State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0776

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Alexander James Menne,
Appellant.

Filed January 13, 2020
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge

Chisago County District Court
File No. 13-CR-17-129

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Janet Reiter, Chisago County Attorney, David Hemming, Aimee Cupelli, Assistant County
Attorneys, Center City, Minnesota (for respondent)

Mark D. Kelly, Law Offices of Mark D. Kelly, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Slieter,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
Appellant Alexander Menne appeals from a judgment of conviction for third-degree
murder and from the district court’s order denying postconviction re lief after a stay and
remand for postconviction proceedings. He argues that the evidence presented at his trial

2
is insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the drugs appellant provided to C.J.
were responsible for causing C.J.’s death. Appellant also argues th at the postconviction
court erred in denying his request for a new trial because overprescribed Ativan rendered
him incompetent at trial. We affirm.
FACTS
On December 10, 2016, appellant sent C.J. a text message stating that appellant
“found an amazing black market website like made for Xanax” and that he would “hook
[C.J.] up with AMAZING prices on hash1 and bars2 and those green pills.”
On December 12, 2016, appellant and C.J. exchanged text messages about trading
pills for “bars.” At 12:49 p.m., C.J. text messaged appellant: “You hit my [m]ail box that
has to be the same as everyone’s in the association so it is gunna cost me a lot more money
I’m not tryna f--k you over or anything I’ll litera lly give you one of my pills when I get
those 11 if you do this for me or do u not want bars or do u want them separate.”
Appellant and C.J. exchanged the following text messages beginning at 12:56 p.m.
and ending at 1:56 p.m.:
C.J.: I want you to either buy bars from me and give me the 4
or lemme trade you bars for it th at’s what I want but tell me
what you can do
Appellant: I don’t have cash on me so I can trade the 4 pills
for bars.
Appellant: When can you call me
Appellant: Do I leave the green pills in the mailbox ?? I don’t
want your mom to get the mail or something
C.J.: Go wait somewhere quick I’m getting yur sh-t
C.J.: Come get it

1 “Hash” apparently refers to hashish.

2 “Bars” apparently refers to Xanax pills that are bar-shaped.

3
Appellant: Coming
C.J.: And drop mine of course please I hooked you up jsha
Appellant: Hahaha of course. [C.J.] your one of my friends
and I wanna stay that way I wouldn’t f--- it up!
C.J.: Is it in there ?
Appellant: Yes
Appellant: It’s in there
Appellant: And [C.J.] I’m bey ond sorry about the mailbox I
really appreciate what ur doing and thanks for the bars to!

At 1:27 p.m., B.S., who was C.J.’s girl friend, received a te xt message from C.J.
stating:

[Appellant]’s gunna drop off those super profitable green pills
for hitting my mail box and I’m selling him xans but I’m
putting it all in my mail box I’ll snap chat you so I don’t have
to deal with him and I know you don’t want me around him
when your not around I love you[.]

Sometime in the afternoon that same day, C.J.’s brother-in-law received a Snapchat
photo from C.J. depicting C.J.’s hand holdi ng a small plastic bag c ontaining four green
pills.
At 1:55 p.m., C.J. text me ssaged a friend that he “[g]ot the best painkillers you can
get the 80 mg so you tryna get f--ked up tonight or what[.]” At 2:32 p.m., C.J. text
messaged the same friend: “I just snorted a tiny line and I’m f--ked up dude ur gonna be
mind blown by this sh-t it’s awesome and we can make so much g-damn money off of
these[.]”
C.J. had stopped replying to text message s from B.S. around 2:30 p.m. B.S. became
worried and drove to C.J.’s house. B.S. entered C.J.’s house, went down to the basement,
and found C.J. lying on the bathroom floor. B.S. called 911 and performed CPR on C.J.
Around 3:30 p.m., a Wyoming Police Depart ment sergeant arrived at C.J.’s house
in response to a report of a possible overdose. The sergeant went to the basement of the

4
house and found C.J. on the ba throom floor. First responde rs were unable to resuscitate
C.J. At 4:05 p.m., C.J. was pronounced dead.
Officers found three-and-one-half green p ills on the counter in the bathroom where
C.J. died. A knife and powder residue were found on the bathroom counter.
Two weeks after C.J.’s death, C.J.’s mother found some pills in a vanity drawer in
the bathroom where C.J. had died. C.J.’s step father took photos of th e pills in the vanity
drawer and disposed of them. C.J.’s mother also found a rolled-up dollar bill, which she
threw into a wood-burning stove.
Appellant was charged with third-degree murder under Minn. Stat. § 609.195(b)
(2016). He remained in jail after violating the conditions of his pretrial release.
At a motion hearing, appellant’s counsel in formed the district court that appellant
“has some anxiety medications that he would normally take.” Appellant had a prescription
for Ativan—an anti-anxiety medication—but was prohibited by jail authorities from using
the medication while jailed. Appellant asked the district court to consider allowing him to
take Ativan during the upcoming tr ial. Appellant’s counsel told the district court that he
did not think that the Ativan would impact appellant’s “consciousness or awareness . . .
and ability to focus.”
The district court requested that the state ask the jail if it was possible for appellant
to take Ativan during trial so that appellant could “participat e fully with [c ounsel] in his
defense.” In response to the district court’s request, the state provided the district court
with a letter from a nurse at the Chisago Coun ty Jail, stating that she had reviewed the
Ativan order and that “Ativan is not clinically indicated” because of “an increased risk of

