State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0893

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Edward Martin,
Appellant.

Filed May 13, 2019
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-17-5099

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin Coun ty Attorney, Patrick R. Lofton , Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Richard Schmitz, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Brat vold, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg , Judge; and
Reilly, Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
In this direct appeal from his conviction for violating the pr edatory-offender-
registration statute, appellant Edward Martin argues that the e vidence is insufficient to
sustain his conviction. We affirm.
FACTS
In 1992, appellant was convicted in California of one count of sexual battery under
Cal. Penal Code § 243.4(a) (West 1991). 1 In 2005, the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal
Apprehension (BCA) informed appellant that he was required to r egister for life as a
predatory offender in Minnesota because of the California conviction. Appellant complied
with his registration requirements for the next several years. In 2011, appellant registered
with the BCA as homeless. Until August 2016, appellant continu ed to either register as
homeless—which obligated him to check-in with law enforcement2—or listed a shelter as
his primary address. On Augus t 19, 2016, appellant was release d from the Hennepin
County Workhouse. Upon his release, appellant registered as homeless.
On September 28, 2016, the BCA deemed appellant noncompliant w ith his
registration requirement because h e had failed to report to law enforcement on a weekly

1 Appellant was originally charged, under California law, with forcible rape, forcible oral
copulation, and two counts of rape by foreign object. He pleaded guilty to the lesser offense
of sexual battery.

2 Persons who are homeless and re quired to register with the BCA “shall report in person
on a weekly basis to the law enforcement authority with jurisdiction in the area where the
person is staying.” Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 3a(e) (2016).

3
basis as required by law. 3 Appellant had previously signed a document, from the
Minnesota BCA, acknowledging his duty to register as a predator y offender. The state
charged appellant with knowingl y failing to register under Minn . Stat. § 243.166, subd.
5(a) (2016).
Appellant moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the sta te lacked probable
cause to support the charge because the certified documents did not establish that he was
required to register in California. The district court denied appellant’s motion. The case
was assigned to another district court judge and submitted to t h e c o u r t f o r a t r i a l o n
stipulated evidence. The distric t court reviewed evidence of a ppellant’s California
conviction, appellant’s BCA registration file, and police repor ts. The district court found
appellant guilty of knowingly failing to register as a predatory offender.
This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
Appellant argues that the evidenc e is insufficient to sustain h is conviction. When
reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, we review the record to determine whether the
evidence is sufficient to allow a fact finder to reach its verd ict. State v. Olhausen , 681
N.W.2d 21, 25 (Minn. 2004); see also State v. Palmer, 803 N.W.2d 727, 733 (Minn. 2011)
(“[Appellate courts] use the same standard of review in bench t rials and in jury trials in
evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence.”). Appellate courts review the evidence in the
light most favorable to the conviction and assume that the fact-finder “believed the state’s

3 We cite to the 2016 version of statutes because that is when appellant was charged.

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witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” Olhausen, 681 N.W.2d at 25.
The verdict will not be disturb ed if the fact-finder “could rea sonably conclude that the
defendant was guilty of the charged offense.” Id. at 25-26.
Although appellant frames the issu e as one of sufficiency of th e evidence, what
appellant appears to be arguing is that Minnesota law did not r equire him to register as a
predatory offender based on his California conviction. Consequ ently, in addition to
determining whether the state pr oved appellant’s California con viction and failure to
register, we must resolve the legal question of whether appella nt is required to register in
Minnesota based on his California conviction. See State v. Vasko, 889 N.W.2d 551, 556
(Minn. 2017) (stating that it is often necessary to interpret a criminal statute when
evaluating an insufficiency-of-the-evidence claim).
Minn. Stat. § 243.166 (2016) requires persons convicted of cer tain crimes to register
with the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension. A person is required to register as
a predatory offender for an offense committed in another state if:
(1) the person was charged with . . . an offense in
another state that would be a violation of a law described
[under Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b(a)] . . . ;
(2) the person enters [Minnesota] to reside, work, or
attend school, or enters this state and remains for 14 days or
longer; and
(3) ten years have not elapsed since the person was
released from confinement or, if the person was not confined,
since the person was convicted of or adjudicated delinquent for
the offense that triggers registration, unless the person is
subject to a longer registration period under the laws of another
state in which the person has been convicted or adjudicated, or
is subject to lifetime registration.

5
Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b(b). The offenses requiring lif etime registration are
enumerated in section 243.166, and include criminal sexual conduct in the fourth degree,4
“or a statute from another state or the United States similar to the offenses described in this
clause.” Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 6(d)(3).
Appellant was convicted in California of sexual battery under C a l . P e n a l C o d e
§ 243.4(a) in 1992. Under the 1991 version of the statute, a p erson is guilty of sexual
battery if he “touches an intimate part of another person while that person is unlawfully
restrained by the accused or an accomplice, and if the touching is against the will of the
person touched and is for the purposes of sexual arousal, sexua l gratification, or sexual
abuse.” Cal. Penal Code § 243.4(a). The unlawful restraint re quired for violation of
section 243.4 is something more t han the mere exertion of physi cal effort required to
commit the prohibited sexual act. People v. Pahl, 277 Cal. Rptr. 656, 662 (Cal. Ct. App.
1991). “‘Intimate part’ means the sexual organ, anus, groin, or buttocks of any person, and
the breast of a female.” Cal. Penal Code, § 243.4(f)(1) (West 1991).5
In Minnesota, a person who engages in sexual contact with anot her person is guilty
of criminal sexual conduct in the fourth degree if “the actor u ses force or coercion to
accomplish the sexual contact.” Minn. Stat. § 609.345, subd. 1(c). Sexual contact includes

4 Not every fourth-degree criminal-sexual-conduct offense or conviction requires lifetime
registration, but relevant here, lifetime registration is required under Minn. Stat. § 609.345,
subd. 1(c) (2016), where “the actor uses force or coercion to a ccomplish the sexual
contact.”

