In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: S. F. and J. E., Parents.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0821

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: S. F. and J. E., Parents.

Filed October 15, 2018
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Pipestone County District Court
File No. 59-JV-18-1

Amie Ascheman, Runchey, Louwagie & Wellman, P.L.L.P., Marshall, Minnesota (for
appellant-father S.F.)

Travis J. Smith, Kayla M. Johnson, Smith & Johnson, Slayton, Minnesota (for respondent-
mother J.E.)

William J. Toulouse, Quarnstrom & Doering, P.A., Marshall, Minnesota (for grandparents
P.F. and D.F.)

Damain Sandy, Pipestone County Attorney, Pipestone, Minnesota ( for Southwest Health
and Human Services)

Alex Miller, Luverne, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Florey, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge ; and Reyes, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REYES, Judge
Appellant father argues that the district court erred in making its statutory findings
and in making its determination to transfer custody of child fr om father to respondent

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mother. Father also argues that the correct standard for review is the clear-error standard.
We affirm.
FACTS
G.F. was born in 2013, to appellan t S.F. (father) and responden t J.E. (mother).
Mother and father were in a brief relationship that ended befor e G.F. was born. After a
trial in 2014, father had sole physical and legal custody, and mother had little to no contact
with G.F. until September 2017.
I. Father
Father has used marijuana and methamphetamine for twenty years. Since March
2016, G.F. has lived with fathe r’s parents (grandparents), who have taken on the primary
role of parenting G.F. In January 2017, Southwest Health and Human Services (SWHHS)
initiated a Child in Need of Protection or Services (CHIPS) proceeding regarding G.F. after
law enforcement found drugs and paraphernalia among G.F.’s toys and clothing in father’s
home. SWHHS began working with father to address concerns including father’s drug use,
the condition of his home, and his anger-management issues. SW HHS formally placed
G.F. with grandparents following a voluntary-placement agreemen t. The district court
formally adjudicated G.F. as CHIPS on September 14, 2017.

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When father entered treatment on December 4, 2017, he tested po sitive for
methamphetamine but maintains that he has remained drug-free si nce this date. 1 Father
successfully completed treatment on January 5, 2018. At the ti me of trial, father still
attended outpatient treatment, Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, a nd maintained daily
contact with his sponsor.
II. Mother
Mother used methamphetamine for about a year and a half shortly after G.F. was
born. Mother stopped using drugs in November 2014, and has not used drugs since. Also
at that time, mother returned to South Dakota to resume living with her fiancé, D.W., and
their five children, who are G.F .’s half-siblings. Since then, mother has been a stay-at-
home parent and continues to be the primary caretaker for her children.
After learning that a CHIPS pro ceeding had been initiated, moth er contacted
SWHHS and stated that she is G .F.’s mother and is willing to ca r e f o r h i m . M o t h e r
complied with a case plan that SWHHS gave her, including the completion of a chemical-
dependency assessment. After conducting the chemical-dependency assessment, SWHSS
did not recommend any additional steps for mother to take.
At the time of trial, mother had unsupervised visitation with G .F. every other
Wednesday and every other weeke nd. G.F. enjoys spending time w ith his half-siblings

1 There is some dispute as to the date on which father stopped u sing drugs. SWHHS has
concerns as to whether father has abstained from using drugs af ter completing in-patient
treatment, as one of the sweat patches removed on January 30, 2 018, came back positive
and another one appeared to be tam pered with. SWHHS maintains that father actually
stopped using drugs after January 30, 2018.

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and has adapted well to daily life at mother’s house. Mother i s very involved in her
children’s education and activities in the community. In addition, D.W. is willing and able
to provide financial and emotiona l support for G.F. in addition to his and mother’s other
children.
SWHHS and mother pe titioned for a transfer of custody to mother . Based on the
testimony at trial, the district court made factual findings an d findings under Minn.
Stat. § 260C.517(a)(1)-(4) (2016). In an order dated May 11, 2 018, the district court
awarded sole legal and physical custody to mother. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
I. Standard of Review

As an initial matter, the parties dispute the standard of revie w on appeal. Father
argues that a clear-error standa rd applies to the district cour t’s statutory bases for the
transfer of custody. Mother argues that the correct standard o f review is abuse of
discretion. On appeal from a juvenile-protection order transferring legal custody, this court
applies a two-part standard of review. See In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D. , 865 N.W.2d
315, 321–22 (Minn. App. 2015), review denied (Minn. July 21, 2015). The district court’s
factual findings are reviewed for clear error, and the statutory findings are reviewed for an
abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 900–01 (Minn.
App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 17, 2012). A finding of fact “is clearly erroneous
only if there is no reasonable evidence to support the finding or when an appellate court is
left with the definite and firm c onviction that a mistake occurred.” In re Welfare of J.H.,
844 N.W.2d 28, 35 (Minn. 2014) (citing State v. Rhoads , 813 N.W.2d 880, 885 (Minn.

