State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0803

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jeremy Allen Giles,
Appellant.

Filed April 22, 2019
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

McLeod County District Court
File No. 43-CR-17-1776

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael K. Junge, McLeod County Attorney, Daniel R. Provencher, Assistant County
Attorney, Glencoe, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Lauren F. Schoeberl, Special Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and
Bratvold, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BRATVOLD, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of being an ineligible person in possession of a
firearm and argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. He argues
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that (1) police lacked a r easonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity when an
officer stopped the car in which Giles was riding; and (2) law enforcement was not
authorized to search the car after arresting the driver for driving while impaired (DWI). We
conclude that police had reasonable articulable suspicion for the stop and that the search
incident to arrest was lawful under Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 334, 129 S. Ct. 1710,
1712 (2009). Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTS
On November 5, 2017, at approximately 12:25 a. m., Officer Fiebelkorn patrolled
downtown Glencoe, and saw a silver car driving northbound “on Pryor Avenue across the
intersection of 16th Street.” Fiebelkorn was driving westbound on 16th Street and
“recognized this travel to be strange” because this street only led to a school, which was
not open due to the late hour. Fiebelkorn watched the car, ran its plates, and determined
that the registered owner was J.R. from Buffalo, Minnesota. Fiebelkorn turned his squad
car around and “attempt[ed] to follow the car,” but realized that he had “actually passed”
the car where it was parked on the 1500 block of Stevens Avenue. Fiebelkorn eventually
“relocated the vehicle going westbound” on Pryor, and followed it. Fiebelkorn “observed
on two separate occasions that the vehicle did not emit a turn signal prior to 100 feet before
the turn. The vehicle would stop, indicate its turn by signaling, and then make the turn.”
After observing these two separate violations, Fiebelkorn activated his emergency lights to
stop the car.
Fiebelkorn approached the car and spoke to the driver, J.R., and “recognized [her]
behavior to be strange or abnormal, because while she was looking at me, she had reached”
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into the center console. Fiebelkorn also noticed that J.R. had “rapid speech, she was
excited, her eyes were sensitive to light, she was unable to sit still, and had rigid arms.”
Accordingly, Fiebelkorn believed that J.R. was under the influence of a stimulant.
Fiebelkorn called for backup, and then asked J.R. to exit her car and perform field sobriety
tests.1 During the tests, Fiebelkorn saw that J.R. had “eyelid tremors,” her pupils were
dilated, and she had “heat bumps” on her mouth or tongue, which are “consistent with
smoking from a glass pipe.” J.R. then attempted to get by Fiebelkorn and return to her car.
Fiebelkorn stopped and arrested J.R., and brought her to his squad car.
Fiebelkorn returned to the car and asked appellant Jeremy Allen Giles, who was
seated in the front passenger seat, to get out of the car. Fiebelkorn then conducted a search
of the driver’s area and found a hypodermic needle inside the driver’s side door and a clear
baggie “with a crystal-like substance in it that [he] recognized to be methamphetamine”
near the center console. Next, Fiebelkorn searched the entire car and found a backpack in
the backseat, “which contained a box of ammunition with six rounds of .38 caliber
missing,” men’s cologne, men’s deodorant, and a receipt. Later, Fiebelkorn returned to the
1500 block of Stevens Avenue where the car had been parked earlier, and found a loaded
“.38 long barreled revolver” on the ground near the street.
The state charged Giles with being an ineligible person in possession of a firearm
under Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2016). Giles filed a motion to suppress the
ammunition and firearm evidence, arguing that the search was unlawful because

