In re the Marriage of: Catherine Elizabeth Welch, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0764

In re the Marriage of:
Catherine Elizabeth Welch, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

William Warrick Welch, III,
Respondent.

Filed April 1, 2019
Reversed and remanded
Jesson, Judge
Concurring in part, dissenting in part, Ross, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19AV-FA-12-955

R. Glenn Nord, R. Glenn Nord, P.A., Lakeville, Minnesota (for appellant)

William Warrick Welch, III, Prior Lake, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge ; and Klaphake,
Judge.
1

1 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by ap pointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

2
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
This case centers on the inability of appellant mother Catheri ne Welch and
respondent father William Welch to agree on the appropriate sch ool district for their
children. The parties’ stipulated judgment and decree included a parenting plan which
provided that a change in school district required the “mutual consent of both parents.”
But the judgment and decree also included a provision requiring the use of a parenting
consultant to resolve disputes. When father withheld his conse nt to a school change,
mother sought to utilize the parenting consultant. And after father refused, mother sought
to have him held in contempt of court. The district court, which deemed the mutual consent
requirement binding on the parties and the court, denied mother ’s motion and granted
father’s motion for attorney fee s. Because we conclude that th e judgment and decree
requires the parties to use their agreed-upon dispute resolutio n method to resolve their
disagreement before going to court, and because district courts retain oversight of
custody-related matters, we reverse and remand.
FACTS
Appellant mother Catherine Welc h and respondent father William Welch married
i n J u l y 2 0 0 0 . D u r i n g t h e i r m a r r i a g e t h e y h a d t w o c h i l d r e n , a son in July 2003 and a
d a u g h t e r i n J u n e 2 0 0 6 . T h e W e l c h e s s e p a r a t e d i n M a r c h o f 2 0 1 2 and dissolved their
marriage by a stipulated judgment and decree one year later.
The judgment and decree established that the parties would have joint legal custody,
with mother’s home as the children’s primary residence. Rather than a designation of

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physical custody, the parties agreed upon a parenting plan whic h addressed
decision-making about the children’s education, medical care, e xtra-curricular activities,
and well-being, and included a detailed parenting time schedule . One provision of the
parenting plan regarding educati on stated that “a change to the minor children’s school
district will not be made without the mutual consent of both parents.”2 Also incorporated
into the parenting plan was a dispute resolution provision which stated:
DISPUTE RESOLUTION-PARENTING CONSULTANT
We agree to work toward respectful resolution of any disputes
regarding our parenting plan. We agree to use a Parenting
Consultant to help us resolve any disputes prior to going to
[c]ourt.

The parenting plan was incorporated into the judgment and decr ee which also
provided for the appointment of a parenting consultant, with detailed terms and conditions.
Those relevant here include the following:
 The parenting consultant “shall have the authority to decide
any and all issues involving said children should the parties
be unable to mutually agree” except that the consultant
“may not determine modification of legal and/or physical
custody.” Issues the parenting consultant may decide
include, but are not limited to, temporary modification of
the parenting time schedules, extracurricular activities, and
holiday and vacation schedules.

2 We note that the parties’ parenting plan addressed not only their decision-making abilities
regarding the matters of the child ren’s education but also thei r medical care. And the
parties included these matters in their parenting plan despite the fact that the parties had
also stipulated to “joint legal custody.” Joint legal custody “means that both parents have
equal rights and responsibilities, including the right to parti cipate in major decisions
determining the child’s . . . education [and] health care.” Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3(b)
(2018) (emphasis added). Additio nally, the parties entered the ir parenting plan in lieu of
an award of physical rather than legal custody.

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 “Any decision by the [parenting consultant] shall be based
on the best interests of the children.”

 The parties agreed to “cooperate and operate in good faith
to resolve the issues in dispute with the assistance of the
[parenting consultant].”

 The parenting consultant’s decisions “shall be the law of
the case unless or until either party appeals the decision”
and the decision is reviewed by the district court according
to the judgment and decree.

Until October 2017, the parties were able to mutually resolve d isputes related to
their marriage dissolution and parenting of their children, wit hout the need for court
intervention and only requiring a ssistance from the parenting c onsultant once. But in
August 2017 mother purchased a home in Orono. In October 2017, mother wrote a letter
to father informing him of her i ntention to move, which would e ntail a change to the
children’s school district fro m Lakeville to Mound Westonka. 3 F a t h e r r e j e c t e d t h i s
proposed change in school distr ict. While at first he suggeste d that the parties meet with
the parenting consultant to resolve the issue, he then refused to use the consultant to help
resolve the school district dispute.
In January 2018, mother filed a motion in district court to hol d father in contempt
for refusing to submit their dispute to the parenting consultan t, and, in the alternative, to
have the district court determin e which school district the chi ldren would attend. Father
opposed the motion arguing that the parenting plan gave him an unreviewable right not to
consent to a school district change. He further sought attorne y fees. In March 2018, the

3 Until their separation, the Welches and their children resided in Lakeville, and the
children remained in Lakeville schools following the marriage dissolution.

