State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0866

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Arcelus Antonio Williams,
Appellant.

Filed April 1, 2019
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-17-23641

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman , Hennepin County Attorney, Jean Burdorf, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, John Donovan, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Slieter,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SLIETER, Judge
Appellant Arcelus Antonio Williams appeals from his 60 -month sentence for
ineligible person in possession of ammunition. Appellant argues that the district court

2
abused its discretion at sentencing by either (1) basing its decision on an erro neous view
of the law, or (2) failing to exercise its discretion properly. We affirm.
FACTS
After a September 17, 2017 incident, appellant was arrested on a felony warrant.
During a search of appellant’s person, officers found a magazine with ten live rounds of
nine-millimeter ammunition in appellant’s pocket. Because of prior convictions, appellant
was prohibited from possessing ammunition.
Appellant was charged with one count of ineligible person in possession of
ammunition, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2016). In a stipulated facts
trial, the district court found appellant guilty.
At sentencing, appellant requested a downward durational or dispositional
departure,1 arguing several mitigating factors were present, including that appellant
possessed only ammunition and was not committing a more serious offense at the time.
The state requested the presumptive 60 -month sentence. After reviewing the record and
hearing arguments from counsel, the district court found no substan tial and compelling
circumstances to warrant a departure and sentenced appellant to 60 months.
This appeal follows.

1 Although appellant requested both a durational and a dispositional departure at
sentencing, appellant only challenges the district court’s denial of a durational departure.

3
D E C I S I O N
I. The district court’s decision is not based on an erroneous view of the law.
Appellant first contends that the district court erroneously interpreted Minn. Stat.
§ 624.713 (2016) as prohibiting sentencing departures for ammunition -only offenses. “A
court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is
against logic and the facts in the record.” Riley v. State , 792 N. W.2d 831, 833 (Minn.
2011).
Appellant focuses on this statement from the district court during the sentencing
hearing:
[t]he statute does not differentiate between ammunition and
firearms. Maybe they should. It would seem to make some
sense to me that they do, but they don’t. So the legislature has
decided it’s just as serious to have ammunitio n as it is to have
a firearm. So that’s not, that doesn’t make this crime less
serious because you were [in] possession of an ammunition
clip, a magazine, and not a firearm.

Appellant argues that this statement shows that the district court interpreted the
statute as prohibiting departures for ammunition offenses entirely. Appellant misconstrues
the district court’s words.
Viewed in light of the entire sentencing hearing, it is clear that the district court is
responding to appellant’s argument that “possession of a couple of bullets without a firearm
. . . is a reasonable basis for a durational departure.” The district court is not interpreting
the statute as prohibiting departures entirely; rather, the district court is noting that the
statute treats ammunition and firearms the same. Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1 (“The
following persons shall not be enti tled to possess ammunition or a pistol . . . .”). The

4
district court’s statement of the law is correct: appellant’s offense is not less serious and
thus a factor for a durational departure simply because he possessed only ammunition. See
State v. Rund, 896 N.W.2d 527, 534 (Minn. 2017) (holding that defendant’s threats to kill
police officers were not less serious because they were made with a reckless disregard of
the risk of terrorizing, as opposed to a purposeful intent to cause terror; the terroristic -
threats statute prohibited both purposeful and reckless conduct); State v. Solberg , 882
N.W.2d 618, 627 (Minn. 2016) (holding that defendant’s sexual assault was not less serious
than typical because it was accomplished using coercion and not violence —defendant’s
use of coercion “fit s squarely within the statute’s prohibition of sexual assault by
coercion”).
The district court accurately stated the law and did not misinterpret the statute as
prohibiting departures entirely. There was no abuse of discretion.
II. The district court properly exercised its discretion.

In the alternative, appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion
because it failed to consider the mitigating factors. 2 The record does not support this
assertion.
“We afford the trial court great discretion in the imposition of sentences and reverse
sentencing decisions only for an abuse of that discretion.” State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303,
307-08 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted). “When factors that may justify depa rting from

2 Because we conclude that the district court properly exercised its discretion and
considered factors for and against departure, we do not address appellant’s arguments
regarding departure factors.

5
the presumptive sentence are present, a court must exercise its discretion and consider the
factors.” State v. Kier, 678 N.W.2d 672, 677 (Minn. App. 2004). “But the mere fact that
a mitigating factor is present in a particular case does not ob ligate the court to place
defendant on probation or impose a shorter term than the presumptive term.” State v. Pegel,
795 N.W.2d 251, 253 –54 (Minn. App. 2011) ( quotation omitted). This court affirms a
presumptive sentence “when ‘the record shows [that] the sentencing court carefully
evaluated all the testimony and information presented before making a determination. ’”
State v. Johnson, 831 N.W.2d 917, 925 (Minn. App. 2013) (alteration in original) (quoting
State v. Van Ruler , 378 N.W.2d 77, 81 (Minn. App. 1985)). “[A] district court is not
required to explain its reasons for imposing a presumptive sentence.” Id.
The record demonstrates that the district court properly considered the mitigating
factors. The district court h eard arguments from the state, appellant’s attorney, and
appellant. The district court also reviewed the presentence investigation report, a letter
from a social worker with the public defender’s office, and a letter from appellant. Before
sentencing, the district court remarked: “Well, obviously I’ve reviewed your record quite
thoroughly by reading the presentence and the information that [the public defender ]
presented.”
After considering the above, the district court found that there were no substantia l
and compelling circumstances warranting a departure, stating , “[s]o, I can’t find good
grounds to depart durationally.” The district court did, i n fact, exercise its discretion and

6
ultimately imposed the presumptive sentence. There is no requirement th at it explain its
decision. Van Ruler, 378 N.W.2d at 80.
Affirmed.