In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: C. R. T. and P. B. B., Parents.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A18-0911

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
C. R. T. and P. B. B., Parents.

Filed December 17, 2018
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Wright County District Court
File No. 86-JV-17-5996

Cathleen Gabriel, CGW Law Office, Annandale, Minnesota (for respondent mother)

Jolanta M. Howard, Howard Law Firm, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant father)

Thomas N. Kelly, Wright County Attorney, John A. Bowen, Assista nt County Attorney,
Buffalo, Minnesota (for respondent county)

Dereck Buss, Monticello, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Brandi L. Schiefelbein, Meeker County Attorney, Jennifer L. Thompson, Assistant County
Attorney, Litchfield, Minnesota (for amicus curiae Minnesota Co unty Attorneys
Association)

Considered and decided by Bratv old, Presiding Judge; Worke, Ju dge; and Jesson,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
Appellant-father P.B.B. challenges the district court’s termina tion of his parental
rights to his child, V.L.B. The district court found the existence of multiple statutory bases
for the involuntary termination of father’s parental rights. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,

2
subd. 1(b) (2018) (listing statutory bases for the involuntary termination of parental rights).
Father, however, does not challenge the existence of any of tho se bases for termination.
Instead, father challenges the district court’s determination t hat reasonable efforts were
made to reunite him with his child. Father also argues that th e district court abused its
discretion by ruling that termination of his parental rights is in the child’s best interests.
Because the record supports the district court’s findings, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant is the biological father of three-year-old child V.L. B., who was around
eighteen months old at the beginning of this case. Father and the child’s mother had a
volatile relationship, which fat her described as toxic. Althou gh it appears that the child
lived with both her mother and father during her early life, bo th parents have ongoing
struggles with substance abuse. As a result of both parents’ s ubstance abuse issues,
domestic disputes frequently occurred. The child’s mother and father are no longer in a
relationship.1
In April 2017, father crashed his car into a tree while the chi ld was in the car with
him, though it appears she was unharmed.2 Father blew a 0.10 preliminary breath test over
one hour after the crash was reported, and police observed nume rous liquor bottles in the
vehicle. Father was arrested for various charges related to the incident.

1 The child’s mother voluntarily consented to termination of her parental rights and is not
involved in this appeal.
2 The child’s foster parents testified that initially the child seemed to get anxious and upset
anytime she was in a car, but that she is doing fine now.

3
A little over one week later, Carv er County Health and Human S ervices (Carver
County) spoke with father, who started shouting “I can’t take this!” and stated that he was
having a mental breakdown. In order to ensure the child’s safe ty and welfare, the district
court granted temporary custody of the child to Carver County i n an ex parte protective
care order for custody. A few days later, a petition for child in need of protection services
(CHIPS) was filed, and the district court determined that the child needed to be placed in a
foster home with supervised visits for the family. Initially, the child was placed with her
paternal grandmother, and father was permitted to visit the chi ld on a fairly liberal basis.
Additionally, the district court ordered father to complete a r ule 25 chemical-use
assessment, a physiological assessment with an anger component, to have no use or
possession of alcohol or non-prescription drugs, and to submit to random drug testing.
An out-of-home placement plan signed by both parents was filed with and approved
by the Carver County District Court. The case plan outlined the requirements for the child
to be returned to her parents’ c ustody. Much of the concern re garding father’s ability to
care for his child revolved around substance abuse issues relat ed to his self-admitted
alcoholism and potential mental-health concerns. Based on thes e areas of concern, many
of the requirements in father’s case plan focused on his need t o demonstrate sobriety,
stabilize his mental health, esta blish supportive services for himself, and demonstrate his
ability to care for his child. The case plan also required fat her to complete a
chemical-dependency assessment and follow the recommendations ( including inpatient
treatment) and to complete mental-health assessments and follow-up recommendations. In

