State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0709

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Marcus Charles Gbala,
Appellant.

Filed March 18, 2019
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Hubbard County District Court
File No. 29-CR-17-881

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Jonathan Frieden, Hubbard County Attorney, Erika C.H. Randall, Assistant County
Attorney, Park Rapids, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of third -degree possession of a controlled
substance, arguing that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress the drug
evidence supporting his conviction. We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Marcus Charles Gbala with third-
degree possession of a controlled substance. The complaint alleged that police executed a
search warrant at Gbala’s residence on August 1, 2017, and found 13.6 grams of cocaine
in the home. The complaint further alleged that Gbala admitted the cocaine belonged to
him.
Gbala moved to suppress the drugs, arguing that the search warrant “on its face
lacked probable cause” because it failed to establish that information from a confidential
reliable informant (CRI) was reliable and because it contained many conclusory statements
that were not supported by detailed information. The district court reviewed the search -
warrant affidavit, concluded that it established probable cause to search Gbala’s residence,
and denied his motion to suppress.
Gbala stipulated to the prosecution’s case under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4,
to obtain review of the district court’s ruling on his motion to suppress . The district court
found Gbala guilty as char ged, entered judgment of convict ion, and sentenced him to a
stayed 27-month prison term. This appeal follows.

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D E C I S I O N
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and
seizures by the government. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. Generally,
a search is lawful only if it is executed pursuant to a valid search warrant issued by a neutral
and detached magistrate after a finding of probable cause. State v. Yarbrough, 841 N.W.2d
619, 622 (Minn. 2014). No warrant shall issue absent a showing of probable cause. U.S.
Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. When determining whether a search warrant
is supported by probable cause, appellate courts do not engage in de novo review. State v.
McGrath, 706 N.W.2d 532, 539 (Minn. App. 2005), review denied (Minn. Feb. 22, 2006).
Instead, “great deference must be given to the issuing [magistrate’s] determination of
probable cause.” State v. Valento , 405 N.W.2d 914, 918 (Minn. App. 1987). When
reviewing a de cision to issue a search warrant, an appellate court limits its review to
whether the issuing magistrate had a substantial basis for concludin g that probable cause
existed. Yarbrough, 841 N.W.2d at 622. In doing so, appellate courts consider the “totality
of the circumstances.” State v. Wiley, 366 N.W.2d 265, 268 (Minn. 1985).
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical,
common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances
set forth in the affidavit before him, including the “v eracity”
and “basis of knowledge” of persons supplying hearsay
information, there is a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.

Id. (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983)).
In reviewing the sufficiency of a search -warrant affidavit under the totality -of-the-
circumstances test, “courts must be careful not to review each component of the affidavit

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in isolation.” Id. “[A] collection of pieces of information that would not be substantial
alone can combine to create sufficient probable cause.” State v. Jones, 678 N.W.2d 1, 11
(Minn. 2004). “Furthermore, the resolution of doubtful or marginal cases should be largely
determined by the preference to be accorded warrants.” Wiley, 366 N.W.2d at 268
(quotation omitted).
In this case, the circumstances set forth in the search-warrant affidavit are as
follows. On July 28, 2017, police were searching for K.M., who had escape d from the
Beltrami County Jail. Police received information that K.M. was using a particular cell
phone after his escape and tracked that phone to a location in Bemidji where C.O., a close
friend of K.M., lived. Special Agent Daniel Seaberg of the Bemid ji Police Department
went to that location and observed K.M. enter a vehicle. Agent Seaberg pursued K.M. but
was unable to apprehend him.
The vehicle was later located east of Lake George. Agent Seaberg knew that C.O.
had a recent law-enforcement contact at a residence in Lake Ge orge. Agent Seaberg also
knew that Gbala, C.O.’s cousin and an ex -boyfriend of K.M.’s mother, lived at the Lake
George residence. Police went to that residence and spoke with D.W., who stated that
K.M. was not there. D.W. refused to allow the police to search the residence.
Later that day, police received information that K.M. had used a second cell phone
after he fled from Agent Seaberg . The police tracked the phone to an area near Gbala’s
residence, returned to that residence, and D.W. consented to a search. Neither Gbala nor
K.M. were at the residence.

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On July 30, 2017, Agent Seaberg received information from a CRI who had spoken
with one of K.M.’s family members. The CRI reported that the family member said that
Gbala was assisting K.M. to hide from law enforcement. That same day, police spoke with
Gbala, who denied having contact with K.M. after his escape from jail. Gbala told police,
“If I had helped [K.M.] I wouldn’t be keeping him at my house.”
On July 31, 2017, police subpoenaed records for Gbala’s cell phone, as well as the
cell phones they believed K.M. had been using . The records indicated that one of the
phones linked to K.M. had made two calls to Gbala’s phone on July 28, 2017, the day K.M.
escaped. The first call was made at approximately 3:30 a.m., shortly after K.M. escaped,
and the second call was made at approximately 10:45 a.m., while K.M . was fleeing from
Agent Seaberg.
The search-warrant affidavit further stated that, based on his training a nd
experience, Agent Seaberg was “aware that criminals will use multiple phones in an
attempt to conceal their criminal activity and location from law enforcement.” The warrant
requested authorization to search Gbala’s person, residence, and vehicles lo cated at the
residence for cell phones and cell-phone data, “including but not limited to: deleted data,
contact lists, text messages, call logs, social media applications, emails, and photographs.”
Gbala argues that the warrant was not supported by probab le cause because “[t]he
warrant application did not establish that the confidential informant was reliable .” When
a search -warrant application includes information from an informant, the supporting
affidavit “must provide the magistrate with adequate info rmation from which he can
personally assess the informant’s credibility.” State v. Siegfried , 274 N.W.2d 113, 114

