A20-1588

1
STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A18-0846
A20-1588

Washington County McKeig, J.

State of Minnesota,

Respondent,

vs. Filed: August 18, 2021
Office of Appellate Courts
Stephen Carl Allwine,

Appellant.

________________________

Christa J. Groshek, Anna E. Tobia, Groshek Law, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota, for
appellant.

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and

Pete Orput, Washington County Attorney, Nicholas A. H ydukovich, Assistant County
Attorney, Stillwater, Minnesota, for respondent.
________________________
S Y L L A B U S
1. Sufficient evidence supports the jury’s verdict that appellant is guilty of first-
degree premeditated murder.
2. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s claim of
prosecutorial misconduct without an evidentiary hearing because, even if the alleged facts
2
were proven by a preponderance of the evidence, appellant is conclusively entitled to no
relief on that claim.
3. Based on the information before the district court when it denied appellant’s
claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel without an evidentiary hearing, the district
court did not abuse its discretion because, even if the then-alleged facts were proven by a
preponderance of the evidence, appellant is conclusively entitled to no relief on that claim.
4. A motion for reconsideration of a postconviction order that denies relief
cannot introduce new evidence.
Affirmed.
O P I N I O N
MCKEIG, Justice.
After being convicted of first-degree premeditated murder for killing his wife,
appellant Stephen Allwine1 appeals from his conviction and from the district court’s denial
of his petition for postconviction relief. Allwine presents four issues on appeal. First, he
argues his conviction must be reversed because the evidence presented at trial was
insufficient to support the jury’s verdict that he is guilty. Second, he claims his conviction
must be reversed, or alternatively, a postconviction evidentiary hearing must be held,
because the State committed prosecutorial misconduct. Third, he argues he is entitled to a
new trial because his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel. Last, he
contends an evidentiary hearing must be held to review the opinions of two experts to

1 Because we reference multiple members of the Allwine family in this opinion, we
will refer to appellant as “Stephen” or “Allwine” to eliminate confusion.
3
determine if a new trial is warranted. Because we conclude that these claims have no merit,
we affirm the judgment of conviction and the decisi on of the district court that denied
postconviction relief.
FACTS
Stephen and Amy Allwine married in 1998. Stephen worked in information
technology. Amy ran a dog training business from the Allwine family residence. Stephen
and Amy had a son, J.A. Stephen and Amy were very involved in their church, which does
not condone infidelity or divorce. Stephen was a church elder who gave sermons and
counseled others in the congregation. If a church elder is found to have committed
adultery, that person could no longer serve as an elder and may be asked to leave the
congregation. Beginning in 2014, Stephen engaged in multiple extramarital affairs.
In February 2016, a person using the online screen name “dogdayGod” sent a
message to Besa Mafia2 on the dark web,3 seeking to hire a person to kill Amy. Soon after,
dogdayGod sent a second message to Besa Mafia requesting that Amy be killed while she
was on a business trip in Moline, Illinois. DogdayGod provided Besa Mafia with the
address of the hotel where Amy would be staying, a physical description of Amy, a

2 The record shows that “Besa Mafia” is a store on the dark web that advertises itself
as a forum for individuals to hire a hitman.

3 The record shows the “dark web” is a part of the internet that masks a user’s identity,
making the user virtually anonymous. The dark web can only be accessed using a
specialized web browser called “TOR.”

4
description of Amy’s vehicle, and a photograph of Amy. DogdayGod paid Besa Mafia in
Bitcoin4 to kill Amy.
In May 2016, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) learned through an
anonymous source that dogdayGod was trying to hire a hitman to kill Amy. An FBI agent
and a Cottage Grove police detective notified Amy of the threat against her life. Law
enforcement advised Amy to take security precautions and to report any suspicious activity
to police. The next month, Amy notified the FBI that she had received two anonymous
emails threatening to harm her and her family unless she committed suicide. In response
to the threats, the FBI began an investigation. Investigators interviewed Stephen and
Amy’s work colleagues, and searched Stephen and Amy’s two HP Notebook laptop
computers.5 The investigation did not result in any leads.
November 13, 2016: The Day Amy Allwine Was Killed
Stephen awoke shortly before 6:00 a.m. and went to his basement office to work.
Around 12:00 p.m., Stephen went upstairs to have lunch with Amy and J.A. Soon after,
Amy told Stephen that she was feeling dizz y, lightheaded, and that s he was going to bed
to rest. Around 1:00 p.m., C.Z., Amy’s father, arrived at the Allwine residence to finish a
home project that he had started a few days earlier. Stephen told C.Z. that Amy was in bed
and not feeling well. C.Z. did not see his daughter while he was at the Allwine residence.

