Carly Jaye Nelson, petitioner, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0810

Carly Jaye Nelson, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Oscar Ivan Garcia Medina,
Appellant.

Filed February 4, 2019
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Scott County District Court
File No. 70-CV-18-2590

Carly Jaye Nelson, Prior Lake, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Bruce M. Rivers, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Ro ss, Judge; and
Johnson, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Appellant Oscar Ivan Garcia Medina challenges the grant of a h arassment
restraining order (HRO) against him, arguing (1) that his actions did not have and were not
intended to have a substantial adverse effect on the safety, security, or privacy of another,
and (2) that the geographic restriction prohibiting his presence in an area should not have

2
been imposed. Because he fails to show that the district court abused its discretion, we
affirm.
FACTS
Garcia Medina and respondent Carly Nelson were in a romantic r elationship from
September 2016 until January 2017. Before and during their relationship, the parties were
both working at the University of Minnesota Hospital—Nelson as a nurse and Garcia
Medina as a medical resident.
For about a year after they broke up, Garcia Medina harassed N elson on a number
of occasions, which led to the grant of an HRO on January 31, 2018 (the first HRO). Garcia
Medina harassed Nelson by contin ually trying to rekindle their relationship, despite
Nelson’s stated disinterest; appearing at Nelson’s home late at night and calling, texting,
and ringing her buzzer repeatedly when Nelson did not answer; sending Nelson a message
saying, “Imagine all of the possible ways that I could retaliat e against you”; accessing
Nelson’s private medical records, using his employment credenti a l s , a n d g a i n i n g
confidential information about Nelson, including her change of address; creating a fake
social media profile of Nelson; and sending messages to her fat her and three of Nelson’s
supervisors from work, stating, in part, that Nelson was “getting drunk/high/laid” and that
she was “offering [her] body to rich old men in exchange for money.”
On the day following the issuance of the first HRO, Garcia Med ina’s new girlfriend,
A.D., contacted Nelson and asked if Nelson would be willing to dismiss the first HRO in
return for an apology and monetary compensation from Garcia Med ina. A.D. claimed to
be reaching out without Garcia Medina’s knowledge. Nelson was r eluctant to negotiate,

3
but, after a lengthy exchange of text messages, Nelson eventual ly met A.D. at a coffee
shop. At the meeting, Nelson a nd A.D. signed a written agreemen t under which Nelson
was promised $20,000 for her dismissing the first HRO. Although Garcia Medina was not
present at the meeting, the agree ment identified him as a contr acting party. Also, when
Nelson was meeting with A.D., Garcia Medina contacted Nelson vi a A.D.’s cell phone,
spoke to Nelson about the agreement, and apologized for his actions.
In accordance with the agreement, on February 5, 2018, Nelson asked the district
court to dismiss the first HRO, which it did. Later that day, G arcia Medina sent Nelson a
text message acknowledging that the first HRO had been dismisse d and offering to meet
her the following day for the payment. The next morning, Garcia Medina texted Nelson a
picture of a check made out to her, along with a message saying , “Just got your check at
the bank.” He then sent her a screenshot of their text conversa tion, purportedly to make
sure she was receiving all of his messages. This screenshot showed that Garcia Medina had
labeled Nelson as “C-nt” in his cellphone contacts. Nelson aske d why he sent the
screenshot, and Garcia Medina apologized.
Nelson and Garcia Medina exchanged several more messages throu ghout the day to
set up a meeting. Nelson told Garcia Medina that she would have her sleeping toddler
daughter with her. Garcia Medina said he would bring a copy of the agreement, which he
had signed and notarized, and he asked that they meet somewhere where they could “talk
for a couple minutes to make sure the agreement [was] clear.” The parties ultimately agreed
to meet at a tea shop in St. Paul. Garcia Medina arrived after Nelson. He came to the table
where Nelson and her daughter were sitting and thrust before he r a copy of a magazine,

