A18-1087

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0862
A18-1087

In re the Marriage of:
Dmitri M. Medvedovski, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Nadezhda Ivanovna Medvedovski,
Respondent.

Filed January 22, 2019
Affirmed
Cleary, Chief Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-FA-12-2889

Dmitri M. Medvedovski, St. Paul, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

John DeWalt, DeWalt, Chawla + Saksena, LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Cleary, C hief Judge; and
Worke, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
CLEARY, Chief Judge
Appellant Dmitri M. Medvedovski (father) challenges the distri ct court’s May 15,
2017 order, awarding respondent Nadezhda Ivanovna Medvedovski ( mother) conduct-
based attorney fees. Father also challenges the district court ’s April 13, 2018 order,

2
declining to consider father’s responsive motion as untimely, denying father’s motions to
hold mother in contempt, and awarding mother conduct-based attorney fees. We affirm.
FACTS
Father and mother were married in October 2003, and the parties have two minor
children. The parties separated in 2007, when mother moved out of the home due to
domestic violence. Medvedovski v. Medvedovski, No. A09-2078, 2010 WL 2900321, at *1
(Minn. App. July 27, 2010), review denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2010). Mother sought an order
for protection (OFP), and father r esolved the pending proceedin g by agreeing to a no-
contact order. Id. In December 2007, mother sought an additional OFP on behalf o f the
children, alleging that father engaged in sexual contact with one of the children. Id. Father
denied any sexual contact, and an “ensuing investigation was inconclusive.” Id.
In September 2009, the district court granted mother sole legal and sole physical
custody, discontinued the children’s OFP, invalidated the parti es’ prenuptial agreement,
apportioned the homestead as mar ital property, determined that father had dissipated
marital assets, set child support and spousal maintenance obligations, and awarded mother
$30,000 in both need- and conduct-based attorney fees. Id. at *1, *5. Father appealed, and
this court affirmed, modifying the district court’s inadvertent double counting of dissipated
assets relating to the division of the parties’ property. Id. at *3, *5.
In March 2014, October 2014, October 2015, and April 2016, fat her moved for sole
legal and sole physical custody of the children. The district court denied father’s motions.
In February 2017, father again moved for sole legal and sole ph ysical custody of the
children on the bases of endangerment and interference with parenting time. Medvedovski

3
v. Medvedovski, 903 N.W.2d 646, 648 (Minn. App. 2017). In an order dated May 15, 2017,
the district court denied fathe r’s custody-modification motion and determined that father
had unreasonably contributed to the length and expense of the p roceeding and awarded
mother $3,000 in conduct-based attorney fees. Father appealed the denial of his custody-
modification motion, and this court affirmed, determining that father’s custody-
modification motion was procedurally barred because it was file d within two years after
the disposition of a prior motion on the merits. Id. at 650.1
Mother initiated contempt proceedings against father on October 4, 2017 for failure
to pay the $3,000 attorney-fees award. On January 9, 2018, mother also moved the district
court for additional fees incurred in initiating contempt proceedings, and a hearing was set
for January 25. On January 12, father filed a responsive motion, including six requests for
relief. Mother filed a reply on January 19, asking the district court to deny father’s motion
in its entirety and to award attorney fees incurred in responding to father’s countermotions.
On January 20, father served, via U.S. mail, a second responsiv e motion, and it was filed
with the district court on January 24. Mother’s counsel received father’s pleadings by U.S.
mail on January 25—the day of the contempt hearing.
Ultimately, the district court denied mother’s motion to hold father in contempt of
court, determining that contempt was not the appropriate remedy for unpaid attorney fees.
The district court declined to consider father’s second respons ive motion, finding that it

1 In a June 16, 2017 order, this court dismissed the portion of the appeal from the May 15,
2017 order awarding a ttorney fees because the court administrat or had not entered
judgment on the attorney-fees award. Judgment was entered on June 8, 2018.

4
was untimely under Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 303. The district court also briefly noted the
remainder of father’s motions and denied his requests in their entirety. In regard to
mother’s request for attorney fees, the district court declined to award mother conduct-
based attorney fees for initiating the contempt action, but awarded mother attorney fees in
the amount of $1,284 incurred in responding to father’s “multip le, frivolous, requests for
relief totaling 136 pages . . . .” Father appeals.
D E C I S I O N
On appeal, father challenges the district court’s May 15, 2017 order, awarding
mother $3,000 in conduct-based attorney fees. In addition, fat her challenges the district
court’s April 13, 2018 order, declining to consider father’s re sponsive motion because it
was untimely, denying father’s motions to hold mother in contempt, and awarding mother
$1,284 in conduct-based attorney fees.
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determini ng that father’s
responsive motion was untimely.