1 At about this time, Fiebelkorn saw a two-way radio in the center console and “three car
CD deck radios with wires which appeared to be ripped” in the backseat.
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Fiebelkorn did not have reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity when he
stopped J.R., and Fiebelkorn lacked probable cause to search the vehicle after J.R.’s arrest.
The state opposed Giles’s motion, arguing that the stop was legal and that “there was
independent probable cause, outside of the driver’s arrest, which gave law enforcement the
right to search the vehicle.”
At a contested omnibus hearing, Fiebelkorn testified to the facts described above.
Giles testified that J.R. and he were unfamiliar with Glencoe and had gotten lost. Giles also
testified that a man that he did not know was in the backseat of J.R.’s car. After they noticed
the squad car following them, the man was concerned because he had outstanding warrants.
J.R. parked briefly at “Stevens and 15th,” the man exited the car and he ran away. Giles
denied that the gun or backpack belonged to him. Fiebelkorn testified that he did not see a
third person in J.R.’s car.
The district court denied Giles’s motion to suppress, concluding that J.R. “turned
twice without signaling” before reaching the intersection, and therefore, “the stop of the
vehicle was proper.” The district court also determined that J.R. was arrested for driving
under the influence, Fiebelkorn reasonably believed she was “under the influence of a
stimulant,” and, therefore, Fiebelkorn was “permitted to search the driver’s area for
evidence of a controlled substance.” After he found a needle in “the driver’s side door
pocket and a baggie containing crystal like substance believed to be methamphetamine,
[Fiebelkorn] then had probable cause under the vehicle exception to expand the search to
the entire vehicle including the passenger compartment, trunk and any containers or bags.”
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The parties stipulated to facts under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4, to preserve
the suppression issue for appellate review. Based on the stipulated facts, the district court
found Giles guilty of being an ineligible person in possession of a firearm and imposed
sentence, committing Giles to the Commissioner of Corrections for 45 months. Giles
appeals.
D E C I S I O N
I. The district court did not err in determining that Fiebelkorn had reasonable,
articulable suspicion to justify the stop.

