In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: J. A. T. and R. N. V., Parents

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0744

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
J. A. T. and R. N. V., Parents

Filed October 15, 2018
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge

Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-JV-18-55

Frederick S. Suhler, Jr., Rochester, Minnesota (for appellant J.A.T.)

Sherri L. Whalen, Anderson Law Firm, Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent R.N.V.)

Debra A. Groehler, Sr. Assistant Olmsted County Attorney, Roche ster, Minnesota (for
respondent Olmsted County Community Services)

Michelle Frohrip, Rochester, Minnesota (guardian ad litem and attorney pro se)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Connolly , Judge; and
Johnson, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
Appellant-mother J.A.T. appeals from the district court’s orde r transferring physical
and legal custody of the child J.E.T. to respondent-father R.N. V., arguing that the district
court’s findings of fact fail to show either that the father is a suitable custodian or that
transferring custody to the father is in J.E.T.’s best interest. We affirm.

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FACTS
The facts of this case are substantially undisputed. Mother a nd father are the parents
of one child, J.E.T., born on July 25, 2015. Mother and father were not in an intimate
relationship or living together w hen J.E.T. was born. The pare nts initially shared joint
legal custody of their child; mo ther had sole physical custody and father had regular
parenting time. Olmsted County Community Services (OCCS) recei ved a report that the
child tested positive for tetrah ydrocannabinol ( THC) at the hos pital shortly after birth.
OCCS provided child-welfare serv ices to mother intermittently o ver the next two years
through its Parent Support and Outreach Program, focusing on co ncerns of possible
continuing drug use. Mother thereafter worked with OCCS on a voluntary basis and made
sufficient progress on her case plan that the case was closed in March 2016.
In May 2017, OCCS received a report that mother was under the influence of drugs
when she picked up J.E.T. from a visit with his father, and dro ve away without putting
J.E.T. in his car seat. The reporter claimed that mother was “ flipping out.” Another
reporter shared concerns that mother had been using methampheta m i n e a n d d i s p l a y e d
irrational and aggressive behav iors and paranoid ideation (beli eving her friends were
undercover agents). OCCS conducted a Family Assessment. Durin g the assessment
process, mother admitted to marijuana use; she denied methamphetamine use. According
to OCCS, urine samples provided by mother were diluted, and mot her avoided other
scheduled urine tests. OCCS observed mother as aggressive and irrational with family and
assigned social workers.

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OCCS filed a CHIPS petition and informed the family that it wo uld seek to place
J.E.T. in foster care because of concerns regarding mother’s alleged methamphetamine use
and her inability to follow the pr eviously developed safety pla n. Father was also not
thought to then be a placement option because of his own chemical-use problems. After a
hearing, the district court placed J.E.T. in emergency protective foster care. Father agreed
that he was then not able to care for J.E.T. because he did not have suitable housing, had
only been sober for three months, and wanted to continue to man age his sobriety before
assuming more parental responsib ility. J.E.T. was adjudicated in need of protection or
services with respect to father (per his admission) on July 25, 2017, and with respect to
mother on August 24, 2017, after a court trial.
J.E.T. was initially placed in fo ster care with his maternal g randparents. Both
parents were offered out-of-home-placement plans that included visits with J.E.T. and
services directed toward reunification. OCCS reported that mother’s compliance with drug
screens was inconsistent. Mother provided her first negative d rug screen in September
2017 and continued to provide neg ative screens until a November 4 d r u g s c r e e n w a s
positive for THC, which mother claimed was the result of using medical marijuana.
Mother provided no drug screens after November 15, and OCCS claims that mother began
demonstrating signs that she was using drugs again. OCCS repor ted that it requested a
drug screen at a meeting with mother on November 27. Mother st ated she could not
provide a sample until later in the day. OCCS told mother she had until 2:00 p.m. to
provide a sample or it would deem her failure to test as a positive test result. Mother never
returned to provide a sample. Mother also admitted to using methamphetamines as late as

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December 1, 2017 (despite her later trial testimony that she has been sober since she found
out that she was pregnant). OCCS reported that, when mother wa s asked to complete a
drug screen in January 2018, she gave a social worker toilet wa ter. At the time of the
transfer-of-custody trial, mother recounted that she had completed three inpatient and two
outpatient chemical-dependency-treatment programs. Most recently, mother completed an
inpatient treatment at Keystone in mid-February 2018. Mother completed a cosmetology
program during the pendency of the case and intends to take the state certification exam.
Mother had the opportunity to engage in superv ised visits with J.E.T. during the
course of the case until OCCS learned of several conflicts at t he maternal grandparents’
home. One conflict escalated to th e point where mother would n ot leave until after her
father called law enforcement. As a result, OCCS informed mother that her parents would
no longer be able to supervise visits. OCCS then arranged for mother to have supervised
visits at the Keystone Family Access Center an average of two days per week. These visits
eventually had to be suspended because mother did not follow the facility’s rules. Mother
was eventually allowed back to the Family Access Center, but in the four scheduled visits
after mother was discharged from treatment at Keystone, the fir s t t w o w e r e c a n c e l l e d ,
mother was late for a third but nevertheless allowed to visit (contrary to ordinary Keystone
Family Access Center policy), and the fourth visit was cancelled because mother was again
late. Mother also missed a meeting relating to J.E.T.’s educat ion plan, despite stating a
few days prior that she would attend the meeting.
Both OCCS and the Guardian ad Litem (GAL) have stressed concer ns with mother’s
irrational, agitated, and aggressive behaviors while using drug s, and claim that these

