion by denying his petition to withdraw his guilty plea because a manifest injustice
occurred. The only issue we consider is whether Reed’s guilty plea was intelligent.
The plea hearing in December 1999, at which Reed pleaded guilty to second-degree
assault for shooting someone in the leg at a party, immediately followed the jury’s return
of guilty verdicts in connection with second -degree-assault charges against Reed for
shootings in July 1999. At the plea hearing, the district court instructed Reed’s counsel to
proceed with Reed’s waiver of trial rights. In response, Reed’s lawyer said, “Your Honor,
just one minute. I have to complete my Petition.” The court allowed Reed and his counsel
time to complete the plea petition and, w hen ready, Reed’s lawyer reviewed the plea
petition with Reed, in relevant part, as follows:
DEFENSE COUNSEL: When you plead guilty to the second
degree assault from September 23, 1999, you are giving up
your right to a jury trial?
REED: Yeah
. . . .
DEFENSE COUNSEL : That means unlike the prior case
where you had an opportunity to have a jury trial, you are
saying you don’t want one and in this case you giving up all of
your rights that we exercised in the prior case; do you
understand that?
REED: Yes.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: So I as your lawyer won’t be
confronting witnesses against you; do you understand that?

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REED: Yes.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: And you’re waiving your right to
remain silent because you are standing up here and you are
going to be entering your plea of guilty to the Court; do you
understand that?
REED: Yes.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Additionally, I won’t be calling any
witnesses in your defense. Do you feel okay with that?
REED: Yes.
DEFENSE COUNSEL : Any hesitation whatsoever, Mr.
[Reed]? This is your opportunity to say you don’t want to do
it.
REED: No hesitation.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: So you acknowledge to the Court that
you do wish to waive your right to a jury trial and you do want
to admit to this offense, you signed the bottom of this petition,
is that right?
REED: Yes.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Is this your signature at the bottom of
all four pages?
REED: Yeah.

After the above colloquy, the district court asked Reed if he had gone over the
petition with his counsel and if he had any questions. Reed replied that he had gone over
the petition and did not have any questions. Before accepting the petition, the court also
asked Reed, “You have been through a trial, so you know what a trial means, and you know
that you could have one in this case too?” Reed replied, “Yeah.” Reed then provided a
factual basis to support his plea, and the court sentenced Reed in accordance with the plea
agreement.
As a threshold argument, Reed contends that the district court failed to comply with
Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.01 and that its noncompliance invalidates his guilty plea. “Before the
judge accepts a guilty plea, the defendant must be sworn and questioned by the judge with
the assistance of counsel” with regard to eight enumerated factors. Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.01,

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subd. 1. Reed cites State v. Halseth , arguing that “the lack of necessary waivers of any
fundamental right renders the plea proceedings invalid.” See 653 N.W.2d 782, 786 (Minn.
App. 2002) (stating “that the requirements for a valid waiver prior to a stipulated court trial
are similar to those necessary for a valid guilty plea under Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.01”). But
“[t]he Comments to Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.01, and Minnesota case law establish that failure
to interrogate a defendant as set forth in Rule 15.01 or to fully inform [a defendant] of all
constitutional rights does not invalidate a guilty plea.” State v. Doughman , 340 N.W.2d
348, 351 (Minn. App. 1983), review denied (Minn. Mar. 15, 1984). Because no per se rule
concerning necessary waivers exists, Reed’s threshold argument fails.
Reed argues that even if the waiver of rights “does not have to be perfect to support
a valid plea,” the “inquiry here was still de ficient” and his plea was unintelligent because
the district court did not receive express verbal waivers of his right to testify and the
presumption of innocence. “The intelligence requirement ensures that a defendant
understands the charges against him, the rights he is waiving, and the consequences of his
plea.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96.
“A reviewing court may weigh a defendant’s experience with the criminal justice
system when evaluating whether his plea was knowing and intelligent.” Doughman, 340
N.W.2d at 353. Reed had just completed a jury trial with the same counsel and judge who
appeared at his plea hearing. And Reed discussed the plea petition with counsel and signed
each page before entering his plea. Reed’s consultation with his lawyer moreover “raises
the presumption that he was fully informed of his rights.” Id. We conclude that any failure
to question Reed about each and every constitutional right did not affect the intelligence of

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his plea. See id. at 351 (stating that failure to inform defendant “of all constitutional rights
does not invalidate a guilty plea ,” that “the order or the wording of the questions” is not
important; what is important is “ whether the record is adequate to establish that the plea
was intelligently and voluntarily given”).
Here, the record shows that Reed was well aware of his fundamental trial rights and
fully understood the trial rights that he was waiving when he entered his guilty plea. We
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Reed’s
postconviction request to withdraw his plea.
Affirmed.