Giles argues that there was no reasonable, articulable suspicion to support
Fiebelkorn’s stop of J.R.’s car and that the district court erred in denying his motion to
suppress the evidence obtained from the stop. This court reviews a district court’s pretrial
order on a motion to suppress evidence using a mixed standard of review. See State v.
Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008). A district court’s factual findings are
reviewed for clear error and legal determinations are reviewed de novo. Id.
Both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee the right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures. See U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I,
§ 10. The United States Supreme Court has determined that the “[t]emporary detention of
individuals during the stop of an automobile by the police, even if only for a brief period
and for a limited purpose, constitutes a ‘seizure’ of ‘persons’ within the meaning of this
provision.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809 -10, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772 (1996)
(citations omitted). When making an investigatory stop of a vehicle, a police officer must
have specific and articulable facts that establish “‘reasonable suspicion’ of a motor vehicle
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violation or criminal activity.” State v. Duesterhoeft, 311 N.W.2d 866, 867 (Minn. 1981)
(citation omitted). An officer must also “have a particularized and objective basis” to
suspect that the person is engaged in criminal activity. State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575,
578 (Minn. 1997). If an officer observes a violation of a traffic law, even one that is
insignificant, there is an objective basis for an investigatory stop. Id.
Minnesota law provides that, “A signal of intention to turn right or left shall be given
continuously during not less than the last 100 feet traveled by the vehicle before turning.”
Minn. Stat. § 169.19, subd. 5 (2016). At the omnibus hearing, Fiebelkorn testified that, on
two occasions, he observed J.R. “stop” at an intersection before indicating her intent to turn
with a turn signal, “and then make the turn.” Accordingly, the district court determined that
J.R. “turned twice without signaling at least 100 feet before doing so” and, therefore, she
violated section 169.19. Because Fiebelkorn saw J.R. violate a traffic law, the district court
concluded that the stop was proper.
On appeal, Giles concedes that J.R. failed to signal 100 feet before she turned, but
argues that J.R. was unfamiliar with the area and did not decide to turn until she had reached
the intersection. Giles argues that, because the statute requires a “signal of intention to
turn,” and J.R. did not form her intention to turn until she reached the intersection, she did
not violate any traffic law. See Minn. Stat. § 169.19, subd. 5 (emphasis added).
When determining whether a driver has committed a traffic violation, the legality
of the driver’s conduct is determined objectively. See State v. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d 818,
822-23 (Minn. 2004). The driver’s subjective understanding, or misunderstanding, of the
law is not relevant to determining whether an officer has acted lawfully in conducting a
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traffic stop. See, e.g., State v. Wendorf, 814 N.W.2d 359, 364 (Minn. App. 2012) (holding
that an officer’s traffic stop was valid, and that it was irrelevant that driver was subjectively
confused as to whether statute allowed officer to make a traf fic stop based solely on a
seat-belt violation). Accordingly, even if J.R. did not decide to turn until she reached the
intersection, Fiebelkorn had an objective basis to believe that J.R. had violated section
169.19 and the stop was proper. See George, 557 N.W.2d at 578.
Giles also argues that “intention to turn” in the statute refers to the individual
driver’s intent to turn. The state argues that “intention to turn” in section 169.19,
subdivision 5, actually refers to “the signal itself, not the driver’s intent.” Statutory
interpretation is a legal question, which we review de novo. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Van
Bus Delivery Co., 400 N.W.2d 759, 760 (Minn. App. 1987). When a statute’s text is plain
and unambiguous, a court must not engage in further construction. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d
at 821.
For two reasons, we agree with the state’s interpretation of this unambiguous statute,
which provides that, “A signal of intention to turn right or left shall be given continuously
during not less than the last 100 feet traveled by the vehicle before turning.” Minn. Stat.
§ 169.19, subd. 5. First, Minn. Stat. § 169.57, subd. 2(a) (2018), provides the requirements
for “vehicle signals,” and states that a vehicle must “be equipped . . . with a lamp or
lamps . . . capable of clearly indicating any intention to turn either to the right or to the left
and shall be visible and understandable during both daytime and nighttime from a distance
of 100 feet both to the front and rear.” Minn. Stat. § 169.57, subd. 2(a) (emphasis added).
Second, section 169.19, subdivision 5, states that the intention to turn must “be given
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continuously.” We conclude that the statute refers to the signal itself, because a driver’s
intent cannot be shown “continuously.” See Minn. Stat. § 169.19, subd. 5.
In sum, we affirm the district court’s determination that police had reasonable,
articulable suspicion to stop J.R.’s car.
II. The district court did not err by denying Giles’s motion to suppress evidence
obtained from the warrantless search of J.R.’s vehicle incident to her arrest.