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behaviors have been unrelenting ot her than the short period of sobriety from about
September to November 2017.
In December 2017, OCCS decided to transition the full-time care of J.E.T. from the
foster parents to an extended visit with father. It obtained the district court’s approval for
this extended visit. The district court ordered OCCS to cease reunification efforts with
mother.
In January 2018, OCCS filed a petition to transfer permanent l egal and physical
custody of J.E.T. to father. The district court found that father complied with his case plan,
obtained part-time employment, a nd had appropriate housing for the child. The district
court found that reunification of J.E.T. with his mother was un likely because she had not
complied with her case plan, continued to use methamphetamine and marijuana throughout
the case, and tampered with drug screens as late as January 10, 2018, when she gave a
social worker toilet water instead of a urine sample. The district court found it in J.E.T.’s
best interests that sole physical and legal custody be transferred to father.
This appeal by mother followed.
D E C I S I O N
On appeal from a juven ile-protection order transferring legal c ustody, this court
applies a two-part standard of review. See In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D. , 865 N.W.2d
315, 321-22 (Minn. App. 2015), review denied (Minn. July 21, 2015). When reviewing an
order transferring legal custody, we determine “whether the tri al court’s findings address
the statutory criteria and are supported by substantial evidence, or whether they are clearly
erroneous.” In re Welfare of A.R.G.-B. , 551 N.W.2d 256, 261 (Minn. App. 1996)

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(quotation omitted). We review a district court’s decision reg arding whether to transfer
legal custody for an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of Children of A.I. , 779 N.W.2d
886, 895 (Minn. App. 2010), review dismissed (Minn. Apr. 20, 2010). “Consistent with
the level of proof generally re quired in child protection proce edings,” a permanent
placement determination must be supported by “clear and convincing evidence.” A.R.G.-B,
551 N.W.2d at 261.
I. The district court acted within its discretion in determinin g father was a
suitable legal and physical custodian.

Mother argues that the district court’s determination that fath er is a suitable legal
and physical custodian is not supp orted by adequately detailed findings. “[A]n order for
transfer of permanent legal and physical custody shall only be made after the court has
reviewed the suitability of the prospective legal and physical custodian.” Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.515, subd. 4(1) (2016). Mother asserts that the distric t court’s seven sentences of
findings relating to the suitab ility of father as the sole cust odian are “rather cursory” and
fail to take into account a numbe r of issues regarding father t hat reasonably call into
question his suitability as the permanent sole custodian of J.E.T.
The number or length of a district court’s findings is not dete rminative of whether
the district court made adequate findings. See In re Civil Commitment of Spicer , 853
N.W.2d 803, 810 (Minn. App. 2014) (noting that the district court’s order containing 317
paragraphs of findings of fact was insufficient where the findings were merely a recitation
of evidence presented at trial). The critical issue is whether the district court makes

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findings of fact on which it bases its decision, thereby facili tating effective appellate
review. Id. at 811.
Here, the district court found that the father “has demonstrated that he can meet all
of [J.E.T.’s] needs.” The district court made several specific findings relating to father’s
suitability as a custodian. It found that father complied with his case plan by completing
outpatient treatment, was attending parenting classes, had arra nged for and attended
medical and educational appointments, and had obtained appropri ate housing for J.E.T.
Mother does not assign error to any particular factual finding, but instead argues that these
findings do not discuss in sufficient detail why father’s histo ry of chemical use, unstable
housing and employment, and in ability to provide parental care without assistance from
family members were not matters of concern to the court. As noted, that the district court’s
findings do not detail each specific issue does not mean the co urt abused its discretion in
determining that father is a suitable custodian. Here, the GAL testified that she had no
concerns about father’s chemical use, found his housing to be suitable, and was confident
in his ability to care for J.E.T. Likewise, an OCCS social worker testified to like effect and
was not presently concerned with father’s history of chemical use and resulting difficulties.
After he completed outpatient treatment, father was involved in multiple support groups
and was attending NA meetings. The district court considered and credited this evidence.
Mother also claims that she was subject to a great deal of scru tiny concerning
whether she was remaining abstinent from using controlled substances and that, during the
same period, father was subjected to only one urine test. Any heightened scrutiny of
mother by OCCS bears no relation to the issue of whether the di strict court reviewed the

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suitability of father as the sole custodian as required under M inn. Stat. § 260C.515,
subd. 4(1). It is readily appare nt from the order that the dis trict court reviewed father’s
suitability as a sole legal and physical custodian, its finding s were adequate, and it acted
within its discretion in determining that father was a suitable custodian.
II. The district court acted within its discretion in transferr ing legal and physical
custody of J.E.T. to father.

