State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0773

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jamie Fuhol Rawson,
Appellant.

Filed June 3, 2019
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Isanti County District Court
File No. 30-CR-17-173

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Jeffrey R. Edblad, Isanti County Attorney, Cambridge, Minnesota; and

Scott A. Hersey, Special Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jenna Yauch-Erickson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Ha lbrooks, Judge;
and Klaphake, Judge.


 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by app ointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Following a jury trial, appellant Jamie Rawson was convicted o f third-degree
criminal sexual conduct against his former girlfriend, J.R. In this direct appeal, Rawson
argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitti ng, as relationship evidence,
J.R.’s testimony that Rawson had been charged with, convicted o f, and sentenced for a
prior assault against J.R. He also argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
We conclude that, even if errone ous, the admission of the chall enged evidence was
harmless and that Rawson has not established ineffective assist ance of counsel. We
therefore affirm.
FACTS
Rawson and J.R. were romantically involved and living together in late 2016. After
an argument during which J.R. ended the relationship, Rawson left the house. He returned
three days later, asking to talk. During the conversation, J.R. realized that Rawson was
intoxicated, and she permitted him to sleep on her couch because she “didn’t want him to
get into trouble.” During the night, Rawson entered J.R.’s room and, over her verbal and
physical resistance, sexually penetrated her. J.R. reported the sexual assault, and Rawson
was charged with third- and fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct.
Before trial, the state moved the district court to admit evide nce related to a 2013
incident in which Rawson threatened J.R. with a gun and was convicted of second-degree
assault. First, the state asked the court to admit evidence of the conviction to impeach
R a w s o n i f h e c h o s e t o t e s t i f y . S e c o n d , t h e s t a t e a s k e d t h e c o u rt to admit testimony

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regarding the prior incident, including “evidence of . . . prior complaints and convictions,”
as evidence of domestic conduct under Minn. Stat. § 634.20 (2018). Rawson opposed both
motions. Following a hearing, the district court ruled that the prior conviction would be
admissible for impeachment as an unspecified felony if Rawson chose to testify. The court
also ruled that it would “permit testimony by the complaining w itness as it relates to that
prior incident. And the—and again, reference to—in general to t he felony conviction
arising out of . . . that inciden t pursuant to Minnesota Statut e 634.20.” The district court
required a cautionary instruction before the state introduced a ny evidence related to the
prior incident.
The trial began with testimony fro m J.R. describing the sexual assault. Then, after
the district court instructed the jury that Rawson was not to be convicted based on anything
other than the charged conduct, J.R. testified that she was unsure if she could have resisted
more than she did, in part because she was afraid of Rawson. Sh e explained the basis of
her fear: the 2013 incident in which Rawson loaded a shotgun and followed her around her
house threatening to kill her. J.R. then testified, in response to a question about when the
incident occurred, that Rawson “was charged with that crime[,] [c]onvicted of second
degree assault and went to prison for that.” Rawson did not testify.
The jury found Rawson guilty on both counts of criminal sexual conduct. Rawson
was convicted of third-degree cr iminal sexual conduct and sente nced to 90 months’
imprisonment.
This appeal follows.

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D E C I S I O N
I. The district court did not co mmit reversible error in admitt ing the domestic-
conduct evidence.

“Evidence of domestic conduct by the accused against the victim of domestic
conduct . . . is admissible unless the probative value is subst antially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice . . . or by considerations of . . . needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.” Minn. Stat. § 634.20.1 Rawson does not challenge the admission of
J.R.’s testimony about the underlying prior act of domestic con duct—that is, Rawson’s
following J.R. with a gun and threatening to kill her. Rather, he argues that the district court
committed reversible error by allowing J.R. to testify that he was charged with, convicted
of, and sentenced for second-degree assault as a result.
We begin with the standard of review. We review a district cour t’s ruling on the
admission of relationship evidence under section 634.20 for an abuse of discretion. State
v. Andersen, 900 N.W.2d 438, 441 (Minn. App. 2017). A defendant must show that the
wrongly admitted evidence was not harmless—that is, that it sig nificantly affected the
verdict—before a reviewi ng court will reverse. State v. Benton , 858 N.W.2d 535, 541
(Minn. 2015). But, if the party raising the issue on appeal fai led to preserve an objection
by making it to the district court, we review the admission of evidence for plain error. State
v. Word, 755 N.W.2d 776, 781 (Minn. App. 2008). To reverse under a plain-error standard,

1 While it is the courts that are charged with determining the admissibility of evidence, and
not the legislature, the Minnesota Supreme Court has adopted se ction 634.20 as a matter
of comity, thus avoiding any possible separation-of-powers concerns with this statute. State
v. Fraga, 864 N.W.2d 615, 627 (Minn. 2015).