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district court issued an order denying mother’s motions, reasoning that the provision in the
parenting plan regarding school d istricts was binding on the pa rties and “shall not be
invalidated by the [c]ourt.” As a result, the district court c oncluded father was not in
contempt for failing to agree to take the issue to the parentin g consultant and denied
mother’s motion to change the children’s school district. Addi tionally, the district court
denied mother’s motion for atto rney fees but granted father’s m otion for conduct-based
attorney fees, ultimately awarding him $4,628.50.4
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
The central issue before us is whether the parties’ agreement i n a parenting plan—
to only change the children’s school district upon mutual consent—insulates that decision
from the parties’ agreed-upon di spute-resolution process and, u ltimately, district court
scrutiny. We conclude it does not. We reach this decision fir st by interpreting the
stipulated judgment and decree as a whole. But this document is not simply a contract. It
is a judgment and decree from the district court which addresse s custody-related issues.
As a result, we further examine the judgment and decree in light of the statutory framework
involving parenting plans and the district court’s mandate to c onsider the children’s best
interests in custody-related dis putes. We review both the cont ract and statutory
interpretation issues de novo, with no deference to the district court’s analysis. Lee v. Lee,

4 After the district court granted father’s motion for conduct-b ased attorney fees, father
submitted an affidavit seeking $9,257 in fees and costs. Mother filed a letter objecting to
that amount, and the district c ourt found that father’s request ed amount was excessive.
Accordingly, the district court awarded father $4,628.50, half of the amount he requested.

6
775 N.W.2d 631, 637 (Minn. 2009); Travertine Corp. v. Lexington-Silverwood , 683
N.W.2d 267, 271 (Minn. 2004); Alpha Real Estate Co. of Rochester v. Delta Dental Plan
of Minn., 671 N.W.2d 213, 221 (Minn. App. 2003), review denied (Minn. Jan. 20, 2004).
We first address the question as a matter of contract interpre tation. This court
applies the rules of contract construction to a stipulated dissolution judgment. Blonigen v.
Blonigen, 621 N.W.2d 276, 281 (Minn. App. 2001), review denied (Minn. Mar. 13, 2001).
One such rule is that a contract should be read as a whole so i ts provisions may be
harmonized and interpreted “in such a way as to give meaning to all of its provisions.”
Brookfield Trade Ctr., Inc. v. Cnty. of Ramsey , 584 N.W.2d 390, 394 (Minn. 1998);
Chergosky v. Crosstown Bell, Inc., 463 N.W.2d 522, 525 (Minn. 1990). With this in mind,
we turn to the provisions of the judgment and decree in question.
Three provisions address the dispute-resolution process which we conclude the
Welches are required to attempt. The first, contained within t he judgment and decree,
states that a parenting consulta nt will serve as the parties’ a lternative dispute resolution
method, with “the authority to decide any and all issues involving [the] children should the
parties be unable to mutually a gree.” While the parenting cons ultant’s decision is only
binding on issues of a temporary nature, its role as a mediator is far broader, as a second
provision of the judgment and decree makes clear. That provision plainly states that “[t]he
parties have agreed to use a [p]arenting [c]onsultant to resolve disputes regarding parenting
time issues.” Third, the parentin g plan—which is incorporated i n t o t h e j u d g m e n t a n d
decree—also states that the Welch es “agree to use a [p]arenting [c]onsultant to help us
resolve any disputes prior to going to [c] ourt.” Read as a whole, we disc ern that the

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Welches are required to use the p arenting consultant to help re solve disputes. This is a
dispute.
Here, the district court based its interpretation of the Welches’ judgment and decree
entirely on a single provision within the parenting plan, which states that “a change to the
minor children’s school district will not be made without the m utual consent of both
parents.” But we do not read a single provision of a stipulate d decree in isolation. See
Quade v. Secura Ins., 814 N.W.2d 703, 705 (Minn. 2012) (noting that terms of a cont ract
are reviewed within the context of the entire contract). Rather, like a contract, we seek to
harmonize each portion and reconcile any conflicting provisions such that each and every
provision can be given effect. Oster v. Medtronic, Inc., 428 N.W.2d 116, 119 (Minn. App.
1988). To read the single provision regarding the children’s s chool district in isolation
would render the Welches’ multip le dispute-resolution provision s meaningless when
addressing school choice. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred by failing
to interpret the judgment and decree in a manner which gave cre dence to every section,
including the dispute resolution provisions.
Our reading of the judgment and decree is further bolstered by the provisions of the
statutory framework governing pare nting plans and custody-relat ed disputes.
5 Two a r e
critical here. First, parenting plans are statutorily required to include dispute-resolution

5 The choice of which schools children attend is a custody-related issue. Novak v. Novak,
446 N.W.2d 422, 424 (Minn. App. 1989), review denied (Minn. Dec. 1, 1989). Here, we
note that father argued to the district court that a change of school district would modify
the amount of parenting time he has with the children and that mother “is effectively
requesting a custody modification.”

