State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0906

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Harley Harlen Bishop,
Appellant.

Filed February 11, 2019
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69HI-CR-16-496

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark S. Rubin, St. Louis County Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota, Jeffrey M. Vlatkovich,
Assistant County Attorney, Hibbing, Minnesota (for respondent)

Patrick Dinneen, Silver Bay, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Tracy M.
Smith, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JOHNSON, Judge
After a court trial, the St. Louis County District Court found Harley Harlen Bishop
guilty of four drug -related offenses . On appeal , Bishop challenges the district court ’s
2
denial of his pre-trial motion to suppress evidence that was found in his home during the
execution of a search warrant. He contends that the search warrant is invalid because it
was issued based in part on information that a law-enforcement officer obtained in a n
unlawful warrantless search of his home. He also contends that the search warrant is
invalid on the ground that the warrant application contained a misstatement of material
fact. We conclude that there was no unlawful warrantless search of Bishop ’s home and
that the misstatement in the warrant application did not concern a material fact. Therefore,
we affirm.
FACTS
In late 2015 and early 2016, buildings on a farm near the city of Nashwauk were
burglarized three times. Numerous items were stolen, including taxidermic mounts of two
animals: a pine marten1 and a goshawk.2 In early May 2016, the property owner’s teenage
grandson, who was involved in the burglaries, showed the property owner where the stolen
items were being kept. The grandson indicated that the two mounted animals were at
Bishop’s home near the city of Hibbing. On May 19, 2016, the property owner reported
the burglaries to the Chisholm Police Department (because most of the stolen items were
1A pine marten is a member of the weasel family. They range from 24 to 30 inches
in length, weigh approximately two pounds, are typically brown in color, and reside
primarily in northern Minnesota. American marten, Minn. Dep’t of Natural Resources,
https://www.dnr.state.mn.us/mammals/americanmarten.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2019).
2 A goshawk is a large forest-dwelling hawk with broad wings, a long rounded tail,
and a white stripe above red eyes. They are most commonly found in the north-central and
northeastern parts of Minnesota. Accipiter gentilis , Minn. Dep’t of Natural Resources,
https://www.dnr.state.mn.us/rsg/profile.html?action=elementDetail&selectedElement=A
BNKC12060 (last visited Feb. 5, 2019).

3
believed to be at a home in Chisholm) and stated that he believed that the mounted animals
were at Bishop’s home in Hibbing.
Later that day, Officer Burns of the Hibbing Police Department went to Bishop’s
home to investigate. The front of Bishop’s house faces west. A small exterior vestibule
protrudes forward from the front of the house, with a screen door on its north side. The
house has a front window that is close to the vestibule and at a right angle to the screen
door to the vestibule so that a person standing in front of the screen door to the vestibule
also would be standing in front of the front window.
When Officer Burns approached the front door of Bishop’s home, he knocked and
waited for a response . While waiting, h e heard a barking dog and movement inside the
home. He looked through the front window into Bishop’s home. In doing so, he saw a
mounted pine marten on a shelf along the back wall of the room inside the front window.
Officer Burns then walked around the corner of the house to its north side, which has three
windows. Officer Burns looked through the third window, which was nearest to the back
of the house, and saw a man, who later was identified as Bishop, standing inside the home.
Officer Burns ask ed Bishop whether he had any mounted animals in his home. Bishop
stated that there were no mounted animals in his home . Officer Burns left Bishop ’s
property and made an electronic record of his visit. He also contacted Investigator Johnson
of the Itasca County Sheriff ’s Office , which was investigating the burglaries near
Nashwauk, and told him what he saw at Bishop’s home.
On June 22, 2016, Investigator Johnson, who previously had interviewed the owner
of the mounted animals and his grandson, prepared an application for a warrant to search