After a CHIPS adjudication, a district court “may order permane nt legal and
physical custody to a fit and willing relative in the best interests of the child.” Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.515, subd. 4 (2016). An order permanently transferring legal and physical custody
of a child must address (1) how t he child’s best interests are served by the order; (2) the
nature and extent of the responsible social services agency’s reasonable efforts to reunify
the child with the parent; (3) t he parent’s efforts and ability to use services to correct the
conditions which led to the out-of-home placement; and (4) that the conditions leading to
the out-of-home placement have not been corrected to permit the child to safely return
home. Minn. Stat. § 260C.517(a)(1)-(4) (2016). Mother challenges only the first of these
four requirements. She argues that the court did not adequately address how J.E.T.’s best
interests are served by the custody-transfer order.
To be adequate, a district court’s best-interests findings must facilitate effective
appellate review, provide insight into which facts or opinions were most persuasive for the
court’s ultimate decision, and demonstrate the court’s comprehensive consideration of the
statutory criteria. In re Tanghe , 672 N.W.2d 623, 626 (Minn. App. 2003). The district
court must make written findings that properly reflect its cons ideration of the relevant

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statutory factors. See Rosenfeld v. Rosenfeld , 249 N.W.2d 168, 171 (Minn. 1976). The
best interests of the child requires all relevant factors to be considered. Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.511(a) (2016). In the case of a permanency disposition, “the court must be
governed by the best interests of the child, including a review of the relationship between
the child and relatives and the child and other important perso ns with whom the child has
resided or had significant contact.” Id. (b) (2016).
Here, the district court reviewed the relationships between J.E .T. and relatives, as
well as other persons important t o J.E.T. The district court f ound that it was in J.E.T.’s
best interests to maintain rela tionships with family members an d that father has
demonstrated an ability to ensu re regular contact between J.E.T . and all of his family
members. The district court also found that reunification with mother was unlikely because
she did not comply with her out-of-home-placement plan and continued to use drugs with
only limited periods of sobriety.
Mother argues that the findings are legally insufficient because the district court did
not address each of the best-interests criteria set forth in Mi nn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 2
(2016), which was meant to ensure that each child’s best interests are met by requiring an
“individualized determination of the needs of the child and of how the selected placement
will serve the needs of the child being placed.” The statute provides:
(b) Among the factors the agency shall consider . . .
are the following:
(1) the child’s current functioning and behaviors;
(2) the medical needs of the child;
(3) the educational needs of the child;
(4) the developmental needs of the child;
(5) the child’s history and past experience;

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(6) the child’s religious and cultural needs;
(7) the child’s connection with a community, school,
and faith community;
(8) the child’s interests and talents;
(9) the child’s relationship to current caretakers,
parents, siblings, and relatives;
(10) the reasonable preference of the child, if the court
. . . deems the child to be of sufficient age to express
preferences.

Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 2(b). “[T]he court shall review and enter findings regarding
whether the responsible social se rvices agency made . . . an in dividualized determination
as required under section 260C.212, subdivision 2, to select a home that meets the needs
of the child.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.193, subd. 3(b)(2) (2016).
Here, the district court expressly stated that transfer of permanent legal and physical
custody of J.E.T. to father was in J.E.T.’s best interests under Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd.
2(b), reasoning that J.E.T. has an Individual Education Plan for emotional and behavioral
concerns, receives early childhood services through Rochester P ublic Schools, needs a
parent who can meet his basic educational and medical needs, an d that father has
demonstrated he can meet those needs. It concluded that father has a positive relationship
with mother’s parents and has de monstrated the ability to ensur e that J.E.T. has regular
contact with all of his family members.
The district court’s findings are sufficient to reflect that the district court considered
the relevant statutory factors. See In re Welfare of Child of W.L.P., 678 N.W.2d 703, 711
(Minn. App. 2004) (noting that the district court’s findings need not “go into great detail”).
Moreover, the record amply supports the district court’s determination that it is in J.E.T.’s
best interests to transfer custody to father. The GAL and OCCS believe it is in J.E.T.’s

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best interests that sole physical and legal custody be entrusted to father. They believe that
it is not in J.E.T.’s best interests that father share custody with mother. The district court
also determined that mother beco mes aggressive when using metha mphetamine and has
demonstrated little to no insight i nto how her chemical depende ncy affects J.E.T. The
record supports these findings. The district court made suffic ient findings to enable
appellate review and acted within its discretion in determining that transfer of permanent
legal and physical custody to father is in J.E.T.’s best interest.
Affirmed.