In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: S. R. S. and D. A. S., Parents.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0728

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
S. R. S. and D. A. S., Parents.

Filed October 8, 2018
Affirmed
Cleary, Chief Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-JV-17-856

Jason Steck, Edina, Minnesota (for appellant S.R.S.)

Anthony C. Palumbo, Anoka County Attorney, Nicholas M. Jannakos, Assistant County
Attorney, Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent Anoka County Social Services)

Ben Sime, Ramsey, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Cleary, Chief Judge; and
Schellhas, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
CLEARY, Chief Judge
On appeal from the termination of appellant-mother’s parental rights, mother argues
(1) that the record does not support the district court’s determination that Anoka County
Social Services made reasonable reunification efforts; and (2) that the district court denied
mother due process when it commented on her judgment and questioned witnesses. We
affirm.
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FACTS
Appellant-mother and D.A.S. are the parents of B.D.S., born in 2011. Mother and
D.A.S. are also the parents of J.A.S, born in 2013, who is not a party to these proceedings.
B.D.S. was diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) in 2014 and requires
heightened levels of routine and structure to regulate his behaviors. Disruptions in routine
and structure dysregulate B.D.S., causing him to act out aggressively towards himself and
others. Mother has anxiety, depression, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), and a
history of drug abuse.
In October 2014, respondent Anoka County Social Services (ACSS) filed a child-
in-need-of-protection-or-services (CHIPS) petition for B.D.S. and J.A.S due to concerns
regarding mother’s homelessness and drug use. ACSS placed the children in foster care
and the county implemented an out- of-home placement plan that identified tasks mother
needed to complete for B.D.S. and J.A.S. to return to her care and custody. The adopted
case plan required that mother complete chemical dependency treatment, maintain
sobriety, participate in UAs as requested by ACSS, obtain safe and stable housing, and
maintain her mental health. Although ACSS stated that mother was “mostly compliant”
with her case plan, it also noted that mother missed over half of her individual therapy
appointments and often discontinued services before completion.
In June 2016, B.D.S. and J.A.S. were returned to mother for a trial home visit. After
about one month, ACSS terminated the trial home visit. The termination followed an
allegation that B.D.S. suffered a rug burn when B.D.S. ran from mother’s apartment unit
and mother dragged him back inside by his legs. During the trial home visit, mother also
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missed her individual therapy appointments and B.D.S.’s therapy appointments. In
September 2016, the district court dismissed the CHIPS proceeding and returned B.D.S
and J.A.S. to mother’s care over the objection of ACSS and the guardian ad litem.
ACSS instituted an investigation regarding the welfare of B.D.S. and J.A.S. in April
2017 after receiving a report that J.A.S. suffered an injury. An ACSS investigator
determined that the injury was not the result of physical abuse, but the investigator learned
that D.A.S. had moved into mother’s apartment. The ACSS investigator was concerned
about D.A.S.’s presence in the home because of D.A.S.’s history of drug abuse and
previous imprisonment for acts of domestic violence against mother. D.A.S. also worked
irregular hours and his work schedule dysregulated B.D.S.’s behaviors.
ACSS received reports throughout May and June of 2017 relating to B.D.S.’s
behaviors. Throughout this timeframe, Anoka Police responded to several calls to help
control B.D.S. Additionally, B.D.S. was taken to Mercy Hospital on four separate
occasions for observation and treatment. On one occasion, B.D.S. was initially admitted
to Mercy Hospital after an aggressive outburst. Mercy Hospital referred B.D.S. to
PrairieCare, a children’s facility specializing in treating mental health needs. PrairieCare
recommended a ten-day stay, but mother removed B.D.S. after two days.
On June 23, 2017, mother called ACSS and informed an investigator that she was
unable to control B.D.S.’s behavior. Mother brought B.D.S. to the Anoka County
Government Center and ACSS placed B.D.S. in foster care.
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ACSS filed a petition to terminate mother’s and D.A.S.’s parental rights as to B.D.S.
on June 28, 2017.1 ACSS ultimately alleged three statutory grounds for termination under
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), (4), (5) (2016). The district court granted a
continuance due to B.D.S.’s recent dysregulated behaviors, resultant hospitalizations, and
ACSS’s concerns regarding the adequacy of B.D.S.’s services and his viability for
permanent placement.
After the filing of the terminat ion petition, the Anoka-Hennepin Narcotics and
Violent Crimes Task Force executed a search warrant at mother’s home in February
2018. Mother was not home, but officers found D.A.S. and J.A.S. in the residence. During
the search, officers discovered metha mphetamine and drug paraphernalia. Mother was
charged with a fifth-degree controlled substance crime.
Before the police search, a parenting assessor completed an assessment of mother.
Originally, the assessor recommended reunification; however, the assessor changed her
recommendation after learning that D.A.S. was living with mother and that police had
discovered methamphetamine in the home.
Another parenting assessor completed a file review of the case before trial.
According to this assessment, mother had “been offered generous and timely services,
many of which would have been very helpful and appropriate in supporting improved
behavior management of a child with Autism. [Mother] simply did not follow through or

1 D.A.S. submitted a Petition of Father to Voluntarily Terminate Parental Rights and the
district court held the order in abeyance pending the outcome of mother’s trial. D.A.S.’s
parental rights are not at issue in this appeal.
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utilize the opportunities [she was] given.” Additionally, the assessor concluded that ACSS
had made reasonable efforts towards reunification. The district court found the parenting
assessor’s testimony credible.
The district court terminated mother’s parental rights following a three-day court
trial. In its 34-page order, the district court considered the testimony and recommendations
of ACSS, a foster parent of B.D.S., various service providers, parenting assessors, mother,
and the guardian ad litem. The district court found that the county proved by clear and
convincing evidence each of the statutory grounds for termination. Additionally, the
district court found that ACSS had made reasonable efforts to reunify the family and that
termination is in the best interests of the child.
D E C I S I O N
On appeal, mother does not challenge the statutory grounds for termination of her
parental rights. Instead, she argues that the record does not support the district court’s
determination that the county made reasonable reunification efforts. In addition, mother
asserts that the district court denied her due process.
I. The record supports the district court’s determination that the county
made reasonable reunification efforts.