5
we must determine not only that the district court made (1) an error, (2) that was plain, and
(3) that affected the defendant’s substantial rights, but also that the error “seriously affects
the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proce edings.” Id. at 781-82. “[T]he
third prong of the plain error test is the equivalent of a harm less error analysis.” State v.
Matthews, 800 N.W.2d 629, 634 (Minn. 2011).
An objection is not preserved if a district court does not definitively rule on a motion
in limine, even if the motion raises the issue that is the subject of appeal. Word, 755 N.W.2d
at 783. While the district court definitively ruled that Rawson’s conviction was admissible
in its decision on the motions i n limine (a ruling that implici tly includes the fact that
Rawson was charged since conviction is impossible without a cha rge), it did not
definitively rule on the admissibility of evidence that Rawson was sentenced for his crime.
Thus, the district court’s admi ssion of evidence of Rawson’s ch arge and conviction is
subject to review for an abuse of discretion and harmless error , but admission of the fact
that he was sentenced is subject to plain-error review. However , for ease of analysis and
because of overlap in the two sta ndards, we address Rawson’s ch arge, conviction, and
sentence together.
A. Admission of the evidence
Rawson makes two arguments why t he district court abused its di scretion in
admitting evidence, which we address in turn.
Rawson first argues that J.R.’s testimony about his charge, conviction, and sentence
for second-degree assault was no t admissible under section 634. 20 “because it is not
d o m e s t i c c o n d u c t ” — t h a t i s , b e c a u s e t h e c h a r g e , c o n v i c t i o n , a n d sentence were actions

6
taken by the government in response to domestic conduct and wer e not themselves
domestic conduct, evidence of those facts was inadmissible.
Evidence that tends to make the existence of domestic conduct m ore probable is
evidence of domestic conduct. See Minn. R. Evid. 401 (“‘Relevant evidence’ means
evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence . . .
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evi dence.”); State v. Schulz,
691 N.W.2d 474, 478 (Minn. 2005) (“Evidence is relevant and has probative value when
it, in some degree, advances the inquiry.”).
Many facts may be proved inferentially by evidence of the conse quences of those
facts. For example, that a battery occurred may be proved by ev idence of injuries, that a
person is not credible may be proved by evidence of felony convictions, and that a person
engaged in conduct constituting a crime may be proved by the person’s conviction for the
crime. See State v. Hill, 801 N.W.2d 646, 652 (Minn. 2011) (explaining that the fact that a
witness has been convicted of a felony tends to prove a “genera l lack of respect for the
law,” thus making that witness less credible; the court’s reasoning only makes sense if the
fact of conviction tends to prove that the witness actually vio lated the law); State v.
Denison, 607 N.W.2d 796 (Minn. App. 2000 ) (discussing evidence of a pr ior conviction
for marijuana possession as evide nce that the person convicted once possessed illegal
drugs), review denied (Minn. June 13, 2000); State v. Nordstrum, 385 N.W.2d 348, 350-
52 (Minn. App. 1986) (holding tha t bruises and testimony about the nature of the bruises
and when they were discovered we re sufficient circumstantial ev idence to sustain a
conviction for fifth-degree assault, without any witnesses to the assault). In the same way,

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the fact that Rawson was charged with, convicted of, and senten ced for second-degree
assault for threatening J.R. with a shotgun tends to make it mo re probable that he did, in
fact, threaten J.R. with a shotgun. The district court did not abuse its discretion in
concluding that Rawson’s charge, conviction, and sentence were “evidence of domestic
conduct” under the statute.
But Rawson makes a second argument why the district court erred . He contends
that, even if the challenged testimony was evidence of domestic conduct, the district court
abused its discretion in admitting the evidence because the fac t that he was charged,
convicted, and sentenced has a low probative value that was sub stantially outweighed by
the possibility of unfair prejudice. See Minn. Stat. § 634.20 (specifying the standard for
admissibility of evidence of domestic conduct).
Evidence of past violence by the defendant against the same vic tim has “inherent
value.” State v. Bell, 719 N.W.2d 635, 641 (Minn. 2006). It is relevant “when it pro vides
context for the crime charged.” State v. Matthews , 779 N.W.2d 543, 553 (Minn. 2010).
Evidence of domestic conduct can a lso “illuminat[e] the relatio nship of defendant and
complainant.” State v. Williams, 593 N.W.2d 227, 236 (Minn. 1999) (quotation omitted).
And it may help establish motive and intent. Id.
As for unfair prejudice in the admission of evidence, the question is not whether the
evidence damages a defendant’s case but whether it “persuades b y illegitimate means,
giving one party an unfair advantage.” Bell, 719 N.W.2d at 641 (quotation omitted). When
the district court gives a limiting instruction, the risk that the jury will inappropriately rely
on the relationship evidence is reduced. State v. Patzold, 917 N.W.2d 798, 805-06 (Minn.