Father argues that the district court abused its discretion in declining to consider his
second responsive motion. Father contends that he properly served his responsive papers
on January 20, 2018, five calend ar days before the hearing date . Under Minn. R. Gen.
Prac. 303.03(a)(2), a responding pa rty raising new issues other than those raised in the
initial motion is required to serve a copy of the notice of mot ion and motion, relevant
affidavits and exhibits, and any memorandum of law on all parties and file the documents
with the court administrator at least 10 days before the hearin g. The district court’s
decision to enforce or relax a procedural rule is reviewed unde r an abuse-of-discretion

5
standard. Lee v. Lee, 749 N.W.2d 51, 61-62 (Minn. App. 2008), aff’d in part and rev’d in
part on other grounds, 775 N.W.2d 631 (Minn. 2009).
In his submission mailed on January 20, father asked the distr ict court to deny
mother’s responsive motion in its entirety and to hold mother in civil contempt for violating
a provision of the parties’ dissolution judgment. Father argue d that mother violated the
requirement that each party keep the other informed of the name and address of his or her
current employer, access to employment-related health insurance coverage, and relevant
health insurance policy information. This issue was not raised in father’s initial responsive
motion. By arguing that mother violated a different portion of the dissolution judgment,
father raised a new issue and was required to file the motion 10 days before the January 25
hearing. But father’s motion was served by U.S. mail on January 20 and filed with district
court administration on January 24. Father’s responsive motion was untimely, and the
district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to consider its contents.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying father’s motions to
hold mother in contempt of court.

Father argues that the district court erred in denying his moti ons to hold mother in
contempt for failing (1) to provide him with tax release forms for tax years 2013 through
2018, and (2) to pay the cost in crease associated with the chil dren’s monthly health and
dental insurance premiums.
The district court has broad discretion to hold a party in civi l contempt, and we
review the district court’s decision for an abuse of discretion . Crockarell v. Crockarell,
631 N.W.2d 829, 833 (Minn. App. 2001), review denied (Minn. Oct. 16, 2001). In order

6
to hold an individual in civil contempt of court, the district court must find that the
individual “acted contumaciously, in bad faith, and out of disr espect for the judicial
process.” Newstrand v. Arend , 869 N.W.2d 681, 692 (Minn. App. 2015) (quotation
omitted), review denied (Minn. Dec. 15, 2015). The purpose of holding a party in civi l
contempt of court is to secure compliance with a court order, n ot to punish a party for
failing to perform in the past. Id.
The district court found that father provided mother with a ten-year tax release form
in 2009, but she was uncomfortable signing a release for ten years. The district court also
found that father did not believe that the parties’ dissolution judgment required him to
provide the necessary documentation to mother every year. The district court further found
that “[n]o additional testimony was provided on [father]’s additional motions.”
First, father asserts that mother failed to provide him with th e appropriate release
forms to allow him to claim the minor children as dependents. The tax documents
presented to the district court by both parties address the issue of a shared dependent. These
documents do not conclusively indicate that father asked mother for the release forms or
that mother failed to provide them. Additionally, at the contempt hearing, father informed
the district court that he did not have any evidence that mothe r failed to provide him with
the necessary release forms beyond his oral inquiries. The dis trict court did not abuse its
discretion in denying father’s mo tion to hold mother in contemp t for failing to provide
father with tax release forms.
Second, father argues that mother was required to directly pay father her share of
the children’s health and dental insurance premiums. At the district court, father submitted

7
a previous district court order explicitly stating that mother’s share of the health and dental
insurance premiums is offset in father’s child support calculat ion. Father’s argument is
unpersuasive given that mother’s percentage is already reflected in father’s lowered child
support payment. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying father’s motion
to hold mother in contempt for failing to pay him her share of the insurance premiums.
III. The district court did not ab use its discretion in awardin g conduct-based
attorney fees.

A district court may, “in its discretion, [award] additional f ees, costs, and
disbursements against a party who unreasonably contributes to the length or expense of the
proceeding.” Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1 (2018). Conduct-ba sed fee awards “are
discretionary with the district court.” Szarzynski v. Szarzynski , 732 N.W.2d 285, 295
(Minn. App. 2007). Conduct-based fees may be “based on the imp act a party’s behavior
has on the costs of the litigation regardless of the relative financial resources of the parties.”
Dabrowski v. Dabrowski, 477 N.W.2d 761, 766 (Minn. App. 1991). We review a district
court’s award of attorney fees for abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of T.A.M. , 791
N.W.2d 573, 578 (Minn. App. 2010).
A. May 15, 2017 Award
Father argues that because his custody-modification motion was meritorious, the
award of attorney fees was unwarranted. In the May 15, 2017 or der awarding mother
$3,000 in conduct-based attorney f ees, the district court caref ully considered father’s
conduct. In determining that an award of attorney fees was jus tified, the district court
considered that father had unsuccessfully brought the same motion five consecutive times.

