State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0832

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Pedro Antonio Lawler,
Appellant.

Filed April 15, 2019
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Chisago County District Court
File No. 13-CR-16-567

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Janet Reiter, Chisago County Attorney, David W. Hemming, Assist ant County Attorney,
Erin C. Stephens, Assistant County Attorney, Center City, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Public Defender, Jessica Merz Godes, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Hooten , Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judg e; and Cochran,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
COCHRAN, Judge
Appellant Pedro Antonio Lawler argues that the district court e rred by failing to
address a potential conflict of interest between himself and his attorney after he moved to

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withdraw his guilty pleas due to ineffective assistance of coun sel. Because Lawler’s
attorney helped him present his request to withdraw his guilty pleas and the district court
fully considered and addressed Lawler’s request, we affirm.
FACTS
In September 2016, a grand jury indicted Lawler on 13 counts of criminal sexual
conduct and child pornography. Ten of those counts carried life sentences. On September
18, 2017, Lawler agreed to plea d guilty to two counts of first- degree criminal sexual
conduct in an amended public indi ctment in exchange for the sta te dismissing the
remaining counts. The plea agr eement specified that Lawler wou ld receive consecutive
200-month sentences.
During the plea hearing, Lawler’s public defender informed the district court that
Lawler had been wavering on whether or not to plead guilty, and Lawler then stated that
he intended to plead guilty. Lawler indicated that he went through the plea agreement line
by line with his public defender. Lawler also indicated that he did not have any additional
questions for his public defender, any questions about his public defender’s representation,
any questions about the pleas, or any questions about his rights. Lawler agreed that he was
clear headed and that he was entering his guilty pleas freely a nd voluntarily. Prior to
accepting Lawler’s pleas, the district court indicated that onc e he pleaded guilty and
established a factual basis “it’s very difficult to withdraw that plea.” Lawler indicated that
he understood and proceeded to plead guilty.
In response to questions from the prosecutor, Lawler agreed that he had differences
of opinion with his public defender over the course of the case . But he indicated that he

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was making the decision to plead guilty for himself, based on t he evidence and his
prospects at trial.
Nearly two months later, on November 2, Lawler sent his public defender a letter
stating that he wished to withdraw his guilty pleas because he was under duress during the
plea hearing. Lawler’s public defender then filed a motion on Lawler’s behalf to withdraw
his guilty pleas. The public defender attached an affidavit in dicating that he “did not
perceive [Lawler] to be operating under any type of mental dure ss; this may have been
difficult to detect because of [L awler’s] intelligence and know ledge of his case.” The
public defender’s affidavit further indicated that if he had “o bserved mental-duress, [he]
would not have furthered the plea[s], and [he] would have informed the Court at the time
of the plea[s].”
During a hearing on Lawler’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, Lawler’s public
defender indicated that Lawler wanted to address the district c ourt. The district court
invited Lawler to speak. The public defender told Lawler that he was free to say anything
he wanted to the district court and that it would not negatively affect his status because he
had already pleaded guilty. Lawler told the district court that, prior to pleading guilty, he
informed his public defender that he was under duress and “in n o mental shape” to plead
guilty. Lawler stated that he had insisted to his public defen der that he wanted to go to
trial, and that his public defe nder responded by yelling at him , telling him that he would
get life in prison, and stating that “he would make himself as limitedly available [to Lawler]
as he possibly could.” Lawler then told the district court that he felt that if he did not plead
guilty he would “have no represen tation to speak of with [his p ublic defender] other than

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the bare minimum possible.” The public defender told the distr ict court that he had no
further argument. Neither Lawler nor his public defender sugge sted that Lawler should
receive different representation either for his motion to withd raw his guilty pleas or later
in the case.
The district court denied Lawle r’s motion to withdraw his pleas , finding that
Lawler’s statements were not credible. The district court’s order noted that (1) aside from
Lawler’s statements made long after the plea hearing, the recor d contained no evidence
that Lawler’s public defender coerced him; (2) the district court did not observe that Lawler
was under any mental duress during the hearing; and (3) Lawler never indicated any
concern or equivocation about his voluntary desire to proceed w ith his guilty pleas. The
district court concluded that Lawler did not meet either the ma nifest-injustice standard or
the fair-and-just standard necessary to withdraw his guilty pleas.
The district court ultimately sentenced Lawler to two consecuti ve 200-month
sentences. Lawler’s public defender continued to represent Law ler for his sentencing
hearing.
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Lawler argues that the district court erred by failing to addre ss the alleged conflict
of interest between Lawler and his public defender and by faili ng to appoint substitute
counsel to represent him for his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. A criminal defendant
has a constitutional right to counsel. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6. A
defendant’s constitutional “right to counsel includes a fair opportunity to secure an attorney