Mother asserts that ACSS failed to provide reasonable reunification efforts because
no new services were attempted after ACSS filed the termination petition. Mother’s
argument focuses on a statement made by the ACSS investigator— that ACSS woul d no
longer “try to fix things.” Mother asserts that ACSS ignored the potential benefit of
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additional services that could have been attempted as further reunification efforts before
ACSS instituted permanency proceedings.
The trial court is vested with broad discretion in deciding child protection cases. In
re Booth, 91 N.W.2d 921, 924 (Minn. 1958). A district court may terminate parental rights
if clear and convincing evidence establishes that (1) at least one statutory basis supports
termination; (2) the county made reasonable efforts to reunite the family ; and
(3) termination is in the child’s best interests. In re Welfare of Children of S.E.P., 744
N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008). Because mother only challenges the second requirement,
we focus our analysis on ACSS’s reunification efforts. We review a district court’s factual
findings for clear error and will not disturb a finding that the county made reasonable
efforts if it is supported by substantial evidence. In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B., 805
N.W.2d 895, 901, 904 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012).
Once a child is removed from the home, the county must make reasonable efforts to
reunify the parent and child. Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a) (2016). In a termination proceeding,
the district court “shall make findings and conclusions as to the provision of reasonable
efforts.” Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (2016). Specifically, the district court must consider
whether a county’s reunification efforts were “(1) relevant to the safety and protection of
the child; (2) adequate to meet the needs of the child and family; (3) culturally appropriate;
(4) available and accessible; (5) consistent and timely; and (6) realistic under the
circumstances.” Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h)(1) -(6). Additionally, the district court must
make specific findings “that reasonable efforts to finalize the permanency plan to reunify
the child and the parent were made including individualized and explicit findings regarding
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the nature and extent of efforts made by the social services agency to rehabilitate the parent
and reunite the family.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 8(1) (2016). Finally, the district
court must consider “the length of the time the county was involved and the quality of
effort given.” In re Welfare of H.K., 455 N.W.2d 529, 532 (Minn. App. 1990), review
denied (Minn. July 6, 1990).
Here, the district court found that ACSS offered a “multitude” of services to mother
that were “substantial and tailored to address the issues that led to [B.D.S.]’s removal”, but
that mother was unable to consistently follow through with the services. Specifically, the
district court found that 17 services for mother and 5 services for B.D.S. were in place
during the CHIPS proceeding from 2014 to 2016. At the close of the CHIPS proceeding
in 2016, the district court found that 11 services were ongoing . The district court found
that the “efforts were consistent and timely, available and accessible, and realistic under
the circumstances.” Finally, the district court found that the services failed due to mother’s
inconsistent use, inability to internalize the teachings, and inability to make good decisions.
In its order, the district court detailed the services that ACSS made available to
mother. The district court order found that mother had received inpatient and outpatient
chemical dependency treatment. The district court also found that Partnership for Family
Success offered mother services for transportation, housing, a psychological assessment,
and parenting skills. Additionally, the district court found that Partnership for Family
Success worked with mother to clear her debt and gave her a referral for a housing voucher.
The district court found that mother also worked with an Early Childhood Family
Education instructor throughout the CHIPS proceeding. Consequently, mother’s argument
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that additional services could have been pursued by ACSS is unpersuasive given the
number of services already offered to mother . The district court’s findings are supported
by the record, and the district court did not err in finding that the count y made reasonable
reunification efforts.
II. Mother failed to preserve her due process argument for appeal, and it is
therefore forfeited.

On appeal, mother raises for the first time the claim that her due process rights were
violated. Mother contends that the district court pre-judged her credibility and that the
district court’s questioning of her during her testimony exhibited bias against her. Mother
argues that these exchanges with the district court denied her due process.
Mother did not raise her due process argument in the district court. We generally
do not consider matters that were not presented to and considered by the district court.
Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988); see also In re Welfare of C.L.L., 310
N.W.2d 555, 557 (Minn. 1981) (declining to address a constitutional issue raised for the
first time on appeal from a termination of parental rights). To determine if bias was
properly presented to the district court, this court looks for an objection made at trial or a
motion for recusal. See Gummow v. Gummow, 375 N.W.2d 30, 34 (Minn. App. 1985). A
party’s failure to raise a claim of judicial bias during the trial makes the timeliness of the
issue “questionable.” Id. Here, mother neither objected to the district court’s comments
or questions during the course of the tria l nor made a motion for recusal. We decline to
reach mother’s argument because it has been forfeited.
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Although the issue is not properly before us, the district court’s conduct during a
portion of the trial is concerning. The district court’s comments to mother before she
testified gave the appearance that the district court may have already determined the
outcome. In addition, the district court’s questions directed to mother during her testimony
were sharp and adversarial. As the fact-finder in a termination of parental rights case, the
district court had the duty to maintain the appearance of impartiality throughout the entirety
of the proceeding, regardless of the facts of the case. I t is unfortunate that in this case the
comments and questions made by the district court did not meet that standard.
Nevertheless, the issue has been forfeited.
Affirmed.