4
Bishop’s house. In the warrant application, Investigator Jo hnson incorrectly stated that
Officer Burns had contacted him on June 21, 2016, even though Officer Burns had actually
contacted him on May 19, 2016. Wh en officers executed the search warrant, they
discovered a marijuana-growing operation in Bishop’s basement. Officers then sought and
obtained a second search warrant, which le d to the discovery of cocaine,
methamphetamine, marijuana, and methamphetamine paraphernalia.
The state charged Bishop with (1) fifth -degree controlled-substance crime by
possessing cocaine, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(1) (2014); (2) fifth -
degree controlled-substance crime by possessing methamphetamine, in violation of Minn.
Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(1); (3) fifth -degree controlled-substance crime by selling
marijuana, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 1(1); and (4) stor age of
methamphetamine paraphernalia in the presence of a child, based on the fact that Bishop’s
then-16-year-old son lived in the home, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.137, subd. 2(a)(4)
(2014).
In October 2017, Bishop moved to suppress the evidence found during the execution
of the second search warrant on the ground that the first search warrant was invalid . At a
contested omnibus hearing, Bishop testified and called his mother as a witness. The state
presented the testimony of Officer Burns. In a post-hearing memorandum, Bishop argued
that the first search warrant was not supported by probable cause on the grounds that the
information obtained by Officer Burns during his May 19, 2016 visit to Bishop’s home
was stale and that Officer Burns obtained the information in an unlawful warrantless
search. In February 2017 , the district court filed an order denying Bishop ’s motion to

5
suppress. Bishop retained substitute counsel, who brought a motion for reconsideration,
which was denied.
Bishop waived his right to a jury trial and stipulated to the prosecution ’s evidence,
and the parties agreed that the district court ’s ruling on the pre -trial suppression motion
would be dispositive of the case. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4. The district court
found Bishop guilty on all counts. The district court stayed im position of sentence. See
Minn. Stat. § 609.135 (2014). Bishop appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Bishop argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress
evidence, for two reasons.
A. Officer Burns’s Observations at Bishop’s Home
Bishop first argues that the district court erred by ruling that Officer Burns did not
conduct an unlawful warrantless search of his home on May 19, 201 6, when he looked
through the front window and saw a mounted pine marten. The officer’s observation of a
mounted pine marten was mentioned in the application for the first search warrant, the
execution of which led to the second search warrant, which led to the incriminating
evidence underlying Bishop’s convictions.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the “right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures. ” U.S. Const. amend. IV. As a general rule, a w arrant is required
before a law -enforcement officer may search a person ’s home. State v. Lohnes , 344
N.W.2d 605, 610 (Minn. 1984); State v. Morin, 736 N.W.2d 691, 695 (Minn. App. 2007),

6
review denied (Minn. Sept. 18, 2007). Accordingly, a warrantless search of a person ’s
home is “presumptively unreasonable.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586, 100 S. Ct.
1371, 1380 (1980). “A person’s home is clearly a constitutionally protected area, ” and a
search of a home occurs if “the government physically intrudes onto a constitutionally
protected area.” State v. Edstrom, 916 N.W.2d 512, 517 (Minn. 2018) (citing United States
v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406-07 n.3, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 n.3 (2012)); see also State v. Chute,
908 N.W.2d 578, 583 (Minn. 2018). Thus, a search of a home occurs if an officer crosses
the threshold of the doorway to a home and enters the home. Payton, 445 U.S. at 590, 100
S. Ct. at 1382.
A search of a home may occur even if an officer does not cross the threshold of the
doorway and enter the home. “[A]n area outside the home may be considered ‘part of the
home itself ’ if it constitutes curtilage. ” Edstrom, 916 N.W.2d at 51 7 (citing Oliver v.
United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1742 (1984)). An officer conducts a
search if the officer enters onto the curtilage of a home and conduct s an investigation
“‘through an unlicensed physical intrusion.’” Chute, 908 N.W.2d at 585 (quoting Florida
v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 7, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415 (2013)). Whether the officer ’s physical
intrusion is unlicensed depends on whether the property owner “had given the officer
express or implied license to enter onto the curtilage.” Id. A license to enter the curtilage
of a home often is implied because “a person is typically invited to ‘approach the home by
the front path, knock promptly, wait briefly to be received and then (absent invitation to
linger longer) leave.’” Id. at 586 (quoting Jardines, 569 U.S. at 8, 133 S. Ct. at 1415).