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(Minn. 1978). “[A]n informant’s reliability can be established if the police can corroborate
the information.” State v. Ross, 676 N.W.2d 301, 304 (Minn. App. 2004), review denied
(Minn. June 15, 2004). “Even corroboration of minor details lends credence to an
informant’s tip and is relevant to the probable-cause determination.” State v. Holiday, 749
N.W.2d 833, 841 (Minn. App. 2008).
Before the police received information from the CRI, they were already
investigating Gbala’s possible concealment of K.M. because K.M. had been observed
outside of C.O.’s residence, police knew that Gbala was C.O.’s cousin and the ex-boyfriend
of K.M.’s mother, and a phone linked to K.M. had been traced to an area near Gbala’s
residence. After receiving the CRI’s information, police learned that two phone calls had
been made to Gbala’s cell phone from a cell phone linked to K.M., after K.M. escaped
from jail. These details corroborate d the CRI’s statement that Gbala was helping K.M.
avoid arrest because they establish ed that Gbala and K.M. had a personal connection and
that Gbala and K.M. were in contact with each other not long after K.M.’s escape.
The dist rict court reasoned that although there was “no specific information
regarding the CRI’s past veracity,” the CRI’s report was not, “in light of the whole
application, critical or at all necessary to the application and subsequent search warrant.”
The district court’s reasoning is sound given that the CRI did not provide the information
that triggered the initial investigation of Gbala’s involvement. Instead, the CRI’s
information corroborated current suspicions regarding Gbala’s involvement, which had
developed during the ongoing investigation.

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Gbala also argues that “the search warrant application, taken as a whole, does not
contain a sufficient evidentiary basis from which a reasonable person could infer that
evidence of a crime or criminal activity would be discovered.”
Probable cause not only requires that the evidence sought
likely exists, but also that there is a fair probability that the
evidence will be found at the spec ific site to be searched. A
sufficient “nexus” must be established between th e evidence
sought and the place to be searched. However, direct
observation of evidence of a crime at the place t o be searched
is not required. A nexus may be inferred from the totality of
the circumstances.

Yarbrough, 841 N.W.2d at 622 (citations omitt ed). Among the circumstances considered
are “the type of crime involved, the nature of the items sought, the extent of an opportunity
for concealment, and reasonable assumptions about where a suspect would likely keep that
evidence.” State v. Ruoho, 685 N.W.2d 451, 456 (Minn. App. 2004), review denied (Minn.
Nov. 16, 2004).
The search-warrant affidavit described cell-phone records showing two calls to
Gbala’s cell phone from a cell phone linked to K.M. the day that K.M. escaped; the use of
a cell phone linked to K.M. near Gbala’s residence not long after K.M. escaped ; the
discovery, near the town where Gbala lived, of the vehicle in which K.M. had fled Agent
Seaberg; information from a C RI that Gbala was helping K.M. avoid arrest; and Gbala’s
prior relationship with K.M.’s mother. In sum, the police established a personal connection
between Gbala and K.M. and had evidence of cell-phone contact between Gbala and K.M.
Based on the totality of the circumstances, it was reasonable to infer that Gbala was helping
K.M. to avoid capture and that a search of his cell phones would reveal evidence of this

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criminal activity. See Minn. Stat. § 609.495, subd. 1(a) (2016) (“Whoever harbors,
conceals, aids, or assists by word or acts another whom the actor knows or ha s reason to
know has committed a crime . . . with intent that such offender shall avoid or escape from
arrest, trial, conviction, or punishment” is guilty of aiding an offender).
Gbala complains that because there was “no information that [K.M.] was the person
calling” Gbala’s phone and “the affidavit contains no basis for how or why the police knew
[K.M.] was using certain phone numbers,” the related statements in the affidavit are
conclusory and do not establish “probable cause that [his] cell phone contained evidence
of criminal activity to justify the search warrant.” Gbala does not cite authority stating that
conclusory statements may not be considered when assessing probable cause. Instead, he
cites State v. Doyle, which stated that the value of a conclusory statement was “lessened”
because it did not “provide a clue as to the source of the information or the manner in which
the information was obtained.” 336 N.W.2d 247, 251 (Minn. 1983).
Although the affidavit does not explain how the police knew t hat K.M. was using
certain cell phones, that information was corroborated by other statements in the affidavit,
including that the police tracked on e of the cell phones to C.O.’s home, went to C.O.’s
home, and observed K.M. outside of the home. Given that corroboration, the conclusory
statements regarding K.M.’s use of certain cell phones had value and were appropriately
considered by the issuing magistrate.
Applying the deferential standard that is required, we hold that the issuing
magistrate had a substantial basis to conclude that probable c ause existed . Any doubt
regarding that conclusion is resolved in accordance with “ the preference to be a ccorded

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warrants,” Wiley, 366 N.W.2d at 268 (quotation omitted), so as “not to deter police officers
from obtaining warrants,” State v. Nolting , 254 N.W.2d 340, 345 n.7 (Minn. 1977). We
therefore affirm the district court’s denial of Gbala’s motion to suppress.
Affirmed.