5 Respondent’s brief cites this as subdivision (g), which is the current version of the statute,
but the definition was provided in subdivision (f) at the time appellant committed the crime.

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“the intentional touching by the actor of the complainant’s int imate parts.” Minn. Stat.
§ 609.341, subd. 11(a)(i) (2016). Intimate parts “includes the primary genital area, groin,
inner thigh, buttocks, or breast of a human being.” Id., subd. 5 (2016). “Force” is defined
as “the infliction, attempted infliction, or threatened infliction by the actor of bodily harm
or commission or threat of any other crime by the actor against the complainant or another.”
Id., subd. 3 (2016). Coercion means “the use by the actor of word s or circumstances that
cause the complainant reasonably to fear that the actor will in flict bodily harm upon the
complainant or another, or the use by the actor of confinement, or superior size or strength,
against the complainant that causes the complainant to submit to sexual . . . contact.” Id.,
subd. 14 (2016).
The sexual-battery statute under which appellant was convicted in California is
sufficiently similar to Minnesota’s fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct statute to trigger
lifetime registration under Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 6(d)(3 ). The elements are nearly
identical.
Appellant argues that the distric t court erred in its third con clusion of law which
states:
With regard to element one, there is evidence to establish
beyond a reasonable doubt that [appellant] is a person required
to register as a predatory offender. See Minn. Stat. § 243.166.
[Appellant] was convicted of felony Sexual Battery on
March 26, 1992 in San Diego County, California. Ex. 1. In
the State of Minnesota, indi viduals convicted of criminal
sexual conduct and individuals who are convicted of a similar
offense in other states must r egister as a predatory offender.
Minn. Stat. § 243.166[,] subd. 1b(a)(iii). [Appellant’s]
conviction of Sexual Battery on March 26, 1992 in California
qualifies as criminal sexual conduct in Minnesota and

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[appellant] is required to register as a predatory offender in
Minnesota. This requires lifetime registration. Minn. Stat.
§ 243.166 subd. 6(d)(1).

First, appellant argues that the district court erred because n ot all criminal sexual
conduct convictions in Minnesota require registration. Appella nt is correct. First-time
convictions for fifth-degree cr iminal sexual conduct do not req uire registration. But, as
noted, appellant’s California conviction is the equivalent of fourth-degree criminal sexual
conduct in Minnesota. The district court’s erroneous statement of law makes no difference
here.
Second, appellant argues that the district court erred by citin g to Minn. Stat.
§ 243.166, subd. 6(d)(1), for the proposition that appellant is subject to lifetime
registration. Section 243.166, s ubdivision 6(d)(1), provides registration requirements for
persons who have a prior conviction requiring registration, and does not apply to appellant.
Here again, the district court’s erroneous statement of law doe s not affect the conclusion
t h a t a p p e l l a n t w a s r e q u i r e d t o r e g i s t e r a s a p r e d a t o r y o f f e n d e r based upon a California
conviction that is the equivalent of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct in Minnesota.
Third, appellant maintains that the district court erred by sta ting that appellant is
required to register in Minnesota because he is required to register in California. There is
no evidence in the record that appellant was required to regist er in California and
appellant’s plea agreement for the 1992 California offense refl ects this conclusion.
6
Consequently, the district court could not have determined on t his record that appellant

6 Appellant’s guilty plea listed numerous possible consequences o f h i s p l e a . S e v e r a l
consequences were circled, but the possible registration as a sex offender was not.

8
was required to register in Minnesota for life because he is required to register in California.
But whether or not appellant is required to register as a preda tory offender in California
would only be relevant if the basis for appellant’s registration was Minn. Stat. § 243.166,
subd. 6(e), which provides that persons required to register in other states shall continue to
register in Minnesota for at least the time required in the other state(s). The state does not
claim that section 243.166, subdivision 6(e), is the basis on which appellant is required to
register in Minnesota, the complaint does not allege that as be ing the reason appellant is
required to register here, and the district court’s erroneous statement of law is immaterial.
The district court’s reasoning in this case was not as robust a s it might have been,
and closely followed the reasoning of the earlier order of anot her district court judge
denying appellant’s motion to dismiss for want of probable cause. The district court should
have analyzed whether the California statute is sufficiently similar to a Minnesota statute
so as to require appellant to register here. But this is a que stion of law, and we do not
afford any deference to the district court’s reasoning underlyi ng its legal conclusion. See
State v. Dorn , 887 N.W.2d 826, 830 (Minn. 2016) (stating that appellate cour ts review
questions of law de novo). While the district court may have made some descriptive errors
in its order, the district court’s conclusion that, “[a]s a result of the [California] conviction,
[appellant] is a person required to register as a predatory off ender under Minnesota state
law” is correct.7

7 Appellant also argues that the first district court judge, hea ring the motion to dismiss,
erred by stating that his “California sentence is largely irrelevant.” The district court judge
was responding to appellant’s argument that the state had to prove that he was required to

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Finally, appellant argues that the exhibit proving appellant’s California conviction
does not contain the elements of California’s crime of sexual b attery. The state need not
offer evidence of the applicable law. The state proved the California conviction. Finding
and construing the applicable law is, and always has been, the court’s duty.
The California statute defining sexual battery is nearly identi cal to Minnesota’s
fourth-degree criminal-sexual-conduct statute that requires lif etime registration. The
district court did not err in concluding that appellant was required to register, and the record
supports appellant’s conviction for knowingly failing to register.
Affirmed.

register in California. The district court was correct that the California sentence is largely
irrelevant; it is the conviction that is relevant under Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 6(d)(3).