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2012)). “Among other ways, a district court abuses its discretion if it acts against logic and
the facts on record, or if it enters fact findings that are uns upported by the record, or if it
misapplies the law.” In re Adoption of T.A.M. , 791 N.W.2d 573, 578 (Minn. App. 2010)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Therefore, we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error, and we
review the statutory findings and ultimate custody determination for an abuse of discretion.
II. The district court’s factual findings are supported by the record.
Father does not challenge the district court’s particular factual findings, but instead
points to other evidence in the record to support his argument that this court should reverse
the district court’s custody determination. Father’s argument is misguided.
Father’s arguments urge this court to reweigh the evidence, ass ess witness
credibility, and disregard factual findings supported by the re cord, without making any
specific challenges to the distric t court’s findings. But, “[t ]hat the record might support
[factual] findings other than t hose made by the trial court doe s not show that the court’s
findings are defective.” Vangsness v. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 468, 474 (Minn. App. 2000);
see In re Welfare of Child of J.L.L. , 801 N.W.2d 405, 413 (Minn. App. 2011) (citing this
aspect of Vangsness in a juvenile-protection appeal).
Further, we have reviewed the record and are satisfied that the district court’s
findings are not clearly erroneous. See Wilson v. Moline, 234 Minn. 174, 182, 47 N.W.2d
865, 870 (1951) (an appellate court’s function “does not require [it] to discuss and review
in detail the evidence for the purpose of demonstrating that it supports the trial court’s
findings” and an appellate court’s “duty is performed when [it] consider[s] all the

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evidence. . .and determine[s] that it reasonably supports the findings.”); Peterka v. Peterka,
675 N.W.2d 353, 257-58 (Minn. App. 2004) (applying this aspect of Wilson in a family
law appeal). Accordingly, we defer to the district court’s findings.
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion in its statutor y findings and its
transfer determination.

Father argues that each of the district court’s findings under Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.517(a)(1)-(4) were not “pr oved by clear and convincing e vidence” and that the
district court “clearly erred” in making each of these findings. We are not persuaded.
The district court’s statutory findings and the ultimate decisi on that there is a
statutory basis for a permanency disposition is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. D.L.D.,
865 N.W.2d at 322.
The district court may order pe rmanent legal and physical custo d y t o a f i t a n d
willing relative if it is in the best interests of the child. Minn. Stat. § 260C.515, subd. 4
(2016). Such an order must include the following detailed find ings: (1) how the child’s
best interests are served by the order; (2) the nature and exte nt of the responsible social-
services agency’s reasonable efforts to reunify the child with the parent; (3) the parent’s
efforts and ability to use services to correct the conditions w hich led to the out-of-home
placement; and (4) that the conditions which led to the out-of- home placement have not
been corrected so that the child can safely return home. Minn. Stat. § 260C.517(a)(1)-(4).
We address each factor in turn.

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A. Best interests
Father argues that the district court clearly erred in finding that the transfer of
custody served G.F.’s best interests because it failed to asses s G.F.’s need to maintain
connections to his community, the impact that a transfer of cus tody would have on G.F.,
and G.F.’s relationship to current caretakers. We disagree.
The district court found that G.F.’s best interests would be se rved by transferring
custody to mother after analyzing the best-interests factors listed in Minn. Stat. § 260C.212,
subd. 2(b)(1-10) (2016). The first factor is the child’s “current functioning and behaviors.”
Id., subd. 2(b)(1). The district court found that G.F. is a “hap py, healthy young boy,” is
enrolled in preschool, is “bright, curious, and verbal,” and functions well at both mother’s
home and grandparents’ home.
The second, third, and fourth best-interests factors are the medical, educational, and
developmental needs of the child. Id., subd. 2(b)(2)-(4). The district court found that G.F.
has no ongoing medical needs and that family counseling may benefit G.F. as he transitions
to mother’s house. The district court found that G.F.’s educat ional needs can be met by
the school system in Clark, Sout h Dakota, where mother lives. The district court found
that G.F. has no developmental issues and can benefit from being active and participating
in family and extracurricular activities.
The fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth factors are the child’s h istory and past
experience, religious and cultural needs, community connections, and interests and talents.
Id., subd. 2(b)(5)-(8). The district court found that G.F. has b een raised in a loving
environment by his grandparents and has been protected from exp osure to father’s

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chemical use, but that he has been deprived of a relationship w ith mother. Additionally,
the district court found that G.F .’s cultural needs could be me t by both parents. Finally,
the district court found that, at age four, G.F. has limited co nnections with communities.
His primary connections are to family, which are well-establish ed with father and
grandparents, and are developing positively with mother and her family. The district court
found that G.F.’s interests revolve around toys and simple outdoor activities and that they
should be developed and encouraged by family members as G.F. grows.
The ninth factor is the child’s relationship to current caretak ers, parents, siblings,
and relatives. Id., subd. 2(b)(9). Under this factor, the district court found that G.F. has a
loving bond with grandparents, but that over time, this relatio nship should take on more
characteristics of a typical gra ndparent-grandchild relationship. The district court found
that while G.F. has a positive relationship with father, the relationship has been stunted by
father’s chemical use and that father should assume more parenting responsibilities. With
respect to G.F.’s relationship with mother, the district court found that while it has been
delayed, the relationship is progressing toward a healthy mother-son relationship. The final
factor is the child’s reasonable preference. Id. subd. 2(b)(10). The district court found that
G.F. is not at a sufficient age to express a preference.
The district court’s findings on the best-interests factors are supported by evidence
in the record. This evidence included the guardian ad litem (GAL)’s testimony that it is in
G.F.’s best interests to be placed in the custody of mother and that G.F. would adapt well
to mother’s home. The social work er also testified that placin g G.F. with mother is in
G.F.’s best interests. Mother expressed her willingness to participate in therapy with G.F.