Giles argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence
obtained from the warrantless search of J.R.’s vehicle, because the search was not justified
under the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement.
We begin our review with the United States and Minnesota Constitutions, which
guarantee individuals the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S.
Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. A warrantless search is reasonable only if it
falls within an exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Stavish, 868 N.W.2d 670, 675
(Minn. 2015). “A search incident to a lawful arrest is a well-recognized exception to the
warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d 762,
766 (Minn. 2015). The arresting officer may search “(1) the arrestee’s person, and (2) the
area within the arrestee’s immediate control. ” State v. Bradley, 908 N.W.2d 366, 369
(Minn. App. 2018).
Giles contends that the district court misapplied the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Arizona v. Gant when it determined that Fiebelkorn was permitted to
search the car after J.R. was arrested. In Gant, the Supreme Court clarified the
search-incident-to-arrest exception, stating that “[p]olice may search a vehicle incident to
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a recent occupant’s arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger
compartment at the time of the search or [if] it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains
evidence of the offense of arrest.” 556 U.S. at 351, 129 S. Ct. at 1723 (emphasis added).
Giles argues that neither of the Gant scenarios apply in this case. We agree with
Giles that the first scenario, where “the arrestee is within reaching distance” of the
passenger compartment, does not apply here because J.R. had already been arrested and
secured in Fiebelkorn’s squad car when police searched her vehicle. Giles also argues that
the second scenario does not apply because it was unreasonable for Fiebelkorn to believe
that “evidence of the offense of arrest,” a DWI, would be in J.R.’s car. Giles argues that
the only “reasonable place [Fiebelkorn] might have expected to find evidence of DWI was
in J.R.’s body, not in her vehicle.”
Giles correctly notes that Gant held that the search of appellant’s vehicle was
unlawful. Id. at 344, 129 S. Ct. at 1718-1 9. Police arrested Gant “for driving with a
suspended license”; Gant was “handcuffed, and locked in the back of a patrol car.” Id. at
335, 129 S. Ct. at 1714. Officers then searched Gant’s car and found cocaine in the pocket
of a jacket on the backseat. Id. at 336, 129 S. Ct. at 1715. The Supreme Court held that the
search was unlawful because Gant was secured at the time of the search, and officers could
not have reasonably believed that evidence of the crime of arrest (driving with a suspended
license) would be in Gant’s car. Id. at 344, 129 S. Ct. at 1719. The Court noted other cases,
including Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632, 124 S. Ct. 2127, 2137 (2004) and
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 462, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 2865 (1981), where police arrested
defendants for drug offenses before their vehicle was searched. Gant observed that drug
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offenses, unlike driving with a suspended license, “suppl[ ied] a basis for searching the
passenger compartment of an arrestee’s vehicle and any containers therein.” Id. at 343-44,
129 S. Ct. at 1719.
Giles argues that Belton and Thornton are distinguishable because J.R. was arrested
for DWI, not possession of drugs, therefore, Fiebelkorn could not have reasonably believed
that he would find drugs in the car. Although Giles is correct that J.R.’s offense is different
from the arresting offenses in Belton and Thornton, the record here still supports the district
court’s determination that Fiebelkorn reasonably believed that he would find drugs —
evidence of the crime of arrest—in the car.
Fiebelkorn testified that when he initially approached the car, J.R. moved
“furtive[ly]” and reached into the center console, and he could not see what was in her
hand. During field sobriety tests, Fiebelkorn noticed that J.R. had “eyelid tremors,” dilated
pupils, and “heat bumps” on her tongue, which is “consistent with smoking from a glass
pipe,” and J.R. had other characteristics consistent with stimulant use. Finally, after J.R.
failed two sobriety tests, she attempted to get past Fiebelkorn to return to her car.
Fiebelkorn testified that because of this, he went to the car to “look[] for evidence related
to the crime, which would have been the DWI.” Based on his observations, it was
reasonable for Fiebelkorn to believe that evidence of the crime would be in the vehicle.
Also, Fiebelkorn was not limited to searching J.R.’s person to obtain DWI evidence
because Fiebelkorn had a reasonable belief that DWI evidence would be found in the car.
Gant requires that “[p]olice may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only
if . . . it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.”
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556 U.S. at 351, 129 S. Ct. at 1723. Giles contends that the only place Fiebelkorn could
find evidence of DWI was in “J.R.’s body, not in her vehicle.” Evidence of drugs or drug
paraphernalia in J.R.’s car is circumstantial evidence that J.R. was driving while impaired.
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not misapply Gant and affirm the
denial of Giles’s motion to suppress.
The state also asserts two alternative grounds to support the search of the vehicle:
(1) Fiebelkorn’s observation of J.R.’s “furtive movements” in the center console gave him
probable cause to search the car, and (2) Fiebelkorn’s observation of the stolen radio items,
in plain view, justified the search. See State v. Flowers, 734 N.W.2d 239, 248 (Minn. 2007)
(stating that the automobile exception allows officers to search a car without a warrant if
they have probable cause to believe the car contains contraband). Because the search was
justified under Gant, we do not consider or decide the state’s alternative arguments.
In conclusion, Fiebelkorn had reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop J.R.’s car,
and the search subsequent to J.R.’s arrest was lawful under Gant. Accordingly, we affirm
the district court’s denial of Fiebelkorn’s motion to suppress.
Affirmed.