Kurt William Sawyer, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0780

Kurt William Sawyer, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Commissioner of Public Safety,
Respondent.

Filed December 17, 2018
Affirmed
Florey, Judge

Cass County District Court
File No. 11-CV-17-2232

Rich Kenly, Kenly Law Office, Backus, Minnesota (for appellant)

L o r i S w a n s o n , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , Daniel S. Schueppert, Assistant A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l ,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Jess on, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Jud ge; and Florey,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
FLOREY, Judge
Appellant files this appeal from the district court’s order sus taining the revocation
of his driving privileges. He specifically challenges the district court’s conclusion that he
was validly stopped for speeding and the findings supporting that determination. Because

2
the state trooper that seized appellant had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that appellant
was speeding, we affirm.
FACTS
A state trooper arrested appellant Kurt William Sawyer for driving while impaired.
Appellant later failed a breath test for alcohol, and his drive r’s license was revoked. He
challenged the license revocation, asserting that there was no basis for “the initial stop or
intrusion,” and therefore he was impermissibly seized. An impl ied-consent hearing was
held. The trooper testified, and a squad-car video and copy of the trooper’s report were
introduced into evidence.1
The trooper testified that she w as stopped at the intersection of two highways, 87
and 371, and noticed a pickup leave an establishment that sells alcohol. The pickup turned
west on 87. The trooper made a U-turn and followed the pickup. The speed limit on that
road goes from 40 to 30 miles per hour heading into the City of Ba c k us . The t r oo pe r
testified that the pickup was in itially driving within the spee d limit, but it did not slow
down when it hit the 30 mile-pe r-hour zone; rather, according t o the trooper’s radar the
pickup increased its speed to 43 miles per hour. The trooper p ursued the pickup. The
pickup quickly turned south onto a side street, and the trooper f o l l o w e d . T h e t r o o p e r
believed that the pickup was spee ding up and attempting to evad e. When the trooper hit
gravel on the side street, she activated her lights. She follo wed the vehicle up a driveway
and saw it pull into a garage. Appellant got out of the pickup , the trooper and appellant

1 The trooper’s report is consistent with the trooper’s testimony and indicates that appellant
was observed speeding, traveling over 40 miles per hour in a 30 mile-per-hour zone.

3
made eye contact, and the garage door closed. The trooper open ed a service door to the
garage, flipped a light switch, and yelled for appellant to come out. She then walked away
from the garage and called for backup. Appellant walked out of the garage and ignored
the trooper as if she was not there. The trooper ordered appellant to come to the squad car,
and appellant then complied. The trooper testified that she se ized appellant for speeding
and evasiveness. After seizing appellant, the trooper noticed indicia of intoxication.
The district court filed an ord er sustaining the revocation of appellant’s driving
privileges. The court concluded that there was a valid basis for the stop because the trooper
observed appellant going 43 in a 30 mile-per-hour zone and seized appellant for that reason.
The court noted that there were some inconsistencies between the trooper’s testimony and
the squad-car video, but nothing significant. The court found that the video corroborated
the trooper’s testimony that appellant was speeding, and the co urt found that appellant
“admitted he was speeding” in his conversation with the trooper. The court found that the
trooper’s entry into appellant’s garage violated appellant’s “r easonable expectation of
privacy,” but concluded that this violation was harmless because the trooper discovered no
evidence during the incursion.2 This appeal followed.

2 While appellant does not challe nge the trooper’s intrusion int o the garage, we note that
the indicia of intoxication were observed after appellant exited his garage and stood in his
driveway. Evidence is not “fruit of a poisonous tree” if its discovery is unconnected to the
unlawful police conduct. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804-05, 104 S. Ct. 3380,
3385 (1984). And in Tracht v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , this court acknowledged that
constitutional protections do not extend to areas around the home that are “impliedly open.”
592 N.W.2d 863, 865 (Minn. A pp. 1999) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. July
28, 1999). Impliedly open areas include ordinary routes of acc ess to the entrance of a
residence, such as driveways. State v. Crea, 233 N.W.2d 736, 739 (Minn. 1975).