4
addition to outlining the requir ements to regain custody, the c ase plan offered several
services to assist father in meeting these requirements.
Between May and November 2017, father cycled in and out of tre atment programs,
with each treatment program noting that he was at a substantial risk for relapse. Father was
discharged from a treatment program in November 2017 for noncom pliance, with his
discharge paperwork noting two instances of substance usage dur ing the treatment period
as well as his failure to regularly attend group sessions. Fat her was not enrolled in any
formal treatment programs from late November 2017 through March 2018.
While father was in and out of these treatment programs, the v enue for the child
protection case was transferred to Wright County. 3 Wright County sent an updated
out-of-home case plan to the child’s parents, but neither ever responded or signed it. The
Wright County social worker also sent the case plan to father’s m o t h e r w i t h a l e t t e r
requesting his signature and offering to discuss the plan in pe rson or by phone. Father
never responded. The case plan contained essentially the same requirements to regain
custody of the child as the Carv er County plan, but updated inf ormation about resource
providers.
After the updated case plan was sent to father, he missed seve n random drug tests.
In mid-January 2018, father was admitted to the hospital for de pression, anxiety, and

3 The district court transferred venue to Wright County because of a domestic violence
history involving the child in Wr ight County, the car crash in April 2017 occurred there,
and because mother said she still lived in Wright County. No o ne objected to the change
in venue.

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alcohol use and was placed on a 72-hour hold. The hospital recommended that he attend a
mental illness/chemical dependency inpatient treatment program, but he did not attend.
Later in January, the court approved placement of the child with a non-relative foster
home, where she currently resides. Once the child was placed w ith her foster parents,
father’s visits with the child w ere scheduled and supervised. Of the four visits that were
scheduled, father missed two. When father did attend the visit s, the child would hug him
and appear to show some attachment to him, and at the end of at least one visit, the child
began crying and asking for her daddy, though she stopped crying when she was returned
to her foster parents.
Given father’s failure to maintain sobriety and demonstrate an ability to care for his
child, a petition to terminate his parental rights (TPR) was filed in February 2018. A few
weeks before the March TPR trial, father was arrested due to an active warrant but was
released to a treatment program . At the time of his admission to this treatment program,
father admitted that he was under the influence of the prescrip tion drug Suboxone, for
which he did not have a prescription.
At trial, the state presented the testimony of several witnesse s, including father,
father’s mother, social workers from Wright and Carver counties , and the child’s current
foster parents. Much of the testimony focused on father’s sobriety and mental health, and
efforts that the social workers made to help father meet the requirements to regain custody
of the child.
The child’s current foster parents, who had been caring for the child for about two
months at the time of trial, testified that the child was adapting to her routine well and that

6
she had shown improvement in the time she had been living with them. Both foster parents
testified that they loved the child and are open to adopting her.
At the end of testimony, the district court continued the trial for about one month at
father’s request. When the trial resumed, the district court h eard testimony from the
guardian ad litem, father, and father’s mother that, during the continuance, father
discharged himself from his current treatment center without staff approval.
After taking the matter under advisement, the district court g ranted the petition to
terminate father’s parental rights. The district court found t hat four statutory grounds for
termination of parental rights were established by clear and co nvincing evidence: failure
to comply with parental duties, palpable unfitness, reasonable efforts have failed to correct
conditions leading to out-of-home placement, and the child is neglected and in foster care.
See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), (4), (5), (8). One ground—palpable unfitness—
does not explicitly reference a r equirement that the county mak e reasonable efforts to
reunite the parent with their ch ild. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, s ubd. 1(b)(4). Additionally,
the district court concluded that it was in the child’s best in terests to not be reunited with
her father. Father moved for a new trial, but the district cou rt denied that motion. Father
appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Father first argues that the district court erred by concluding that reasonable efforts
were made to reunite him with his child. Before we address fat her’s argument, we note
that two circumstances relevant to father’s case raise reoccurr ing questions regarding
reasonable efforts in appeals from a district court’s involunta ry termination of parental

