State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0800

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Ebony Mary Lane,
Appellant.

Filed March 4, 2019
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge

Clay County District Court
File No. 14-CR-17-4385

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brian J. Melton, Clay County Attorney, Alexander J. Stock, Assi stant County Attorney,
Moorhead, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rochelle R. Winn, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and
Bratvold, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
In this direct appeal from judgmen t of conviction, appellant Eb ony Mary Lane
challenges her sentence for first-degree test refusal, arguing that the district court erred

2
when it rejected a plea agreemen t that included a bottom-of-the -box guidelines sentence.
We affirm.
FACTS
Clay County Sergeant Schroeder arrested appellant for first-de gree driving while
impaired (DWI) after Sergeant Sch roeder received reports that a ppellant’s car was
“swerving and had almost hit several vehicles head on” and was “speeding and all over the
road.” Field sobriety testing indicated that appellant was imp aired. Sergeant Schroeder
transported appellant to the Clay County Jail and read her an i mplied-consent advisory.
Appellant refused to take a breath test. The state charged appellant with first-degree DWI
under Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(1) (2016), and felony refusal to submit to a chemical
test under Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2(1) (2016).
Appellant reached a plea agreement with the state. She agreed to plead guilty to the
test-refusal offense in exchange for the state’s dismissal of the DWI offense and the state’s
agreement to request a bottom-of-the-box sentence for the test-refusal offense. A preplea
sentencing worksheet indicated that appellant had a criminal history score of six. With that
criminal history score, the maximum penalty the court could imp ose without departing
from the Minnesota Sentencing Guid elines is an 84-month prison term. The bottom-of-
the-box sentence would be 62 months.
Appellant pleaded guilty. At th e conclusion of the plea heari ng, the district court
explained that it would reserve acceptance of the guilty plea until sentencing. Between the
plea hearing and sentencing, a presentence investigation (PSI) was completed. After the
PSI was completed, appellant’s trial counsel moved to correct appellant’s criminal history

3
score, arguing that the PSI was incorrect, and appellant’s criminal history score should be
four, not six.
At sentencing, appellant’s trial counsel explained the miscalcu lation and asked the
district court to follow the earli er bottom-of-the-box agreemen t which, because of the
lowered criminal history score, would result in a 51-month prison term. The district court
rejected the previously deferred plea agreement. It informed appellant that, if she chose to
maintain her plea of guilty and proceed to sentencing, the dist rict court’s intention was to
impose a top-of-the-box prison term—72 months based on a criminal history score of four.
The district court explained that it would allow appellant to either withdraw her guilty plea
or proceed with sentencing. Appellant conferred with her attorney and then informed the
district court that she wanted to maintain her plea of guilty a nd proceed with sentencing
for the felony test-refusal offense. The district court senten ced appellant to 72 months in
prison, with 84-days credit for time served and a five-year conditional release period.
This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
Appellant argues that the district court abused its sentencing discretion by rejecting
the plea agreement and instead sentencing her to a top-of-the box prison sentence.1

1 The parties and the district court made several references to an “agreement” during
appellant’s guilty-plea and sentencing hearings. The record confirms that the negotiation
between appellant and the state amounted to an agreement and not a recommendation. See
State v. Tyska , 448 N.W.2d 546, 549 (Minn. App. 1989) (concluding that the re cord
reflected that a plea agreement had been entered into because t he parties and the district
court referred to it as an agreement rather than a recommendation).

4
When a district court rejects a plea agreement, we review that decision for abuse of
discretion. State v. Pero, 590 N.W.2d 319, 325 (Minn. 1999). Although the state has the
authority to enter into plea ag reements and to decide who shoul d be prosecuted and for
what charge, a district court is not bound by a plea agreement concerning any sentence to
be imposed. Johnson v. State , 641 N.W.2d 912, 917-18 (Min n. 2002). Accordingly, a
defendant has no right to have a plea agreement accepted; wheth er to accept a guilty plea
is within the discretion of the district court. State v. Klug, 839 N.W.2d 723, 726 (Minn.
App. 2013). The final dispositio n of a criminal case is for th e judiciary. Johnson, 641
N.W.2d at 917.
“When a plea is entered and the defendant questioned, the trial court judge must
reject or accept the plea of guilty on the terms of the plea agreement.” Minn. R. Crim. P.
15.04, subd. 3(1). The district court may postpone its accepta nce or rejection until it has
received the results of a presentence investigation (PSI). Id. “If the court rejects the plea
agreement, it must advise the parties in open court and then ca ll upon the defendant to
e i t h e r a f f i r m o r w i t h d r a w t h e p l e a . ” Id.; see also Tyska , 448 N.W.2d at 549 (further
explaining Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.04, subd. 3(1)).
Appellant argues that the district court’s rejection of her plea was arbitrary, and that
she is entitled to receive the agr eed-upon bottom-of-the-box se ntence. But because the
district court expressly withheld acceptance or rejection of th is plea until sentencing, and
provided appellant with the oppo rtunity to withdraw or affirm h er guilty plea after it
declined to accept the agreement, the district court acted within its discretion.