5
abuse and dependency and certainly not prescribing up to 4mg a day as needed.” Appellant
had submitted a letter from his doctor which recommended that appella nt be allowed to
take Ativan—up to four milligrams per day— during trial. The letter from appellant’s
doctor also explained potential side effects of Ativan, including “sedation, lethargy,
lightheadedness, dizziness.” Appellant’s doctor included a medication safety sheet, which
listed additional side effects of Ativan, including possible memory impairment.
Considering that appellant’s doctor believed the Ativan to be beneficial to appellant,
that the jail would not a llow appellant to take Ativan, and that appellant indicated that he
did not suffer from side effects after taking Ativ an, the district court modified appellant’s
conditions of release so that appellant could “receive the medications so that he can assist
his counsel with his defense.” Appellant was not jailed during trial and instead lived at his
grandmother’s house. Appellant took two milligrams of Ativan twice per day during trial.
On the first day of appellant’s jury trial, the district court asked appellant’s counsel
if appellant suffered “any of the side effects indicated by [appellant’s doctor], which
include sedation, lethargy, lightheadedne ss and dizziness[.]” Appellant’s counsel
responded, “No.” He told the district court that appellant “actually functions much better
and is more alert when he’s on [Ativan] because he’s calmer and he can stay focused.”
At trial, Dr. Strobl, the medical exam iner, testified that the Midwest Medical
Examiner’s Office conducted an autopsy of C.J., including testing of his blood and urine.
The blood and urine tests “showed the pres ence of furanyl fentanyl, diazepam, and
alprazolam.” The green pills found by police on the bathroom counter were also tested and
found to contain furanyl fentanyl . The pills found in the vani ty drawer by C.J.’s parents

6
after his death were never tested. Dr. Strobl concluded that the cause of C.J.’s death was
furanyl fentanyl toxicity. Dr. Strobl testified that furanyl fentanyl is considered an analog
of fentanyl. Dr. Isenschmid, a forensic toxicologist, testifie d that furanyl fentanyl is a
schedule I drug.
The jury found appellant guilty of third-degree murder, and the district court
sentenced him to 86 months in prison. Appellant filed a notice of appeal. We stayed that
appeal to enable appellant to pursue postconviction relief.
Appellant filed a petition for postconvic tion relief on remand, arguing that the
Ativan that he took during trial rendered him incompeten t. The district court held an
evidentiary hearing on the petition.
Appellant testified that, after the district court altered his conditions of release to
allow him to take Ativan during trial, he rece ived a prescription that directed him to take
two milligrams of Ativan twice per day. A ppellant had previously taken two milligrams
of Ativan twice per day, but had not taken any Ativan in the appr oximately two months
during which he was in jail. Appellant clai med to remember nothing about the trial after
jury selection and until he woke up in jail afte r the verdict. Appellant conceded at the
evidentiary hearing that he was conscious throughout the trial.
Appellant’s trial attorney testified that appellant used a notepad to write down
questions or comments during trial, and that the questions that appellant asked were
relevant to the evidence and what was occurring at trial. Appellant’s trial attorney testified
that he spoke with appellant during breaks and that appellant woul d constantly ask him
how things were going. At no point during the trial, at the taking of the verdict, or before

7
sentencing did appellant ever tell his trial at torney that he was having amnesia or trouble
remembering what was happening. Appellant’s trial attorney testified that he did not notice
any behaviors that caused him to worry about appellant’s competence.
Dr. Gratzer, a rule 20 evalua tor who never evaluated appe llant, testified that four
milligrams of Ativan is on the high end of the therapeutic range. He also testified that a
person taking four milligrams of Ativan migh t have memory loss, but that amnesia is not
the most common side effect of Ativan.
The district court denied appellant’s petition for postconviction relief, from which
denial appellant also appealed. We reinstat ed appellant’s direct appeal and permitted
appellant to raise issues decided in the postconviction proceedings as well as direct-appeal
issues.
D E C I S I O N
Sufficient evidence supports appellant’s conviction for third-degree murder.
Appellant argues that the circumstantia l evidence presented by the state is
insufficient to prove that appellant provided the furanyl fentanyl that caused C.J.’s death.
“When evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we carefully examine the record
to determine whether the facts and the legitimate inferences drawn from them would permit
the factfinder to reasonably c onclude that the de fendant was guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt of the offense of which he was convicted.” State v. Waiters, 929 N.W.2d 895, 900
(Minn. 2019) (quotation and alternation omitted). We view the evidence “in the light most
favorable to the verdict” and assume “that the fact-finder disbelieved any evidence that
conflicted with the verdict.” State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 263 (Minn. 2016). “The