4 The record shows “Bitcoin” is an online digital currency.

5 For clarity, these HP laptop computers are not the same as the MacBook Pro laptop
computer discussed below.

5
Around 2:00 p.m., C.Z. left. Minutes later, Stephen called C.Z. and asked him to return
and pick up J.A. , so that he could take Amy to the clinic for medical attention. C.Z.
returned to the Allwine residence, picked up J.A., and the two left.
Around 5:30 p.m., Stephen arrived at C.Z.’s residence to pick up J.A. C.Z. asked
Stephen what he learned about Amy’s illness at the clinic. Stephen told C.Z. that Amy
decided not to go to the clinic. Following a brief conversation, Stephen and J.A. left.
Stephen and J.A. returned to the Allwine residence at approximately 6:52 p.m. Upon
entering their home, J.A. saw his mother lying on the floor with a pool of blood around her
head. At approximately 7:00 p.m., Stephen called 911. On the 911 call, Stephen told the
emergency dispatcher: “I think my wife shot herself. There’s blood all over.” Minutes
later, Cottage Grove police arrived at the Allwine residence. Officers went into the master
bedroom and saw Amy lying face up on the floor with her pants unbuttoned and unzipped,
her hands at her sides, blood on the floor, and a handgun laying on Amy’s left forearm .
Officers discovered Amy suffered a gunshot wound to the right side of her head.
Stephen Allwine’s Trial
Following an investigation, a grand jury indicted Stephen Allwine on the charge of
first-degree premeditated murder. Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(1) (2020). Allwine retained
private defense counsel. On January 23, 2018, the case proceeded to trial. The State
presented several witnesses and experts, including law enforcement officials, the medical
examiner who conducted the autopsy on Amy’s body, and a computer forensic expert who
analyzed over 60 electronic devices that were seized from the Allwine residence—
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including a MacBook Pro laptop computer with the username “S Al lwine” and an iPhone
6S named “S Allwine’s iPhone.”
A retired officer testified that Allwine reported to police that he had been scammed
out of $6,000 while trying to purchase Bitcoin in March 2016. Another officer testified
that the crime scene was “strange” and not consistent with a suicide. The medical examiner
testified that she discovered a nontherapeutic amount of scopolamine 6 in Amy’s system.
Based on the level of scopolamine, the medical examiner agreed with law enforcement’s
assessment that Amy died at 3:15 p.m. or earlier on November 13, 2016. The medical
examiner also agreed with law enforcement’s assessment that the evidence was not
consistent with a suicide.
The computer forensic expert testified that the user S Allwine downloaded TOR—
a web browser needed to access the dark web—on the MacBook Pro laptop computer. 7
The expert testified that he found a “note” on the MacBook Pro laptop computer with an
email address “sharklasers.com,” which allows users to send anonymous emails. The
expert testified that the user S Allwine composed an anonymous email on the MacBook
Pro laptop computer. The expert testified that minutes before dogdayGod sent a message

6 The record shows that “scopolamine” is a prescription drug that is commonl y used
to prevent motion sickness. Scopolamine can cause a person to experience blurred vision,
a dry mouth and throat, confusion, hallucinations, dilated pupils, flushing of the skin,
drowsiness, or insomnia. Further, the record shows Amy never had a prescription for
scopolamine.