4
D E C I S I O N
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and
seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. A n officer may conduct a
limited investigatory stop if the officer has reasonable, artic ulable suspicion of criminal
activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968); State v. Diede, 795
N.W.2d 836, 842-43 (Minn. 2011). The reasonable, articulable suspicion standard is met
when the officer “observes unusual conduct that leads the offic er to reasonably conclude
in light of his or her experience that criminal activity may be afoot.” State v. Timberlake,
744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). The stan dard for reasonable
suspicion is not high. Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 843.
A person may challenge a license revocation by arguing that he or she was not
lawfully arrested for driving while impaired, a challenge which permits review of any
investigatory stop leading to the arrest. Minn. Stat. § 169A.5 3, subd. 3(b)(2) (2018); see
Hoekstra v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 839 N.W.2d 536, 537 (Minn. App. 2013). We review
de novo a district court’s ruling on whether an officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion
for an investigatory stop. Hoekstra, 839 N.W.2d at 539. We review the district court’s
findings of fact for clear error. Id. “Findings of fact are clearly erroneous when they are
manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reason ably supported by the
evidence as a whole.” Schulz v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 760 N.W.2d 331, 333 (Minn. App.
2009) (quotation omitted). We defer to the district court’s cr edibility determinations and
ability to weigh the evidence. Constans v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 835 N.W.2d 518, 523
(Minn. App. 2013).

5
Here, the district court found that the trooper observed appell ant speeding and
temporarily seized appellant for that reason. The record suppo rts these findings. The
trooper had a reasonable, articulable basis to temporarily seize appellant. “Generally, if an
officer observes a violation of a traffic law, no matter how insignificant the traffic law, that
observation forms the requisite particularized and objective ba sis for conducting a traffic
stop.” Wilkes v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 777 N.W.2d 239, 243 (Minn. App. 2010)
(quotation omitted). We agree with appellant that the record does not support the district
court’s finding that appellant admitted to speeding, but appellant’s admission is not crucial
for our conclusion that the seizure was valid.
Appellant points to inconsistencies between the trooper’s testi mony and the squad
video and asserts that these inconsistencies remove all credibi lity from the trooper’s
testimony. In effect, appellant suggests that there is no basis for the district court’s finding
that he was speeding because the trooper’s testimony must be rejected. Although there are
slight inconsistencies between the trooper’s testimony and the squad video, we agree with
the district court that these inconsistencies “are not significant.”
For example, the trooper testifie d that she activated her light s when she hit gravel
on the side street, but the video shows that she did not activate her lights until she reached
appellant’s garage. The trooper testified that she did not ful ly enter the garage, but the
video shows that the trooper briefly stepped in. Appellant’s c ounsel asked the trooper
about the time it took to comme nce pursuit. The trooper respon ded “[f]ifteen seconds,”
but the video, though inconclusive, suggests it may have been longer.

6
Appellant’s counsel also asked th e trooper about appellant’s di stance when the
trooper commenced pursuit. The trooper responded “two blocks a t the most.” Appellant
argues that this is inconsistent with the district court’s find ing that the trooper “perceived
the pickup was speeding because it was further ahead of her tha n it should have been had
it been travelling at the speed limit.” But, appellant is conf using two parts of the chase.
The trooper’s “two blocks” concerns the distance between her squad car and the pickup at
the time she began following appellant, but the court’s “furthe r ahead” finding relates to
the pickup’s turn and acceleration on the side street. At any rate, although there are
inconsistencies, they have no be aring on the basis for the stop , which is speeding. The
record clearly shows that the trooper had an opportunity to obs erve and calculate
appellant’s speed in the 30 mile-per-hour zone.
Appellant argues that the video shows that he slowed down at the 30 mile-per-hour
zone because brake lights can be seen. We disagree with appell ant’s assessment of the
video. The district court’s finding that appellant was speeding when he entered Backus is
not clearly erroneous because it is reasonably su pported by the record as a whole. See
Schulz, 760 N.W.2d at 333.
Appellant argues that the district court cannot accept some of the trooper’s
testimony and reject other testimony, but this is simply not the case. A trier of fact is free
to accept part and reject part of a witness’s testimony, and we defer to the district court’s
determinations as to what is credible. State v. Johnson , 568 N.W.2d 426, 436 (Minn.
1997); Constans, 835 N.W.2d at 523. The record supports the district court’s findings that

7
the trooper observed appellant s peeding and temporarily seized appellant for that reason.
The trooper had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to warrant the seizure.
Affirmed.