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rights.4 First, some, but not all, of the statutory bases for terminat ion of parental rights
explicitly refer to “reasonable efforts” by the social services agency to assist the family of
the child who is the subject of a petition to terminate parental rights.5 Compare Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2) (stating that the district court “may ” involuntarily terminate
parental rights if a parent failed to satisfy the duties of the parent-child relationship “and
either reasonable efforts by the social services agency have failed to correct the conditions
that formed the basis of the petition or reasonable efforts wou ld be futile and therefore
unreasonable”) and Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b )(5) (stating that the distric t court
“may” involuntarily terminate parental rights if “following th e child’s placement out of
the home, reasonable efforts, und er the direction of the court, have failed to correct the

4 Because these issues were not originally briefed, we requested and received supplemental
briefing from the parties. Additionally, we invited amicus bri efs and received one from
the Minnesota County Attorneys Association.
5 Although a district court may invoke more than one of the stat utory bases to terminate
parental rights listed in Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b), if an appellate court affirms the
existence of one of those grounds, it need not address the othe r grounds invoked by the
district court. E.g., In re Welfare of P.R.L. , 622 N.W.2d 538, 545 (Minn. 2001); In re
Welfare of A.D. , 535 N.W.2d 643, 650 (Minn. 1995). Because any one unchalleng ed
ground is a sufficient statutory basis to support termination o f parental rights, this court
need not address any statutory ground if all of the statutory grounds for termination are not
challenged on appeal. Although in his supplemental brief fathe r suggests that this court
should adopt the plain-error standard of review used in criminal cases for cases where the
appellant does not challenge each statutory basis for terminating parental rights, his request
goes beyond the current state of the law. See Sefkow v. Sefkow , 427 N.W.2d 203, 210
(Minn. 1988) (noting that the function of this court is limited to identifying and correcting
errors); Tereault v. Palmer , 413 N.W.2d 283, 286 (Minn. App. 1987) (stating that
extending laws is the province of the supreme court or the legi slature, but not this court),
review denied (Minn. Dec. 18, 1987). In cases where every statutory ground f or
termination is not challenged, thi s court may, in the interest of justice, review whether a
statutory ground is supported by clear and convincing evidence, but it is not required to do
so.

8
conditions leading to the child’s placement”) with Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(1)
(stating that the district court “may” involuntarily terminate parental rights if “the parent
has abandoned the child”) and Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd . 1(b)(3) (stating that the
district court “may” involuntarily terminate parental rights if a parent is “ordered to
contribute to the support of the child or financially aid in th e child’s birth and has
continuously failed to do so without good cause”).
Second, some caselaw recites a three-prong analysis for reviewing a district court’s
decision to involuntarily terminate parental rights. That thre e-prong analysis requires
review of whether the social services agency made reasonable efforts to reunite the family:
I n r e v i e w i n g a d e c i s i o n t o t e r m i n a t e p a r e n t a l r i g h t s , t h e
appellate court determines [1] whether there is clear and
convincing evidence to support at least one statutory ground
for termination and, if so, [2] whether termination is in the best
interests of the child. If statutory grounds for termination exist
and termination is in the best interests of the child, the appellate
court then determines [3] whether there is clear and convincing
evidence that the county made reasonable efforts to reunite the
family.

In re Children of T.A.A., 702 N.W.2d 703, 708 (Minn. 2005) (citations omitted); see, e.g.,
In re Welfare of Children of S.E.P. , 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008); In re Welfare of
Children of A.R.B. , 906 N.W.2d 894, 897 (Minn. App. 2018). Other caselaw, however,
recites a two-prong analysis for reviewing a district court’s d ecision to involuntarily
terminate parental rights. And this two-prong analysis could be read to not require review
of the reasonableness of the efforts of the social services age ncy. See, e.g., In re Welfare
of Children of R.W. , 678 N.W.2d 49, 55 (Minn. 2004 ) (stating that an involuntarily
termination of parental rights can be affirmed if (1) at least one statutory ground alleged in