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The district court’s rejection of the plea agreement was not ar bitrary. Appellant’s
criminal history score at senten cing was different than the ple a agreement had
contemplated. The district court determined that the bottom-of-the-box sentence based on
the lower criminal history score was not an appropriate sentence, given the PSI, appellant’s
criminal history, and her drivi ng conduct. Accordingly, the di strict court rejected the
agreement. Carefully following t he pr oc e d ur e s s e t f or t h i n c a se l a w a n d t he Mi n ne s ot a
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the district court told appellant that she could either withdraw
her guilty plea or proceed to sentencing by maintaining her guilty plea despite the rejection
of the plea agreement. See Melde v. State, 778 N.W.2d 376, 379 (Minn. App. 2010) (stating
that if a district court rejects a plea agreement, a defendant is entitled to withdraw her plea
if one has been entered and must again decide whether to plead guilty). After consulting
with her lawyer, appellant decided that she wanted to maintain her plea of guilty and be
sentenced that day.
The record establishes that whe n appellant initially pleaded gu ilty, she was aware
that the district court could reject the plea agreement at sent encing. Appellant’s signed
plea petition provided that, if the district court did not approve of the agreement, appellant
had “an absolute right to withdraw [her] plea of guilty and hav e a trial” and provided that
appellant’s testimony at the plea hearing could not be used against her at trial. The petition
also provided that, if appellant w i t h d r e w h e r p l e a , s h e w o u l d then “stand trial on the
original charge(s)” and the “prosecution could proceed against [her] just as if there had
been no plea of guilty and no plea agreement.”

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Despite appellant’s assertion that the district court should ha ve sentenced her
according to her agreement with the state, the district court w as not bound by that
agreement. The district court’s decision to wait to accept app ellant’s guilty plea until
sentencing was entirely proper. See State v. Kunshier, 410 N.W.2d 377, 379 (Minn. App.
1987) (stating that a district court judge may elect not to acc ept a plea until further
information is available, such as information provided by a pre sentence investigation),
review denied (Minn. Oct. 21, 1987).
For this same reason, appellant’s argument that she is entitled to specific
performance of the plea agreement is misplaced. Cf. State v. Meredyk, 754 N.W.2d 596,
603 (Minn. App. 2008) (stating th at plea agreements represent a bargained-for
understanding between the government and a defendant). The dis trict court acted within
its discretion in rejecting the plea agreement. When, in light of that, appellant chose to
maintain her plea of guilty and be sentenced, there was no plea agreement to follow.
Appellant also argues that she is entitled to a lesser prison term because her sentence
ended up being longer than origin ally contemplated. But appellant’s signed plea petition
provided that her sentence would not exceed 84 months and would not be less than 36
months. The 72-month sentence imposed by the district court was within the presumptive
sentencing range provided by the Minnesota Sentencing Guideline s . M i n n . S e n t .
Guidelines 4.A (2016). It is well-established that we afford a district court great discretion
in the imposition of sentences, and generally we will not modif y a sentence within the
presumptive guidelines range absent compelling circumstances. State v. Delk, 781 N.W.2d
426, 428 (Minn. App. 2010), review denied (Minn. July 20, 2010). While the sentence

7
imposed was not a bottom-of-the-box term, it was within the presumptive range under the
guidelines.
The district court’s careful and thoughtful handling of the rejected plea agreement—
within its proper province for determination—was exemplary. Eyes open, fully informed,
and represented by counsel, appe llant chose to maintain her ple a of guilty, despite the
district court’s disapproval of the plea agreement presented to it earlier.2
Affirmed.

2 The state makes additional arguments concerning whether the district court impermissibly
interjected itself into plea negotiations by sentencing appella nt to a term not proposed by
the parties. These arguments were not raised by the appellant and are unnecessary to our
resolution of this appeal. We therefore do not address them further.