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provisions. Minn. Stat. § 518.1705, subd. 2(a)(3) (2018). This requirement is not a mere
technicality. As we noted in Rutz v. Rutz, “the inclusion of a dispute-resolution mechanism
is central to the purpose and function of parenting plans that are designed to provide
comprehensive methods of resolving custody, visitation and acce ss issues.” 644 N.W.2d
489, 492 (Minn. App. 2002), review denied (Minn. July 16, 2002). The mandate of this
statutory requirement is clear: dispute resolution mechanisms s hould be used to resolve
disputes.6
Second, our statutory framework provides for court oversight o f custody-related
matters, which was unrecognized in the district court’s order. The district court cited to
the statutory provision stating that a parenting plan may be mo dified by agreement of the
parties as support for its conclusion that the school district provisi on was binding on the
parties and the court, but neglected to reference Minnesota Sta tutes section 518.175,
subdivision 5(b) (2018), which provides for potential court modification of provisions of a
parenting plan, based upon the best interests of the child. This grant of authority to courts
to modify parenting time plans is bolstered by a separate porti on of Minnesota law which
provides that generally “no mo tion to modify a custody order or parenting plan may be
made earlier than one year” afte r adoption. Minn. Stat. § 518. 18(a) (2018) (emphasis

6 We note that requiring the parties to use the parenting consul tant to attempt to resolve
their dispute does not bestow final decision-making authority on the parenting consultant.
As explained above, the consultant’s decision-making authority in custody-related matters
is limited and subject to review by the district court. But th e parenting consultant’s
authority as a mediator—or in a similar role—is far broader. See Minn. R. Gen.
Prac. 114.02(a)(4), (5), (6), (7 ) (noting that alternative disp ute resolution components
include early neutral evaluation, a non-binding advisory opinion, neutral fact-finding, and
mediation).

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added). This potential for court intervention further counters father’s contention, adopted
by the district court, that a provision of the stipulated parenting plan is insulated from both
the dispute resolution process and court oversight.7
In summary, while a court gives “considerable weight” to intel ligently entered
stipulations, “in determining questions of custody the paramount issue remains the welfare
and best interests of the children.” Petersen v. Petersen , 206 N.W.2d 658, 659 (Minn.
1973). As father acknowledges, the choice of school district i s a custody-related matter.
And in custody-related issues, “[t]he court must in every case exercise an independent
judgment and is not bound by the stipulation.” Id. As a result, based on the judgment and
decree read as a whole, and in context of Minnesota statutes go verning custody-related
matters, we determine that the district court erred in interpre ting the judgment and decree
in a manner that rendered meaningless the alternative-dispute-r esolution provision and
court oversight. Because we conclude that the district court e rred in its interpretation of
the judgment and decree, we reverse the award of conduct-based attorney fees which was
predicated upon that determination. We remand to the district court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.

7 We also note that the judgment and decree itself provides for potential court involvement
when it provides for review of the parenting consultant’s recommendations and decisions.

C/D-1
ROSS, Judge (concurring in part, dissenting in part)
I respectfully dissent in part. I agree with that portion of the majority’s opinion that
reverses the district court’s failure to address mother’s motion as it concerns the merits of
her effort to change the children’s school district. The record shows that her contempt-of-
court motion included an alternative request for the district court to address her change-of-
school plans on the merits and th at the parties each offered ev idence for a best-interests
determination. Particularly discussing whether a best-interests analysis applied to a
parental dispute over a child’s education, we explained that “[t]he law makes no distinction
between general determinations o f custody and resolution of spe cific issues of custodial
care.” Novak v. Novak , 446 N.W.2d 422, 424 (Minn. App. 1989), review denied (Minn.
Dec. 1, 1989). And neither the district court nor father cited any authority for the
proposition that stipulating parents can divest the district court of authority to make a best-
interests determination to resolve this sort of custody-related dispute.
But I do not agree with the majority’s interpretation of the st ipulated decree as it
regards the authority of the parenting-time consultant. Nor do I agree with its conclusion
that the custody statute implici tly prevents parties from exclu ding a consultant from
deciding their disputes.
The parties expended considerable effort and were aided by coun sel when they
agreed upon their children’s school district, prohibited either parent from unilaterally
moving the children to a different school district, withheld fr om the dispute-resolution
parenting consultant any authority to decide the children’s school district, and received the
district court’s endorsement of that approach as a component of the judgment and decree.