8
verdict will not be overturned if the fact-finder, upon applic ation of the presumption of
innocence and the State’s burden of proving an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, could
reasonably have found the defendant guilty of the charged offense.” Id.
Direct or circumstantial evidence may be us ed to prove an offense. “Direct evidence
is evidence that is based on personal knowledge or observation and that, if true, proves a
fact without inference or presumption.” Bernhardt v. State , 684 N.W.2d 465, 477 n.11
(Minn. 2004) (quotation omitted ). Circumstantial evidence is “evidence from which the
factfinder can infer whether the facts in dispute existed or did not exist.” State v. Harris,
895 N.W.2d 592, 598 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted).
We apply the circumstantial-evidence standa rd of review in cases where the state
presents solely circumstantia l evidence on one or more elements of an offense. State v.
Porte, 832 N.W.2d 303, 309 (Mi nn. App. 2013). The circum stantial-evidence standard
requires a “review [of] the sufficiency of the evidence using a two-step analysis.” State v.
Barshaw, 879 N.W.2d 356, 363 (Min n. 2016). The first step is to “identify the
circumstances proved, deferring to the fact finder’s acceptance of the proof of these
circumstances and rejection of the evidence in the record that conflicted with the
circumstances proved by the State.” Id. (quotation omitted). Th e second step is to
“independently examine the reasonableness of all inferences that might be drawn from the
circumstances proved to determine whether th e circumstances proved are consistent with
guilt and inconsistent with any rationa l hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id. (quotation
omitted). “Circumstantia l evidence must form a complete chain that, in view of the
evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the defendant as to exclude beyond a

9
reasonable doubt any reasonable inference other than guilt.” State v. Taylor, 650 N.W.2d
190, 206 (Minn. 2002).
Appellant contends that the circumstantial evidence is insufficient to prove that the
pills he provided to C.J. cause d C.J.’s death. Appellant was convicted of third-degree
murder under Minn. Stat. § 609 .195(b). The state needed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that (1) C.J. died , (2) appellant, directly or indir ectly, without the intent to cause
death, was the proximate cause of C.J.’s death by unlawfully selling, giving away,
bartering, delivering, excha nging or distributing a schedul e I controlled substance, and
(3) appellant’s acts happened on or about December 12, 2016, in Chisago County.
10 Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 11.40 (2015).
Appellant does not dispute that elemen ts one and three we re proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. Appellant disputes the suff iciency of the evidence concerning element
two.
Under the first step of the circumstantia l-evidence test, we must identify the
circumstances proved, giving deference to the fact-finder’s determinations. Barshaw, 879
N.W.2d at 363. Those circumstances, defe rring to the jury’s ve rdict, are that, on
December 12, 2016, appellant and C.J. exchanged multip le text messages about
exchanging green pills for “bars” and as payment for fixing C.J.’s broken mailbox. By text
message, appellant asked C.J. if he should l eave four pills in C.J .’s mailbox, and, at
1:43 p.m., told C.J. that the pills were in the mailbox. That afternoon, C.J.’s brother-in-
law received a photo of C.J. holding a small plastic bag containing four green pills. At
2:32 p.m., C.J. text messaged a friend that he “just snorted a tiny line” and that he was

10
“f--ked up.” At some point thereafter, C.J. stopped responding to text messages from B.S.,
which prompted B.S. to drive to C.J.’s house. B.S. went to the basement of C.J.’s house
and found C.J. on the bathroom floor. B.S. called 911 and performed CPR on C.J. At
4:05 p.m., C.J. was pronounced dead. A knife, powder residue, and three and one-half
green pills near a small plastic bag were found on the counter in the bathroom where C.J.
died. C.J.’s cause of death was determined to be furanyl fentanyl toxicity. The three and
one-half green pills found on the bathroom counter contained furanyl fentanyl.
Under the second step of the circumstantial-evidence test, we must “independently
consider the reasonableness” of the circumstances proved. Id. The circumstances above
are consistent with guilt and are inconsistent with any other reasonable inference.
The jury reasonably inferred that appellant provided C.J. with four green pills
containing furanyl fentanyl. From the text message sent by C.J. to a friend about snorting
“a tiny line” and being “f--ked up,” it is reasonable that the jury inferred that C.J. ingested
some sort of drug. From the knife, powder residue, and three and one-half green pills found
on the counter in the bathroom where C.J. died, it is reasonable to infer that C.J. cut one of
the four green pills in half, crushed it, and snorted it. These inferences are consistent with
appellant’s guilt.
Appellant argues that C.J.’s parents having found some additional pills in the room
where C.J. died gives rise to an alternativ e inference that is also reasonable—that the
furanyl fentanyl that killed C.J. came from a source other than appellant. There are at least
three problems with appellant’s argument. First, the jury was not obligated to have
accepted that the additional pills were found; it is not a circumstance necessarily proved by

