Joel Marvin Munt, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0740

Joel Marvin Munt, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Eddie Miles,
Respondent.

Filed November 26, 2018
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-CV-18-1718

Joel Marvin Munt, Stillwater, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Kelly S. Kemp, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Florey,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REILLY, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s denial of his application to proceed in forma
pauperis and his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We affirm.

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FACTS
Appellant Joel Marvin Munt is serving life in prison following his conviction for
first-degree murder. The conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. State v. Munt , 831
N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 2013). In November 2017, appellant handed a 19 -page “love letter”
to a corrections officer. The officer filed an incident report and turned the letter over to
prison authorities. The prison charged appellant with violating four Offender Discipl ine
Regulations (ODRs) for abuse/harassment, disorderly conduct, sexual behav ior, and
soliciting/bribery. Appellant admitted to abuse/harassment and disorderly conduct and the
remaining two charges were withdrawn. The prison imposed a sanction of ten days in
segregation, which appellant completed. In April 2018, appellant attemp ted to initiate a
habeas corpus proceeding against the prison warden, challenging the “[d]isciplinary
charges, policy, and punishment received” as a consequence to his admission that he
violated the prison’s ODRs. Appellant sought an order permitting him to proceed in forma
pauperis (IFP). The district court denied appellant’s request to proceed IFP and dismissed
the action with prejudice, determining that the habeas petition was “frivolous or malicious”
because it had “no arguable basis in law or in fact.” This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
I. Appellant’s habeas petition is moot.
It is uncontested that appellant served ten days of disciplinary segregation before
seeking relief. “A case is moot if there is no justiciable controversy for a court to decide.”
Pechovnik v. Pechovnik, 765 N.W.2d 94, 97 (Minn. App. 2009). Whether a cause of action
is moot is a question of law reviewed de novo. In re Risk Level Determination of J.V., 741

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N.W.2d 612, 614 (Minn. App. 2007), review denied (Minn. Feb. 19, 2008). A matter may
be dismissed as moot if the court cannot grant effective relief. Id. (citation omitted). We
will ordinarily dismiss a dispute when it is “settled or in some other way resolved” prior to
adjudication. State v. Rud , 359 N.W.2d 573, 576 (Minn. 1984). Here, appellant did not
seek immediate release from confinement. Instead, appellant was already out of segregated
confinement at the time he sought to file his habeas corpus petition, challenging a penalty
which he had already served. Because th ere is no longer a live controversy for this court
to decide, we hold that appellant’s petition is moot and the district court did not err by
dismissing the action.1
Appellant argues that an exception to the mootness doctrine applies. An appeal is
not moot when collateral consequences attach to the penalty. In re McCaskill, 603 N.W.2d
326, 327 (Minn. 1999). Appellant bears the burden of producing evidence that collateral
consequences “actually resulted” from a judgment. Id. at 329. Appellant has not satisfied
his burden of production here. Appellant argues that collateral consequences may attach
as a result of his discipline because he is innocent of the underlying charges and suffered
reputational harm, he has been prohibited from speaking to the corrections officer to whom
he sent the love letter, and he may have difficulty qualifying for certain types of prison jobs

1 Appellant previously filed a habeas petition against the prison in 2016, challenging a
disciplinary penalty of 30 days in segregated confinement imposed for violations of the
prison’s ODRs. See Munt v. Smith, No. A16-0462, 2016 WL 7042010, at *1 (Minn. App.
Dec. 5, 2016), review denied (Minn. Feb. 14, 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 85 (2017). We
deemed that petition moot and dismissed it, reasoning that because appellant completed his
confinement before filing his petition, there was “no unlawful confinement from which his
punishment-contesting habeas petition can afford him relief.” Id. at *3.

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due to his disciplinary record. We determine that appellant’s speculative claims, in the
absence of actual or direct evidence, are ins ufficient to demonstrate an exception to the
mootness doctrine. See, e.g., Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237, 88 S. Ct. 1556, 1559
(1968) (discussing direct effects which render the case justiciable).
We also reject appellant’s argument that he is e ntitled to an exception because the
issue is capable of repetition but will evade review. See In re Schmidt, 443 N.W.2d 824,
826 (Minn. 1989). Appellant argues that this exception applies because “the low standard
for punishment [suggests that] there is a realistic possibility [he] will be punished again .”
“But t he capable -of-repetition exception cannot revive a dispute that was moot before
commencement of the action.” State ex rel. Sviggum v. Hanson , 732 N.W.2d 312, 322
(Minn. App. 2007). Because appellant served ten days of segregation several months
before he sought to file his habeas petition, the petition was moot before it was filed.
Appellant has not established that an exception applies.
Finally, we are not persuaded by appellant’s argument that his habeas petition is not
moot under Heck v. Humphrey , 512 U.S. 477, 487 -89, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 2372 -73 (1994).
Heck involved a claim arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 479, 114 S. Ct. at 2368
(alleging violations that directly challenged legal ity of conviction). Heck does not apply
to a state prisoner’s claim against a corrections officer where the suit does not seek a
judgment at odds with the prisoner’s conviction or with the state’s calculation of time to
be served in accordance with the underlying sentence. Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749,
751, 124 S. Ct. 1303, 1304 (2004). Appellant is not seeking a judgment at odds with his