8
The district court further found that father’s “basic allegatio n i s t h e s a m e : t h a t t h e
children’s emotional health is endangered as there has been no progress in the reunification
therapy which is entirely due to the conduct of [mother].” The district court noted that
“[p]ervasive throughout this file are concerns and statements r aised regarding [father]’s
lack of credibility and good faith .” The district court also d etailed instances throughout
the case where father’s actions were non-cooperative, misleadin g, and misrepresentative,
leading the district court to question father’s good faith and credibility in the present
motion. Because father’s motion caused mother to defend hersel f “against the same
spurious claims,” the district c ourt determined that father’s c onduct unreasonably
contributed to the length and expense of the proceeding and warranted an award of conduct-
based attorney fees to mother.
In the appeal of the district court’s denial of father’s custod y-modification motion,
this court rejected father’s custody-modification arguments as procedurally barred.
Medvedovski, 903 N.W.2d at 650. This court determined that father’s motio n was
procedurally-barred because it was filed within two years after disposition of a prior motion
on the merits. Id. Based on our prior opinion, the district court did not abuse its discretion
in determining that father unrea sonably contributed to the leng th and expense of the
proceeding by bringing a procedurally-barred motion.
B. April 13, 2018 Award
Father argues that the district court abused its discretion in its April 13, 2018 award
of conduct-based attorney fees because (1) mother’s motion fail ed to satisfy procedural
requirements, (2) mother and the district court also contributed to the length and expense

9
of the proceeding, (3) father’s motions seeking to hold mother in contempt were not
frivolous, and (4) the district court failed to specify actual instances of conduct justifying
an award of conduct-based attorn ey fees and the calculation use d in arriving at the fee
award.
The district court found that f ather unreasonably contributed to the length and
expense of the proceeding by “rais[ing] multiple, frivolous, requests for relief totaling 136
pages to which [mother] was subsequently required to respond.” The district court awarded
mother $1,284 in conduct-based a ttorney fees incurred in respon ding to father’s
countermotions, but denied mother’s request for conduct-based fees in bringing her initial
motion to hold father in contempt for unpaid attorney fees.
Father argues that mother’s motion for attorney fees was untim ely and improperly
supported by an un-notarized affidavit. But conduct-based attorney fees may be awarded
at any point in the proceeding. Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1. Additionally, Minn. Stat.
§ 358.116 (2018)
2 provides that, unless specifically required by a court rule, an affidavit is
not required to be notarized. Under Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 303.02 , “[a]ll motions must be
supported by affidavits that contain facts relevant to the issues before the court.” There is
no requirement that supporting affidavits be notarized. Mother’s motion for conduct-based
attorney fees satisfied procedural requirements.

2 Minn. Stat. § 358.116 was amended in 2018. 2018 Minn. Laws ch. 176, art. 2, § 3, at 19-
20. Although the 2017 version of the statute was in effect at the time mother filed her
affidavit, we cite to the most recent version because it was not amended in relevant part.

10
Father further asserts that an award of fees is inappropriate because mother and the
district court contributed to th e length and expense of the pro ceeding. Father argues that
mother contributed to the lengt h and expense of the proceeding because she initiated
contempt proceedings. Although t he district court ultimately d enied mother’s motion to
hold father in contempt, mother presented a colorable legal arg ument in an attempt to
collect unpaid attorney fees. See Kitchar v. Kitchar , 553 N.W.2d 97, 104 (Minn. App.
1996) (declining to award attorney fees on appeal where “both parties presented colorable
legal arguments on difficult issues”), review denied (Minn. Oct. 29, 1996). Moreover,
father cites no legal authority for his assertion that a district court is capable of contributing
to the length and expense of the proceeding. See State v. Bartylla, 755 N.W.2d 8, 22 (Minn.
2008) (appellate courts “will not consider pro se claims on appeal that are unsupported by
either arguments or citations to legal authority”).
As discussed above, father’s argum ents regarding his motions to hold mother in
contempt are unpersuasive. This dispute arose when mother init iated contempt
proceedings against father to co llect the award of conduct-base d attorney fees from the
district court’s May 15, 2017 or der. In his responsive motion, father moved for the
following: (1) denying mother’s m otion in its entirety; (2) sa nctioning mother’s attorney
in the amount of $10,000 for unnecessarily increasing the cost of litigation over the past
ten years; (3) holding mother in constructive civil contempt and ordering her incarceration
for violating a term of the parties’ dissolution judgment relat ing to the provision of tax
release forms for claiming the ch ildren as dependents; (4) awar ding father $12,500 for
reimbursement of tax penalties, accountant fees, and legal fees ; (5) holding mother in

11
constructive civil contempt and ordering her incarceration for violating a term of the
parties’ dissolution judgment relating to mother’s share of the children’s medical and
dental expenses; and (6) finding mother’s actions to be in bad faith and of a harassing
nature and awarding father $7,500. Rather than simply addressi ng the issues before the
district court in the contempt motion, father’s countermotions were retaliatory and sought
relief for grievances dating back ten years. The district cour t did not abuse its discretion
in awarding mother conduct-based attorney fees sustained in rep lying to father’s reactive
countermotions.
Affirmed.