7
In Jardines, a detective walked onto the unenclosed front porch of a home with a
drug-sniffing dog, wh o signaled that drugs were present inside the home. 569 U.S. at 4,
133 S. Ct. at 1413. Law-enforcement officers used that information to obtain a search
warrant, the execution of which revealed marijuana inside the home. Id. The question on
appeal was whether the detective conducted an unlawful warrantless search by using a
drug-sniffing dog on the person’s front porch. See id. at 5-6, 133 S. Ct. at 1414. The
Supreme Court’s analysis in Jardines, which Bishop cites and quotes extensively in his
brief, is especially pertinent to this case, so we quote it extensively as well:
Since the officers ’ investigation took place in a
constitutionally protected area, we turn to the question of
whether it was accomplished through an unlicensed physical
intrusion. While law enforcement officers need not “shield
their eyes ” when passing by the home “on public
thoroughfares,” Ciraolo, 476 U.S., at 213, 106 S. Ct. 1809, an
officer’s leave to gather information is sharply circumscribed
when he steps off those thoroughfares and enters the Fourth
Amendment’s protected areas. In permitting, for example,
visual observation of the home from “public navigable
airspace,” we were careful to note that it was done “in a
physically nonintrusive manner.” Ibid. Entick v. Carrington, 2 Wils. K. B. 275, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K. B. 1765), a case
“undoubtedly familiar” to “every American statesman ” at the
time of the Founding . . . , states the general rule clearly: “[O]ur
law holds the property of every man so sacred, that no man can
set his foot upon his neighbour ’s close without his leave. ” 2
Wils. K. B., at 291, 95 Eng. Rep., at 817. As it is undisputed
that the detectives had all four of their feet and all four of their
companion’s firmly planted on the constitutionally protected
extension of Jardines ’ home, the only question is whether he
had given his leave (even implicitly) for them to do so. He had
not.

“A license may be implied from the habits of the
country,” notwithstanding the “strict rule of the English
common law as to entry upon a close. ” McKee v. Gratz, 260

8
U.S. 127, 136, 43 S. Ct. 16, 17 (1922) (Holmes, J.). We have
accordingly recognized that “the knocker on the front door is
treated as an invitation or license to attempt an entry, justifying
ingress to the home by solicitors, hawkers and peddlers of all
kinds.” Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 626, 71 S. Ct. 920,
924 (1951). This implicit license typically permits the visi tor
to approach the home by the front path, knock promptly, wait
briefly to be received, and then (absent invitation to linger
longer) leave. Complying with the terms of that traditional
invitation does not require fine -grained legal knowledge; it is
generally managed without incident by the Nation ’s Girl
Scouts and trick-or-treaters. Thus, a police officer not armed
with a warrant may approach a home and knock, precisely
because that is “no more than any private citizen might do. ”
Kentucky v. King , 563 U.S. 452, 469, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1862
(2011).

But introducing a trained police dog to explore the area
around the home in hopes of discovering incriminating
evidence is something else. There is no customary invitation
to do that. An invitation to engage in canine forensic
investigation assuredly does not inhere in the very act of
hanging a knocker. To find a visitor knocking on the door is
routine (even if sometimes unwelcome); to spot that same
visitor exploring the front path with a metal detector, or
marching his bloodhound into the garden before saying hello
and asking permission, would inspire most of us to—well, call
the police. The scope of a license —express or implied —is
limited not only to a particular area but also to a specific
purpose. Consent at a traffic stop to an officer ’s checking out
an anonymous tip that there is a body in the trunk does not
permit the officer to rummage through the trunk for narcotics.
Here, the background social norms that invite a visitor to the
front door do not invite him there to conduct a search.

[T]he question before the court is precisely whether the
officer’s conduct was an objectively reasonable search. As we
have described, that depends upon whether the officers had an
implied license to enter the porch, which in turn depends upon
the purpose for which they entered. Here, their behavior
objectively reveals a purpose to conduct a search, which is not
what anyone would think he had license to do.

9
Id. at 7-10, 133 S. Ct. at 1415-17 (footnotes omitted).
In its order denying Bishop ’s motion to suppress, the district court made a finding
that Officer Burns “looked through the front -west facing window of the Defendant ’s
residence and viewed a pine marten mount inside. ” In its legal analysis, the district court
rejected Bishop’s argument for the following reasons:
Officer Burns viewed a pine marten mount through the
Defendant’s window and used that observation to support the
original search warrant. The Defendant questions whether this
viewing was from a lawful vantage point. What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home, is not
subject to Fourth Amendment protection. State v. Carter, 569
N.W.2d 169, 177 (Minn. 1997). Because the officer
inadvertently viewed the mount from the window nex t to the
front door, a place impliedly open to the public, the plain-view
exception applies.