4
featuring on its cover the attorney representing him in this ca se. He also placed the
attorney’s business card on the table and told Nelson, “[My att orney] has your money;
deal’s off.” Garcia Medina left the shop and drove away.
Later that afternoon, Nelson texted Garcia Medina and A.D., in forming them that
she would petition for another HRO if the agreement was not hon ored. Garcia Medina
replied, “A case of extortion has been started against you. [My attorney] is waiting for my
call to move on and press charges against you. You won’t be abl e to leave the country or
take that flight tomorrow.” 1 He also told Nelson, “[My attorney] has your 20k for legal
expenses.”
Shortly thereafter, Nelson moved for an ex-parte HRO, which th e district court
granted. Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court g ranted Nelson’s petition for
a second HRO against Garcia Medina. Among the prohibitions, the district court prohibited
Garcia Medina from “being within t w o b l o c k s o f [ N e l s o n ’ s ] c u r r ent job site” at the
University of Minnesota Hospital.
Garcia Medina appeals.
D E C I S I O N
“An appellate court reviews a district court’s grant of a[n] [ HRO] under an abuse-
of-discretion standard.” Kush v. Mathison , 683 N.W.2d 841, 843 (Minn. App. 2004),
review denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2004). “[T]his court will reverse the issuanc e of a
restraining order if it is not supported by suffi cient evidence ,” but “[a] district court’s

1 Nelson had plans to fly out of the country the next day for an extended trip.

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findings of fact will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.” Id. at 843-44. A question of
law is reviewed de novo. Peterson v. Johnson, 755 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. App. 2008).
I. The district court did not a buse its discretion in granting the HRO.
To grant an HRO, the district court has to find “at the hearin g t h a t t h e r e a r e
reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent has engaged in harassment.” Minn. Stat.
§ 609.748, subd. 5(b)(3) (2018). Harassment is statutorily defi ned, in pertinent part, as
“repeated incidents of intrusive or unwanted acts, words, or gestures that have a substantial
adverse effect or are intended to have a substantial adverse ef fect on the safety, security,
or privacy of another.” Id., subd. 1(a)(1) (2018). We have held that the HRO statute
“requires proof of, first, objectively unreasonable conduct or intent on the part of the
harasser, and, second, an objectively reasonable belief on the part of the person subject to
harassing conduct.” Peterson, 755 N.W.2d at 764 (quotations and citation omitted).
The district court identified three incidents of harassment by Garcia Medina since
the issuance of the first HRO: “calling [Nelson] a ‘C-nt,’ thre atening her with extortion
charges, and telling her that he’d given ‘her money’ to his new attorney.” It is not in dispute
that the three incidents constituted “intrusive or unwanted acts, words, or gestures.” Minn.
Stat. § 609.748, subd. 1(a)(1). Garcia Medina argues, however, that his conduct did not
“have a substantial adverse effect . . . on the safety, securit y, or privacy of” Nelson. Id.
According to him, his treatment of Nelson was “merely inappropriate and argumentative”
and thus “insufficient to rise to the level of harassment.” See Beach v. Jeschke, 649 N.W.2d
502, 503 (Minn. App. 2002) (citing Witchell v. Witchell, 606 N.W.2d 730, 732 (Minn. App.
2000)) (dicta). He tries to support this general contention in two ways.

6
First, Garcia Medina argues that Nelson’s “safety was never in question,” because
“her sleeping daughter was presen t” when she met him to “comple t e t h e p a y m e n t f o r
dismissing” the first HRO. This argument is unpersuasive. As th e district court noted,
Nelson’s decision to bring her child to the meeting was “predicated on the illusory promise
that the parties had resolved their issues and would be moving forward in mutual respect.”
And the harassing nature of Garcia Medina’s conduct at the meeting was precisely that he
shattered such illusion of respect in, as the district court fo und, a “dramatic” and
“calculated” way.
Moreover, “[a] district court may still make a finding of harassment if such conduct
has, or is intended to have, a substantial adverse effect on the safety, security or privacy of
the average, reasonable individua l, even if the intended victim s h o w s r e s i l i e n c e t o t h e
harasser’s ongoing conduct.” Kush, 683 N.W.2d at 842 (syllabus). Assuming for purposes
of argument that Nelson was not fearful of or intimidated by Ga rcia Medina’s conduct at
the meeting, he fails to show why the district court could not, based on the evidence, find
his conduct objectively harassing.
Second, Garcia Medina explains that his comments merely “expre ss[ed] a feeling
of being oppressed because [Nels on] was holding the restraining order over [his] head in
an effort to extort $20,000.00 from him.” This explanation did not convince the district
court. It is undisputed that the first HRO was rightfully grant ed, and it was A.D. who
pleaded with Nelson to dismiss the order in return for monetary compensation. Initially,
Nelson was extremely reluctant. The district court did not clearly err by finding that Garcia
Medina was manipulating Nelson.

