In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: R. H. and C. L. M., Parents.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0725

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:
R. H. and C. L. M., Parents.

Filed October 29, 2018
Affirmed
Ross, Judge

Crow Wing County District Court
File No. 18-JV-16-4803

John P. Chitwood, Chitwood Law, PLLC, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant C.L.M.)

Donald F. Ryan, Crow Wing County Attorney, Angela J. Frie, Assistant County Attorney,
Brainerd, Minnesota (for respondent Crow Wing County Social Services)

Tina Jay, Baxter, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Florey, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Reyes, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
ROSS, Judge
Crow Wing County took custody of three of C.L.M.’s children after reports from a
doctor that the youngest child, an infant, was not gaining adequate weight and had a severe
skin condition on her scalp. The county designed a case plan for C.L.M. to facilitate
reunification, including supervised visits with his children, therapy, parenting education,
and living-skills training. C.L.M. participated in some of his case plan, but he failed to
attend visits, therapy sessions, and education sessions. He ref used to participate in
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domestic-violence programming and gave up on therapy and living-skills training. The
district court found that the children were neglected and in foster care and that their best
interests required termination of C.L.M.’s parental rights. C.L.M. appeals, arguing that he
corrected the conditions that led to out-of-home placement, he substantially complied with
his case plan, and the conditions were such that his children should have been returned to
him. Because clear and convincing evidence supports the district court’s findings , we
affirm.
FACTS
C.L.M. and R.L.H. (referred to in the caption as R.H.) are the parents of three
children whose relationship with C.L.M. is the subject of this appeal: C.A.M., S.A.M., and
A.D.M.M. The parents were never married but raised the children together. They are also
the parents of E.V.M., who is the subject of a different child-protection case, and in 2014,
they lost a child, D.M, because of complications from a genetic condition. Due to D.M.’s
health needs, and continuing after his death, the family received services through multiple
social-service agencies. The count y first became involved in December 2015 after
receiving a report that a service provider saw that infant A.D.M.M. had a thick blanket over
her head, dried milk in the creases of her neck and in her ears, and severe cradle cap. The
county social worker recommended the family participate in ongo ing child protective
services.
A month into these services, A.D.M.M.’s pediatrician wrote the county expressing
concern that A.D.M.M. was not gaining weight and continued to have cradle cap. The
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county petitioned for a finding that all three children needed protection or services. The
county removed the children from the home in January 2016.
The next month, the county assigned a new social worker to the family. At their first
meeting, the parents requested that the two older children be returned home. After
reviewing the family’s prior history with other child-protection agencies, the social worker
drafted out-of-home case plans for all three children. Although each case plan states that
the social worker “met with [ C.L.M.] to jointly make this plan,” she did not meet with
C.L.M. before submitting the plans with the district court. In May 2016, the district court
adjudicated the children in need of protection or services and implemented the social
worker’s case plans. The district court ordered C.L.M. to abstain from mood-altering
chemicals, submit to random drug tests, complete a psychological evaluation, continue in
individual therapy, attend visits with his children, maintain clean and safe housing, and
participate in parenting education.
C.L.M. participated in a psychological evaluation. The evaluator recommended
additional requirements for C.L.M.’s case plan, including training to address his anger ,
training to improve his interpersonal skills, training to improve his infant-specific parenting
skills, maintaining stable housing and employment, meeting with a living-skills worker,
and completing a domestic-violence assessment.
C.L.M. questioned his need for a domestic-violence assessment but he completed it
anyway. The evaluator recommended that he complete 18 to 24 sessions with a domestic -
violence program offered by the evaluator, and the district court ordered this as part of his
case plan. C.L.M. refused to participate.
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Beginning in January 2016, C.L.M. had weekly scheduled visits with his children.
He attended the first twenty visits through April, but then he missed two visits in May, one
in June, three in July, and three in August. C.L.M.’s visits starting in September were
scheduled to take place at a new facility, where he argued with staff about various policies.
He became progressively louder. The center canceled his first visit because staff suspected
that he planned to intercept the children when they arrived with their foster family. C.L.M.
left an angry voice message with the center. The center informed the county that it would
not facilitate visits with the family because of C.L.M.’s “aggressive actions and behavior.”
Around that time, R.L.H. delivered another child. While C.L.M. was present with
R.L.H. at the hospital after delivery, the county served him with a petition seeking an order
finding the newborn to be in need of protection or services. Enraged, C.L.M. threatened to
take the baby. Police officers escorted him out of the hospital and prevented his return. The
district court ordered C.L.M. to complete at least six sessions of domestic-violence
programming before it would reinstate his visits. C.L.M.’s last visit with his children was
on September 1, 2016.
In November, the county petitioned to terminate his and R.L.H.’s parental rights.
R.L.H. consented. After an 11-day trial in early 2018, the district court terminated C.L.M.’s
parental rights. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
C.L.M. challenges the district court’s order terminating his parental rights. We
afford the district court’s termination decision considerable deference. In re Welfare of
Children of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008). The district court may terminate
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parental rights if clear and convincing evidence establishes that at least one statutory
ground for termination exists and termination is in the child’s best interests. In re Welfare
of Children of R.W. , 678 N.W.2d 49, 55 (Minn. 2004). We review the district court’s
findings of fact for clear error and its determination of whether a particular statutory basis
for termination is present for abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B., 805
N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). Our review of
termination proceedings is informed by the understanding that courts may terminate
parental rights only for “grave and weighty reasons.” In re Welfare of M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d
370, 375 (Minn. 1990). We first address the statutory bases for termination found by the
district court before turning to its best-interests analysis.
I
C.L.M. challenges the district court’s decision on all three statutory grounds the