7 The record shows that Allwine told FBI investigators in August 2016 that he had
never used the dark web.

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to Besa Mafia, requesting that Amy be killed while traveling to Moline, Illinois, the user S
Allwine ran a Google search of Moline, Illinois on the MacBook Pro laptop computer. The
expert testified that the user S Allwine used the MacBook Pro laptop computer to view
Amy’s Facebook account and browsed her photographs the day before dogdayGod sent a
photo of Amy to Besa Mafia. The expert testified that dogdayGod sought to buy the drug
scopolamine online. Last, the expert testified that the same unique 34-digit alphanumeric
code that dogdayGod used to pay Besa Mafia in Bitcoin was found on the MacBook Pro
laptop computer with the username S Allwine.
The defense argued that Stephen could not have murdered Amy because he was not
home at the time Amy was murdered. The defense presented several witnesses8 who all
testified to either seeing Amy sometime in the afternoon in her driveway or to hearing an
anonymous vehicle speed off quickly around the Allwine residence. On January 31, 2018,
the jury found Stephen Allwine guilty of f irst-degree premeditated murder. The district
court sentenced him to life without the possibility of release.
Postconviction History
In May 2018, Allwine filed a direct appeal with our court. On September 28, 2018,
while his direct appeal was pending, CBS News aired an episode of 48 Hours—titled
“Click for a Killer: Part I.” The episode featured the Allwine case, and included interviews

8 The record shows that Allwine’s trial counsel hired multiple experts, but none
testified at trial because trial counsel believed that their testimony would have been
consistent with the State’s experts, or because they were not relevant to the defense’s theory
of the case—that Allwine was not at home at the time Amy was murdered.

8
with lawyers and law enforcement officials involved in the case . In the episode, an
unidentifiable man named “Yura” claimed that a Besa Mafia hitman killed Amy .
Subsequently, we granted Allwine’s motion to stay his direct appeal to allow him to pursue
postconviction relief in district court. State v. Allwine, A18 -0846, Order at 1–2 (Minn.
filed Apr. 2, 2019).
On August 1, 2019, Allwine filed a petition for postconviction relief.9 Three weeks
later, on August 20, 2019, Allwine made a request for funds under Minn. Stat. § 611.21(a)
(2020)10 to hire a digital forensic expert in support of his petition. The district court denied
Allwine’s request for funds on September 5, 2019, because he did not establish he was
“indigent” as is statutorily required. 11 On May 4, 2020, the State filed a response to
Allwine’s petition for postconviction relief. In support of its response, the State submitted
an affidavit of Allwine’s trial counsel, explaining the decisions he made during trial. On

9 Seven months later, on March 2, 2020, clarifying language was added to the petition
under Minn. Stat. § 590.03 (2020), which allows a district court to “permit amendments”
to the petition. See Rossberg v. State, 874 N.W.2d 786, 791 (Minn. 2016). Although
Allwine captioned the amended document as a “second petition for postconviction relief,”
we refer to the two documents as Allwine’s “petition for postconviction relief,” for ease of
reference.

10 Minnesota Statutes § 611.21(a) allows a district court, after making the appropriate
inquiry and findings, to authorize counsel for an indigent defendant or a defendant whose
annual income at the outset of the prosecution is below a certain level, to obtain
“investigative, expert, or other services necessary to an adequate defense in the case.”

11 This was not Allwine’s first request for funds. On July 8, 2019, Allwine filed a
motion for funds to hire an expert, which the district court granted on July 16, 2019.

9
June 3, 2020, the district court issued an order amending the briefing schedule and closing
the record as of June 12, 2020.
On July 8, 2020, Allwine filed another motion for f unds under Minn. Stat.
§ 611.21(a). Before ruling on this additional motion for funds, the district court directed
Allwine to provide an affidavit listing his income “at the outset of the prosecution” to
determine his eligibility. 12 On August 12, 2020, Allwine’s postconviction counsel
informed the district court that she was “working with [Allwine’s] family to determine his
assets at the outset of the case,” and anticipated receiving that information “in the next two
weeks.” The record contains no indication that Allwine or his counsel ever provided the
district court with his income at the outset of the prosecution.
On September 21, 2020, the district court issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and an Order denying Allwine’s petition for postconviction relief.13 Four days later,
on September 25, 2020, Allwine filed a motion to set aside the district court’s findings of
fact and filed a third motion for funds under Minn. Stat. § 611.21(a), with the district court.
On October 16, 2020, the district court denied Allwine’s motion, which it construed
as a motion to reconsider its order denying postconviction relief. It also denied Allwine’s
July 8, 2020 and September 25, 2020 motions for funds. The court concluded that Allwine

12 The record shows Allwine’s counsel claimed that the “relevant timeframe” when
interpreting the statutory phrase “at the outset of the prosecution” contained in Minn. Stat.
§ 611.21(a), was “when [Allwine] began prosecuting his post-conviction action” in 2019.