9
the petition is supported by clear and convincing evidence and (2) termination of parental
rights is in the child’s best interests); In re Welfare of M.A.H., 839 N.W.2d 730, 740 (Minn.
App. 2013); In re Welfare of Children of D.F., 752 N.W.2d 88, 94 (Minn. App. 2008).
In light of the different articulations of the relevant standard, reoccurring questions
have arisen regarding when an appellate court must address an appealing parent’s challenge
to the reasonableness of the efforts of the social services age ncy. This is especially the
case when—as here—(a) the district court invoked at least one s tatutory basis for
termination which does not expl icitly refer to reasonable effor ts by the social services
agency and (b) father challenges none of the statutory bases fo r termination but does
challenge the reasonableness of the efforts made by the social services agency.
A s a p r e l i m i n a r y m a t t e r , w e r e i t e r a t e t h a t M i n n e s o t a l a w c l e a r ly answers that
question. By statute,
[o]nce a child alleged to be in need of protection or services is
under the court’s jurisdiction, the court shall ensure that
reasonable efforts . . . are made to prevent placement or to
eliminate the need for removal and to reunite the child with the
child’s family at the earliest possible time. . . . Reasonable
efforts to prevent placement and for rehabilitation and
reunification are always required except upon a determination
by the court that [certain conditions exist].

Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a) (2018) (emphasis added). Thus, while some of the statutory bases
for involuntarily terminating parental rights listed in Minn. S tat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b),
explicitly refer to reasonable efforts by the social services agency, a separate, independent
statute requires the social services agency to make reasonable efforts or to obtain an order
from the district court excusing the agency from making those e fforts. Because those
efforts are required to be made or excused in all cases in which a child alleged to be in need

10
of protection or services is under the court’s jurisdiction, a parent’s otherwise properly
raised challenge to the district court’s ruling(s) on those mat ters generally needs to be
addressed, even in appeals in which no challenge is made to a s tatutory basis for
termination that does not explic itly refer to reasonable effort s by the social services
agency.6
With this understanding, we proceed to address the reasonable efforts in this case as
well as the district court’s analysis regarding the best interests of the child.
I. Reasonable efforts were made to reunite father with his chi ld.

Father contends that the distri ct court erred by concluding tha t Wright County
Human Services Agency (Wright County) provided reasonable effor ts for reunification
because Wright County failed to p rovide him with an out-of-home case plan that met the
statutory requirements. We review the district court’s factual findings, including whether
reasonable efforts were made, for clear error. In Re Welfare of Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d
76, 87 (Minn. App. 2012).

6 Moreover, we note that many of the cases reciting the two-pron g standard for review of
an involuntary termination of parental rights did not involve a challenge to the
reasonableness of the efforts of the social services agency. See R.W., 678 N.W.2d at 55;
M.A.H., 839 N.W.2d at 740. Therefore, we cannot say that those cases would necessarily
govern appeals in which a challenge to the reasonableness of th e agency’s efforts was
properly made. See In re Rollins, 738 N.W.2d 798, 802 (Minn. App. 2007) (stating that
“[o]pinions must be read in light of the issue presented for de cision. And assumptions
underlying an opinion that are not the subject of a court’s analysis are not precedential on
the point that is assumed” (citing Skelly Oil Co. v. Comm’r of Taxation, 131 N.W.2d 632,
645 (Minn. 1964); Chapman v. Dorsey, 41 N.W.2d 438, 443 (Minn. 1950)); see Peterson
v. Holiday Recreational Indus., Inc., 726 N.W.2d 499, 504 n.1 (Minn. App. 2007), review
denied (Minn. Feb. 28, 2007).

