State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0837

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Christina Vanda Garza,
Appellant.

Filed April 8, 2019
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Carlton County District Court
File No. 09-CR-17-1281

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Michael Everson, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Lauri A. Ketola, Carlton County Attorney, Carlton, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Suzanne M. Senecal -Hill,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Florey, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and
Bjorkman, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges her controlled-substance convictions, arguing that insufficient
evidence supports them because the only direct evidence of her participation in the offenses

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was the testimony of a cooperating witness who participated in a controlled purchase of
methamphetamine. We affirm.
FACTS
In mid-June 2017, S.V. was arrested for possessin g methamphetamine and agreed
to cooperate with police to get out of jail and possibly avoid criminal charges . S.V.
arranged to purchase one pound of methamphetamine from M.M. for $9,000. Before the
purchase, police equipped S.V. with a hidden recording device, $9,000 in cash, and an
unmarked vehicle.
On June 22, shortly before midnight, M.M. pulled into the gas station parking lot
where he and S.V. had agreed to meet. Appellant Christina Garza got out of M.M.’s vehicle
and walked into the gas station, carrying a large blue purse with a white plastic bag inside
it. M.M. called S.V. to say he had arrived at the gas station, then pulled around to the side
of the building where S.V. had parked. S.V. got out of his vehicle and into M.M.’s vehicle.
He handed M.M. the cash. M.M. counted the money and then called Garza, who was in
the gas station restroom. He told her to “come out the bathroom” and around the building
to his vehicle. Garza made a brief purchase and returned to M.M.’s vehicle.
Garza approached the passenger side of the vehicle, and S.V. opened the door.
Garza took a white plasti c shopping bag, contain ing another plastic bag, out of her purse
and handed it to him. She told S.V., “You’ll be happy . . . . It’s made up—super made up
for ya.” S.V. removed his hat to signal police that the transaction was complete.
Officers immediately approached M.M.’s vehicle. They discovered Garza holding
the cash in her hand and arrested her and M.M. They also collected the plastic bag from

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S.V. It contained a gallon -sized zip bag with a “crystal -like glass material” inside;
subsequent testing confirmed that the material was 444.46 grams of methamphetamine.
Garza told police that she knew M.M. was involved with methamphetamine, but she
denied selling methamphetamine. Police searched Garza and her purse. From inside
Garza’s bra, police recovered a small plastic bag containing a substance later confirmed to
be 0.516 grams of methamphetamine. Among the contents of Garza’s purse, police
discovered two zip pouches containing $412 cash and a trace amount (0.019 grams) of
methamphetamine.
Garza wa s charged with first -degree sale of a controlled substance, first -degree
possession of a controlled substance, fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance, and
introducing contraband into a jail. At trial, S.V. testified that Garza handed him the bag of
methamphetamine. He also acknowledged that he has multiple prior convictions and that
he arranged the June 22 controlled purchase to avoid another charge. The jury found Garza
guilty of all charges, and the district court sentenced her to 105 months ’ imprisonment.
Garza appeals.
D E C I S I O N
When reviewing a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge, we carefully analyze the
record to determine whether the evidence is sufficient , when viewed in the light most
favorable to the conviction. State v. Ortega, 813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn. 2012). We must
assume that “the jury believed the state’ s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the
contrary.” State v. Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d 373, 384 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). And
we will “not disturb the ve rdict if the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of

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innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably
conclude that the defendant was guilty of the charged offense.” Ortega, 813 N.W.2d at
100.
To convict Garza of the sale offense, the state was required to prove that she sold
(or gave away, bartered, delivered, exchanged, distributed, or disposed of to another) at
least 17 grams of methamphetamine. Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 1(1) (2016); see Minn.
Stat. § 152.01, subd. 15a (2016) (defining “sell”). To convict Garza of the possession
offense, the state was required to prove that she possessed at least 50 grams of
methamphetamine. Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(1) (2016).
S.V.’s testimony is direct evidence t hat Garza had in her purse and then delivered
to him a plastic bag containing a crystalline substance later confirmed to be 444.46 grams
of methamphetamine. This evidence alone amply establishes the requisite elements of both
the sale and possession offenses.
Garza contends that S.V.’s testimony is insufficient to support the convictions
because (1) he was not a credible witness, in light of his criminal history and cooperation
with the police to avoid a drug charge , and (2) his testimony was not sufficiently
corroborated. These arguments are unavailing.
First, unlike accomplice testimony, a cooperating witness’s testimony does not
present any unique concerns that necessitate corroboration. Cf. State v. Longo, 909 N.W.2d
599, 607 (Minn. App. 2018) (explaining that accomplice testimony requires corroboration
because it is “inherently suspect”). Rather, “a conviction can rest on the uncorroborated
testimony of a single credible witness,” including testimony of a cooperating witness. State

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v. Foreman, 680 N.W.2d 536, 539 (Minn. 2004); see State v. Hadgu, 681 N.W.2d 30, 34
(Minn. App. 2004) (affirming controlled -substance conviction based on testimony of
cooperating witness), review denied (Minn. Sept. 21, 2004). Credibility determinations are
“the exclusive province of the jury ,” which we do not second -guess on appeal. State v.
Outlaw, 748 N.W.2d 349, 356-57 (Minn. App. 2008), review denied (Minn. July 15, 2008).
The jury heard about S.V.’s criminal history and his motive for working with police and
testifying; the verdict reflects that the jury determined that he was nonetheless credible.
See Foreman, 680 N.W.2d at 539 (stating that a jury apprised of credibility concerns can
weigh credibility).
Second, even if corroboration were required, substantial evidence corroborates
S.V.’s testimony that Garza was the one who gave him the methamphetamine.
Photographic evidence indicates that Garza had a white plastic bag, like the one containing
the metham phetamine, in her purse when she entered the gas station. Although S.V.
handed the cash to M.M., nothing in the audio recording indicates that M.M. gave S.V. the
methamphetamine. The recording reveals that Garza spoke to S.V. about the
methamphetamine, telling him, “You’ll be happy . . . . It ’s made up—super made up for
ya.” When officers approached M.M.’s vehicle immediately after the controlled purchase,
Garza was the person with the cash. And her purse contained trace amounts of
methamphetamine. This evidence thoroughly corroborates S.V.’s testimony implicating
Garza.

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On this record , we conclude that sufficient evidence establish es that Garza
possessed methamphetamine and sold it to S.V.
Affirmed.