court relied on to terminate his parental rights. The district court concluded that C.L.M.
failed to comply with the duties imposed by the parent-child relationship under Minnesota
Statutes, section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(2) (2016); reasonable efforts failed to correct
the conditions leading to the out-of -home placement under subdivision 1(b)(5); and the
children were neglected and in foster care under subdivision 1(b)(8). We may affirm even
if only one statutory ground is supported. See R.W., 678 N.W.2d at 55. We find it necessary
to focus only on the district court’s decision that the children were neglected and in foster
care.
We are satisfied that the district court had an adequate basis to terminate C.L.M.’s
parental rights based on his neglect of the children in foster care. Termination is appropriate
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under subdivision 1(b)(8) if the children are in court-ordered foster care; the parent’s
circumstances or conduct preclude returning the children to him; and the parent, despite
available rehabilitative services, failed to make reasonable efforts to adjust his situation or
willfully failed to meet reasonable expectations to visit the children. See R.W., 678 N.W.2d
at 57 (listing these among other bases for termination). The statute requires the district
court to consider, among other things, the length of time the children are in foster care
along with the parent’s commitment to visiting and the regularity of his contact and
communication with the agency responsible for the child. Minn. Stat. § 260C.163, subd. 9.
Our review of the record supports termination under this standard.
Among other things that support termination under the neglect- in-foster-care
provision, C.L.M.’s visits with the children had become i nfrequent even before his visits
were suspended because of his behavior. And after the suspension, he did not see the
children for over a year, all the way through the time of the termination trial. The record
indicates that his choices controlled whether he would be allowed to visit the children.
Despite knowing his visits would be suspended until he completed six domestic-violence
or anger-management sessions, C.L.M. refused to engage because he did not see the need.
His willingness to maintain communication with the county service providers was as
lacking as his willingness to engage sufficiently to lift the suspension. The record indicates
that he refused to answer calls, refused to return calls, and refused to answer letters. In this
context, he willingly failed to make reasonable efforts to visit the children. His
unwillingness to cooperate when he knew that his lack of cooperation prevented his
children from spending any time with him whatsoever and when he knew that it was putting
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his relationship with them permanently at stake supports the district court’s finding of his
neglect. This is so even if C.L.M. saw the offered services as inconvenient or unnecessary.
C.L.M. argues that he substantially complied with his case plan and that he corrected
the original conditions that led to out-of-home placement. The record supports a different
finding. It supports the finding that the children could not be returned to him, not only due
to the issues he refused to address but due to his failure to cooperate with even basic
remedial services offered to him. The district court also found that the children could not
be returned to him for several other reasons, including his failure to secure and maintain
stable housing and emplo yment. C.L.M. testified that he did not have a lease agreement
and that he would be losing his housing. The district court found that “[h]e had no plans
for a new residence, and no stable home for the children.” After quitting two jobs, he
testified that he was unemployed and survived by exchanging services for gas and food in
his community. The district court found that, by the time the trial ended in March 2018,
C.L.M. had not worked since spring 2016 when he quit a fast-food job he held only briefly.
C.L.M. fails to demonstrate that any of the critical findings are clearly erroneous.
We understand C.L.M. to argue that the conditions that originally led to the
children’s out-of-home placement, specifically the infant’s health, were corrected. It is true
that A.D.M.M. gained weight and no longer suffered from cradle cap at the time of the
trial, but that consideration does not complete the analysis. The district court must also
consider the factors listed in section 260C.163, subdivision 9, including the factors we have
discussed. Those factors support the district court’s decision. And we conclude that the
district court’s decision is supported by clear and convincing evidence that the children
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were neglected and in foster care. Because one statutory basis is established, we decline to
analyze the others. We turn to the best-interests determination.
II
C.L.M. challenges the district court’s finding that termination of his parental rights
is in the children’s best interests —a finding necessary for termination. See Minn. R.
Juv. Prot. P. 39.05, subd. 3(b)(3). The best interests of the children is the paramount
consideration after a statutory basis for termination is established. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 7. We review a district court’s finding that termination is in the children’s best
interests for an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895,
906 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 17, 2012).
C.L.M. argues only that “[n]one of the . . . statutory bases cited in the trial court’s
order were prove[d] by clear and convincing evidence.” This argument is not persuasive.
When analyzing the children’s best interests , the court must balance three factors: the
children’s interests in preserving the parent -child relationship, the parent’s interest in
preserving the parent-child relationship, and any competing interest of the children. Id. at
905. The district court identified various circumstances supporting its conclusion that
termination of parental rights is in the children’s best interests. It found that C.L.M. failed
to address his aggressive and angry behavior and was unwilling to cooperate with service
providers “even if it mean[t] helping his children.” This finding has ample support in the
trial evidence. The district court found that the children have significant needs that require
their attendance at appointments with providers. The district court found that C.L.M. failed
to show he was capable of meeting these needs, and the record supports the finding. The
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evidence shows that the children have been diagnosed with varying serious mental-health
disorders, and witnesses providing services testified that C.L.M.’s failure to address his
own mental- health issues made it difficult for him to address theirs. It found that the
children’s need for safety, stability, and permanency outweighs the need to preserve the
parent-child relationshi p. It found their opportunity for potential adoption into a secure
environment with their needs consistently met is in their best interests and that they would
not have this opportunity in C.L.M.’s care. C.L.M. has not adequately challenged these
findings.
The record leaves little doubt that C.L.M. wants to remain a father to the children.
But it also supports the district court’s findings that, despite this strong desire, C.L.M.
neglected the children after they were placed in foster care and termination of parental
rights is in their best interests.
Affirmed.