Bishop takes issue with the district court ’s finding that Officer Burns saw the
mounted pine marten through the front (west) window, not through a side (north) window.
Both Bishop and his mother, who owns the home and also lives in it, testified that Officer
Burns could not have seen through the front window because it has curtains that always
are closed. But Officer Burns testified that his view through the window was not obstructed
when he visited Bishop ’s house on May 19, 2016 . The district court ’s findings are
consistent with Officer Burns’s testimony and inconsistent with Bishop ’s evidence. “It is
the province of the fact -finder to determine the weight an d credibility to be afforded the
testimony of each witness. ” State v. Kramer , 668 N.W.2d 32, 38 (Minn. App. 2003),
review denied (Minn. Nov. 18, 2003). We must defer to the district court ’s resolution of

10
conflicting evidence unless its findings are clear ly erroneous. Id. Because the district
court’s findings are supported by Officer Burns’s testimony, they are not clearly erroneous.
To resolve Bishop’s argument, we must determine whether Officer Burns engaged
in a warrantless search of Bishop’s home when he looked through Bishop’s front window
after knocking on the front door and while waiting for a response. As stated above, the
answer to that question hinges on whether Officer Burns entered the curtilage of Bishop ’s
home and conducted an investigation “‘through an unlicensed physical intrusion,’” and that
depends on whether Bishop “had given the officer express or implied license” to act as he
did. Chute, 908 N.W.2d at 585 (quoting Jardines, 569 U.S. at 7, 133 S. Ct. at 1415). The
law presumes a lice nse “to ‘approach the home by the front path, knock promptly, [and]
wait briefly to be received. ’” Id. at 586 (quoting Jardines, 569 U.S. at 8, 133 S. Ct. at
1415). But “the background social norms that invite a visitor to the front door do not invite
him there to conduct a search.” Jardines, 569 U.S. at 9, 133 S. Ct. at 1416. Furthermore,
the scope of the implied license “is limited not only to a particular area but also to a specific
purpose.” Id. at 9, 133 S. Ct. at 1416. An officer exceeds the scope of the implied license
if the officer’s “behavior objectively reveals a purpose to conduct a search.” Id. at 10, 133
S. Ct. at 1417.
In this case, Officer Burns ’s conduct plainly was within the scope of the license
implied from social norms insofar a s he approached the front door of Bishop ’s home,
knocked, and waited for a response, so long as his wait was brief. See Chute, 908 N.W.2d
at 586. The more difficult question is whether Officer Burns’s conduct was within the
scope of the implied license w hen, while briefly waiting, he looked through the front

11
window into Bishop’s home. The license implied from social norms does not necessarily
forbid a visitor from looking through an unobstructed window that is next to a front door
or is mounted in the front door while waiting for a response to a knock on the door, so long
as the visitor remains in front of the door. A polite visitor is likely to direct his or her gaze
away from the window so as not to intrude on the privacy of persons inside the home , or
at least to refrain from doing so conspicuously or for a long period of time. But some
visitors might, depending on the circumstances, consider it acceptable to look through an
unobstructed window to determine whether a resident is inside the home or is preparing to
answer the door. Consequently, a resident of a home with an unobstructed window at the
front door cannot expect all visitors to avoid looking through the window while waiting for
a response to a knock on the door. But if and when there is a response to a knock on the
door, social norms are more permissive toward a visitor. If a person inside the home opens
an inner door or is heard walking toward the front door, it would not be unusual for a visitor
to look through a window to make eye contact with the person answering the door.
The distinctive feature of this case is that Officer Burns apparently looked through
the front window only after hearing noises inside —a barking dog and the noise of some
other movement. When asked whether he heard or saw anyone inside the house after
knocking on the door, he testified, “ I heard what I thought was movement and then I also
heard a dog barking inside the residence. ” When asked whether he tried to identify the
movement inside the home, he testified, “ That is one of the reasons why I peered into the
window, yes.” Officer Burns may have looked through the window instinctively, as
anyone might do upon suddenly hearing a nearby noise. It is significant that Officer Burns

12
did not relocate before looking through the window. He was standing directly in front of
the window as well as directly in front of the screen door to the vestibule, so he could have
seen through the window merely by turning 90 degrees to his left. Thus, from an objective
point of view, the record does not indicate that Officer Burns exceeded the scope of the
implied license to enter onto the curtilage of Bishop ’s home. Accordingly, Officer Burns
did not conduct an unlawful warrantless search of Bishop’s home.
Our conclusion is consistent with post -Jardines caselaw from other jurisdictions
arising from similar circumstances. We are aware of four opinions issued since Jardines
in which an appellate court has concluded that an officer conducted a warrantless search of
a home by looking through a window, but in none of those cases was the officer positioned
directly in front of the front door to the home. See Friedson v. State, 207 So. 3d 961, 963
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016); Powell v. State , 120 So. 3d 577, 580-81 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2013); Sayers v. State , 433 S.W.3d 667, 671-72 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); State v. Popp ,
855 N.W.2d 471, 475 (Wis. Ct. App. 2014). On the other hand, we are unaware of any
opinion issued since Jardines in which an appellate court has concluded that an officer
conducted a warrantless search by approaching the front door of a home, knocking on the
door, and looking through a window into the home while standing in front of the door and
waiting for a response to the knock on the door.
Our conclusion also is consistent with the supreme court’s opinion in State v. Carter,
which the district court cited for the proposition that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes
to the public, even in his own home, is not subject to Fourth Amendment protection.” See
569 N.W.2d 169, 177 (Minn. 1997), rev’d on other grounds sub nom., Minnesota v. Carter,