11
the jury’s verdict. Second, and assuming that additional pills were found, the jury was not
obligated to have accepted that the pills contained fentanyl. Again, that the pills contained
fentanyl is not a circumstance consistent with the jury’s verdict. The additional pills were
never tested, and there is no record evidence that they contained fentanyl. Third, that C.J.
consumed any of the additiona l pills found by his parents is not a circumstance proved.
Appellant argued this theory to the jury in summation and the jury’s verdict establishes that
the jury rejected the argument.
Taken as a whole, the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and
inconsistent with any rational hypothesis othe r than guilt. The only reasonable inference
that can be drawn from the evidence and circumstances proved is that C.J. died as a result
of ingesting part of a green pill provided by appella nt. There is no reasonable inference
that can be drawn from the circumstances prove d to support appellant’s theory that C.J.
died as a result of ingesting drugs other than the pills appellant provided.
The postconviction court did not abuse its di scretion by denying appellant’s petition
for postconviction relief.

Appellant argues that the district court erred by deny ing his petition for
postconviction relief, based on appellant’s clai m of incompetence during trial due to an
alleged overprescription of Ativan.
Appellate courts review a district c ourt’s denial of a petition for postconviction
relief for abuse of discretion. Fort v. State, 861 N.W.2d 674, 677 (M inn. 2015). “Under
this standard of review, a matter will not be reversed unless the postconviction court
exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an

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erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.” Reed v. State, 793
N.W.2d 725, 729 (Minn. 2010).
“A defendant is incompetent and must not . . . be tried, or be sentenced if the
defendant due to mental illne ss or cognitive impairment l acks ability to: (a) rationally
consult with counsel; or (b) understand the pr oceedings or participate in the defense.”
Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 2. The prosecutor, defense counsel, or the court can make
a motion challenging the defendant’s competen cy at any time if they doubt that the
defendant is competent. Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 3.
The postconviction court held an eviden tiary hearing on ap pellant’s petition and
found that “[a]t no point during the trial was the Court given reason to doubt [appellant]’s
competency.” The judge in the postconviction proceedings is the same judge who presided
at trial. The postconviction court explaine d that appellant “demonstrated competency
during the trial by participating during the tr ial, conversing coherently with both his
attorney and the Court, and providing appropri ate answers to the Court’s inquiries.” The
postconviction court further found that appellant’s assertion that he has no memory of his
trial “lacks credibility” and that “the fact that [appellant] now has no recollection of the
trial does not mean that [appellant] at the time of the trial was incompetent.” The record
supports the postconviction court’s findings.
Appellant testified at the postconvictio n hearing that when he previously took
Ativan, he did not have amnesia, but woul d have small moments of forgetfulness—like
misplacing his keys. Appellant testified that he was awake du ring the trial. Appellant
testified that during trial he could stand up, sit down, move his chair, and click his pen.

13
Appellant agreed that the district court told him to stop moving his chair during trial and
to speak to his attorney more quietly.
The district court also credited the tes timony of appellant’s trial attorney who
testified at the postconviction hearing that appellant reacted to the events that were taking
place during trial, and often wr ote questions or reactions on a pad of paper to show his
attorney. Appellant’s trial atto rney testified that appellant’s questions during trial were
relevant and based on the eviden ce being presented. The tria l attorney explained that he
talked to appellant about the trial during brea ks, and that appellant would constantly ask
him how things were going. Appellant’s trial attorney described appellant as calmer during
trial than he had been before taking the Ativan, which he believed “was the intended effect
of [appellant’s] prescription drugs.”
Dr. Gratzer, who testified about the potential side effects of Ativan, never treated or
spoke with appellant, but instead testified in response to hypothetical questions about a
patient similar to appellant. Dr. Gratzer opine d that such a person taking four milligrams
of Ativan daily “would be impaired,” but he could not definitively say that a person would
be impaired to the point of becoming incompetent.
We think the district court was best positio ned to resolve this competency challenge,
having presided at trial and having heard the evidence at the postconviction hearing. The
record supports the district court’s findings, which are not clearly erroneous. Accordingly,
the district court acted with in its discretion when it de nied appellant’s petition for
postconviction relief.
Affirmed.