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of choice, but an indigent defendant does not have the unbridled right to be represented by
the attorney of his choice.” State v. Worthy, 583 N.W.2d 270, 278 (Minn. 1998). “A court
will grant an indigent’s request for different counsel only if exceptional circumstances exist
and the demand is timely and reasonably made.” Id. (quotation omitted).
If “the defendant voices serious allegations of inadequate representation, the district
court should conduct a searching inquiry before determining whe ther the defendant’s
complaints warrant the appointment of substitute counsel.” State v. Munt , 831 N.W.2d
569, 586 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted). “[W]hen an attorney informs the district court
of a probable risk of conflict, and the court fails to take adequate steps to ascertain whether
an impermissible conflict exists , the defendant’s conviction mu s t b e r e v e r s e d w i t h o u t
inquiry into prejudice resulting from the alleged conflict.” State v. Paige, 765 N.W.2d 134,
140-41 (Minn. App. 2009) (quotation omitted).
The Minnesota Supreme Court addressed whether a defendant shoul d receive
substitute counsel on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea in Butala v. State , 664 N.W.2d
333, 341 (Minn. 2003). In that case, Butala sought to withdraw his guilty pleas, arguing in
part that he was “under emotional and mental stress at the time of the pleas” and that he
“had received inadequate representation.” Butala, 664 N.W.2d at 340. Butala brought his
motion pro se, and his attorneys declined to speak in support of the motion, citing conflicts
of interest should the motion be granted. Id. at 341. The district court denied the motion
to withdraw the guilty pleas, and Butala later brought a petiti on for postconviction relief
through independent counsel. Id. at 341. After the postconvic tion court denied Butala’s
petition, he appealed. Id. at 338. The supreme court affirmed his conviction, stating that,

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although the better procedure would have been to appoint substitute counsel for the motion
to withdraw the guilty pleas, the district court gave the motio n serious consideration, and
the defendant was able to present his claims to the postconvict ion court with independent
counsel. Id. at 341.
This court considered a similar issue in Paige. In that case, Paige pleaded guilty
while represented by private counsel. Paige, 765 N.W.2d at 136. Paige then wrote to the
district court, indicating that he wanted to withdraw his plea and fire his counsel, and
alleging that he only pleaded guilty because of his counsel’s “ verbal coercion and
persuasion.” Id. at 136-37. The district court then held a hearing “to understa nd on the
record what [Paige’s] wishes are,” but stated that it was not h earing any motions. Id. at
137 (quotation marks omitted). The district court indicated that it could not take any action
on Paige’s request to withdraw his plea unless he had another attorney ready to substitute.
Id. The district court also indicated that Paige could re-apply for a public defender but took
no further action on the issue. Id.
Paige’s attorney did not file any motion on his behalf and mad e no argument during
a combined sentencing and withdrawal hearing. Id. Paige’s attorney indicated during the
hearing that, because Paige was arguing ineffective assistance of counsel, he was “a little
bit in a difficult position in terms of what [he could] and [co uld not] do in this case.” Id.
This court distinguished the case from Butala, writing that “counsel’s comments at the
January 8, 2008, hearing, combined with his failure to file any motion or make any
arguments on appellant’s behalf, were sufficient to bring the district court’s attention to the
fact that a potential conflict of interest existed that could m aterially limit counsel’s

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representation of appellant.” Id. at 141. This court noted that the absence of representation
in Butala “was attributable solely to the nature of [Butala’s] plea-withdrawal claim” while
in Paige, the issue could not be “divorced from the district court’s fa ilure to clarify and
address appellant’s request to discharge counsel.” Id. at 142.
Lawler argues that this case is similar to Paige and that this court should remand to
district court for a new plea-withdrawal hearing with conflict- free counsel. But this case
is distinguishable from Paige in several significant ways. First, Paige had a private
attorney. Id. at 136. Lawler was represented by the public defender’s office. A defendant
does not have an unbridled right to a different public defender , and, unlike Paige, Lawler
never requested a new attorney. See Worthy, 583 N.W.2d at 278 (explaining that the court
will only grant a request for a different public defender under exceptional circumstances).
Second, Paige’s attorney moved to withdraw and indicated that h e was limited in
his ability to represent Paige. Paige, 765 N.W.2d at 137. In contrast, Lawler’s public
defender did not move to withdraw or indicate any difficulty representing Lawler. In fact,
Lawler’s public defender continued to represent Lawler through his sentencing.
Third, Paige’s attorney did not file a motion or argue on his b ehalf. Id. at 136-37.
Lawler’s public defender filed a motion indicating Lawler’s pos ition and arranged for
Lawler to explain his position to the district court in his own words. Lawler was able to
present his position and his version of the facts to the district court. Lawler argues that his
public defender’s affidavit undermined his position. But the affidavit’s statement that the
public defender did not observe any mental duress was a simple statement of fact, and the
affidavit also noted that the public defender may not have noticed signs of duress. Lawler’s

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public defender, as an officer of the court, has a duty to the administration of justice as well
as to his client. Rucker v. Schmidt , 794 N.W.2d 114, 120 (Minn. 2011). The public
defender’s affidavit complied with both of these duties by informing the district court that,
although he did not observe any mental duress, signs of mental duress may have been
difficult to notice due to Lawler’s intelligence and knowledge of the case.
Finally, and most importantly, in Paige, the district court did not consider Paige’s
requests. 765 N.W.2d at 137. Here, the district court considered Lawler’s plea-withdrawal
request, including his claim that he was under duress when he pleaded guilty. The district
court found that Lawler’s statements were not credible, that th e district court did not
observe any mental duress during the hearing, and that Lawler never indicated any concern
or equivocation about his request to plead guilty. The district court thoroughly considered
Lawler’s claims under both the manifest-injustice standard and the fair-and-just standard.
The district court did not err by denying Lawler’s request to w ithdraw his guilty pleas
without appointing substitute counsel.
Affirmed.