7
Furthermore, Garcia Medina’s fe elings, even if they were reasonable, do not justify
his expressing his anger toward Nelson in a harassing manner. Affirming an HRO imposed
on a person who unreasonably expressed outrage against his neighbor over damage to his
property, we held that “there are limits to such expressions in order to keep peace in the
community.” Id. at 846. Garcia Medina has not shown why the district court err ed by not
finding that his conduct was “an acceptable expression of outrage and civilized conduct.”
Id.
We finally observe that Garcia Medina’s prior harassment, whic h resulted in the
first HRO and which the district court recognized in the HRO under review, gives context
to the current situation. Given the history of Garcia Medina’s prior conduct toward Nelson,
there were objectively reasonable grounds to determine that Garcia Medina’s actions after
the grant of the first HRO had “a substantial adverse effect or [were] intended to have a
substantial adverse effect on th e safety, security, or privacy” of Nelson. Minn. Stat.
§ 609.748, subd. 1(a)(1).
On appeal, the party asserting error bears the burden to make t he alleged error
“appear affirmatively before there can be reversal.” Midway Ctr. Assocs. v. Midway Ctr.,
Inc., 237 N.W.2d 76, 78 (Minn. 1975) (quotation omitted); see also Horodenski v. Lyndale
Green Townhome Ass’n , 804 N.W.2d 366, 372 (Minn. App. 2011) (“[T]he burden of
showing error rests on the party asserting it.”). Because Garci a Medina has failed to meet
his burden, we affirm the district court’s grant of the HRO.

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II. The geographic restriction was not an abuse of discretion.

Garcia Medina raises two challe nges to the geographic restrict ion prohibiting him
from being within two blocks of Nelson’s workplace at the Unive rsity of Minnesota
Hospital. First, he argues that, under the HRO statute, the district court was not authorized
to designate a geographic location where he could not be. It is true that the HRO statute
does not explicitly provide for exclusion of the harasser from a specific location. Section
609.748, subdivision 5(a), simply states that an HRO may “order[] the respondent to cease
or avoid the harassment of another person; or . . . order[] the respondent to have no contact
with another person.” Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 5(a) (2018).
However, it is also true that the HRO statute does not explici tly bar the granting of
an exclusion radius as relief. In fact, subdivision 8(a) requir e s a n H R O t o s e t a c l e a r
boundary of proscribed conduct. See Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 8(a) (2018) (“An order
granted under this section must contain a conspicuous notice to the respondent . . . of the
specific conduct that will constitute a violation of the order.”). Also, although caselaw does
not seem to have conclusively answered the question whether district courts are statutorily
authorized to grant HROs with ge ographic restrictions, this cou rt did not take issue with
such form of relief in Welsh v. Johnson, in which we held that a two-block restriction was
permissible. 508 N.W.2d 212, 216 (Minn. App. 1993). Garcia Medina fails to convincingly
show that the district court erred by prohibiting him from being near Nelson’s workplace.
Second, Garcia Medina argues that the two-block restriction wa s excessive. In
support, he cites an unpublished opinion of this court, Courtney v. McReynolds , which
interpreted the Domestic Abuse No Contact Order (DANCO) statute. A17-0759, 2018 WL

9
1043295 (Minn. App. Feb. 26, 2018). The DANCO statute provides that “the abusing party
[may be excluded] from a reasonable area surrounding the dwelling or residence” of the
abused party. Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 6(a)(3) (2018) (emphasis added). In Courtney,
a one-mile geographic restriction was determined to be unreason able, and Garcia Medina
argues that the two-block restriction here was likewise unreasonable.
Garcia Medina fails to show why the two-block restriction was in fact unreasonable.
The only basis for his claim of “unreasonable hardship” is that the restriction “terminat[es]
any activity a doctor could have at the hospital.” However, nothing in the record indicates
that Garcia Medina needs to ca rry out any activity as a doctor at the University of
Minnesota Hospital. On February 2, 2018, A.D. sent the following text message to Nelson:
“[Garcia Medina] was done at the U prior to any of this. I can tell you with 100% certainty,
this is not the reason for his leaving. He was signing out of all of his cases in November.”
Also, the written agreement among the parties stated, “[Garcia Medina] will not accept
employment at the University of MN. His presence on the campus will be only to complete
previous commitments.” Garcia Me d i n a n e v e r e x p l a i n e d w h a t t h e “previous
commitments” are. His assertion th at he suffers “unreasonable h ardship” due to the two-
block restriction is not supported by the record. He has failed to show that the district court
abused its discretion by imposing the geographic restriction. We, therefore, also affirm the
district court’s decision in this regard.
Affirmed.