13 Since the court had not received Allwine’s proof of income affidavit, it had not ruled
on his July 8, 2020 motion for funds when it issued its postconviction order denying relief.

10
had not established that he was indigent “at the outset of the prosecution” and, therefore,
he did not qualify for funds under Minn. Stat. § 611.21(a).
On November 9, 2020, Allwine filed a second motion to reconsider the district
court’s findings of fact in the September 2020 order denying postconviction relief . In
support of this motion, Allwine submitted an affidavit from a medical expert, challenging
parts of the testimony the State’s medical examiner provided during Allwine’s trial. On
November 23, 2020, the district court denied Allwine’s second motion to reconsider its
order denying his petition for postconviction relief. On December 3, 2020, Allwine filed
a third motion to reconsider the postconviction order denying relief. In support of this third
motion, Allwine submitted an affidavit from a digital forensic expert, challenging some of
the statements made in the affidavit submitted by Allwine’s trial counsel.14 On December
17, 2020, before the district court ruled on his third reconsideration motion, Allwine filed
an appeal with our court from the district court’s September 2020 order denying
postconviction relief. The next day, the district court denied Allwine’s third motion to
reconsider, reasoning that the case was before our court and, consequently, its “authority
is suspended due to an appeal.”
On December 22, 2020, we consolidated Allwine’s stayed direct appeal with his
postconviction appeal. State v. Allwine, Nos. A18-0846, A20-1588, Order at 2–3 ( Minn.
filed Dec. 22, 2020).