8
App. 2018), review denied (Minn. Nov. 27, 2018); see also State v. Pendleton, 706 N.W.2d
500, 509 (Minn. 2005) (“It is presumed that the jury follows the court’s instructions.”). In
addition to unfair prejudice, co urts should also consider wheth er evidence is needlessly
cumulative. See Minn. Stat. § 634.20. Evidence is cumulative if it “merely dupl icate[s]
other evidence already presented.” State v. Buchanan, 431 N.W.2d 542, 551 (Minn. 1988)
(analyzing the exclusion of evidence under Minn. R. Evid. 403, which requires the same
weighing as does section 634.20).2
Here, the relationship evidence w as relevant mainly as a way to prove an element
of the charged crime. Rawson w as charged with committing third-degree criminal sexual
conduct by using “force or coercion to accomplish” sexual penet ration with J.R. Minn.
Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(c) (20 16). “‘Coercion’ means the use b y the actor of words or
circumstances that cause the complainant reasonably to fear that the actor will inflict bodily
harm upon the complainant . . . .” Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 14 (2018) (defining coercion
for the purposes of section 609.344). The state framed J.R.’s t estimony about the prior
second-degree assault by eliciting testimony from J.R. suggesti ng that she was afraid of

2 Rawson contends that the probative value of the charge, conviction, and sentence should
be steeply discounted because the state had other, less-prejudicial ways to prove the same
thing—specifically, the state could and did introduce J.R.’s te stimony about the incident
itself. Rawson’s argument relies on a portion of Old Chief v. United States in which the
United States Supreme Court held that, in the context of a defe ndant’s stipulation to the
existence of a prior felony as a n element of the crime, the pro bative value of a piece of
evidence is discounted if there is other, less-prejudicial evidence available to the state on
the same point. 519 U.S. 172, 182-85, 117 S. Ct. 644, 651-52 (1997). The applicability of
Old Chief ’s discounting principle in Minne sota has not been definitively settled—the
Minnesota Supreme Court has neither adopted it nor rejected it. However, we need not
decide the applicability of Old Chief here because of our conclusion that Rawson suffered
no prejudice. See infra part I.B.

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Rawson during the sexual assault. Rawson’s prior assault provid ed context that would
allow the jury to better understand why J.R. would fear that he would inflict bodily harm
upon her. Thus, the evidence had at least some probative value. We also recognize the
value of logical and coherent narratives in testimony. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 187-189,
117 S. Ct. at 653-54. The credib ility of J.R.’s narrative about the assault was legitimately
reinforced because she mentioned the legal consequences of the act, making her description
of the prior domestic conduct more logical and complete.
But, as is generally true of evidence of prior bad acts, this evidence also carried with
it the risk that a jury could convict Rawson because it believe d him to be a bad person,
rather than because it was persua ded the evidence showed he com mitted the crimes. See
Ture v. State, 681 N.W.2d 9, 19-20 (Minn. 2004) (describing the “potential for prejudice”
with Spreigl evidence as “inherent”). The prejudicial nature of the evidence may have been
compounded by the fact that it a ppears to have been gratuitous— the state had just
introduced direct testimony about the conduct constituting second-degree assault. We have
concerns that the legitimate pers uasive value of the facts of c harge, conviction, and
sentence—that is, their tendency to prove that Rawson committed prior domestic conduct
against J.R.—was outweighed by the possibility that the evidence illegitimately suggested
that Rawson had a propensity to be violent against J.R. This possibility appears magnified
because J.R. had already described the domestic conduct in detail.
But we need not decide whether admission of the evidence was an abuse of
discretion or plainly erroneous if Rawson was not prejudiced by any error. Benton, 858

10
N.W.2d at 541 (declining to consider whether a district court erred in its evidentiary ruling
because the evidence did not significantly affect the verdict). We turn to that question.
B. Prejudice resulting from any error
Even if a district court abuses its discretion by admitting ina dmissible evidence, a
conviction need not be reversed unless “there is a reasonable possibility that the wrongfully
admitted evidence ‘significantly affected the verdict.’” Id. (quoting State v. Post , 512
N.W.2d 99, 102 n.2 (Minn. 1994). Again, because this is the sam e standard as the third
prong of plain-error review, we analyze all three purportedly prejudicial pieces of evidence
(charge, conviction, and sentence) together. See Matthews, 800 N.W.2d at 634 (“[T]he
third prong of the plain error test is the equivalent of a harmless error analysis.”).
When considering whether the admission of prior-bad-acts evidence was harmless,
the Minnesota Supreme Court examines four factors: (1) whether the state presented other
evidence on the issue for which the evidence was offered; (2) w h e t h e r t h e r e w a s a n
appropriate limiting instruction; (3) “whether the [s]tate dwel led on the evidence in [its]
closing argument”; and (4) “whet her the evidence of guilt was o verwhelming.” State v.
Riddley, 776 N.W.2d 419, 428 (Minn. 2009).3

