State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0727

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Eddy Robert Oman,
Appellant.

Filed February 11, 2019
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69DU-CR-16-3262

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Shawn B. Reed, Maki & Overom, Ltd., Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent)

Robert E. Mathias, Duluth, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and
Bratvold, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
After the Hoghead Festival in Pr octor, a Hermantown police off i c e r s t o p p e d a
driver, appellant Eddy Robert Oman, when he accelerated away from a stop sign. During
the stop, the officer noticed signs of intoxication and request ed that Oman perform field

2
sobriety tests. The officer arrested Oman based on a failed preliminary breath test. Oman
moved to suppress the evidence of impairment on the ground it was obtained as a result of
an illegal stop. The district court denied his motion because it found that the stop was
reasonable because the officer suspected Oman of violating a Pr octor city o rdinance
prohibiting unreasonable acceleration. We affirm.
FACTS
On August 21, 2016, around 2:30 a.m., a Hermantown police offic er was working
a Toward Zero Death DWI enforcement shift after the Hoghead Festival in Proctor. While
on patrol, the officer observed a pickup truck rapidly accelera te from a stop sign. The
officer stopped the pickup, whic h was driven by appellant Eddy Robert Oman, and
informed Oman that his driving conduct was unsafe because of th e large crowds after the
Hoghead Festival. While Oman was speaking, the officer noticed a strong smell of alcohol
and observed that Oman’s eyes were glossy and bloodshot. Oman admitted to drinking
three beers before driving. The officer then requested that Om an perform field sobriety
tests, which Oman agreed to do. But Oman failed the field sobr iety tests and his
preliminary breath test.
Oman was transported to the Hermantown Police Department. After being read the
implied-consent advisory, Oman stated he understood and did not wish to speak to an
attorney. Around 3:45 a.m., Oman agreed to a breath test, whic h registered an alcohol
concentration of 0.16.
As a result, Oman was charged w ith two counts of second-degree driving while
impaired (DWI), one count of third-degree DWI, and possession o f a small amount of

3
marijuana.1 Oman moved to suppress the evidence of impairment on the ground that it was
seized during an illegal stop of his vehicle. The district cou rt denied Oman’s motion on
the ground that the officer was acting upon his professional de termination that Oman
accelerated too fast in violation of a Proctor city ordinance.
Oman stipulated to the state’s ev idence under Minnesota Rule of C r i m i n a l
Procedure 26.01, subdivision 4, t o preserve the pretrial suppre ssion ruling for appellate
review. The district court adjudicated Oman guilty of second-d egree DWI and sentenced
him to one year in jail, and stayed the sentence for two years. Oman appeals from the final
judgment raising only the issue involving the denial of his suppression motion.
D E C I S I O N
On appeal, Oman contends that t he officer did not have reasona ble articulable
suspicion to justify the stop because the facts do not amount to a violation of a Proctor city
ordinance. Oman asserts that his case is similar to State v. Bender , in which this court
affirmed a district court’s finding of no reasonable suspicion w h e n t h e r e c o r d d i d n o t
establish that the officer observed any criminal conduct justifying a stop. 381 N.W.2d 896,
898 (Minn. App. 1986). When reviewing the legality of an investigatory stop, we review
findings of fact for clear error, but review questions of reasonable suspicion de novo. State
v. Britton, 604 N.W.2d 84, 87 (Minn. 2000).
Both the United States and Minne sota Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches
and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10 . But a police officer is

1 In violation of Minnesota Statu tes sections 169A.25, subd. 1(a ) (second-degree DWI),
.26, subd. 1(a) (third-degree DWI), 152.027, subd. 4(a) (possession of marijuana) (2016).

4
permitted to conduct a limited i nvestigatory stop of a vehicle “if the officer has an
objectively reasonable and articul able basis for suspecting the motorist of criminal
activity.” State v. Kilmer , 741 N.W.2d 607, 609 (Minn. App. 2007). In determining
whether a stop is justified, we review the events surrounding t he stop and considers the
totality of the circumstances. Britton, 604 N.W.2d at 87. Traffic violations, even
insignificant ones, can provide an objective basis for stopping a vehicle. State v. George,
557 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Minn. 1997).
The traffic violation at issue here is unreasonably accelerati ng away from a stop
sign. The applicable Proctor city code provision states:
No person shall turn, accelerate, decelerate, or otherwise
operate a motor vehicle on any public or private roadway
within the City in a manner which causes unnecessary engine
noise or backfire, squealing tires, skidding, sliding, swaying,
throwing of sand or gravel, or in a manner simulating a race,
impeding traffic, or with an unnecessary exhibition of speed.

Proctor, Minn. City Code § 801.02(a) (2003) (emphasis added.) The district court found
that the officer’s testimony established the legality of the st op because the officer
reasonably suspected Oman of violating Proctor City Code section 801.02(a).
Multiple facts in the record support the district court’s finding. The officer testified
that he observed Oman’s vehicle stop at a stop sign, then “acce lerate very fast” down the
street. When Oman’s vehicle left the stop sign, the officer he ard the loud acceleration of
the motor, which he testified seemed excessive. By the time the officer turned the corner
to follow, Oman’s vehicle was near the end of the block. The v ideo from the dashboard
camera mounted in the patrol car confirms the officer’s testimo ny. It shows Oman’s

5
vehicle far ahead of the squad car by the time the officer made a turn. And while the patrol
car caught up to Oman’s vehicle, the dashboard-camera video recorded that the patrol car
had to move at a speed of 41 miles per hour to do so.
Nevertheless, Oman argues that the officer did not establish a ny facts that
demonstrated that he violated the Proctor city code. He assert s that “made up facts” and
“gross exaggeration” on the officer’s part are readily apparent when comparing the police
report and the dashboard-camera video. We are not persuaded. The dashboard-camera
video explicitly shows Oman accelerating away from the stop sign at a fast speed.
Finally, Oman’s analogy to Bender is misplaced. In Bender, this court determined
that the officer did not have a reasonable articulable suspicio n for instigating the
investigatory stop because the officer did not suspect the driver of being under the influence
or committing any other traffic offenses. Bender, 381 N.W.2d at 897. Instead, the officer
testified that the basis for the stop was that the driver’s car was making excessive noise.
Id. at 898. And the officer never testified that the noise level would have constituted a
traffic violation. Id. Unlike Bender, the testimony here shows that the officer reasonably
suspected Oman of violating the Proctor city code provision pro hibiting unreasonable
acceleration.
Because facts in the record support the district court’s findi ng that the officer
reasonably suspected that Oman violated the city code provision prohibiting unreasonable
acceleration, we affirm the district court’s denial of Oman’s motion to suppress.
Affirmed.