C/D-2
Today the majority renders that part of the judgment and decree void based on what I
believe are two errors.
The majority’s first error is its failure to apply the correct contract-interpretation
tool. The parties’ agreement included the following distinct provisions:
We agree that neither parent will move the children out of the Twin
Cities Metropolitan Area without the consent of the other paren t or
further order of the Court. Further, we agree that a change to the minor
children’s school district will not be made without the mutual consent
of both parents.

By including the language about the court’s involvement in disputes about moves from the
area and excluding that language as to disputes about changes t o the school district, the
parties evidenced their intent to reserve at least one issue to themselves without including
either a parenting consultant or the court. Although I have ass umed that the majority
correctly holds that the parties could not by stipulation remove the court’s authority, I do
not reach the same conclusion about the consultant’s authority.
The majority invalidates the parties’ implicit withholding of a parenting consultant’s
authority, as that withholding can be derived from the following stipulated provision of the
judgment and decree: “[A] change to the minor children’s school district will not be made
without the mutual consent of bot h parents.” The majority does so on the contract-
interpretation principle of harmonization of all provisions wit hin an agreement and on its
suggestion that “the dispute-reso lution provisions” in the agre ement here prevent the
district court from effectuating the school-district provision. I believe that, to the contrary,
the only way to read both the school-district provision and the dispute-resolution provisions
together is by enforcing both, not by ignoring one.

C/D-3
Numerous Minnesota cases teach that, when interpreting an agreement, “the definite
prevails over the indefinite.” Egner v. States Realty Co., 26 N.W.2d 464, 470 (Minn. 1947).
It is now settled as “a general principle of contract interpretation that a specific provision
dealing with a particular subject will control over a different provision dealing only
generally with that same subject.” Dunn v. Nat’l Beverage Corp ., 729 N.W.2d 637, 646
(Minn. App. 2007) (quotation omitted), aff’d, 745 N.W.2d 549 (Minn. 2008). The parties
chose broadly and generally to give the dispute-resolution parenting consultant “authority
to decide any and all issues involving [their] children,” but they also expressly and plainly
carved from that authority a specific category—the decision ove r the children’s school
district—about which the decision had already been made by the parents cooperating
together and that could be changed only by the parents. By refe rencing the agreement’s
general dispute-resolution provi sions to disregard the specific exception to those
provisions, the majority is not f ollowing the specific-over-general interpretive method of
construing supposed (but not actual) conflicting contract language. I disagree that applying
the exception “would render the Welches’ multiple dispute-resol ution provisions
meaningless.” Rather, applying the exception allows for the application of all the dispute-
resolution provisions in every situation except the one the parties chose to treat differently.
The majority’s second error is its application of a statute. The majority reasons that
the parties’ agreement (and the district court’s decree) requiring the consent of both parents
before moving the children to a different school district is un enforceable based on the
statutory requirement to include dispute-resolution provisions in a parenting plan, citing
Minnesota Statutes section 518.1 705, subdivision 2(a)(3) (2018) . I see nothing in that

C/D-4
statute mandating that a parenting plan must involve a parenting consultant to resolve any
particular dispute. The majority cites a part of the statute au thorizing courts to modify
parenting plans, subdivision 5(b) (2018), but neither party her e sought to modify the
parenting plan. The majority also refers to the statutory “pote ntial for court intervention”
in disputes about a parenting plan and seems to suggest that th is “potential” judicial
involvement assumes that the par ties were prohibited from exclu ding the parenting
consultant from a dispute about school districts. While the sta tute assumes judicial
involvement in the dispute, it does not assume a consultant’s. I do not see how it supports
the majority’s holding to essentially invalidate a component of the parties’ agreement.
The parties had the foresight to decide on a school district be fore their dissolution,
to prohibit either parent from unilaterally undermining that decision, and to except disputes
over school districts from those disputes otherwise within the authority of a consultant. The
district court then validated that foresight by incorporating it into the judgment and decree
and by later enforcing it in the present litigation after one of the parties violated it. I do not
believe the district court errantly interpreted the decree’s language or abused its discretion
by applying it.
I would affirm the district court’s decision not to hold father in contempt for not
involving a parenting consultant as well as its decision to den y mother’s motion for
attorney fees. I would remand with instructions to consider the merits of the school-district
dispute and to reconsider father’s motion for conduct-based fees.