14 As explained below, the affidavits Allwine submitted on November 9, 2020 and
December 3, 2020 with his motions to reconsider were submitted to the district court after
the scheduling order closed the record, and after the district court issued its order denying
Allwine’s petition for postconviction relief.
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ANALYSIS
On appeal, Allwine presents four arguments. He argues (1) the evidence is
insufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict that he is guilty of first- degree premeditated
murder; (2) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct; (3) his trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance of counsel; and (4) an evidentiary hearing must be held to review the
opinions of the two experts whose affidavits were submitted with the motions to reconsider
to determine whether a new trial is warranted. We consider each in turn.
I.
The first issue we address is whether sufficient evidence supports the jury’s verdict
that Allwine is guilty of first-degree premeditated murder. In assessing the sufficiency of
the evidence, we determine “whether the facts in the record and the legitimate inferences
drawn from them would permit the jury to reasonably conclude that the defendant was
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense of which he was convicted.” State v.
Moore, 481 N.W.2d 355, 360 (Minn. 1992).
“A conviction based on circumstantial evidence, however, warrants heightened
scrutiny.” State v. Al -Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn. 2010). This heightened
scrutiny requires us to consider whether the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from
the circumstances proved support a rational hypothesis other than guilt. See State v. Taylor,
650 N.W.2d 190, 206 (Minn. 2002). “Circumstantial evidence must form a complete chain
that, in view of the evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the defendant as to
exclude beyond a reasonable doubt any reasonable inference other than guilt.” Id.
12
When “reviewing the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, our first task is to
identify the circumstances proved.” Al -Nasser, 788 N.W.2d at 473 (quoting State v.
Anderson, 784 N.W.2d 320, 329 (Minn. 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In
identifying the circumstances proved, we defer “to the jury’s acceptance of the proof of
these circumstances and rejection of evidence in the record that conflicted with the
circumstances proved by the State.” Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted). In simpler terms, we “winnow down the evidence presented at trial” to a “subset
of facts” that are consistent with the jury’s verdict and “disregard evidence that is
inconsistent with the jury’s verdict.” State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 600–01 (Minn.
2017). Second, we independently examine the reasonableness of any inferences that can
be drawn from the circumstances proved, as a whole, including an inference consistent
with rational hypotheses other than guilt. Al-Nasser, 788 N.W.2d at 473-74. In
considering the reasonable inferences drawn from the circumstances proved, we “give no
deference to the fact finder’s choice between reasonable inferences.” State v. Stein ,
776 N.W.2d 709, 716 (Minn. 2010) (plurality opinion).
To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, “the reasonable inferences
that can be drawn from the circumstances proved as a whole must be consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty” and must also be “inconsistent with any rational
hypothesis except that of guilt.” State v. Fox, 868 N.W.2d 206, 223 (Minn. 2015)
(emphasis added). The State was required to prove at trial that Stephen acted with
premeditation and intent when he caused Amy’s death. Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(1); see
13
also State v. Leake, 699 N.W.2d 312, 326 n.10 (Minn. 2005) (explaining the elements of
first-degree premeditated murder).
Allwine claims only four facts are consistent with the hypothesis of his guilt: (1)
He was married to Amy, (2) Amy was found dead at the home she shared with him, (3) he
could not be excluded as a contributor to the DNA found on the gun at the scene, and (4)
he was home with Amy for much of the day on which she was killed. Allwine also argues
there are many circumstances proved that are inconsistent with the hypothesis of his guilt.
The State counters that Allwine’s characterization of the circumstances proved is “woefully
inadequate” and ignores many facts in record that are consistent with the jury’s verdict.
We agree with the State here. Both of Allwine’s claims are incorrect.
First, the circumstances proved in this case are as follows. On November 13, 2016,
the day Amy was killed, Stephen awoke at the Allwine residence at approximately 6 a.m.
and did not leave the residence until approximately 5 p.m. S tephen began working from
his basement office that morning. At approximately 12:15–12:30 p.m., Amy told Stephen
that she was experiencing dizziness, lightheadedness, and dry mouth. Amy then told
Stephen she was going to bed to rest. Stephen’s last employment activity was at
approximately 12:51 p.m. Amy’s father picked J.A. up from the Allwine residence at 2
p.m., leaving Stephen and Amy in the home. Based on the level of scopolamine found in
Amy’s system, the medical examiner agreed with the assessment that Amy died at 3:15
p.m. or earlier that day. Police also discovered a particle of gunshot residue on Stephen’s
right hand.
14
Computer forensic analysis of the MacBook Pro laptop computer with the username
S Allwine established the following facts. The analysis found tha t the TOR browser—
needed to access the dark web —was installed on the MacBook Pro laptop computer.
Stephen previously told law enforcement that he had never used the dark web before.
Forensic analysis also discovered that the same computer searched for a service that allows
users to send anonymous emails, and that the user clicked the “compose” button to create
