State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0766

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Omar Kwabena Walford,
Appellant.

Filed May 13, 2019
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-16-14016

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Fre eman, Hennepin County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Michael McLaughlin, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JOHNSON, Judge
In 2015, Omar Kwabena Walford rented a 2014 Mitsubishi Lancer from the Hertz
car rental company and never returned it. In 2016, he pleaded guilty to theft of leased or

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rented personal property. On appeal, he argues that his guilty plea is invalid on the ground
that there is an inadequate factual basis. We conclude that Walford’s guilty plea has an
adequate factual basis and, therefore, affirm.
FACTS
In May 2016, the state charged Walford with theft of leased or rented personal
property, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd. 2(a)(9)(iii) (2014). The complaint
alleged as follows: On October 15, 2015, Walford rented a car for one day from the Hertz
retail location at the Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport. Walford did not return the
car the next day and did not extend the term of the rental. Hertz employees tried to contact
Walford a t the telephone numbers and e -mail address he had provided, but they were
unsuccessful. In November 2015, Hertz sent Walford a letter by certified mail in which it
demanded that he return the car. Walford signed a receipt for the certified letter but did
not return the car or contact Hertz. In December 2015, law-enforcement officers recovered
the car at the address Walford had provided to Hertz. By that time, Walford had accrued
$3,739 in rental charges.
In November 2016, Walford and the state entered into a plea agreement. Walford
agreed to plead guilty , and the state agreed to request a sentence of 19 months of
imprisonment with execution stayed and three years of probation, and the state also agreed
to dismiss another theft charge. A t the plea hearing, Walford pleaded guilty pursuant to
the agreement after acknowledging that he had had an opportunity to consult with his
attorney and did not have any questions.

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In January 2018, before sentencing, Walford mo ved to withdraw his guilty plea.
The district court denied the motion in February 2018 in an eight -page order . At
sentencing, the district court imposed a sentence consistent with th e terms of the plea
agreement. But a t Walford’s request, the district court executed the sentence and
committed him to the commissioner of corrections. Walford appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Walford argues that his guilty plea is invalid. He does not challenge the district
court’s denial of his motion to withdraw the plea. Rather, he contends that the
circumstances surrounding his guilty plea do not satisfy the requirements of a
constitutionally valid plea. A criminal offender may challenge the validity of a guilty plea
on direct appeal without regard for any prior motion to withdraw the plea. State v. Iverson,
664 N.W.2d 346, 350 (Minn. 2003); Brown v. State, 449 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Minn. 1989).
“To be constitutionally valid, a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and
intelligent.” State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). If a guilty plea does not
meet all three of these requirements, it is invalid. State v. Theis , 742 N.W.2d 643, 650
(Minn. 2007). “A defendant bears the burden of showing his plea was invalid.” Raleigh,
778 N.W.2d at 94. In determining whether a guilty plea is invalid, this cou rt applies a de
novo standard of review. State v. Mikulak, 903 N.W.2d 600, 603 (Minn. 2017).
In this case, Walford argues that his guilty plea is invalid on the ground that the
accuracy requirement is not satisfied . “The main purpose of the accuracy requ irement is
to protect a defendant from pleading guilty to a more serious offense than he could be
convicted of were he to insist on his right to trial.” State v. Trott , 338 N.W.2d 248, 251