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Reasonable efforts are “services that go beyond mere matters of f o r m s o a s t o
include real, genuine assistance.” In re Welfare of Children of S.W., 727 N.W.2d 144, 150
(Minn. App. 2007) (quotations omitted), review denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2007). In order to
determine if efforts were reasonable, the district court must determine whether the services
offered were: (1) relevant to the safety and protection of the child; (2) adequate to meet the
needs of the child and family; (3) culturally appropriate; (4) available and accessible; (5)
consistent and timely; and (6) realistic under the circumstances.7 Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h)
(2018). To assess whether the services offered met these crite ria and were reasonable,
courts first turn to the written case plan.
As part of the county’s reasonable efforts to reunite the parent with their child, when
a child is placed in foster care by a court order, the responsible social services agency must
prepare an out-of-home case plan. A.R.B., 906 N.W.2d at 897. The case plan must explain
the specific reasons why the chil d was placed in foster care, t he changes a parent must
make in order for their child to return home, and note services that are available to help
achieve these requirements and reunify the family. Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 1(c)(2),
(3) (2018). Further, the out-of-home case plan must be a written document that is prepared
jointly with the parents, signed by them, approved by the court , and explained to all
involved parties. A.R.B., 906 N.W.2d at 897.
Here, father argues that the county failed to make reasonable efforts because Wright
County failed to prepare and provide him with an out-of-home ca se plan according to the
statutory requirements. But the district court correctly deter mined that reasonable efforts

7 Father appeared to acknowledge at trial that the services offered to him met these criteria.

12
at reunification were made because father received a written, complete, thorough case plan
from Carver County. The Carver County case plan was signed, approved by the court, and
contained all of the requisite substantive information. Additi onally, once the case was
transferred to Wright County, the Wright County social worker updated the plan to provide
new names of resource providers and more specific steps for fat her to meet his
requirements for reunification, but the plan remained substanti ally the same. The Wright
County social worker mailed the updated plan to father and his mother and indicated her
availability to discuss the plan in person or over the phone.
Further, as the district court found, father was provided with ample resources and
opportunities to reunite with his child. Between Carver and Wr ight counties, father was
offered services including but not limited to: out-of-home plac ement planning; risk
assessments; identification of s u p p o r t n e t w o r k t o a s s i s t w i t h vehicles, housing, and
employment; chemical-dependency assessments; inpatient and outp atient
chemical-dependency treatment opportunities; anger assessments; mental-health
assessments; therapy referrals; and supervised and unsupervised visits with the child.
These resources were specifically tailored to the areas identif ied as requirements for
father’s reunification with the c hild—chemical-dependency and m ental-health issues.
Father never requested any service that was not provided to him . Rather, father did not
avail himself of the resources presented to him. Based on the evidence in the record, the
district court reasonably concluded that reunification efforts failed not because of a lack of
effort from the county, but because father demonstrated a lack of commitment to his case

13
plan. These conclusions are supported by the case plans in the record and the testimony of
the social workers, the guardian ad litem, and father himself.
But father argues that once the venue of the case was transferr ed, Wright County
was obligated to provide him with a case plan that met all of t he statutory requirements,
despite the fact that he had a case plan already. This argument lacks a basis in the statutory
scheme or caselaw.
While an out-of-home placement plan is statutorily required, nowhere in the statute
does it say that any time venue is transferred in a child prote ction case, each county must
prepare its own separate case plan. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.212 ( 2018). Although under
the statutory scheme governing child protection individual counties are the administrators
of the law, the law applies on a state-wide basis. Carver Coun ty provided father with the
statutorily required case plan, and the Wright County social worker updated the case plan
with new information about resource providers and made reasonab le efforts to provide
father with the updated case plan. Father’s argument that the statute requires more is not
persuasive.
Father attempts to analogize his case to another recent case in which this court found
that reasonable efforts require a written case plan and that that obligation is not excused by
a father’s brief opposition to p articipating in developing a ca se plan. See A.R.B. , 906
N.W.2d at 894. But this case is factually distinguishable. In A.R.B., no written case plan
was ever prepared, even after the incarcerated father requested one. Id. Furthermore, the
county in A.R.B. made no effort to provide the father with assistance that coul d help him
achieve reunification with his child. Id. Here, father received two written case plans and

14
was provided with a variety of resources. Because of the factual differences between this
case and A.R.B., father’s analogy is not persuasive.
Because the statute does not require a new case plan in every c ounty, and because
the district court’s findings tha t reasonable efforts were made to reunify father are
supported by evidence in the record, the district court did not clearly err by concluding that
reasonable efforts were made to reunite father with his child.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determi ning that
terminating father’s parental rights was in the best interests of the child.