13
525 U.S. 83, 119 S. Ct. 409 (1998) . The district court ’s reference to Carter gives the
impression that Carter is permissive toward a law-enforcement officer who looks through
the window of a home. But the holding in Carter actually is protective of the Fourth
Amendment rights of the persons inside the home . The officer in that case approached a
ground-floor window of an apartment by leaving the sidewalk, walking across a grassy
lawn, and positioning himself behind some short bushes. Id. at 172. “The window’s blinds
were drawn closed, but gaps in the blinds allowed [the officer] to observe activity in the
apartment.” Id. The officer was approximately 12 to 18 inches from the window and
looked inside the apartment for approximately 15 minutes. Id. The officer saw three
persons packaging powder cocaine. Id. The supreme court concluded that the officer ’s
conduct constituted a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 178. The court
reasoned that the three persons inside the home “took sufficient precautions to keep their
activities private” and that the officer “took extraordinary measures to enable himself to
view the inside of a private dwelling.” Id. at 177-78. By comparison, Bishop apparently
did not take as much precaution to maintain the privacy of his home. Likewise, Officer
Burns did not take extraordinary measures to peer into Bishop’ s home. He merely stood
in front of the front door of Bishop ’s home while waiting for a response to his knock on
the door, intending to ask questions of Bishop, and he looked through the nearby front
window after he heard noises inside the home.
Before concluding, we note that the district court improperly referred to the “plain-
view exception” in its analysis of Bishop ’s argument. T he plain-view exception to the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement applies only to a seizure of a tangible item, not

14
to a search of a place. Chute, 908 N.W.2d at 583 n.2 (citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S.
128, 134, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 2306 (1990)). Bishop does not argue that Officer Burns
unlawfully seized evidence. Indeed, Officer Burns did not seize anything during his visit
to Bishop’s home on May 19, 2016. Rather, Bishop argues that Officer Burns conducted
an unlawful warrantless search of his home. The proper legal conclusion flowing from the
district court’s premise that “the officer inadvertently viewed the mount from the window
next to the front door” is that Officer Burns did not conduct an unlawful warrantless search
of Bishop’s home.
Thus, the first search warrant is not invalid on the ground that the application stated
that Officer Burns saw a mounted pine marten in Bishop’s home.
B. Application for First Search Warrant
Bishop also argues that the district court erred by ruling that the first search warrant,
which authorized a search for the stolen animal mounts, is invalid on the ground that the
warrant application contained a misstatement of material fact.
In Franks v. Delaware , 438 U.S. 154, 98 S. Ct. 2674 (1978), the United States
Supreme Court held that, after a warrant has been issued and executed, a criminal defendant
may “challenge the truthfulness of factual statements made in an affidavit supporting the
warrant.” Id. at 155-56, 98 S. Ct. at 2676. “A search warrant is void, and the fruits of the
search must be excluded, if the application includes intentional or reckless
misrepresentations of fact material to the findings of probable cause.” State v. Moore, 438
N.W.2d 101, 105 (Minn. 1989). Accordingly, if a defendant seeks to invalidate a warrant
under Franks, the defendant must show that “(1) the affiant ‘deliberately made a statement