an anonymous email. Seven minutes before dogdayGod sent an email to Besa Mafia
seeking to hire a person to kill Amy while she was on a business trip to Moline, Illinois, a
user of the same MacB ook Pro laptop computer ran a Google search for Moline, Illinois.
The MacBook Pro laptop computer was used to search for the drug “scopolamine,” the
same drug found in Amy’s system. Amy never had a prescription for scopolamine. Lastly,
the analysis found that the MacBook Pro laptop computer contained the same unique
34-digit alphanumeric Bitcoin code as the code that dogdayGod used to communicate with
Besa Mafia. The computer forensic expert also opined that the person using “S Allwine’s
iPhone” on March 22, 2016 was the person who paid Besa Mafia in Bitcoin to kill Amy.
Second, Allwine’s claim that there are many circumstances inconsistent with the
hypothesis of his guilt misunderstands our circumstantial evidence analysis on review. As
noted above, rather than consider circumstances inconsistent with guilt, as he asks us to do,
we are bound to disregard evidence that is inconsistent with the jury’s verdict when
identifying the circumstances proved. See Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 601.
Next, we independently examine the reasonableness of all inferences that can be
drawn from the circumstances proved. The circumstances proved support three reasonable
15
inferences in favor of the jury’s verdict. First, the circumstances proved support the
reasonable inference that the person plotting to kill Amy and using the online screen name
dogdayGod was Stephen Allwine. The computer forensic expert provided extensive
testimony establishing a chronological and digital nexus between dogdayGod’s messages
to Besa Mafia and actions taken by the user of the MacBook Pro laptop with the username
S Allwine. Particularly, the fact that the same 34-digit alphanumeric Bitcoin code that
dogdayGod sent to Besa Mafia was found on the S Allwine MacBook Pro laptop provides
a strong inference that Allwine was the person using the online screen name dogdayGod.
Second, the circumstances proved support the reasonable inference that Stephen
drugged Amy with scopolamine. Because Amy did not have a prescription for
scopolamine, because Stephen—as dogdayGod—was searching the dark web for
scopolamine on the MacBook Pro laptop computer, and because a nontherapeutic amount
of scopolamine was found in Amy’s system after death, a reasonable inference arises that
Stephen drugged Amy with scopolamine the day she died.
Last, the circumstances proved support the reasonable inference that Stephen was
the person who used the handgun to shoot and kill Amy. The medical examiner testified
that Amy died at 3:15 p.m. or earlier. Stephen told investigators he was the only person
with Amy at that time, and even claimed he talked to her over an hour after her time of
death. Law enforcement testified that the crime scene was inconsistent with a suicide, and
Stephen’s right hand tested positive for gunshot residue. These inferences are reasonable
based on the circumstances proved.
16
The reasonable inferences are also inconsistent with a rational hypothesis other than
guilt. When viewed as a whole, the circumstances proved do not support a reasonable
inference that someone else killed Amy, especially when Allwine’s right hand tested
positive for gunshot residue, Allwine—as d ogdayGod—searched for scopolamine to
purchase on the dark web, a nontherapeutic amount of scopolamine was found in Amy’s
system after death, and Amy did not have a prescription for scopolamine. Accordingly,
there is no rational hypothesis other than guilt. Therefore, we conclude that the
circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s verdict that Stephen Allwine is
guilty of first-degree premeditated murder.
II.
Second, we consider whether the facts alleged in the petition for postconviction
relief, if proven by a preponderance of the evidence, support a claim that the State
committed prosecutorial misconduct. The district court concluded that the State did not
and therefore denied Allwine’s claim without an evidentiary hearing. We review the
district court’s denial of postconviction relief, including a denial of relief without an
evidentiary hearing, for an abuse of discretion. State v. Nicks, 831 N.W.2d 493, 503 (Minn.
2013). A district court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous
view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record. Id.
Allwine argues the prosecution committed misconduct by failing to disclose the
third-party Yura confession, in violation of Minnesota’s “very broad discovery rules” and
Rule 3.8(g)–(h) of the American Bar Association’s (ABA) Rules of Professional
17
Conduct.15 Because the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure only require prosecutors
to disclose exculpatory evidence before or during a trial, and because Allwine’s trial was
complete before the prosecution was aware of or had possession of the Yura c onfession,
the State argues it did not commit prosecutorial misconduct. We agree with the State here
as well.
Rule 9 of the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure governs evidentiary disclosure
requirements. The rule requires the State to disclose exculpatory evidence at the defense’s
request and before the Rule 11 o mnibus hearing. Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.01, subd. 1(6).
Further, the rule imposes a continuing duty on the State to disclose exculpatory evidence
“before and during trial.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.03, subd. 2(c). B y the plain language of
these Rule 9 provisions, the State had a duty to disclose exculpatory evidence—such as a
third-party confession—to the defense from the filing of charges until the trial has ended .
Here, the record shows prosecutors exchanged several email communications with
CBS News staff from January 2018 to September 2018, but none of the communications
included exculpatory evidence.16 Allwine’s claim that the State violated “broad discovery