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and her other children in order to assist him with the transiti on. Mother stated that she
would help maintain G.F.’s relationship with father and G.F.’s grandparents. The district
court carefully considered and ba lanced all of the best-interes ts factors, including G.F.’s
current relationships to caretakers and the impact that the transfer might have on G.F. The
district court did not abuse its discretion.
B. Reunification efforts
Father argues that the district court clearly erred when it found that SWHHS made
reasonable efforts to reunite G.F. and father because SWHHS should have asked father to
complete a parenting class and to work on the parent-child bond. We disagree.
The district court found that SWHHS provided father with chemic al-use
assessments, transportation, anger-management assessments, case management,
unannounced home visits, random UAs, monthly face-to-face conta ct with G.F., and
administrative-review meetings with father, the foster parents, social services, and the
child-protection social worker. The “nature of the services wh ich constitute ‘reasonable
efforts’ depends on the problem presented.” See In re Welfare of Children of T.R. , 750
N.W.2d 656, 664 (Minn. 2008) (citing In re Welfare of S.Z., 547 N.W.2d 886, 892 (Minn.
1996)). Given the issues presented here, which include father’ s chemical use, anger
management, and the condition of father’s home, SWHHS’s efforts were reasonable. We
discern no abuse of discretion by the district court.
C. Father’s efforts and ability to use services to correct conditions
Father argues that the district court clearly erred when it fou nd that father’s efforts
and ability to use services to correct the conditions leading to out-of-home placement were

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insufficient because he worked on items in his case plan prior to entering into treatment
and was in full compliance with his case plan at the time of trial. We are not persuaded.
The district court found that father’s compliance with the case p l a n w a s
unsatisfactory for a period of time based on his continued chem ical use and failure to
improve the conditions of his home. The district court based this finding on the testimony
of the social worker that father did not fully comply with the case plan until January 18,
2018, his chemical use had continued for eleven months after SW HHS became involved,
and he failed to cooperate with agency efforts prior to enterin g treatment. The social
worker testified that, in accord ance with the CHIPS case plan, she visited father’s home
approximately ten times between January 2017 and January 2018 a nd observed that the
house was not safe and appropriate for G.F. until January 2018. Additionally, the case plan
required father to comply with all random drug testing, but on some occasions, father
refused to comply because he wa s still using drugs. Substantia l evidence in the record
supports the district court’s determination that father’s efforts and ability to use services to
correct the conditions were insufficient.
D. Whether conditions have been corrected
Father contends that the distri ct court clearly erred by findin g that the conditions
which led to out-of-home placement had not been corrected so that G.F. could safely return
home. Similar to the argument above, father’s argument centers on the fact that he had
completed the case plan at the time of trial. We disagree.
The district court found that the conditions leading to G.F.’s out-of-home placement
had not been corrected to allow G.F. to safely return home. De spite father’s successful

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completion of treatment, father “continues to defer parenting responsibilities to his parents,
has not demonstrated sufficient stability, and would need a sig nificant amount of time to
develop a healthy parent-child relationship.” In addition, the district court found that father
has not demonstrated an ability t o provide safety and stability for G.F. While the district
court commended father for being drug-free, it also considered the risk of relapse in the
early stages of recovery and the particular dangers to G.F. in the event that father were to
relapse.
The record contains substantial evidence to support these findi ngs, including the
opinions of the GAL and the social worker. The social worker testified that, at the time of
trial, father had not demonstrated an ability or willingness to assume all parental duties and
responsibilities for G.F. He needed a significant amount of time to build a healthy parent-
child relationship. As of February 2018, father’s parental dut ies were minimal, such as,
giving G.F. “a quick bath once,” and father’s relationship with G.F. was “more of a fun
uncle that likes to play video games.” According to the social worker, G.F. could not be
returned to father in the fores eeable future. The GAL also tes tified that father had not
demonstrated an ability to be a f ull-time parent. Further, fat her’s treatment counselor
recommended that his patients refrain from major life changes i n the first six to twelve
months of treatment to lower the risk of relapse. As a result, the district court did not abuse
its discretion in determining that the conditions that led to out-of-home placement were not
corrected so that G.F. could safely return home.

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Here, the district court made extensive findings under Minn. St at. § 260C.517(a)
(1)-(4). Because the district court’s findings are supported by ample evidence in the record,
we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion.
Affirmed.