15
that was false or in reckless disregard of the truth,’ and (2) ‘the statement was material to
the probable cause determination.’” State v. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320, 327 (Minn. 2010)
(quoting State v. McDonough, 631 N.W.2d 373, 390 (Minn. 2001)). If a defendant makes
such a showing, the “search warrant is void, and the fruits of the search must be excluded.”
Moore, 438 N.W.2d at 105. This court applies a clear-error standard of review to a district
court’s finding on the first requirement and a de novo standard of review to a district court’s
determination of the second requirement. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d at 327.
Bishop’s Franks claim is based on the fact that Investigator Johnson’s application
for the first search warrant was inaccurate in stating that Officer Burns provided him with
information on June 21, 2016, which was one day before Investigator Johnson signed the
warrant application, rather than May 19, 2016, which was the day of Officer Burns’s visits
to Bishop’s home. The district court found that the warrant application misstated the date
but that the misstatement “appears to be the result of a misunderstanding between officers
or typographical error rather than a deliberate misrepresentation to the court.” The district
court also found that the misstated fact was not material because the information obtained
from Officer Burns “is not so stale that it could not support the application for the warrant
despite the officer having viewed the pine marten mount 34 days earlier.”
Bishop contends that the district court erred by reason ing that the factual
misstatement was not material. “A misrepresentation or omission is material if, when the
misrepresentation is set aside or the omission supplied, probable cause to issue the search
warrant no longer exists.” Andersen, 784 N.W.2d at 327. To establish probable cause, the
facts supporting a warrant application must be “‘so closely related to the time of the issue

16
of the warrant as to justify a finding of probable cause at that time. ’” State v. Souto, 578
N.W.2d 744, 750 (Minn. 1998) (quoting Sgro v. United States , 287 U.S. 206, 210, 53 S.
Ct. 138, 140 (1932)). If the supporting facts are not sufficiently related in time, the
information is stale, and the warrant application is not supported by probable cause. See
United States v. Leon , 468 U.S. 897, 904, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3410 -11 (1984); Souto, 578
N.W.2d at 750. In determining whether information in a warrant application is stale, a
court should consider a number of factors, including “whether there is any indication of
ongoing crimin al activity, whether the articles sought are innocuous or incriminating,
whether the property sought is easily disposable or transferable, and whether the items
sought are of enduring utility.” Souto, 578 N.W.2d at 750.
A mounted pine marten is, by its nature, both innocuous and easily transportable.
But it is the type of item that is likely to have enduring value and, thus, likely to remain in
the possession of a person who was known to have possessed it on a prior date. Thus, even
if Investigator Johns on had correctly understood that Officer Burns saw a mounted pine
marten in Bishop’s home 34 days earlier, the information would not have been stale and,
thus, would not have affected the probable -cause determination. This conclusion is
consistent with th e applicable caselaw. See State v. DeWald , 463 N.W.2d 741, 746 -47
(Minn. 1990) (concluding that information concerning defendant ’s possession of kitchen
knives 22 days earlier was not stale); State v. Jannetta, 355 N.W.2d 189, 1 92-94 (Minn.
App. 1984) ( concluding that information concerning defendant’s possession of sexually
explicit photographs of minors two years earlier was not stale), review denied (Minn. Jan.
14, 1985).

17
Accordingly, even if the application for the first search warrant had said that Officer
Burns had visited Bishop’s home on May 19, 2016, the application nonetheless would have
provided probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant. This is so even though the
application also stated that Bishop had told Officer Burns on May 19 , 2016, that he was
not in possession of any mounted animals and that the owner of the animal mounts had
been told two weeks earlier that the animal mounts were at another person ’s house. Law-
enforcement officers are not required to accept a suspect ’s statements at face value, and
Bishop’s statement to Officer Burns was directly contradicted by Officer Burns ’s
observation of a mounted pine marten inside Bishop’s home only moments earlier. Thus,
the district court did not err by determining that the information obtained by Officer Burns
was not stale.
Bishop also argues that probable cause was lacking on the ground that Officer Burns
described the mounted pine marten in Bishop’s home as being brown even though,
according to Bishop, the stolen pine marten was albino. Bishop did not make this argument
in his motion to suppress evidence. He made a similar argument in his motion for
reconsideration after retaining substitute counsel. The district court denied the motion for
reconsideration without discussing the color of the stolen pine marten. Bishop may not
appeal from a denial of a motion for reconsideration. Hohenwald v. State , 875 N.W.2d
843, 846 (Minn. 2016). Nonetheless, the argument is without merit because the warrant
application does not specify the color of the stolen mounted pine marten. Bishop testified
at the omnibus hearing that he possessed the stolen mount ed pine marten at some point in
time and that it was an albino . But there is no evidence in the record to suggest that the

18
owner of the stolen mounted pine marten had specified its color or that any law -
enforcement officer was aware of its color.
In sum, the district court did not err by denying Bishop ’s motion to suppress
evidence.
Affirmed.