15 Without providing a substantive argument, Allwine also asserts in connection with
this claim that he “was not charged with Aiding and Abetting so his conviction must be
reversed.” Because Stephen does not go beyond this conclusory statement in his briefs, we
deem the argument waived. State v. Morrow , 834 N.W.2d 715, 724 n.4 (Minn. 2013).
Even if we reached this argument, however, we would reject it because “aiding and abetting
is not a separate substantive offense, but rather is a theory of criminal liability.” State v.
Ezeka, 946 N.W.2d 393, 400 n.1 (Minn. 2020) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).

16 An email exchange on May 7, 2018, mentions Yura, but in no way suggests that he
had confessed to the murder of Amy.
18
rules” and the ABA Rules of Professional Conduct is without merit. As mentioned, our
discovery rules expressly place a duty on the State to disclose exculpatory evidence to the
defense before or during trial—not after trial. Nothing establishes that the State had
undisclosed exculpatory evidence regarding an alternative perpetrator before or during the
trial. Accordingly, there is no disc losure violation. Further, Allwine’s reliance on the
ABA’s Rules of Professional Conduct is misplaced because those rules concern attorney
discipline, not the criminal evidentiary matters at issue here.
Accordingly, even if the facts Allwine alleges in his petition for postconviction
relief were proven at an evidentiary hearing, Allwine’s prosecutorial misconduct claim
fails as a matter of law. Consequently, the district court did not abuse its discretion when
it denied Allwine’s prosecutorial misconduct claim without an evidentiary hearing.
III.
Third, we determine whether the facts Allwine alleged in his petition for
postconviction relief, if proven by a preponderance of the evidence, support a claim that
his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel. “Because claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel involve mixed questions of law and fact, our review of decisions by
the postconviction court is de novo.” Opsahl v. State, 677 N.W.2d 414, 420 (Minn. 2004).
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are governed by “the two-prong test announced in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).” Nicks, 831 N.W.2d at 504 (applying
Strickland in the context of a postconviction petition seeking a new trial based on an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim ). Strickland requires a petitioner to show that (1)
19
trial counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness 17 and (2)
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of
the proceeding would have been different. Peltier v. State, 946 N.W.2d 369, 372 (Minn.
2020).
Allwine provides three reasons why his counsel was ineffective. 18 First, he argues
his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed “to use an expert to develop alternative
perpetrator theory and to present alternative perpetrator evidence” against two persons. He
also argues his trial counsel was ineffective because his trial counsel “did not consult with
a medical examiner nor did he present the testimony of a medical examiner.” Last, he
contends his trial counsel was ineffective because his trial counsel failed “to use [a]
computer forensic expert.” In arguing that the district court erred when it failed to order a

17 The objective standard of reasonableness means “representation by an attorney
exercising the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would
perform under similar circumstances.” White v. State, 248 N.W.2d 281, 285 (Minn. 1976).

18 Allwine also argues that the district court’s decision to issue its findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and order denying his postconviction petition before he submitted the
two affidavits “violated [his] right of due process” by “not allowing [him] to submit expert
information as to his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel[.]” Accordingly, he claims
that “this Court must reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing.” We disagree. On
June 3, 2020, the district court issued an order amending the briefing schedule. In it, the
district court stated that the “record will close on June 12, 2020 and the Court will take the
matter under advisement on that date.” Such an order rests within the district court’s
discretion. See Matakis v. State, 862 N.W.2d 33, 40–41 (2015); cf. Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.03,
subd. 3 (allowing the district court to impose “reasonable terms and conditions” on
discovery); Minn. R. Civ. P. 16.02(c) (similar authority for civil cases). Consequently, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering that the record close on June 12, 2020.
See Matakis, 862 N.W.2d at 41.

20
new trial on his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, Allwine primarily relies on the
two expert affidavits submitted with his motions to reconsider.19
In reviewing whether the district court abused its discretion here, we consider the
information available to the district court at the time the court issued its order denying
postconviction relief. Cf. State v. Jenkins, 782 N.W.2d 211, 231 (Minn. 2010) (rejecting a
police misconduct argument that “was not made to the district court at the time it was
considering admission of the motive evidence.”). When the district court issued its
September 2020 order denying Allwine’s petition for postconviction relief, the two
affidavits had not yet been presented to it. Allwine’s reliance on the affidavits is misplaced
and, therefore, his ineffective assistance of counsel argument on appeal cannot prevail.
Therefore, the district court did not err when it denied Allwine’s petition for post-
conviction relief.
In addition, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Allwine’s
three reconsideration motions because such motions cannot introduce new evidence into
the record. See Sullivan v. Spot Weld, Inc., 560 N. W.2d 712, 715–16 (Minn. App. 1997)
(rejecting attempt t o supplement record with affidavit submitted in support of motion to
reconsider), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 27, 1997). Although we have never squarely
considered whether a motion for reconsideration can introduce new evidence into the