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underlying conviction or with the state’s calculation of time to be served, and Heck
therefore does not apply.
In sum, we determine that appellant has not established that a mootness exception
exists, and so the district court did not err by dismissing appellant’s petition as moot. 2
II. Appellant is not entitled to relief on the merits.
If we were to assume appellant’s petition is not moot, then we would nevertheless
determine that he is not entitled to relief on the merits. “A person imprisoned or otherwise
restrained of liberty . . . may apply for a writ of habeas corpus to obtain relief from
imprisonment or restraint.” Minn. Stat. § 589.01 (2016). A writ of habeas corpus may also
be used to challenge conditions of confinement or to raise claims involving fundamental
constitutional rights or significant restraints on liberty. Guth v. Fabian , 716 N.W.2d 23,
26-27 (Minn. App. 2006), review denied (Minn. Aug. 15, 2006). The burden of proof rests
with the petitioner. Bedell v. Roy, 853 N.W.2d 827, 829 (Minn. App. 2014), review denied
(Minn. Oct. 28, 2014).
An inmate may proceed IFP if the inmate satisfies the statutory criteria articulated
in Minn. Stat. § 563.02, subd. 2 (2016). The district court shall dismiss an action in which
an inmate seeks to proceed IFP with prejudice, if the court determines that the underlying
action is frivolous or malicious. Id., subd. 3(a) (2016). In making this determination, the
court considers whether “the claim has no arguable basis in law or fact” or “the claim is
substantially similar to a previous claim that was brought against the same party, arises

2 Appellant includes additional issues on appeal, including allegations that the prison
violated his constitutional rights. Our mootness decision precludes these issues.

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from the same operative fact s, and in which there was an action that operated as an
adjudication on the merits.” Id., subd. 3(b) (2016). The district court has broad discretion
in considering IFP proceedings and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.
Maddox v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 400 N.W.2d 136, 139 (Minn. App. 1987).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s IFP request on
the ground that his habeas corpus claims were frivolous and had no basis in law or in fact.
The grounds for a habeas corpus petition are limited to constitutional issues and
jurisdictional challenges. Bedell, 853 N.W.2d at 829. A habeas corpus petitioner may also
obtain judicial review of the Minnesota Department of Correction’s implementation of a
sentence. State v. Schnagl, 859 N.W.2d 297, 303 (Minn. 2015). Here, appellant does not
agree with the prison’s ODRs or with the application of those ODRs to his behavior. But
appellant’s challenge to the ODRs exceeds the relief available to him through a habeas
corpus petition. The c ommissioner of corrections has broad statutory authority to
“prescribe reasonable conditions and rules for . . . discipline within or outside the
[correction] facility.” Minn. Stat. § 241.01, subd. 3a(b) (2016); see also Jones v. N.C.
Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc ., 433 U.S. 119, 125 -26, 97 S. Ct. 2532, 2537 -38 (1977)
(recognizing prison officials’ authority to exercise discretion with respect to the custody
and control of inmates). The commissioner may extend an inmate’s term of imprisonment
for violating disciplinary rules. Minn. Stat. § 243.52 (2016).
Here, prison officials imposed ten days of segregation for violating prison rules,
which appellant served prior to seeking to file his second habeas petition. Appellant has
not put forth evidence establishing that this sanction amounted to an illegal detention. See

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Breeding v. Swenson, 60 N.W.2d 4, 7 ( Minn. 1953) (placing burden of proving illegality
of detention on habeas petitioner ).3 Because appellant has not asserted a claim justi fying
relief under the habeas corpus statute, we hold that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by denying his IFP request.
III. Appellant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.
Appellant argues that he is entitled to an expedited evidentiary hearing. The district
court shall dismiss with prejudice an action commenced by an inmate who seeks to proceed
IFP, if the court determines that the action is frivolous or malicious. Minn. Stat. § 563.02,
subd. 3(a). The court may dismiss an action “before or after service of process, and with
or without holding a hearing.” Id., subd. 3(c). The district court determined that appellant’s
petition was frivolous, and we affirm that decision. Therefore, appellant is not entitled to
an expedited evidentiary hearing.
Affirmed.

3 We reached the same conclusion in appellant’s first habeas action, noting that appellant
did not seek immediate release from confinement and instead sought “reversal of the
prison’s disciplinary decision that resulted in the segregated confinem ent he has already
served” on similar grounds to those raised here. Munt, 2016 WL 7042010, at *2. We
determined that his request “exceed[ed] the relief available through habeas corpus” and
affirmed dismissal of the first habeas petition. Id. at *2-3.