Father also contends that the district court erred in finding t hat termination of his
parental rights was in the best interests of the child. Specif ically, father argues that the
district court abused its discretion by discounting evidence that the child was comfortable
with her father and would respond to him, that the child’s pate rnal grandmother’s home
was a safe and positive environment, that visits between father and the child were positive,
a n d t h a t t h e r e w a s a n a t t a c h m e n t b e t w e e n t h e c h i l d a n d h e r f a t her. Deciding whether
termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interests is a decision that rests within the
district court’s discretion. D.F., 752 N.W.2d at 95. Accordingly, we review the decision
to terminate parental rights based on the child’s best interests for an abuse of discretion. In
re Welfare of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 905 (Minn. App. 2011).
When determining the best interests of the child, the district court must analyze and
balance three factors: “(1) the child’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship;
(2) the parent’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship; and (3) any competing
interest[s] of the child.” In Re Welfare of R.T.B., 492 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 1992). If

15
the interests of the parent and the child conflict, the interes ts of the child are paramount.
Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 39.05, subd. 3(5).
Here, the district court found th at the child had a small inter est in maintaining the
parent-child relationship becaus e of her young age, and that wh ile the child did interact
well with her father, she had a st rong interest in obtaining permanency and was adjusting
well to her foster home. In contrast, the district court found that while father had a strong
interest in maintaining the pare nt-child relationship, his fail ure to make progress on his
case plan, his lack of communication with social workers, and h is continued substance
usage demonstrated a lack of true commitment to maintaining the parent-child relationship.
Because the interests of the parent and child conflicted, the c hild’s interests are
paramount. The district court found that while there is no doubt that father loves his child,
his alcoholism interfered with his ability to provide a stable home or meet the child’s needs.
The court ultimately determined:
Father has known for 12 months that his behavior would
determine whether V.L.B. would be returned to him, yet he has
failed to make any tangible progress on his case plan. His
continued failure to complete tre atment, utilize the services
[provided to him by] Carver an d Wright count[ies], keep in
contact with his social workers, [and] consistently attend
supervised visits with V.L.B. all suggest a persistent,
continuing problem that make[s] it untenable to reunite V.L.B.
with him.

The district court also found that any further delay would nega tively impact the child by
preventing her forming an attachment to her caregivers. In addition, the guardian ad litem,
who the court found to be credible, testified that he believed it was in the child’s best
interests to remain in the custody of her foster parents because father was unable to provide

16
her with a safe and stable home free from chemical use. Accord ingly, the district court
found that father was not a suitable caregiver for the child, would not be for the foreseeable
future, and determined that termination of father’s parental rights was in the best interests
of the child.
Without question, the child and father shared a strong bond. We note the evidence
of attachment between father and child, particularly during the supervised visits. But there
also was a significant amount of testimony and evidence support ing the district court’s
conclusion that termination of father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests. The
district court found testimony from the social workers, the guardian ad litem, and father’s
mother to be credible. Each of these witnesses noted concerns about father’s struggles with
sobriety. Testimony from the Wright County social worker indicated that father was often
difficult to communicate with, and evidence from various treatment programs documented
father’s struggles with participating in and completing treatment.
The district court is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses, and we
give great deference to the district court’s determination. In re Welfare of L.A.F. , 554
N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. 1996). The district court’s determinati on that termination of
father’s parental rights was in the best interests of the child was supported by evidence in
the record and accordingly was not an abuse of discretion.
Accordingly, because the district court did not err by determi ning that reasonable
efforts were made to reunite fat her with his child and because the district court did not

17
abuse its discretion by finding that termination of father’s parental rights was in the child’s
best interests, we affirm the district court’s termination of father’s parental rights to V.L.B.
Affirmed.