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(Minn. 1983). To satisfy the accuracy requirement, a guilty plea must “be established on
a proper factual basis.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. A proper factual basis exists if there
are “‘sufficient facts on the record to support a conclusion that defendant ’s conduct falls
within the charge to which he desires to plead guilty.’” Iverson, 664 N.W.2d at 349
(quoting Kelsey v. State , 214 N.W.2d 236, 237 ( Minn. 1974)). Stated somewhat
differently, a proper factual basis exists if “ ‘the record contains a showing that there is
credible evidence available which would support a jury verdict that defendant is guilty of
at least as great a crime as that to which he pled guilty.’” Nelson v. State, 880 N.W.2d 852,
859 (Minn. 2016) (quoting State v. Genereux, 272 N.W.2d 33, 34 (Minn. 1978)). A proper
factual basis exists if a defe ndant admits the necessary facts at the plea hearing or if the
necessary facts may be inferred from the admitted facts. See id. at 859-61. “The factual
basis of a plea is inadequate when the defendant makes statements that negate an essential
element of the charge d crime because such statements are inconsistent with a plea of
guilty.” Iverson, 664 N.W.2d at 350.
To determine whether Walford’s guilty plea is supported by a proper factual basis ,
we must identify the essential elements of the offense of conviction. A person is guilty of
theft of leased or rented personal property if he: (1) leases or rents the property “under a
written instrument”; (2) “does not return the property to the lessor at the end of the lease
or rental term, plus agreed -upon exte nsions”; and (3) acts “with intent to wrongfully
deprive the lessor of possession of the property.” Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd. 2(a)(9)(iii);
see also 10 Minn . Dist. Judges Ass’n, Minnesota Practice —Jury Instruction Guides —
Criminal § 16.16, at 774-75 (6th ed. 2015).

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Walford first contends that there is an inadequate factual basis for his plea on the
ground that the record does not establish the first element, that he rented the car from Hertz
“under a written instrument.” See Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd. 2(a)(9)(iii). In response, the
state acknowledges that the factual record does not include a copy of a written rental
agreement or any reference to a written rental agreement. But the state contends that the
factual basis is nonetheless proper because Walford admitted that he entered into a n
agreement with Hertz and because it is common knowledge that large, nationwide car-
rental companies such as Hertz routinely rent vehicles to members of the public pursuant
to written agreements and would not do so pursuant to an oral agreement.
The factual basis of a guilty plea may be not only the facts that are admitted by a
defendant or otherwise present in the record but also the inferences that may be drawn from
those facts. As the supreme court has explained, “‘It is well established that before a plea
of guilty can be accepted, the trial judge must make certain that facts exist from which the
defendant’s guilt of the crime charged can be reasonably inferred.’” Nelson, 880 N.W.2d
at 861 (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Neumann, 262 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1978)).
Walford admitted at the plea hearing that he rented a car from Hertz and that there was a
“contract.” The primary lay definition of the word “contract” is “[a]n agreement between
two or more parties, especially one that is written and enforceable by law” or “[t]he writing
or document containing such an agreement.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the
English Language 409 (3d ed. 1996). Accordingly, it is reasonable to interpret Walford’s
admission to mean that he rented the car pursuant to a written contract. Walford does not

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contend that a written contract is not a “ written instrument.” Thus, t he factual record
supports the inference that Walford rented the car “under a written instrument.”
Walford also contends that there is an inadequate factual basis for his plea on the
ground that the record does not establish the third element, that he “inten[ded] to
wrongfully deprive [Hertz] of possession of the property.” See Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd.
2(a)(9)(iii). At the plea hearing, Walford admitted that he rented a car from Hertz and that
he never returned it. Walford’s attorney asked him whether he “didn’t have permission to
take it beyond the contract ” but “did so anyway.” Walford answered, “Correct.” “Intent
is generally proved by inferences drawn from a person’s words or actions in light of all the
surrounding circumstances.” Nelson, 880 N.W.2d at 860 (quotation omitted). In this case,
Walford’s words and actions demonstrate that he knew that he was required to return the
rental car but did not do so. Thus, the factual record supports the inference that Walford
intended to deprive Hertz of possession of the car.
Walford further contends that the factual basis of his plea is inadequate on the
ground that it consists mostly of his responses to his attorney’s leading questions . The
supreme court has “repeatedly discouraged the use of leading questions to establish a
factual basis.” Id. The supreme court has encouraged district courts to establish a factual
basis for a guilty plea “by asking the defendant to express in his own words what
happened.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. But the supreme court has “never held that the
use of leading questions automatically inva lidates a guilty plea.” Nelson, 880 N.W.2d
at 860. In this case, the use of leading questions did not interfere with the making of a
record that is an adequate basis for Walford’s guilty plea.

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In sum, Walford’s guilty plea is not invalid.
Affirmed.