State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0806

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Aaren Treina Bertelsen,
Appellant.

Filed April 1, 2019
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69DU-CR-17-91

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Karen B. McGillic, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Mark S. Rubin, St. Louis County Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sharon E. Jacks, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided b y Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and
Florey, Judge.

2
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant challenges her conviction of theft of a motor vehicle, arguing that she was
denied her right to present a complete defense when the district court excluded her
testimony and argument concerning her necessity defense. Because there was no error in
the determination that appellant did not have a valid necessity defense, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Aaren Bertelsen and K.O. each regarded J.H. as her boyfriend. Early in
the morning of January 7, 2017, appellant and J.H. were in J.H.’s house when K.O. drove
up. She left her car running in the driveway and approached the door.
After appellant let K.O. into J.H.’s house, the two women began to fight over whose
boyfriend J.H. was. They fe ll to the floor, and appellant bit K.O.’s thumb. J.H. broke up
the fight. Appellant then left the house and drove away in K.O.’s car, which contained
K.O.’s purse, wallet, checkbook, prescription medication, and cell phone. K.O. called 911,
saying that appellant had stolen her car. Two police officers went to J.H.’s house, and K.O.
filled out a stolen-vehicle report.
Appellant drove to a casino that was open all night, left the car, and got a cab. She
directed the cab to her apartment, about 12 miles from K.O.’s house, and the police found
her there. She had two purses, her own and K.O.’s, when she was taken into cus tody.
Appellant’s purse contained a bottle of Lorazepam prescribed to K.O., a cell phone, a
plastic straw used for the ignition interlock system in K.O.’s car, and K.O.’s insurance

3
cards. Police later found K.O.’s car parked outside the casino. Appellant was charged with
theft of a motor vehicle and theft of a controlled substance.
Appellant wanted to raise a necessity defense to the charge of auto theft. The district
court refused her request to testify about or to argue this defense, saying, “This is not a case
where a necessity defense would be allowed and I’m not going to allow it. . . . I wouldn’t
allow [appellant to testify] regarding her belief that [taking K.O.’s car] was necessary
because that would then be irrelevant ”; nor would the district c ourt allow appellant to
testify that she “had to take the car because [she] felt like [she] was in a situation that [she]
had to get away from.” The judge precluded her from bringing in the evidence by denying
the defense.
But on direct examination, app ellant did testify that: (1) when she saw K.O.’s car
running in J.H.’s driveway, her instinct was to jump in and go so K.O. and J.H. would not
be able to get her; (2) she knew she did not have permission to take K.O.’s car; (3) she
drove it to a casino because she thought she would be safe there; (4) she left the car at the
casino; and (5) although she planned to tell K.O. where the car was, she did not.
During closing argument, appellant’s attorney told the jury that appellant: (1) “was
just attacked at h er new boyfriend’s house in the country”; (2) “testified that she had too
much to drink”; (3) “[left J.H.’s] house in a hurry”; (4) “believed [leaving his house] was
reasonable”; (5) “didn’t intend on keeping that car”; (6) “wanted to get home”; (7) “wanted
to get to a place of safety”; (8) “wanted to be around lights and people ”; and (9) “did the
only thing she [could] think to do and that [was] to get home, to get to a place of safety. . .”

4
The jury convicted appellant of car theft but not of theft of controlled substances.
She challenges the exclusion of her testimony and argument about why she took and drove
K.O.’s car.
D E C I S I O N
Appellant argues that the exclusion of evidence was erroneous because it violated
her constitutional right to intr oduce evidence in her defense. An alleged constitutional
error is subject to harmless-error review. State v. Taylor, 869 N.W.2d 1, 12 (Minn. 2015).
Assuming without deciding that the district court erred in
excluding the evidence, and applying the harmless-error test to
the exclusion, we must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt
that an average jury (i.e., a reasonable jury) would have
reached the same verdict if the evidence had been admitted and
the damaging potential of the evidence fully realized.

Id. (quotations omitted).
A necessity defense defeats a criminal charge if the harm that
would have resulted from compliance with the law would have
significantly exceeded the harm actually resulting from the
defendant’s breach of the law. In addit ion, the defense exists
only if (1) there is no legal alter native to breaking the law,
(2) the harm to be prevented is imminent, and (3) there is a
direct causal connection between breaking the law and
preventing the harm.

State v. Rein, 477 N.W.2d 716, 717 (Minn. App. 1991) (quotation and citations omitted),
review denied (Minn. Jan. 30, 1992). To have the jury instructed on the necessity defense,
a defendant must make a prima facie showing of necessity. State v. Brodie, 532 N.W.2d
557, 557 (Minn. 1995).
Appellant argues that the district court denied her the “constitutional right to present
a defense by prohibiting her testimony and argument about why she took [K.O.’s] car.”

5
But this argument has two defects. First, the transcript shows that, despite the district
court’s disallowance of testimony regarding appellant’s belief that taking K.O.’s car was a
necessity, both appellant on direct examination and her attorney in closing argument did
inform the jury of appellant’s belief that taking the car was a necessity and that she had no
alternatives. Therefore, the district court’s decision did not prejudice appellant because the
jury was informed of appellant’s necessity defense and would have reached the same
verdict if the evidence had been admitted.
Second, appellant implicitly if not explicitly argues that a defendant’s constitutional
right to present a complete defense equates to the right to present any evidence, regardless
of relevance or admissibility. For this argument she rel ies on State v. Wiltse, 386 N.W.2d
315, 317-18 (Minn. App. 1986) (holding that, when a defendant’s presence in a particular
place is an essential element of a crime, the defendant has the right to explain that presence
to the jury), review denied (Minn. June 30, 1986). Here, the elements of appellant’s crime
were (1) taking or driving a motor vehicle (2) without the owner’s consent and (3) knowing
that the owner did not give consent. Appellant admitted to the jury that she took and drove
K.O.’s car without K.O.’s consent and that she knew K.O. had not given consent; she also
told the jury that she did so because she wanted to leave J.H.’s house. Thus, Wiltse is
distinguishable: appellant was not prevented from explaining any element of her crime to
the jury.
Appellant also relies on State v. Thompson , 617 N.W. 2d 609, 613 (Minn. App.
2000) (holding that a defendant was denied her due -process right to present a complete
defense when the district court suppressed her statement to the police and limited her

6
testimony). In Thompson, the defendant was substantially prejudiced by not being allowed
to tell the jury “why she acted with aggression” toward the victim, who the defendant
believed had been having relations with the defendant’s 13-year-old daughter. Thompson,
671 N.W.2d at 613. “ [T]he jury may have inferred [the defendant] was a crazy woman
who just assaults people for no good reason.” Id. (quotation omitted). Here, the jury heard
from appellant why she had driven off in someone else’s car. Neither Wiltse nor Thompson
supports appellant’s position.
Moreover, the district court’s decision to exclude further evidence of appellant’s
reason for taking the car is supported by State v. Thiel , 846 N.W .2d 605, 614 -16 (Minn.
App. 2014) (finding no error in excl usion of a California medical marijuana patient
verification card offered as necessity evidence for possession of marijuana because it
“would have served to confuse and mislead the jury” since “a defense of medical necessity
is not available in Minnesota for . . . a controlled-substance crime”), review denied (Minn.
Aug. 5, 2014), and by Rein, 477 N.W .2d at 718 (finding no error in the exclusion of
necessity-defense evidence when the defendant was not entitled to raise a necessity
defense).
Appellant has not shown that , if the district court had allowed her testimony and
argument about her reason for taking and driving K.O.’s car, the jury would have reached
a different verdict.
Affirmed.