19 Allwine’s argument regarding alternative perpetrators does not rest on the two
expert affidavits. Assuming, without deciding, that Allwine’s trial counsel did not pursue
an alternative perpetrator theory, such an omission fails to state a claim of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel as a matter of law. Under well-established law, the decision to
pursue alternative perpetrators is a matter of trial strategy that we do not scrutinize. Opsahl,
677 N.W.2d at 421.
21
record, the court of appeals’ analysis in Sullivan is sound and consistent with the advisory
committee’s comment to the rule that authorizes motions for reconsideration. See Minn.
Gen. R. Prac. 115.11 advisory comm. cmt.—1997 amendment (“Motions for
reconsideration are not opportunities for presentation of facts or arguments available when
the prior motion was considered.”). We therefore hold that a motion for reconsideration
cannot introduce new evidence. Because Allwine’s motions for reconsideration introduced
two affidavits as new evidence, the district court did not err when it denied the motions.20
For the foregoing reasons, the district court did not err when it denied the petition for
postconviction relief and the motions for reconsideration.

20 In effect, the State argues that we should not consider the affidavits in determining
any of the issues on appeal because an order denying a motion for reconsideration is not
an appealable order. See Hohenwald v. State, 875 N.W.2d 843, 846 (Minn. 2016). The
State’s argument is unsound because it conflates two distinct questions. The first question
is whether an appeal may be taken from a particular order. The State is correct that a
defendant cannot appeal from an order denying a motion for reconsideration. The second
question is which orders may an appellate court review when a defendant files an appeal
from a judgment. As Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.02, subd. 11, makes clear, in an appeal from a
judgment, “the court may review any order . . . as the interests of justice may
require.” Here, Allwine filed a timely appeal from his judgment of conviction. See Minn.
R. Crim. P. 29.02, subd. 1(a) (authorizing an appeal in a first-degree murder case from the
judgment). Consequently, we may review the district court’s October, November, and
December 2020 orders denying Allwine’s motions for reconsideration based on the
supporting affidavits presented to the district court at the time it decided each order. But
as previously stated, we cannot consider the affidavits in determining whether the court
abused its discretion when it made the decision in September 2020 to deny Allwine’s claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel without an evidentiary hearing because those affidavits
were filed after that decision was made.

22
IV.
Finally, we determine whether an evidentiary hearing must be held to review the
opinions of two experts 21 to determine if a new trial is warranted. 22 As previously
mentioned, Allwine improperly submitted the affidavits from the two experts with his
motions for reconsideration. Accordingly, Allwine is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing
to consider the opinions of the two experts.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of conviction and the decision of
the district court that denied Allwine’s petition for postconviction relief.

Affirmed.

21 One of these experts is the digital forensic expert previously mentioned that
Allwine’s trial counsel chose not to have testify during his trial.

22 Allwine also argues the district court erred when it denied his motion for funding,
as authorized under Minn. Stat. § 611.21(a), for him to hire an expert. This assertion is
incorrect, however. Section 611.21(a) distinguishes between two categories of defendants:
(1) those with “counsel appointed by the court for an indigent defendant” and (2) those
with private counsel who have an annual income not greater than 125 percent of the poverty
line “at the outset of the prosecution.” Because Allwine has a private attorney, he is not
entitled to funds for experts unless he established that his annual i ncome was not greater
than 125 percent of the poverty line at the outset of the prosecution. Allwine did not do
that before the district court. Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying him
additional funding. The fact that Allwine has private counsel also dooms his claim that,
under Minn. Stat. § 59 0.05, he is entitled to funding to hire an expert without a showing
that his income was not greater than 125 percent of poverty line at the outset of the
prosecution.