3 The parties both suggested a test with slightly different fact ors, drawn from State v.
Peltier, which examines: “(1) the manne r i n w h i c h t h e S t a t e p r e s e n t e d the testimony;
(2) whether the testimony was highly persuasive; (3) whether the State used the testimony
in closing argument; and (4) whether the defense effectively countered the testimony.” 874
N.W.2d 792, 802 (Minn. 2016) (citing Matthews, 800 N.W.2d at 634). However, the test
from Riddley has been applied by the supreme court specifically to evidence of prior bad
acts, and its factors are a better fit for that type of evidence. See State v. Thao, 875 N.W.2d
834, 839 (Minn. 2016) (evaluating the harmlessness of evidence admitted under Minn. R.
Evid. 404(b)); Benton, 858 N.W.2d at 541-42 (evaluati ng the harmlessness of evidence
admitted under Minn. Stat. § 634.20).

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Rawson is not challenging the admission of J.R.’s testimony about the conduct that
led to conviction but only her testimony about the charge, conviction, and sentence. Thus,
the state did present other evidence on the issue of Rawson’s p rior domestic conduct and
how it made her fear Rawson. Next, there was an appropriate—and stipulated-to—limiting
instruction. Third, while the state mentioned J.R.’s testimony about the conviction in its
closing argument, it did so only once, and certainly did not “d well[] on” that evidence.
Indeed, the state’s closing argument properly framed the challe nged evidence as a way to
understand J.R.’s fear and find coercion, rather than unfairly suggesting that Rawson has a
propensity for criminal behavior. Finally, we consider the overwhelming-evidence factor.
J.R.’s testimony was undoubtedly sufficient to support the conviction. The testimony of a
victim of criminal sexual conduct need not be corroborated, Minn. Stat. § 609.347, subd. 1
(2018), and J.R.’s testimony was corroborated by her own consistent, detailed description
of Rawson’s conduct and by the testimony of others about her emotional state, see State v.
Wright, 679 N.W.2d 186, 190 (Minn. App. 2004) (stating that prior consistent statements,
the level of detail in testimony, and testimony of others about a victim’s “emotional
condition” may be corroborative evidence), review denied (Minn. June 29, 2004). But the
testimony of a single witness is not “overwhelming,” even if it is corroborated and not
seriously controverted. Nonetheless, given the strength of the other three factors and the
consistency of J.R.’s testimony, any abuse of the district court’s discretion in admitting the
facts of Rawson’s previous charge, conviction, and sentence was harmless.

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II. Rawson was not denied eff ective assistance of counsel.
In a pro se supplemental brief, Rawson argues that he was denie d effective
assistance of counsel. To prove ineffective assistance of couns el, “an appellant must
demonstrate that counsel’s performance ‘fell below an objective s t a n d a r d o f
reasonableness, and that a reasonable probability exists that the outcome would have been
different but for counsel’s errors.’” State v. Rhodes, 657 N.W.2d 823, 842 (Minn. 2003)
(quoting State v. Lahue, 585 N.W.2d 785, 789 (Minn. 1998)).
Several of Rawson’s claims—that he had many different attorneys , that his
attorneys spent little time with h im, that they gave him pretri al advice about cooperating
with DNA testing that he asserts was ineffective, and that his attorney at trial failed to
challenge a discrepancy between J.R.’s testimony and charges in another criminal case
against him—turn on evidence out s i d e t h e r e c o r d . “ A r e v i e w i n g court cannot base its
decision on matters outside the record on appeal . . . .” State v. Breaux, 620 N.W.2d 326,
334 (Minn. App. 2001) (quotation omitted). Rawson cannot pursue these claims on this
record and we reject them.
Rawson’s other claims of ineffective assistance are based on record evidence. They
consist of a list of citations to the trial transcript identifying moments when he believes his
attorney should have objected or pursued further examination. B ut not one of his claims
contains legal citation, identifies a basis for the objection, or explains how the failure
prejudiced him. Rawson forfeited these claims by failing to inc lude argument or legal
citation. See State v. Krosch, 642 N.W.2d 713, 719 (Minn. 2002) (deeming allegations of

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wrongdoing by trial counsel and the district court to be forfei ted when unsupported by
“argument or citation to legal authority”).
Affirmed.